Markham v. Hall Worldwide Transportation, LLC et al

Filing 30

ORDER denying 16 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/15/2012. (csr)

in the unitth Otatto 1trttt Court
for the bouthtm Marta ofeorgta
aptro
ftition
JAMES A. MARKHAM,
Plaintiff,
VS.

HALL WORLDWIDE
TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
and STAR INSURANCE
COMPANY

Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CV 511-095

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant Star Insurance
Company's ("Star") Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 16. For the
reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
Star moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims based on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), arguing that Plaintiff
has failed to state a cause of action against Star. Plaintiff's
Complaint is a brief, five-page pleading asserting that Jeremy
Dane Hancock negligently operated a tractor trailer on May 20,
2011, causing an accident on State Route 31 in Coffee County,
Georgia. According to Plaintiff's Complaint, Hancock's conduct
caused harm to the Plaintiff. The Complaint goes on to state
that Hancock was operating the tractor trailer within the course

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

of his employment with Hall Worldwide Transportation, LLC,
("Hall") when the accident occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff
seeks to hold Hall liable for his injuries.
The Complaint also states that Star was listed as the
registered insurer for Hall at the time the Complaint was filed.
The Complaint states that Star is a proper party to the suit
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12. That statute stated, in
relevant part:
It shall be permissible under this article for any
person having a cause of action arising under this
article in tort or contract to join in the same action
the motor carrier and its surety, in the event a bond
is given.
O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(e). Since the filing of this lawsuit, § 467-12 was repealed, and the Georgia legislature passed the
Georgia Motor Common Carrier Act of 2012. The 2012 Act included
O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c), which is substantially similar to the
previous § 46-7-12(e). Section 40-1-112(c) states:
It shall be permissible under this part for any person
having a cause of action arising under this part to
join in the same action the motor carrier and the
insurance carrier, whether arising in tort or
contract.
The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that
where a plaintiff has a cause of action against a Georgia motor
carrier, that plaintiff may join the carrier's insurer as a
party to the lawsuit. As such, the previous version of this
provision was interpreted to provide "a right of action against

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

2

not only the carrier but directly against its insurer as well."
Sapp v. Canal Ins. Co., 706 S.E.2d 644, 683 (Ga. 2011). The
Court has no reason to diverge from the previous view, and holds
that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) also provides a right of action
against both a motor carrier and its insurer.
Star does not argue that Hall is not a Georgia motor
carrier, that it was not Hall's insurer, or that Plaintiff does
not have a cause of action against Hall. Rather, Star argues
that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to establish a
claim against Star. Plaintiff states clearly the factual basis
for his claim against Hall. Plaintiff provides the time, date,
and location of the disputed accident and asserts that Hall is a
common carrier. Plaintiff further alleges that Star was Hall's
insurer at the time. Plaintiff has adequately asserted a claim
against Star under Georgia law. Star has received adequate
notice of the factual basis for Plaintiff's claim and is able to
defend against that suit. For these reasons, Star's Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 15th day of August, 2012.

LISAPtODftY 900t, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

3