Montgomery v. Classification et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice. This case stands closed. Signed by Judge Dudley H. Bowen on 8/1/2022. (pts)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COXmT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
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RUBIN MONTGOMERY,

Plaintiff,
•k

V.

*

CV 422-014

k

CLASSIFICATION and CHATHAM

*

COUNTY DETENTION CENTER,^

*
k

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Plaintiff

filed

this

County Detention Center.

lawsuit

while

housed

at

the

(Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 3.)

Chatham

Plaintiff

is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this case
brought

under

status).)

42

Because

U.S.C.

§

1983.

(Doc.

he is proceeding IFP,

No.

3

(granting

IFP

Plaintiff's pleadings

must be screened to protect potential defendants.

Phillips v.

Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Al-Amin
V. Donald, 165 F. App'x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.

A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a more

lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but the Court may dismiss the
Complaint or any portion thereof if it is frivolous, malicious.

^ The Clerk's Office erroneously docketed this case listing two defendants even

though the Complaint clearly indicates he is suing one defendant - "Chatham
County Detention Center-Classification."
Nevertheless, for
thoroughness, the Court will discuss "both" defendants herein.

the

sake

of

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it
seeks monetary relief from
relief.

a

defendant

such

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

I.

Plaintiff

2020.

who is immune to

was

BACKGROUND

removed from

(Doc. No. 1, at 5.)

explanation for the removal.

protective

custody in

December

He complains that he was given no
(Id.)

Plaintiff later reported that

several doors in his new dorm could be opened by the inmates, and
he suspects that the other inmates found out he made that report.
(Id.)

Afterwards,

he

heard

remarks

that

sounded

threatening.

Plaintiff sent a grievance stating that he felt unsafe, but when

the

officials

attempted

to

separate

the

accused

threatening

inmate, the wrong person was removed from his dorm.

(Id.)

He

suspects the inmate in question has ^'deep ties" in the city of
Savannah and, after evading prison officials, spread rumors within
their dorm that Plaintiff is a snitch.

(Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff

continued to notice looks and overhear words that made him feel

uncomfortable.
refused

causing

to

him

He complained again on November 17, 2021, but he

report

to

the

feel

specific

unsafe.

names

He

of

individuals

eventually

who

disclosed

were

the

individuals' room numbers, and the officials "put separations on
them." (Id.)

Plaintiff additionally complains about the conditions of his
current dorm, including criticisms of the commissary, food, clean

up

procedures,

recreation limitations,

and

safety issues.

vaguely describes incidents of others being assaulted.
7.)

He

notes that he

has been denied

profiled for due to arthritis.
putting

something

nefarious

(Id.)
in

his

He

(Id. at

his cane, which

he

was

He suspects that someone is
food.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

complains that even though there is room in another "'bubble,'' the
classification officials refuse to place him there.
On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff drafted a letter informing the
Court that he had been released from jail.

letter on April 1, 2022.
April 26, 2022.

The Clerk docketed the

(Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff followed up on

(Doc. No. 8.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune to such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A claim is

frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (1989).

"Failure to state a claim under §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for
failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."

Wilkerson

V. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell

V. Farcass, 112 F.Sd 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must ''state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
V.

Twombly,

550

U.S.

544,

570

(2007).

"A

Bell Atl. Corp.

claim

has

facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw

the

reasonable

inference

liable for the misconduct alleged."
662, 678 (2009).

that the

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
U.S. at 555.

defendant is

Twombly, 550

While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than
an

unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

accusation."

A complaint is insufficient if it "offers

'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action,'" or if it "tenders 'naked assertions' devoid

of 'further factual enhancement.'"

at 555, 557).

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

In short, the complaint must provide a "'plain

statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is

entitled to relief.'"

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Finally, courts afford a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than
those drafted by an attorney.

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction
does not mean that courts have a duty to re-write the complaint.
Snow V. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. DISCUSSION

In

his

Detention

Complaint,

Plaintiff

Center-Classification"

named

as

the

the

"Chatham

Defendant.

The

County
Clerk

construed this as two individual defendants, but in any event,

neither are appropriately named.

The Chatham County Detention

Center is not an entity subject to suit.

