Mehta et al v. Foskey et al

Filing 130

ORDER denying 113 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 4/29/2013. (csr)

3n the 11nittb btatto )ttrftt Court
for the £outjjern 39farta of georgia
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ATITH H. MEHTA; CK GAS, LLC dlb/a 3-D *
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CHEVRON STATION,
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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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RICHARD R. FOSKEY; and JOHN M.
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BLOOD WORTH,
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Defendants.

CV 510-001

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Atith Mehta's
Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 113. For the reasons
stated below, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.

A motion for reconsideration "is committed to the sound
discretion of the district judge." Region Eight Forest Serv.
Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th
Cir. 1993). There must be a reason why a court should
reconsider its prior decision, and the moving party must set
forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the

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court to amend its prior decision. See Sussman v. Salem, Saxon
& Nielson, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
"Reconsideration is appropriate only if [the moving party]:
demonstrates: (1) an intervening change of law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice." Whitesell
Corp. v. Electolux Home Prods., Inc., No. CV 103-050, 2010 WL
4025943, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2010). "In considering a
motion for reconsideration, a court must balance the need for
finality and judicial economy against the need to render just
decisions." Id. Motions for reconsideration "should not be
used to relitigate issues which have already been found
lacking." Id.

"[R]econsideration of an earlier order is an

extraordinary remedy, which should be granted sparingly." Id.
DISCUSSION

None of Plaintiff's arguments warrants reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration contains no basis to justify
conclusions different than those reached in this Court's prior
Order. See Dkt. No. 112.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that
"Cox did not tell Bloodworth that the young Indian male 'owned'
the store." See Dkt. No. 113 at 2. Plaintiff takes issue with
whether the suspect was described to Officer Bloodworth as a
convenience store employee or as the convenience store owner.
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Plaintiff argues that viewing the facts most favorably to
Plaintiff means concluding that Cox did not tell Officer
Bloodworth that the young Indian male that "owned" the store
gave Boatright the marijuana bud, but that Cox told Officer
Bloodworth that the young Indian male who worked at the store
gave Boatright the marijuana bud. This argument, however, is
surprising given that Plaintiff's counsel urged the opposite in
opposition to summary judgment.
In "Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Facts Which They
Contend Are Material and Present a Genuine Issue for Trial,"
Plaintiff's counsel listed the following fact in opposition to
Summary Judgment: "Cox told Bloodworth a young Indian male who
'owns' the 3-D Store gave Boatright the marijuana bud." Dkt.
No. 90, Ex. 3, ¶ 5 (emphasis added) . Plaintiff cannot now seek
reconsideration or clarification based on a version of the facts
that Plaintiff's own counsel previously advanced.
Plaintiff also contends that, viewing the facts most
favorably to him, "Bloodworth did not interview Boatright before
he applied for the arrest warrant." In the Order, this Court
stated: "However, even if Officer Bloodworth had not spoken with
Boatright prior to the search warrant and resulting arrest, a
reasonable officer in Defendants' position would have probable
cause to arrest Mehta based on the information supplied by Cox."
Dkt. No. 112 at 11. Thus, Plaintiff's argument on this point
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does not warrant reconsideration. As stated in the prior Order,
the timing of Officer Bloodworth's conversation with Boatright
has no impact on the appropriateness of summary judgment.
Additionally, Plaintiff contends the requirements of the
"reasonable mistake-doctrine" are not met because Defendants did
not have a valid arrest warrant. See Dkt. No. 113 at 12 (citing
Rodriguez v. Ferrell, 280 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002)). However,
the Court did not rely on the "reasonable mistake-doctrine"
cited by Plaintiff because it is inapplicable to the present
case and therefore irrelevant.
The only discussion concerning reasonable mistake in this
Court's Order involved whether inaccuracies in Officer
Bloodworth's affidavit in support of the search warrant
invalidated the search warrant. Thus, the cases cited in the
Order concerning the reasonableness of mistakes involve that
issue. See Dkt. No. 112 at 12-14 (citing Maughon v. Bibb Cnty.,
160 F.3d 658, 660 (11th Cir. 1998)). It would be circular and
nonsensical if a valid warrant was required to evaluate whether
the warrant was invalidated based on inaccuracies in a warrant
application.
Furthermore, the "reasonable mistake-doctrine" cases cited
by Plaintiff in his reconsideration request involve an entirely
different situation than the present case. Those cases concern
when law enforcement officers arrest one person, thinking it is
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someone else. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-04
(1971); Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1346 ("The same 'reasonable
mistake' standard applies (1) in the context of a section 1983
action and (2) when the police have a valid warrant—as opposed
to just probable cause—to arrest someone, but mistakenly arrest
someone else due to misidentification.") . In contrast, in this
case, Defendants intended to arrest Plaintiff and did arrest
Plaintiff. Viewing the facts most favorably to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff was innocent, and it was someone else who committed
the alleged crime. That situation, however, is materially
different than that addressed in Hill and Rodriguez. As
discussed in the Order, Defendants had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff did not in fact commit the
offense. Hill and Rodriguez involve law enforcement arresting
X, for whom they have no probable cause, thinking that they are
arresting Y, for whom they do have probable cause. The
reasonable-mistake doctrine cited by Plaintiff does not apply
every time the police arrest someone who is innocent.
Plaintiff reargues that Officer Bloodworth's investigation
was insufficient. The Court addressed and rejected those
arguments previously. In Rankin v. Evans, a case cited by
Plaintiff, the Eleventh Circuit stated "[aln arresting officer
is required to conduct a reasonable investigation to establish
probable cause." 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
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added).

"An officer, however, need not take 'every conceivable

step . . . at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of
convicting an innocent man." Id. at 1436 (citations omitted).
Without question, Officer Bloodworth could have conducted a more
thorough investigation. The issue though is whether Officer
Bloodworth's investigation was so cursory it violated the
Constitution, not whether Officer Bloodworth should win an award
for investigatory excellence.
Additionally, Plaintiff's arguments regarding the state law
false imprisonment claim are unavailing. Plaintiff argues that
his arrest was invalid under Georgia law because no exigency
justified the lack of a warrant. As an initial matter, the
Court notes an apparent difference in nomenclature between
federal law and Georgia law.
Under federal law, no "exigency" is needed for an officer
to arrest a suspect in public if that officer has probable
cause. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-34
("[T]he judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been
to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather
than encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with
respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it
was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about
to flee, and the like."); United States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d
1360, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The search . . . . occurred in
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a public place and was supported by probable cause. There is no
need to examine whether exigent circumstances also justified the
issuance of a warrant.") The situation changes, however, if the
arrest occurs within one's home. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S.
559, 565 (1999)

("[OJur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has

consistently accorded law enforcement officials greater latitude
in exercising their duties in public places."). Exigent
circumstances, in addition to probable cause, are necessary for
a warrantless home arrest under federal law. Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)
For a warrantless arrest, Georgia requires the presence of
one of the exigent circumstances listed in O.C.G.A. § 17-420(a). Kline v. KDB, 673 S.E.2d 516, 518-19 (Ga. Ct. App.
2009). However, probable cause counts as an exigent
circumstance for a public arrest. Under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a),
one of the listed circumstances is when "there is likely to be a
failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a
warrant." O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a). In interpreting the "failure
of justice" exigency, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that
"if an officer, while in the presence or vicinity of the
accused, acquires 'probable cause' (federal) to arrest the
accused outside of his or her home, and fails to make such
arrest, there is likely to be a failure of justice as a matter
of law if the officer is required to delay the arrest until a
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warrant is obtained." Durden v. State, 297 S.E.2d 237, 240 (Ga.
1982). Thus, the Georgia rule is "the same as the federal
rule." Id. "An arrest and search, legal under federal law, are
legal under state law." Id. Essentially, under Georgia law,
the existence of probable cause to effectuate a public arrest
satisfies O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a). Officer Bloodworth, as
discussed in the prior Order, had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. This arrest occurred in public. As a result, the
arrest complied with both federal and state law. Thus,
Plaintiff cannot recover for false arrest.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 113, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 29th day of April, 2013.

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ISA GODftYtWOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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