Oliver v. Ameris Bank et al

Filing 76

ORDER vacating 54 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS; denying 41 Motion to Strike and 58 MOTION to Stay; denying 42 MOTION to Stay; withdrawing 19 MOTION for Service and 39 MOTION to Change Venue. Signed by Magistrate Judge Christopher L. Ray on 07/16/2021. (jlh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
ANTHONY OLIVER,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERIS BANK,
CHEX SYSTEMS, INC.,
EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., and
EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendants.

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CV420-273

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Quintessential to childhood are afternoons spent playing the
boardgame Monopoly, which inevitably involves a player drawing the
Community Chest card “Bank Error in Your Favor, Collect $200.” A
pleasant windfall on a lazy childhood afternoon, however, has become a
federal case in Oliver’s practiced hands. In doing so, he has continued
the abusive practices for which he has become well known to this Court.
Litigation is not a game and the Court remains unamused by Oliver’s
antics and conduct. It must now set itself to resolve a litany of pending
motions and determine whether the filing restrictions previously

imposed on Oliver must be reimposed and if greater restrictions are
warranted.
BACKGROUND
A brief recitation of the procedural history of this case and Oliver’s
broader litigation history is necessary for context. Oliver has filed dozens
of cases before the federal courts and has been repeatedly recognized as
a vexatious litigant. Oliver v. City of Pooler, et al., CV4:18-100, doc. 59
(S.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2019) (recognizing Oliver as a vexatious litigant); see
also Oliver v. Luner, CV2:18-2562, doc. 99 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2018);
California

Courts,

List

of

Vexatious

Litigants,

available

at

https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/vexlit.pdf (last visited July 1, 2021)
(list of litigants deemed vexatious by the California courts containing
Oliver’s name).

His abusive practices have resulted in this Court

imposing restrictions on his ability to bring new cases, including the
requirement that he post a $1,000 contempt bond. See Oliver v. Lyft, Inc.,
CV4:19-063, doc. 115 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2019) (Order) adopting doc. 113
(S.D. Ga. Sep. 13, 2019) (Report and Recommendation); Oliver v. Lyft,
Inc., CV4:19-125, doc. 56 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2019) (Order) adopting doc.
54 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 13, 2019) (Report and Recommendation).

After the Court initially restricted his filing, Oliver was
incarcerated.

Lacking the ability to earn income during his

incarceration, Oliver filed a motion to rescind the bond requirement,
alleging that it effectively barred his access to the Court.1 Doc. 22. The
undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation, recommending that
the contempt bond be suspended during the pendency of Oliver’s
incarceration, finding the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (PLRA), to be an adequate
deterrent to his prior vexatious conduct. Doc. 23. The only objection to
the recommendation was filed by Ameris, which sought to ensure that
Oliver would be subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in
cases removed from state court.2 Doc. 37. The Court adopted the Report
and Recommendation and suspended the contempt bond for cases

This motion was originally filed in two closed cases. Oliver v. Lyft, CV 419-063, 131
(S.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2020); Oliver v. Lyft, Inc., CV4:19-125, do. 71 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 10,
2020). As it would have no effect in the cases in which it was filed, the Court construed
the motion to request relief in Oliver’s then-pending cases. Doc. 23 at 3.
1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) bars an incarcerated plaintiff from bringing a case in forma
pauperis when he has previously, “on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States
that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
2

brought during Oliver’s incarceration in which he proceeds in forma
pauperis. Doc. 48 at 2. In all other cases, plaintiff is required to request
a waiver of the contempt bond, supported by a sworn affidavit of his
indigency. Id. at 2–3. The Court construed Ameris’ objection as a request
for clarification and refrained from resolving the question, expressly
noting that it understood Oliver to not have accumulated prior strikes
under § 1915(g). See doc. 48.
When plaintiff failed to move for waiver of the contempt bond
within sixty days of the Court’s Order, the undersigned entered a second
Report and Recommendation, recommending that the case be dismissed.
Doc. 54.

After the period for objections to the Report and

Recommendation had closed, Oliver filed a motion for either a stay of the
case or 45-day extension of an undefined deadline in order to obtain and
submit his inmate trust account statement and affidavit required to
support his waiver request. Doc. 58. An affidavit requesting waiver and
the prisoner trust account statement were received by the Court the
following day.3 Doc. 59; doc. 60. Oliver later filed an untimely objection

As the prisoner trust account statement and affidavit of indigency have been received,
Oliver’s motion to stay or for an extension of time is DENIED as moot. Doc. 58.
3

to the Report and Recommendation, in which he claimed that his
considerable delay in filing the affidavit and prisoner trust account was
due to being placed in quarantine after testing positive for COVID-19.4
Doc. 64.

On May 26, 2021, more than four months after the Court

amended the filing restrictions, Oliver filed a motion requesting the
waiver of the contempt bond. Doc. 70.
Oliver, while incarcerated, filed his original Complaint in the
Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia. Doc. 4 at 17–24. While the
case was pending before the state court, plaintiff filed at least one
Amended Complaint. Id. at 66–80. On November 5, 2020, the case was
removed to this Court by Experian Information Solutions, Inc.
(Experian). Doc. 1. Since the case was removed, defendants Geovista
Credit Union (Geovista) and TransUnion, LLC (TransUnion) have
reached settlement with Oliver and have been voluntarily dismissed.
Doc. 45 (Order); see also doc. 29 (Stipulation of Dismissal); doc. 49 (Order)
adopting doc. 46 (Stipulation of Dismissal). Stipulations of dismissal

As Oliver has filed the necessary documents, the Court VACATES its March 15,
2021, Report and Recommendation. Doc. 54.
4

have also been filed for Experian and Chex Systems, Inc. (Chex). Doc. 53
& 55.
Defendant Ameris Bank (Ameris) filed two motions to dismiss
based on Oliver’s failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted
and, alternatively, for failure to perfect service. Doc. 10 & 30. Following
Oliver providing proof of service, these motions were withdrawn. Doc.
33. Oliver subsequently filed a motion to strike one of the motions to
dismiss and a motion for sanctions against Ameris, its counsel, and its
employee,

alleging

that

the

motion

to

dismiss

constituted

a

misrepresentation to the Court. Doc. 41 & 66. He also filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of his claims against Ameris. Doc. 74.
DISCUSSION
I.

Pending Motions
A. Motion to strike responsive pleadings and for entry of
default judgment
On November 12, 2020, Ameris filed a motion to dismiss the claims

asserted against it on the basis that plaintiff’s pleadings fail to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. Doc. 10. The motion noted that,
though the 90-day period for service had not then elapsed since removal,

plaintiff had yet to effect service and that such deficiency, if not corrected,
would provide an alternative ground for dismissal. Id. at 1 & 9. On
December 4, 2020, Ameris filed a renewed motion to dismiss, alleging as
the primary ground for dismissal plaintiff’s failure to serve the
Complaint when originally filed before the Chatham County Superior
Court. Doc. 30. On December 8, 2020, in response to the motions to
dismiss, plaintiff provided a copy of a proof of service executed by a
Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Deputy, evidencing that service was effected
on Ameris’ registered agent. Doc. 33 at 5 & 9. One week later, Ameris
withdrew its motions to dismiss. Doc. 38. After the withdrawal, plaintiff
filed a motion to strike Ameris’ pleadings and for entry of a default
judgment, alleging that Ameris’ claim that service was not perfected was
fraudulent and perjurious. Doc. 41.
Plaintiff’s motion mixes and conflates multiple theories of relief.
The motion to strike travels under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f),
which allows the Court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added).

Pleadings are limited to: “(1) a

complaint; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim

designated as a counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a thirdparty complaint; (6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the
court orders one, a reply to an answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). The motion
is ambiguous as to what filing plaintiff seeks to have stricken. Though it
is titled “motion to strike defendant Ameris Bank’s response pleading,” it
expressly states that “the Court should strike the declaration of John
Exum.” Doc. 41 at 1 & 3. As the objected-to statements are included in
Ameris’ motions to dismiss, and not its Answer, the Court must presume
that plaintiff seeks to have the motion to dismiss and supporting
declaration stricken. Neither of these filings qualifies as a “pleading” as
defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a), so Rule 12(f) does not
apply. See, e.g., Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir.
2018) (“[A] motion for summary judgment is no ‘pleading’ and, thus, may
not be attacked by a motion to strike under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).” (citation
omitted)); Reed v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 735 F. App'x 192, 197 (6th Cir.
2018) (observing that affidavits “are not pleadings subject to motions to
strike under Rule 12(f)”). Furthermore, as plaintiff has withdrawn the
motions, the motion to strike is moot. Doc. 38. Therefore, to the extent

that plaintiff seeks to have plaintiff’s motions to dismiss stricken, the
motion is DENIED. Doc. 41.
B. Motion for service and motion to transfer venue
Plaintiff has filed a motion for service of his pleadings on
defendants by the United States Marshals Service. Doc. 19. He has also
filed a motion seeking the transfer of this case to the Middle District of
Georgia. Doc. 39. He subsequently filed multiple notices of withdrawal
of both motions.