See Johnson v. Benton,

2021 WL 6750967, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2021) (citing Jamelson
V. Unnamed Defendant, 2017 WL 6503630, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 19,

2017)); see also Brannon v. Thomas Cnty. Jail, 280 F. App'x 930,
934 n.l (11th Cir. 2008) (noting Thomas County Jail is not entity
capable of being sued under Georgia law).

Nor is "Classification"

(see doc. no. 1, at 4) an appropriate party.

Appropriate parties

for suit under Section 1983 include "persons" who participated in

the alleged violation.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting only

"persons" to liability).
Moreover, amendment to state an appropriate defendant would

be futile.

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir.

2007) ("Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as
amended would still be properly dismissed . . . .").

To state a

Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must at least allege some violation

of the Constitution.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (making it unlawful for a

state actor to deprive persons of ^^any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").

than

allege

a

constitutional

violation.

Here, rather

Plaintiff

requests

compensation for the mental anguish which accompanied his prison
stay.

(Doc. No. 1, at 9.)
However, even if prison conditions are ''restrictive and even

harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim of unlawful

prison conditions, a prisoner "must show that a condition of his
confinement pose[s] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his
future health or safety." Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289

(11th Cir. 2004).

The prisoner must also show that the defendant

prison officials subjectively acted with "deliberate indifference"
with

regard to the conditions at issue.

Id.

Conditions are

objectively serious or extreme if they amount to deprivation of
"minimal civilized

measure of life's

necessities" or "the

basic

human needs." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
It

is

doubtful

whether

unreasonable risk of harm.

Plaintiff

has

stated

a

claim

of

He does not describe specific threats

or explicitly name incidents of specific risk, but rather suggests
that

there

Moreover,

was
though

an
he

atmosphere
lists

of

some

danger

within

criticisms

the

regarding

prison.
food.

sanitation,

recreation,

and

his

need

for

a

cane,

these

unsubstantiated claims do not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.

''[T]he

Constitution

does

prisons." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.

not

mandate

comfortable

Generally speaking, prison

conditions rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation only
when they ""involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain."
Id.

Next,

Plaintiff

deliberately

has

indifferent.

not

alleged

Plaintiff

that

any

indicated

official

that

officers

attempted to transfer problematic inmates out of the cell.
Plaintiff

believes

that

an

inmate

has

evaded

detection

was

Though

of those

officials, this allegation does not state a claim against any state

actor.

Ultimately, an official may escape liability for known

risks ""if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm

ultimately was not averted." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844
(1994).

Moreover,

to the extent Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants

failed to protect him from a serious risk of prisoner violence in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, this claim also fails.
asserting

a

failure-to-protect

claim,

a

prisoner

must

In

advance

factual allegations sufficient to support the inference that the
responsible prison official intended that he be harmed or was at
least consciously indifferent to the prisoner's safety.
511 U.S. at 834; Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289.

7

Farmer,

Plaintiff does not

provide any facts suggesting such an inference should be made.
C.f. ^ Jones V. St. Lawrence, 2008 WL 5142396, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Dec.

5, 2008) (collecting failure to protect cases and holding that
where an official ""incited" inmates to harm plaintiff, ""knowing"
the action would harm him, the plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment
claim).

Finally,

inmates

have

no

protected

particular custody classification.

liberty interest in

a

See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

215, 223-25, (1976) (explaining that ""[c]onfinement in any of the
State's

institutions

is

within

the

normal

limits

or

range

of

custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose");
Moody V. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) (noting that Congress

has given prison officials full discretion to control conditions
of confinement, including prisoner classification). Consequently,

prison officials may assign inmates to any security classification
level they choose without necessarily violating any constitutional
right of the inmates.

See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983);

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)
modified on other grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481
(1995); see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994)

(in the context of a claim based on

a custody classification,

holding that the U.S. Constitution affords no liberty interest in
a prisoner's custody classification).
to

allege

facts

consistent

with

a

Given that Plaintiff failed
constitutional

violation.

amendment of his Complaint would be futile.

His Complaint is

properly dismissed instead.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this

case.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this

/.MA

day
X
of August,

2022.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE