Presley v. City of Blackshear et al
Filing
114
ORDER granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/31/08. (slt)
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia Waycross Division
BRENDA and the as PRESLEY, the Individually, of : : CIVIL ACTION
Administratrix of Antonio
Estate
Presley,
decedent,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY
OF
BLACKSHEAR, DEPARTMENT, POLICE
BLACKSHEAR FORMER MOCK,
POLICE CHIEF
OF
JAMES in
Individually Official former City of
and
his the of the
Capacity of
as
Chief
Police
Blackshear, Individually
LT. and
GEORGE in the
SMILEY, his
Official
Capacity
for
Blackshear OFFICER
Police K.
Department, EVANS, his the
GREGORY
Individually Official
and
in
Capacity Police
for
Blackshear OFFICER
Department, W. CARTER,
CHRISTOPHER and in
Individually Official
his the
Capacity Police
for
Blackshear PIERCE
Department, COUNTY SHERIFF and
COUNTY,
PIERCE
SHERIFF'S RICHARD in his
DEPARTMENT,
KING,
Individually Capacity County DET. as
Official of
Sheriff
Pierce
Sheriff's JOHN
Department, BENNETT, and in
RAMSEY
Individually Official Pierce
his the
Capacity
for
County
Sheriff's LEE his HUNT,
Department,
RAYMOND and in
Individually
Official Pierce County DAPHNE and for in the
Capacity
for
the
County
Jail,
Pierce
Sheriff's G. her VAN,
Department,
Individually Capacity Jail,
Official
Pierce County
County
Pierce
Sheriff's COUNTY
Department, EMERGENCY DIRECTOR THE
PIERCE
MEDICAL KENNETH COUNTY
SERVICES, L. JUSTICE OF
PIERCE
EMERGENCY
MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT, and in his the Pierce
Individually Official Director County
Capacity of the
as
of
the
Emergency
Medical DAVID and for in the
Services, FARRIOR, his
PARAMEDIC
Individually Capacity
Official County
Pierce Medical ALFRED
Emergency PARAMEDIC
Services, DAVIS, and
KENT
Individually Official Pierce Medical
in
his the
Capacity
for
County
Emergency EMTANDREAE, her the
Services, LORNE and
INTERMEDIATE Individually Official Pierce Medical 10,
in
Capacity
for
County
Emergency JOHN and DOES in 1
Services,
Individually
the
Official of
Capacities
for
City
Blackshear,
Blackshear Pierce
Police County,
Department, Pierce
County Pierce
Sheriff's County
Department,
Emergency
Medical
Services,
Defendants.
NO.
CV507-094
2
ORDER
Plaintiff
Brenda
Presley,
individually
and
as
the
Administratrix
of
the
Estate
of
Antonio
Presley,
Decedent,
filed
the
above-captioned
case
against
Defendants,
asserting
claims
for
denial
of
essential
medical
care,
under
42
U.5.C.
§
1983,
and
state-law
claims
for
medical
malpractice
and
negligence.
Presently
before
the
Court
is
Defendants'
motion
for
summary
judgment.
For
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
Defendants'
motion
will
be
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I.
The
Parties
Plaintiff
is
a
resident
of
Blackshear
in
Pierce
County
Georgia.
5he
is
the
Decedent's
mother
and
the
administratrix
of
Decedent's
estate.
Defendant
City
of
Blackshear
is
a
political
subdivision
of
the
5tate
of
Georgia
located
in
Pierce
County,
Georgia.
Defendant
Blackshear
Police
Department
is
an
entity
of
the
City
of
Blackshear.
Defendant
James
Mock
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
the
Chief
of
Police
for
the
City
of
3
Blackshear.
Defendant
George
Smiley
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
a
Lieutenant
with
the
Blackshear
Police
Department
and
was
the
head
of
the
Department's
Patrol
and
Training
Division.
Defendants
Gregory
Evans
and
Christopher
Carter
were
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
police
officers
with
the
Blackshear
Police
Department.
Defendant
Pierce
County
is
a
political
subdivision
of
the
State
of
Georgia.
Defendant
Pierce
County
Sheriff's
Department
is
an
entity
of
Pierce
County.
Defendant
Richard
King
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
the
Sheriff
of
Pierce
County.
Defendant
John
Ramsey
Bennett
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
an
employee
of
Sheriff
King.
1
Defendants
Raymond
Lee
Hunt
and
Daphne
G.
Van
were
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
jailers
at
the
Pierce
County
jail.
Defendant
Pierce
County
Emergency
Medical
Services
("Pierce
County
EMS")
is
a
recognized
legal
entity
located
in
Pierce
County,
Georgia.
Defendant
Kenneth
L.
Justice
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
the
department
head
in
charge
1 was
In
her
complaint,
Plaintiff to as
asserts case
that
Defendant by the
Bennett Pierce
at
all
times
relevant
this a
employed
County ¶ 20.
Sheriff's In their
Department
detective/investigator. deny this allegation, Answer
Complaint but by admit
answer, "an ¶
Defendants of
that
Bennett
was
employee
Sheriff
King."
Pierce
County
Defendants
20.
4
of
Pierce
County
EMS. 2
Defendants
David
Farrior
and
Alfred
Kent
Davis
were
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
paramedics
with
Pierce
County
EMS.
Defendant
Lorne
Andreae
was
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
either
a
paramedic
or
an
emergency
medical
technician
with
Pierce
County
EMS.
3
Defendants
John
Does
1-10
were
at
all
times
relevant
to
this
case
employed
by
the
City
of
Blackshear,
the
Blackshear
Police
Department,
Pierce
County,
the
Pierce
County
Sheriff's
Department,
or
Pierce
County
EMS.
II.
Decedent's
Detention
and
Death
The
evidence
shows
that,
on
November
30,
2005,
Decedent
was
stopped
by
Defendant
Evans,
an
officer
with
the
Blackshear
Police
Department,
as
he
walked
down
Youmans
Street
in
Blackshear,
Georgia.
Defendants'
Statement
of
Undisputed
2 Plaintiff Pierce admit County
asserts EMS.
that
Defendant ¶ 28.
Justice
is
the
Director this,
of
Complaint Justice but that is
Defendants
deny in
but of
that
Defendant EMS,
the
"department County
head
charge"
Pierce
County to ¶
"the
Commission by
retains
the
authority Defendants
review
his
decisions." also admit
Answer that
Pierce
County is and
26. for
Defendants "hiring,
Defendant
Justice
responsible
training,
supervision,
termination,
conduct of persons employed by" Pierce County EMS, "though his role remains Pierce subject to review ¶ by 29. the County Commission." Answer by
County
Defendants
3 Plaintiff Pierce however, County and
asserts EMS.
that
Defendant ¶ is
Andreae
is
a
paramedic deny
with
Complaint Andreae
35.
Defendants an
this, medical
assert Answer
that by
instead
emergency ¶ 35.
technician.
Pierce
County
Defendants
5
Material
Facts
¶¶
3,
5.
According
to
Officer
Evans,
he
initially
stopped
Decedent
to
investigate
a
warrant
which
he
believed
to
be
still
active,
related
to
a
prior
Georgia
Bureau
of
Investigation
drug
roundup.
Id.
¶
6.
However,
Defendants
admit
that,
at
the
time
of
the
stop-and,
according
to
Defendants,
unbeknownst
to
Officer
Evans--there
was
no
arrest
warrant
pending
for
Decedent.
Answer
by
City
of
Blackshear
Defendants
¶
16.
According
to
Officer
Evans,
upon
exiting
his
patrol
car
to
speak
with
Decedent,
Decedent
began
to
run.
Defendants'
Statement
of
Facts
¶
8.
When
Decedent
started
to
run,
Officer
Evans
grabbed
him
by
the
shirt
to
prevent
his
flight.
A
struggle
then
ensued
between
Decedent
and
Officer
Evans.
Id.
In
his
incident
report,
Officer
Evans
states
that,
during
this
struggle,
he
observed
Decedent
"trying
to
hide
and
discard
something"
and
that
Decedent
"kept
his
hands
in
front
of
him
at
his
waist"
and
"appeared
to
be
taking
something
out
of
the
waist
area
of
his
pants."
Gregory
K.
Evans
Incident
Report
at
1,
Exhibit
"A"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Officer
Evans'
report
also
indicates
that,
after
an
empty
orange
pill
bottle
dropped
from
Decedent's
front
waist,
Decedent
"placed
his
left
hand
up
to
his
mouth
approximately
6
three
times."
Id.
Officer
Evans
admits
that,
based
on
his
observations,
it
appeared
to
him
as
though
Decedent
had
swallowed
something,
and
that
it
was
probably
some
sort
of
drugs.
Answer
by
City
of
Blackshear
Defendants
¶
18.
However,
Evans
testified
in
his
deposition
that
he
did
not
observe
Decedent
actually
putting
anything
into
his
mouth.
Gregory
Evans
Dep.
26.
According
to
Evans,
he
asked
Decedent
several
times
if
he
had
swallowed
anything,
and
Decedent
repeatedly
denied
that
he
had.
Evans
Dep.
18,
20,
25.
Defendant
Carter,
another
officer
with
the
Blackshear
Police
Department,
and
Defendant
Bennett,
of
the
Pierce
County
Sheriff's
Office,
both
arrived
at
the
location
of
the
stop
in
order
to
assist
Officer
Evans.
Complaint
¶
42;
Chris
Carter
Incident
Report
at
3,
Exhibit
"A"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment;
Ramsey
Bennett
Incident
Report
at
3,
Exhibit
"B"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Officer
Evans
informed
Carter
and
Bennett
of
what
had
happened,
and
asked
them
to
assist
him
in
looking
for
a
substance
that
Decedent
had
discarded
during
the
struggle.
Evans
Incident
Report
at
1.
Upon
searching
the
area,
Officer
Carter
found
what
appeared
to
be
a
small
block
of
crack
cocaine.
Carter
Incident
Report
at
3.
Bennett
then
tested
7
the
substance
and
it
tested
positive
for
cocaine.
Bennett
Incident
Report
at
3.
Ultimately,
Officer
Evans
arrested
Decedent
and
charged
him
with
obstruction
of
a
law
enforcement
officer
and
possession
of
crack
cocaine.
Defendants'
Statement
of
Facts
¶
11.
Evans
proceeded
to
transport
Decedent
to
the
Pierce
County
Jail.
Id.
¶
12.
When
Decedent
arrived
at
the
jail,
he
smelled
of
alcohol
and,
according
to
Defendant
Hunt-a
jailer
at
the
Pierce
County
Jail--Decedent
had
"glassy
eyes."
Complaint
¶
43;
Defendants'
Statement
of
Facts
¶
47;
Raymond
Hunt
Dep.
19.
Decedent
was
placed
in
the
jail's
holding
cell
by
Jailer
Hunt.
Defendants'
Statement
of
Facts
¶
48.
Early
the
next
morning,
December
1,
at
approximately
2:00
A.M.
while
doing
rounds
in
the
jail,
Defendant
Hunt
heard
another
inmate,
John
Myles,
yelling
from
the
holding
cell
where
Decedent
was
located.
Id.
¶
49.
When
he
went
to
investigate,
Hunt
saw
Decedent
lying
on
the
floor,
asleep,
with
what
appeared
to
Hunt
to
be
drool
coming
out
of
the
sides
of
Decedent's
mouth.
Hunt
Dep.
16.
Mr.
Myles
told
Hunt
that
Decedent
"had
been
shaking
real
badly"
and
had
"hit
his
head
on
the
floor."
Id.
17.
Because
Decedent
was
unresponsive,
8
Hunt
told
a
fellow
jail
employee
to
call
EMS
and
Office
Evans.
Id.
In
response
to
this
request,
Defendant
Farrior,
a
paramedic
with
Pierce
County
EMS,
arrived
at
the
jail
at
2:12
A.M.
Complaint
¶
46;
David
Farrior
Transport
Report
at
1,
Exhibit
"C"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Farrior
first
made
contact
with
Decedent
in
his
cell
one
minute
later,
at
2:13
A.M.
Transport
Report
at
1.
Although
there
were
two
other
paramedics
on
duty
at
Pierce
County
EMS
that
morning,
Farrior
admits
that
he
responded
to
the
call
alone.
Farrior
Dep.
20.
According
to
Farrior's
testimony,
Officer
Evans,
who
was
in
Decedent's
cell
with
Farrior
during
Farrior's
examination,
did
not
tell
Farrior
of
his
suspicions
that
Decedent
had
ingested
cocaine
earlier
in
the
evening.
Id.
at
14.
Further,
when
Farrior
asked
Decedent
whether
he
had
ingested
any
drugs,
Decedent
responded
that
he
had
not.
Id.
at
18.
Mr.
Myles,
Decedent's
cell-mate,
told
Farrior
that
he
had
witnessed
Decedent
"jerk"
for
approximately
two
seconds
and
that
Decedent
appeared
to
have
"foam"
coming
from
his
mouth.
Id.
at
15-16.
According
to
Farrior,
when
he
asked
Decedent
whether
he
remembered
this,
Decedent
responded
that
he
did
9
not.
Id.
at
15.
In
his
deposition,
Farrior
testified
that
he
questioned
Decedent
about
his
medical
history,
and
that
Decedent
denied
having
any
history
of
seizures.
Id.
at
16.
According
to
Farrior,
he
then
checked
Decedent
for
any
signs
of
a
possible
seizure.
Id.
at
18.
This
included
a
check
of
Decedent's
vital
signs,
blood
pressure,
pulse,
and
oxygen
saturation.
Id.
at
19.
He
also
checked
Decedent's
mouth,
"listened
to
his
breath
sounds,
looked
at
his
pupils,
[and]
checked
his
stomach."
Id.
Based
on
the
results
of
his
examination,
Farrior
concluded
that
Decedent
had
no
"neurological
deficits"
normally
associated
with
a
seizure.
Id.
Farrior
testified
that
based
on
the
examination,
as
well
as
what
Decedent
told
him,
he
had
no
reason
to
think
there
was
anything
to
worry
about.
Id.
at
20-21.
Farrior
concluded
that
Decedent
required
no
further
treatment
and
left
the
jail
at
2:25
A.M.,
twelve
minutes
after
first
making
contact
with
Decedent.
Farrior
Transport
Report
at
1.
Approximately
thirty
minutes
later,
at
2:52
A.M.,
Defendant
Van,
another
jailer
at
the
Pierce
County
Jail,
was
advised
to
check
on
Decedent
in
his
cell.
Defendants'
Statement
of
Facts
¶
56;
Complaint
¶
47.
Upon
her
arrival,
Van
observed
Mr.
Myles
holding
Decedent's
head
up
with
a
10
blanket.
Id.
According
to
Van,
Decedent's
eyes
appeared
glassy,
he
was
foaming
at
the
mouth,
and
his
heart
was
beating
fast.
Daphne
Van
Incident
Supplemental
Report
at
4,
Exhibit
"B"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Van
also
observed
Decedent
"jerking
and
hitting
his
head
on
the
floor."
Id.
Mr.
Myles
advised
Van
that
Decedent
had
told
him
that
he
had
eaten
a
"handful
of
crack"
just
before
Officer
Evans
arrested
him.
Id.
Van
immediately
made
a
request
for
Pierce
County
EMS.
Id.
In
response
to
this
second
call,
Defendant
Farrior
arrived
at
the
jail
at
2:57
A.M. 4Transport
Report
at
1.
Upon
arriving
at
Decedent's
cell,
Van
told
Farrior
that,
according
to
Myles,
Decedent
had
ingested
crack
earlier
in
the
evening.
Daphne
Van
Dep.
12.
According
to
the
testimony
of
Defendant
Davis,
as
he
and
Defendant
Andreae
arrived
at
the
jail
just
minutes
after
Farrior
arrived,
Farrior
met
him
in
the
hallway
to
Decedent's
cell
and
advised
him
of
the
4 According before jail
to
Farrior's Davis and
testimony, Andreae
he
arrived he
at
the
jail the
Defendants foot, Dep.
because
responded in due an to
to
on
while 23-24.
Davis
and
Andreae
arrived that,
ambulance. the close
Farrior
Farrior
testified
proximity between the EMS' building and the jail-approximately 100 feet--a get that person in can actually get Id. to at the 37. on jail faster than a crew can
there
an
ambulance. to
Plaintiff so at that 16.
claims, he
however, smoke a
Farrior on
traveled the way.
the
jail
foot
could
cigarette
Plaintiff's
Brief
11
situation.
Alfred
Davis
Dep.
14.
Davis
then
provided
Farrior
with
a
"jump
bag"
and
went
back
to
the
ambulance
with
Andreae
to
get
a
cardiac
monitor,
airway
bag,
and
a
stretcher.
Davis
Dep.
19-20.
According
to
Davis,
Farrior
immediately
went
back
to
Decedent's
cell
and
began
treatment
on
Decedent.
Id.
Farrior
testified
that
he
began
CPR
and
basic
cardiac
life
support
("BCLS")
on
Decedent
while
still
in
the
holding
cell.
Farrior
Dep.
27.
Once
Davis
and
Andreae
arrived
in
the
cell
with
the
stretcher,
Decedent
was
moved
to
the
ambulance.
Id.
The
ambulance
departed
the
jail
at
3:10
A.M.
Transport
Report
at
1.
5
Defendants
Farrior,
Andreae
and
Davis
continued
to
perform
life
support
efforts
upon
Decedent
while
in
the
ambulance
on
the
way
to
the
Satilla
Regional
Medical
Center
in
Waycross,
Georgia.
Farrior
Dep.
25-32.
The
ambulance
arrived
at
the
hospital's
Emergency
Room
at
3:20
A.M.,
ten
minutes
after
departing
from
the
jail.
Transport
Report
at
1.
5 There the
are
several
inconsistencies visit to the
in
the
testimony
regarding while in the to
paramedics' testified and
second that,
jail.
For
instance, met him
Davis
upon
his
arrival, back
Farrior to
hallway
then
immediately after
went
Decedent's bag,"
cell
administer
treatment
grabbing
his
"jump
Defendant
Hunt
wrote in his incident report that Farrior "ran down the hallway and out the front and 2 door" other and that he "came right back at in 5. with a
stretcher
EMT'S."
Hunt
Incident
Report
12
Decedent
remained
on
life
support
at
Satilla
Regional
Medical
Center
and
was
then
placed
at
the
Jesup
Healthcare
Center.
Complaint
¶
49.
According
to
Plaintiff,
Decedent
never
regained
consciousness
and
never
recovered
from
the
seizures
and
cardiac
arrest.
Id.
He
died
on
January
22,
2006.
Id.
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
STANDARD
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
56(c)
provides
for
summary
judgment
"if
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions
on
file,
together
with
the
affidavits,
if
any,
show
there
is
no
genuine
issue
as
to
any
material
fact
and
the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law."
Celotex
Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477
U.S.
317,
322
(1986)
.
Facts
are
"material"
if
they
could
affect
the
outcome
of
the
suit
under
the
governing
substantive
law.
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
248
(1986).
The
Court
must
view
the
facts
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
non-moving
party,
Matsushita
Elec.
Indus.
Co.
v.
Zenith
Radio
Corp.,
475
U.S.
574,
587
(1986),
and
must
draw
"all
justifiable
inferences
in
his
favor."
United
States
v.
Four
13
Parcels
of
Real
Prop.,
941
F.2d
1428,
1437
(11th
Cir.
1991)
(en
banc)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
DISCUSSION
In
her
complaint,
Plaintiff
asserted
seven
separate
causes
of
action
against
seventeen
separate
Defendants.
To
complicate
matters
further,
many
of
these
Defendants
were
sued
in
both
their
official
and
individual
capacities.
The
complaint
alleged
claims
for
wrongful
and
excessive
detention,
and
denial
of
essential
medical
care
under
§
1983,
as
well
as
state-law
claims
for
medical
malpractice,
negligence,
false
imprisonment,
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress,
and
medical
expenses.
In
Davis
v.
Coca-Cola
Bottling
Co.
Consolidated,
516
F.3d
955,
979-84
(11th
Cir.
2008),
the
Eleventh
Circuit
imposed
upon
District
Courts
the
responsibility
to
address
thoroughly
and
methodically
all
facts,
claims
and
defenses
presented
in
connection
with
summary
judgment
motions
in
multiple
claim,
multiple
party
cases
such
as
this.
In
order
to
fulfill
this
responsibility,
the
Court
has
encouraged
Plaintiff
to
clearly
and
thoroughly
set
forth
which
causes
of
action
are
being
asserted
against
which
Defendants,
and
the
allegations
related
14
to
each
claim.
At
the
Court's
suggestion,
Plaintiff
has
significantly
limited
the
issues
before
the
Court
by
consenting
to
summary
judgment
as
to
certain
claims
and
as
to
certain
Defendants.
In
particular,
Plaintiff
has
consented
to
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
Defendants
Pierce
County,
City
of
Blackshear,
Mock,
Smiley,
Carter,
Bennett,
Hunt,
Van,
King,
Justice,
Pierce
County
EMS,
Blackshear
Police
Department,
Pierce
County
Sheriff's
Department,
Andreae,
Davis,
and
John
Does
1-10.
See
Plaintiff's
Statement
of
Claims
at
2.
Doc.
No.
110.
Accordingly,
the
Court
grants
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
those
defendants.
The
only
remaining
Defendants,
therefore,
are
Defendants
Evans
and
Farrior.
Further,
Plaintiff
has
abandoned
her
claims
for
wrongful
and
excessive
detention,
false
imprisonment,
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress,
and
medical
expenses.
Id.
at
2-4.
It
should
be
noted
that
it
was
entirely
appropriate
for
Plaintiff's
attorney
to
abandon
these
claims.
Even
if
Plaintiff
had
not
consented
to
summary
judgment
on
these
claims,
summary
judgment
would
still
have
been
appropriate.
As
to
Plaintiff's
claim
for
wrongful
and
excessive
detention
under
the
Fourth
Amendment,
the
evidence
shows
that
reasonable
15
articulable
suspicion
existed
to
justify
the
initial
stop
of
Decedent.
Further,
once
that
stop
was
initiated,
probable
cause
arose
to
justify
Decedent's
eventual
arrest.
Not
only
does
the
existence
of
probable
cause
defeat
Plaintiff's
claim
for
wrongful
and
excessive
detention,
but
it
also
defeats
Plaintiff's
state-law
claim
for
false
imprisonment.
See
Mayor
of
Savannah
v.
Wilson,
447
S.E.2d
124,
127
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1994)
(holding
that,
to
survive
summary
judgment
on
a
false
imprisonment
claim,
"[l]ack
of
probable
cause
.
.
.
must
be
shown.").
As
to
Plaintiff's
claim
for
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress,
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
show
that
Defendants'
conduct
was
"so
outrageous
in
character,
and
so
extreme
in
degree,
as
to
go
beyond
all
possible
bounds
of
decency,
and
to
be
regarded
as
atrocious,
and
utterly
intolerable
in
a
civilized
community."
Phinazee
v.
Interstate
Nationalease,
Inc.,
514
S.E.2d
843,
845
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1999)
(quoting
Bowers
v.
Estep,
420
S.E.2d
336,
339
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1992)).
Because
"[w]hether
a
claim
rises
to
the
requisite
level
of
outrageousness
and
egregiousness
to
sustain
a
claim
for
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress
is
a
question
of
law,"
id.,
summary
judgment
would
be
proper
on
Plaintiff's
16
intentional
infliction
of
emotional
distress
claim
even
if
Plaintiff
had
not
so
consented.
Accordingly,
the
Court
grants
the
Defendants'
motion
for
summary
judgment
as
to
these
claims.
The
only
claims
remaining
are
as
follows:
(1)
a
§
1983
claim
for
deliberate
indifference
to
serious
medical
needs
against
both
of
the
remaining
Defendants;
and
(2)
a
state-law
claim
for
negligence/medical
malpractice
against
Defendant
Farrior.
Id.
II.
Denial
of
Essential
Medical
Care
Claims
Plaintiff
claims
that
Defendants
Evans
and
Farrior
were
deliberately
indifferent
to
Decedent's
serious
medical
needs,
and
denied
Decedent
immediate
emergency
medical
attention,
in
violation
of
the
Eighth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
Specifically,
Plaintiff
claims
that
Defendant
Evans
"deliberately
refused
to
take
any
action
to
permit
[Decedent]
to
have
the
medical
care
he
required"
and
that
these
actions
"were
objectively
unreasonable."
Plaintiff's
Statement
of
Claims
at
3.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Defendant
Farrior
"knew
of
and
disregarded
the
substantial
risk
of
serious
harm
to
[Decedent]'s
health
and
safety
when
he
elected
to
leave
[Decedent]
unattended
and
in
an
unmonitored
holding
cell."
17
Id.
at
4.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
these
actions
were
also
"objectively
unreasonable."
Id.
Although,
in
her
complaint,
Plaintiff
claimed
that
these
alleged
actions
amounted
to
a
violation
of
the
Eighth
Amendment,
the
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
"[t]he
State
does
not
acquire
the
power
to
punish
with
which
the
Eighth
Amendment
is
concerned
until
after
it
has
secured
a
formal
adjudication
of
guilt
in
accordance
with
due
process
of
law."
Ingraham
v.
Wright,
430
U.S.
651,
671
n.40
(1977).
"Conditions
of
confinement
imposed
prior
to
conviction
are
limited
instead
by
the
due
process
clause
of
the
fourteenth
amendment."
Hamm
v.
DeKalb
County,
774
F.2d
1567,
1572
(11th
Cir.
1985)
.
Because
the
conditions
about
which
Plaintiff
complains
in
this
case
were
imposed
on
Decedent
before
a
conviction
was
had,
the
Court
must
evaluate
these
claims
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
only.
Id.
However,
because
the
legal
standard
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment's
Due
Process
Clause
is
the
same
as
that
which
applies
to
convicted
persons
under
the
Eighth
Amendment,
the
analysis
is
the
same
regardless.
Id.
at
1574.
In
Farmer
v.
Brennan,
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
held
that,
in
order
for
a
plaintiff
to
recover
for
deliberate
18
indifference
to
serious
medical
needs,
the
plaintiff
must
show
that
an
official
"acted
or
failed
to
act
despite
his
knowledge
of
a
substantial
risk
of
serious
harm."
511
U.S.
825,
842
(1994) .
In
Carroll
v.
Correctional
Medical
Services,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
held
that
a
constitutional
violation
is
present
only
where
the
medical
treatment
received
was
"`so
grossly
incompetent,
inadequate,
or
excessive
as
to
shock
the
conscience
or
to
be
intolerable
to
fundamental
fairness.
Mere
incidents
of
negligence
or
malpractice
do
not
rise
to
the
level
of
constitutional
violations.'"
160
Fed.
App'x
848,
850
(11th
Cir.
2005)
(quoting
Harris
v.
Thigpen,
941
F.2d
1495,
1505
(11th
Cir.
1991)).
The
Court
in
Carroll
went
on
to
hold
that
"[a]n
inmate
who
complains
that
[a]
delay
in
medical
treatment
rose
to
a
constitutional
violation
must
place
verifying
medical
evidence
in
the
record
to
establish
the
detrimental
effect
of
[the]
delay
in
medical
treatment
to
succeed."
Id.
(quoting
Hill
v.
DeKalb
Reg'l
Youth
Det.
Ctr.,
40
F.3d
1176,
1188
(11th
Cir.
1994),
abrogated
on
other
grounds
by
Hope
v.
Pelzer,
536
U.S.
730
(2002)
)
.
The
Eleventh
Circuit
went
on
to
state:
"To
show
that
a
prison to
official serious an
acted
with a a
deliberate plaintiff subjective
indifference must
medical
needs, and
satisfy A
both
objective must
inquiry."
plaintiff
first
show
19
"an
objectively that of
serious
medical
need."
He
must
then an
"prove
the
prison
official
acted to that
with
attitude medical
deliberate
indifference
serious
need."
Id.
(internal
citations
omitted)
(quoting
Farrow
v.
West,
320
F.3d
1235,
1243
(11th
Cir.
2003)).
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
raise
a
genuine
issue
of
fact
as
to
her
deliberate
indifference
claims.
In
Burnette
v.
Taylor,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
held
that,
in
order
to
survive
summary
judgment
on
a
claim
of
deliberate
indifference
to
serious
medical
needs,
the
plaintiff
"must
establish
for
each
Defendant
that
[the
inmate]'s
medical
need
was
so
obvious
that
a
lay
person-in
that
Defendant's
place-would
recognize
the
need
for
treatment."
533
F.3d
1325,
1330
(11th
Cir.
2008).
The
court
in
Burnette
went
on
to
hold
that
"[n]o
liability
arises
under
the
Constitution
for
an
official's
failure
to
alleviate
a
significant
risk
that
he
should
have
perceived
but
did
not
.
.
.
.
As
such,
imputed
or
collective
knowledge
cannot
serve
as
the
basis
for
a
claim
of
deliberate
indifference.
Each
individual
Defendant
must
be
judged
separately
and
on
the
basis
of
what
that
person
knows."
Id.
at
1331
(internal
citations
omitted).
Like
Plaintiff
in
this
case,
the
plaintiff
in
Burnette
claimed
that
jail
officials
were
deliberately
indifferent
to
20
the
serious
medical
needs
of
an
inmate
who
died
of
a
drug
overdose
while
in
police
custody.
Id.
at
1327.
Further,
there
was
evidence
in
Burnette
that
the
officers
knew
that
the
decedent
had
ingested
drugs.
First,
the
decedent's
stepfather
had
specifically
informed
the
defendants
in
Burnette,
prior
to
the
decedent
being
arrested,
that
the
decedent
was
"strung
out"
on
pills
and
other
drugs.
Id.
at
1328.
The
decedent's
stepfather
also
told
the
defendants
that
his
trailer
had
been
broken
into
and
that
he
suspected
the
decedent
had
stolen
drugs
from
him.
Id.
The
stepfather
told
the
defendants
that
the
decedent
had
gone
through
drug
treatment
in
the
past,
and
that
the
treatment
was
unsuccessful.
Id.
When
the
defendants
in
Burnette
went
to
arrest
the
decedent,
they
observed
that
the
decedent
"had
glassy
eyes
and
dilated
pupils."
Id.
Further,
the
arresting
officers
noted
that
the
decedent's
responses
to
questions
were
slow
and
that
the
decedent
was
in
possession
of
a
bottle
of
prescription
pills
when
he
was
arrested.
Id.
In
fact,
the
court
in
Burnette
noted
that
"[i]t
was
apparent
to
[the
arresting
officer]
that
[the
decedent]
was
under
the
influence
of
something."
Id.
21
When
the
decedent
in
Burnette
arrived
at
the
jail,
the
jailer
found
another
bottle
of
prescription
pills
in
the
decedent's
underwear.
Id.
After
the
jailer
observed
the
decedent
staggering,
he
stated
"you're
almost
wasted;
ain't
you?"
Id.
Another
jailer
on
duty
that
night
noticed
that
the
decedent's
speech
was
slurred.
Id.
at
1329.
There
was
also
evidence
that
the
decedent
was
not
able
to
walk
on
his
own,
and
that
the
jailers
on
duty
knew
of
this.
Id.
Based,
in
part,
on
the
evidence
outlined
above
indicating
that
the
defendants
were
aware
that
the
decedent
was
under
the
influence
of
drugs
yet
failed
to
provide
the
decedent
with
medical
assistance,
the
district
court
denied
summary
judgment
in
Burnette.
The
Eleventh
Circuit
reversed,
ruling
that
summary
judgment
must
be
granted
to
all
of
the
defendants.
Id.
at
1333.
In
reversing
the
denial
summary
judgment,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
in
Burnette
held
that
"[t]he
Constitution
does
not
require
an
arresting
police
officer
or
jail
official
to
seek
medical
attention
for
every
arrestee
or
inmate
who
appears
to
be
affected
by
drugs
or
alcohol."
Id.
Like
the
plaintiff
in
Burnette,
Plaintiff
in
this
case
has
failed
to
present
sufficient
evidence
to
defeat
summary
judgment
on
her
deliberate
indifference
claims.
As
to
22
Defendant
Evans,
the
evidence
presented
by
Plaintiff,
at
best,
shows
that
Evans
should
have
known
that
Decedent
may
have
ingested
cocaine.
The
evidence
shows
that
Evans
observed
Decedent
put
his
hand
to
his
mouth
three
times.
Defendants
have
admitted
that
"it
appeared
to
defendant
Evans
that
[Decedent]
had
swallowed
something,
and
that
it
was
possibly
some
sort
of
drugs."
Answer
by
City
of
Blackshear
Defendants
¶
18.
However,
Evans
himself
testified
that
he
did
not
personally
observe
Decedent
ingest
any
drugs.
Evans
Dep.
25-
26.
There
is
no
evidence
in
the
record
suggesting
that
Evans
actually
saw
Decedent
swallow
any
drugs.
In
any
event,
even
if
Plaintiff
could
prove
that
Evans
had
actual
knowledge
of
Decedent's
drug
ingestion,
Officer
Evans
would
still
be
entitled
to
summary
judgment
based
on
the
holding
in
Burnette
that
the
Constitution
does
not
require
an
officer
to
provide
medical
assistance
to
every
arrestee
who
appears
to
be
affected
by
drugs.
533
F.3d
at
1333.
In
fact,
the
officers
in
Burnette
had
even
more
of
a
reason
to
know
that
the
decedent
in
that
case
had
ingested
drugs,
yet
the
court
still
found
summary
judgment
to
be
appropriate.
Based
on
this,
Evans
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment.
23
Defendant
Farrior
is
also
entitled
to
summary
judgment
on
Plaintiff's
deliberate
indifference
claim.
The
evidence
in
the
record
shows
that
Farrior
promptly
responded
to
both
calls
from
the
Pierce
County
Jail
concerning
Decedent
that
evening,
and
that,
each
time,
he
examined
Decedent
to
determine
whether
further
medical
treatment
was
needed.
Farrior
Dep.
15-21;
25-
30.
Plaintiff
has
not
presented
any
evidence
to
suggest
that
Farrior
failed
to
respond
to
any
of
the
calls
regarding
Decedent,
or
that
he
had
any
reason
to
know
of
Decedent's
condition
prior
to
receiving
the
first
call
from
the
jail.
At
best,
a
reasonable
jury
could
conclude,
based
on
the
evidence
in
the
record,
that
Farrior
failed
to
properly
diagnose
Decedent's
condition
during
his
first
visit
to
the
jail
and
that
he
was
negligent
in
the
way
he
treated
Decedent
on
both
visits.
However,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
has
made
it
clear
that
"[m]ere
incidents
of
negligence
or
malpractice
do
not
rise
to
the
level
of
constitutional
violations."
Carroll,
160
Fed.
App'x
at
850
(emphasis
added).
Further,
in
Ryan
v.
Aina,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
held
that
"[a]n
inmate's
mere
disagreement
with
the
course
of
medical
treatment
does
not
amount
to
deliberate
indifference."
222
Fed.
App'x
801,
805-
806
(11th
Cir.
2006)
.
There
is
no
evidence
in
the
record
to
24
suggest
that
Farrior
acted
with
deliberate
indifference
to
a
serious
medical
need
Therefore,
Farrior
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment.
Although
the
Court
need
not
address
Defendants'
qualified
immunity
defense,
the
Court
does
note
for
the
sake
of
thoroughness
that,
in
Burnette,
the
Eleventh
Circuit
held
that,
even
if
it
were
mistaken
on
the
appropriateness
of
summary
judgment
based
on
the
merits
of
the
plaintiff's
claims,
qualified
immunity
would
apply.
533
F.3d
at
1333
n.7.
Similarly,
even
if
Defendants
Evans
and
Farrior
had
not
been
entitled
to
summary
judgment
on
the
merits
of
Plaintiff's
deliberate
indifference
claims,
they
would
be
entitled
to
qualified
immunity.