Doc. 63; doc. 69; doc. 73.

The motions are

WITHDRAWN and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE
the motions. Doc. 19; doc. 39.
C. Motions to amend
Plaintiff has sought to amend his Complaint multiple times. The
First Amended Complaint was filed on November 20, 2020, shortly after
the case was removed to this Court. Doc. 18. This constituted the single
amendment permitted as a matter of course under the Federal Rules and
did not require leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Less than a
month later, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. Doc. 40. Thereafter, he filed a motion to withdraw his First
Amended Complaint and requested leave to file an Amended First

Amended Complaint. Doc. 52. The Court is obligated to freely give leave
to amend when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, as
this case will be resolved through the Court’s recommended sanctions or
Oliver’s attempted dismissal, the pending motions to amend should be
DENIED as moot. Doc. 40; doc. 52.
D. Motion to stay
Ameris, Chex, and Experian filed a motion to stay this case pending
resolution of whether plaintiff is required to post a contempt bond. Doc.
42. Plaintiff filed a response, objecting to the stay. Doc. 47. As the
matter of plaintiff’s contempt bond is resolved in this Order and Report
and Recommendation, the motion is DENIED as moot. Doc. 42.
II.

Filing Restrictions
Oliver has filed a motion seeking to vacate his pre-filing conditions

and contempt bond. Doc. 70. The Court construes this as a motion to
waive the contempt bond in accordance with its prior Order. See doc. 48
(permitting waiver of the contempt bond during Oliver’s incarceration).
He has previously filed with the Court an affidavit of indigency and his
prisoner trust account statement. Doc. 59; doc. 60. Ameris has raised
questions regarding the accuracy of the financial picture presented by

Oliver’s filings.

Doc. 62 at 3–4.

The Court need not wade into an

accounting analysis as Oliver’s continued abusive conduct in this
litigation evidences not only the need for the bond requirement to remain
in place but also for more significant steps.
Oliver’s recent filings in this case are a reiteration of the tactics that
he has previously used to harass opposing parties in prior cases. This
includes the filing of frivolous motions for sanctions, disqualifications,
and the striking of pleadings. Compare docs. 41 (Motion to Strike) & 66
(Motion for Sanctions), with Oliver v. Lyft, Inc., CV4:19-063, doc. 73 (S.D.
Ga. Feb. 25, 2019) (motion seeking the disqualification and sanction of
defense counsel for seeking a “tactical advantage” in contacting Oliver’s
potential witnesses); Oliver v. Lyft, Inc., CV4:19-063, doc. 59 (S.D. Ga.
Feb. 13, 2019) (motion for sanctions against counsel for filing a motion to
transfer that was ultimately granted); Oliver v. Cnty. Of Chatham, et al.,
CV4:17-101, doc. 64 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 25, 2017) (motion for sanctions for
defendants seeking to have Oliver deemed a vexatious litigant); Oliver v.
Cnty. Of Chatham, et al., CV4:17-101, doc. 35 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 27, 2017)
(motion for sanctions alleging that defendants failed to mail copies of
pleadings to Oliver); Oliver v. Lyft., Inc., CV3:18cv7166, doc. 73 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 25, 2019) (motions for sanctions and to disqualify counsel for contact
non-party potential witnesses); Oliver v. Luner, et al., CV 2:18-2562, doc.
81 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2018) (motion for sanctions against defendant for
allegedly filing a fabricated letter), denied doc. 88 at 16–17 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 3, 2018); Luner, CV2:18-2562, doc. 81 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2018)
(motion for sanctions alleging that defendants filed falsified documents
offered in support of a motion to dismiss and challenging defendants’
characterization of plaintiff as a vexatious litigant); Oliver v. Oceanside,
et al, CV3:16-565, doc. 38 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2016) (motion to disqualify
city attorney and city attorney’s office for alleged fraud and perjury);
Oliver v. CMRE Fin. Servs., Inc., CV2:15-8174, doc. 12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2015) (motion to disqualify counsel alleging a conflict of interest and
violation of discovery rules). The Court is unaware of any instance in
which his prior filing of such motions resulted in the relief Oliver
requested.

Rather, they have been universally recognized as

inappropriate and abusive. See, e.g, Luner, CV 2:18-2562, doc. 99 at 1–2
(C.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2018) (order) (citing Oliver’s “abuse of Defendant and
Defendant’s counsel throughout this litigation, as well as [his] history of
filing baseless lawsuits in federal and state court” as grounds for

directing him to show cause why he should not be deemed a vexatious
litigant). This Court has previously imposed sanctions upon Oliver for
similar conduct.5 See Cnty. Of Chatham, CV4:17-101, doc. 188 (S.D. Ga.
Mar. 27, 2018) (requiring Oliver to include a certification with and
statement of specific support fact with any allegation of fraud or
misconduct raised against opposing counsel).

Despite this, plaintiff

persists in his vexatious and abusive tendencies.
Oliver also routinely files partial voluntary dismissals of his claims.
See Oliver v. City of Pooler, et al., CV4:18-100, doc. 53 at 6 (S.D. Ga. Jan.
29, 2019) (admonishing Oliver for pattern of partial dismissals); Oliver v.
Cnty. of Effingham, CV4:18-120, doc. 58 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2019) (same);
In some instances, the dismissals appear to be a transparent effort to
avoid the negative consequences of his misconduct or to coerce conduct
from an opposing party. See, e.g., Oliver v. Lyft, Inc., CV4:19-063, doc.
114 (S.D. Ga. Sep. 25, 2019) (notice of voluntary dismissal filed shortly
after the Court recommended that filing restrictions be imposed); Cnty.

This did not deter Oliver’s behavior, as he was subsequently sanctioned for not
abiding by the imposed requirements. Oliver v. Cnty. of Chatham, et al., CV4:17-101,
doc. 220 (S.D. Ga. May 31, 2018) (dismissing case for failure to comply with the Court’s
sanctions).
5

of Chatham, CV4:17-101, doc. 50 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 2017) (notice
dismissing a party in their individual capacity but refusing to dismiss
them in their official capacity until they produce requested recordings).
In multiple instances, he has subsequently attempted to withdraw the
notice of dismissal. See, e.g., Cnty. of Effingham, CV4:18-120, doc. 47
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2018) (motion to unilaterally withdraw a stipulated
dismissal). In one particularly egregious case, Oliver filed a notice of
withdraw of his voluntary dismissal more than six months after the case
was closed. Oliver v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., CV4:20-140, doc. 19
(S.D. Ga. Jul. 8, 2021) (notice of withdrawal of notice of dismissal). This
practice serves little purpose beyond frustration. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Cox Comm. Georgia, LLC, CV4:16-255, doc. 21, (S.D. Ga. Jan 9, 2017)
(order to show cause issued after Oliver voluntarily dismissed his
individual claims against all defendants directing co-defendant to notify
the Court what claims, if any, remain).
At his request, the Court reconsidered the appropriateness and
necessity of his filing restrictions during his period of incarceration.
Believing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321-71, and its prior warnings to be an adequate deterrent, it

acceded to the request.

Rather than taking this opportunity to

demonstrate his ability to litigate this case responsibly, Oliver has
merely returned to his old patterns. Only four months after the Court
loosened its restrictions, Oliver filed his motion seeking to sanction
Ameris for an illusory motion that was never filed. Doc. 66. He later
filed a notice seeking to dismiss his remaining claims.6 Doc. 74. He has
once again abused the resources and patience of this Court and now seeks
to walk away, apparently, to avoid the consequences of his behavior.
It also appears that Oliver has actively tried to deceive the Court.
In accusing his opposing parties and counsel of misconduct, Oliver has
routinely stated that the “[d]uty of candor . . . [is] essential to preserving
the public confidence in our system of justice.” Doc. 66 at 2; see also
Chatham Cnty., CV4:17-101, doc. 35 at 4 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 27, 2017) (motion
for sanctions) (“Duty of candor, these three words are essential to
preserving the public confidence in our system of justice.”); Lyft, Inc., CV