III.
Plaintiff's
State-Law
Claims
Remaining
in
this
case
are
Plaintiff's
state-law
claims
for
negligence
and
medical
malpractice
against
Defendant
Farrior.
Farrior
claims
that
he
is
statutorily
immune
from
liability
under
Georgia
law.
The
relevant
Code
Section
provides:
(a) is
Any
person, to
including
agents
and
employees, and who
who in
licensed
furnish
ambulance
service
25
good a
faith
renders an any any such
emergency or
care
to
a
person shall
who not as
is be a
victim
of
accident civil act or
emergency to such
liable result
for of
damages
victim
omission care to
by
such
person
in
rendering
emergency
such
victim.
(c)
The
immunity to
provided those
in
this
Code who no
section
shall the
apply
only
persons for
perform
aforesaid
emergency
services
remuneration.
O.C.G.A.
§
31-11-8.
Unlike
sovereign
immunity,
"a
claim
of
immunity
under
[this
Code
Section]
cannot
be
waived
by
those
persons
to
whom
the
statute
applies;
and
among
those
`persons'
to
whom
the
statute
applies
are
`municipalities'
and
`counties.'"
Johnson
v.
Gwinnett
County,
449
S.E.2d
856,
857
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1994).
It
is
undisputed
that,
on
the
date
in
question,
Farrior
was
an
employee
of
Pierce
County
EMS,
which
was
licensed
to
provide
ambulance
services
by
the
Georgia
Department
of
Human
Resources.
Kenneth
L.
Justice
Aff.
¶
6,
Exhibit
"F"
to
Defendants'
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment.
Further,
Plaintiff
does
not
present
any
evidence
suggesting
that
Defendants
did
not
act
in
"good
faith."
Viewing
the
evidence
in
light
most
favorable
to
Plaintiff,
the
evidence
shows,
at
best,
that
Defendants
exercised
bad
judgment
and
acted
negligently
in
caring
for
Decedent.
However,
Georgia
courts
have
made
clear
26
that
this
is
not
enough
to
show
a
lack
of
good
faith
for
purposes
of
statutory
immunity.
See,
e.g.,
Thomas
v.
DeKalb
County,
489
S.E.2d
58,
62
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1997)
("Even
if
the
paramedics
exercised
bad
judgment
and
acted
negligently,
such
does
not
amount
to
a
lack
of
good
faith.").
See
also
Bixler
v.
Merritt,
534
S.E.2d
837,
839
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
2000).
Therefore,
under
the
statute,
immunity
attaches
as
long
as
the
services
in
question
were
not
for
remuneration.
O.C.G.A.
§
31-11-8(c);
See
also
Thomas,
489
S.E.2d
at
61.
The
Court
rejects
the
Plaintiff's
argument
that
the
immunity
statute
does
not
apply
because
Decedent
was
to
be
charged
for
the
ambulance
services.
In
his
affidavit,
Defendant
Justice
states
that:
Pierce County
County, EMS
Georgia,
bills two a
persons things: mileage The
using (a) fee a
a
Pierce
ambulance fee; the
for
standard upon
transportation the length of
and
(b)
based
transport. and
monies fees do
collected not cover EMS.
from the The the EMS.
transport for
fees the
mileage of
budget fees
operation solely costs to of
Pierce
County
are
used
assist
with
defraying County
administrative
operating
Pierce
Justice
Aff.
¶
7.
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
present
any
evidence
to
the
contrary.
In
Ramsey
v.
Forest
Park,
the
Georgia
Court
of
Appeals
held
that
"a
fee
charged
by
a
governmental
organization
to
27
assist
in
defraying
the
administrative
costs
of
`transporting
a
person
to
a
hospital'
is
not
the
equivalent
of
receiving
remuneration
for
providing
stated
`emergency
care,'
within
the
meaning
of
O.C.G.A.
§
31-11-8(c)
."
418
S.E.2d
432,
434
(Ga.
Ct.
App.
1992)
.
The
court
in
Ramsey
went
on
to
hold
that
"[w]hat
may
constitute
a
remuneration
to
a
private
`person'
may
not
reward
and
constitute
remuneration
to
a
governmental
organization
having
to
control
its
public
expenditures
carefully
while
providing
`emergency
medical
services'
to
those
within
its
boundaries."
Id.
The
court
in
Ramsey
concluded
that
immunity
under
Code
Section
31-11-8
applied
in
that
case
despite
the
fact
that,
like
here,
the
defendant
charged
a
fee
to
defray
the
administrative
costs
of
patient
transportation.
Id.
Accordingly,
the
court
in
Ramsey
affirmed
the
trial
court's
grant
of
summary
judgment
in
favor
of
the
defendant.
Id.
As
was
the
case
in
Ramsey,
Georgia
Code
Section
31-11-8
applies
to
the
facts
of
this
case.
Pursuant
to
that
statute,
Defendant
Farrior
is
entitled
statutory
immunity,
and
therefore
summary
judgment,
on
Plaintiff's
state-law
claims.
28
CONCLUSION
For
the
above
reasons,
Defendant's
motion
for
summary
is
GRANTED.
Doc.
No.
52.
SO
ORDERED
this
31
st
day
of
December,
2008.
___________________________________ Judge, United States of District Georgia Court
Southern
District
29
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