The Court will not rule on Oliver’s notice of dismissal at this time; however, on
cursory review it appears deficient. Four defendants remain in this case—Ameris,
Chex, Experian, and Equifax. As two of these defendants have filed Answers—
Experian, doc. 6, and Ameris, doc. 35—the notice of dismissal must include a
stipulation of dismissal signed by at least these those parties, if not all remaining
defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). To date, only Ameris has provided a
stipulation of dismissal. Doc. 74.
6

3:18-7166, doc. 59 at 4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13 2018) (motion for sanctions)
(same). It is now clear that these lofty proclamations lacked personal
conviction, as Oliver has not been forthcoming with this Court.
In issuing the Order that amended Oliver’s filing restrictions, the
Court expressly noted that it was not necessary to determine if the
limitations 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) would serve as a bar to cases removed
from state courts, like the instant matter, because the Court understood
Oliver to have not accumulated three prior qualifying dismissals. Doc 48
at 2. Since the issuance of that Order, the Court has identified four cases
that qualify as strikes under § 1915(g): Oliver v. Gore, et al., CV3:09-2505
(S.D. Cal. May 12, 2010); Oliver v. Reays Ranch Investors, et al., CV4:10158 (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2010); Oliver v. Sloane, et al., CV4:10-169 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 24, 2010); and Oliver v. Monson, CV0:10-4218 (D. Minn. Jan. 3,
2011). The Court is also confident that Oliver was aware of his status
under § 1915(g) at the time of the Court’s Order but took no steps to
correct the record.
In Oliver v. Gore, Oliver, while incarcerated at Donovan State
Prison in San Diego, California, brought a civil suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against various prison employees alleging excessive force, denial

of equal protection, and denial of adequate medical care during his
incarceration.

Gore, CV3:09-2505, doc. 1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2009)

(Complaint); Gore, CV3:09-2505, doc 15 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (Second
Amended Compliant). The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim
on which relief could be granted. Gore, CV3:09-2505, doc 19 (S.D. Cal.
May 11, 2010) (Order Dismissing). In dismissing the case, the court
expressly found that the dismissal constituted a strike under § 1915(g).
Id.
While incarcerated in California, Oliver filed two cases in the
District of Arizona. In Oliver v. Reays Ranch Investors, he brought a
§ 1983 suit against a former employer that accused him of stealing and
terminated his employment. Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc. 1 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 15, 2010) (Complaint); Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc.
21 (D. Ariz. Jun. 28, 2010) (Second Amended Complaint). Claiming
indigency due to his incarceration, he was permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis. Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc. 2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 15, 2010)
(IFP Motion noting incarceration status); Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10158, doc. 17 (D. Ariz. Jun. 2, 2010) (Order Granting IFP). The complaint
was dismissed for failure to state a claim as the named defendants were

not subject to suit under § 1983, which creates liability only for stateactors. Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc. 22 (D. Ariz. Jul. 19, 2010)
(Order Dismissing). The dismissal order and judgment noted that the
dismissal may constitute a strike under § 1915(g). Id.; Reays Ranch
Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc. 22 (D. Ariz. Jun. 28, 2010).
Similarly, in Oliver v. Sloane, Oliver brought a § 1983 suit against
a different former employer, alleging that the employer took possession
and disposed of his property following his arrest. Sloane, CV4:10-169,
doc. 1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2010) (Complaint); Sloane, CV4:10-169, doc. 15
(D. Ariz. May 28, 2010) (Second Amended Complaint). As in Oliver v.
Reays Ranch Investors, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted because § 1983 does not provide a
cause of action against non-state actors. Sloane, CV4:10-169, doc. 17 (D.
Ariz. Jun. 8, 2010) (Order Dismissing). The court’s order and judgment
again noted that the dismissal may qualify as a strike under § 1915(g).
Id.; Sloane, CV4:10-169, doc. 18 (D. Ariz. Jun. 8, 2010).
Following the dismissal of his California and Arizona cases, Oliver
turned his attention to the District of Minnesota. In Oliver v. Monson,
he alleged that following a domestic altercation with his then girlfriend

“Crystal,” he was arrested. Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 1 (D. Minn. Oct.
12, 2010) (Complaint). During the period in which he was in custody,
Crystal, her sister, and the sister’s boyfriend wrote several bad checks at
various businesses around Cambridge, Minnesota in Oliver’s name. Id.
Oliver brought what was characterized as a § 1983 civil rights suit
against twenty-four defendants allegedly connected to the check fraud
and his subsequent efforts to resolve the matter. Id. The complaint was
dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted, as he failed to identify a specific cause of action or conduct by
any defendant that might be viewed as a violation of a Constitutional or
statutory right. Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 8 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2010)
(Order Dismissing) adopting Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 4 (D. Minn. Nov.
3, 2010) (Report and Recommendation).

As with the California and

Arizona actions, the court expressly noted the relevance of the dismissal
under § 1915(g). Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 8 (D. Minn. Dec. 30, 2010)
(Order Dismissing); Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 9 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2011)
(Judgment).
Oliver is presumed to have knowledge of these dismissals as he was
a party to each case. Even if he did not appreciate the California and

Minnesota courts’ identification of strikes, his status under § 1915(g)
provided grounds for the dismissal of two cases within the previous two
years, including one that involved several overlapping claims and parties
with the instant matter. See Oliver v. Kemp, CV1:19-5014, doc. 6 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 12, 2019) (order dismissing complaint based on Oliver having
accumulated three-strikes under § 1915(g)); Oliver v. Chex Sys, Inc., et
al., CV3:20-030, doc. 12 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2020) (same). In one of these
cases, Oliver filed an objection acknowledging the prior dismissal and
objecting to his status as a three-striker. Chex Sys, Inc., et al., CV3:20030, doc. 11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2020) (objection to report and
recommendation). Oliver contested that he was the plaintiff in each of
the cited cases. Id. The Court overruled Oliver’s objection, noting its
“confiden[ce] that [he] has run afoul of the three strikes provision . . . .”
CV3:20-030, doc. 12 at 6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2020). A cursory review of
the pleadings in each case reveals that the Northern District’s confidence
was not misplaced.
In Oliver v. Monson, the plaintiff alleges that he moved to
Minnesota with his girlfriend “Crystal” and their two children where he
was arrested for an act of domestic violence. CV0:10-4218, doc. 1 at 10

(D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2010). This is consistent with the facts alleged in a
recent appeal filed by Oliver in the Georgia state courts. See Oliver v.
Field, 353 Ga. App. 891, 892, 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that Oliver
and “Crystal” “have two children together” and that he “followed
[Crystal] to Minnesota where additional acts of domestic violence were
committed”). The address and prisoner identification number provided
by the plaintiff in Oliver v. Monson is identical to that used by the
plaintiffs in the other cases. Compare Monson, CV0:10-4218, doc. 1 at 1
(D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2010) (providing prisoner number AA-9551 and a post
office box at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi,
California) with Gore, et al., CV3:09-2505, doc. 16 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
2010) (change of address providing same prisoner number and mailing
address); and Reays Ranch Inv’rs, CV4:10-158, doc. 13 (D. Ariz. May 13,
2010) (same) and Sloane, CV4:10-169, doc. 9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2010)
(same). The Court is confident that Oliver was the plaintiff is each of the
cited cases and has knowingly accumulated three-strikes under the
§ 1915(g).
The Court clearly stated in its January 15, 2021 Order, that
consideration of whether the instant case should be dismissed under §

1915(g) was unnecessary because it did not understand Oliver to have
accumulated three-strikes. Doc. 48 at 2. Oliver’s failure to correct this
misunderstanding is tantamount to deceiving the Court through
omission. Efforts to deceive or conceal information from the Court are
not tolerated and warrant the immediate dismissal of a complaint and
other sanction. Johnson v. Chisolm, 2011 WL 3319872 at *1 n. 3 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) (“This Court does not hesitate to invoke dismissal and
other sanctions against inmates who lie to or otherwise deceive this
Court.”); Morefield v. DuPree, 2008 WL 5100926, at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 3,
2008) (dismissing action without prejudice where petitioner abused the
judicial process by providing dishonest information about his prior filing
history); Gillilan v. Walker, 2007 WL 842020, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 15,
2007) (same). Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that this case be
DISMISSED with prejudice or, in the alternative, that Oliver’s motion
to waive the contempt bond be DENIED.
It is now clear that the Court’s optimistic hope that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act would provide an adequate deterrent for Oliver’s
abusive practices was misplaced. His return to form evidences the need
for a more severe sanction. See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069,

1073–74 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Federal courts have both the inherent power
and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from
conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”).
Oliver is clearly a vexatious litigant and his continued abuse of the
judicial system and opposing parties warrants the most extreme
condemnation and action. Therefore, the Court recommends that the
following sanctions be imposed in all pending and future civil cases filed
by Oliver in this district.7
1. The Clerk of Court shall open a miscellaneous file into which all of
Oliver’s future filings shall be collected. The presiding judge shall
review the filings. Only those complaints that allege a plausible
claim for relief will be approved for filing. All other cases will be
dismissed without any further judicial action after 30 days from the

The Court has imposed such restrictions on vexatious litigants in the past. See Drake
v. 7-Eleven, 2020 WL 4196189 (S.D. Ga. June 26, 2020) adopted by CV4:19-208, doc 9
(S.D. Ga. July 21, 2020); Drake v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co., 2020 WL 3452485
(S.D. Ga. May 27, 2020) adopted by CV4:20-099, doc. 11 (S.D. Ga. June 24, 2020); Oliver
v. Lyft. Inc., CV4:19-063, doc. 113 (S.D. Ga Oct. Sept. 13, 2019) adopted by Oliver v.
Lyft, 2019 WL 5390012 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2019); Williams v. Darden, 2016 WL 6139926
(S.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2016); Fields v. Terminal, 2016 WL 823020 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2016);
Hurt v. Zimmerman, CV415-260, doc. 3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2015); Robbins v. Universal
Music Grp., 2015 WL 171443 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2015); Finch-Grant v. Long, 2014 WL
3888124 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2014).

7

date the complaint was received by the Clerk, unless the Court
orders otherwise.
Thus, although the Court will read and consider any future
complaint that Oliver endeavors to file, it will not necessarily enter
an order addressing that complaint. If no order is forthcoming, then
30 days after the complaint's receipt, the Clerk shall, without
awaiting any further direction, notify Oliver that the case has been
dismissed without prejudice.

The Clerk shall not docket any

further motions or papers in that case except for a notice of appeal.
If a notice of appeal is filed, the Clerk shall forward a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, the Order adopting, the notice of
appeal, and the dismissed Complaint to the Court of Appeals.
2. To ensure that all of Oliver’s future pleadings are properly
consolidated for review, the Clerk shall personally advise each
deputy clerk of the Court's ruling in this case and develop a
procedure for ensuring that all of Oliver’s future complaints are
immediately assigned and forwarded to the presiding district judge
in this case, regardless of which divisional clerk's office received
and docketed the papers.

3. In any case approved for filing, Oliver must post a $1,000 contempt
bond with the Clerk of Court. The bond will be held by the Clerk of
Court and returned to Oliver at the conclusion of the case, if he
conducts his affairs appropriately.

During the period of his

incarceration, Oliver is also subject to the provisions and
restrictions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321-71;
4. Oliver may file a motion to modify or rescind the order imposing
these restrictions no earlier than two years from the date of its
entry;
5. These filing restrictions do not apply to any criminal case in which
Oliver is named as a defendant, or to any proper application for a
writ of habeas corpus.
6. A copy of the order imposing these restrictions shall be forwarded
to each judicial officer in this District.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court VACATES its Report and Recommendation
of March 15, 2021. Doc. 54. Oliver’s motion to strike, doc. 41 and motion
to stay, doc 58, are DENIED. Defendants’ motion to stay is DENIED.

Doc. 42.

Oliver’s motions for service by the United States Marshal

Service and to transfer venue are deemed WITHDRAWN. Docs. 19 &
39. The Court RECOMMENDS that Oliver’s motions to amend, docs.
40 & 52, and motion for waiver of his contempt bond, doc. 70, be
DENIED. It further RECOMMENDS that this case be DISMISSED
and the above described restrictions be imposed as a sanction for Oliver’s
persistent abusive conduct.
This report and recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district
judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
this Court’s Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may
file written objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all
parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations.” Any request for additional time
to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the
assigned district judge.
After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The
district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of
rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp.,
648 F. App’x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F.
App’x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of July,
2021.
__
___________________________
_______________________________
____ ____ __________
_
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY
CHRI TOP
CHR STOPHER
Y
UNITED STATES MAGISTR
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
T
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA