Davis v. Pope et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. All claims against Sheriff Pope in his official capacity and against the Coffee County Sheriff's Department are DISMISSED. Further, Plaintiff's claims under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims under the Eight Amendment remains pending, for the time being. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/28/2012. (csr)

Sn the Mnfttb Otattg ;Dtgtrtrt Court
for the Ooutbtrn Dttritt of atorata
Waptrofifs Athigton

KAYLA DAVIS, as next of kin of
Tina Davis, Deceased, and as
Administratrix of the Estate of
Tina Davis
Plaintiff,
VS.

JERRY POPE, Individually and in
his official capacity as
Sheriff; LEON GAFF, Individually
and in his official capacity as
Deputy Sheriff; JOHN DOE,
Individually and in his official
capacity as Deputy Sheriff; and
the COFFEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CV 511-105

ORDER
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed
by Defendants Jerry Pope and the Coffee County Sheriff's
Department. Dkt. No. 9. For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' motion is GRANTED and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2011, Plaintiff Kayla Davis ("Plaintiff"),
as next of kin of Tina Davis, Deceased, and as Administratrix of

1
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

the Estate of Tina Davis filed this suit in the State Court of
Coffee County against four defendants: Sheriff Jerry Pope
("Pope), Deputy Sheriff Leon Gaff ("Gaff"), Deputy Sheriff John
Doe ("Doe"), and the Coffee County Sheriff's Department
("Sheriff's Department"). Pope, Gaff, and Doe are named in
their individual and official capacities.
According to the Complaint, on October 9, 2009, Tina Davis
("Davis") was being held at the Coffee County Sheriff's
Department's holding facility. Davis was taken from the holding
facility by Defendant Gaff and placed, while cuffed, in Gaff's
patrol car. Gaff then drove Davis to a bank where Davis signed
certain documents. After leaving the bank, Gaff drove Davis to
her home. Gaff then sexually assaulted Davis, which ultimately
caused Davis's death. Plaintiff asserts that Gaff has a history
of violence and brutality towards women, and especially AfricanAmerican women.
The Complaint contains five counts. Count I asserts a
number of state law claims against Gaff, including assault,
battery, and false imprisonment. Count II asserts a claim
against Gaff for wrongful death. Count III asserts a claim
against Pope and Doe for inadequate training, hiring, and
supervision. Count IV asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Specifically, Count IV asserts that the Defendants violated
Davis's rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

2

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count
IV goes on to explain that Pope, his agents, and his employees
choose inadequate training programs, were deliberately
indifferent to misbehavior by Gaff and other deputies, failed to
adequately investigate Gaff before hiring him, and improperly
retained Gaff despite his misbehaviors. Count V seeks punitive
damages.
Defendants removed the case from the State Court of Coffee
County to this Court. Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), seek dismissal of the claims against
the Coffee County Sheriff's Department and Defendant Pope in his
official capacity. Defendants also seek dismissal of some of
the § 1983 constitutional claims.
LEGAL STANDARD

"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . .
. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Where a defendant challenges a
complaint for failing to adequately state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court applies a "two-pronged
approach" in analyzing the complaint. See Am. Dental Ass'n v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) in resolving a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). First,
the court should "eliminate any allegations in the complaint
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

II
`

3

that are merely legal conclusions." Id. This first prong
excludes "threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements,
supported by mere conclusory statements." Igbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Second, the court should assume that all well-pleaded
factual allegations are true "and then determine whether [those
allegations] plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."
Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1290. In determining
plausibility, the court should "draw on its experience and
common sense." Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Moreover, it is proper
for the court to infer "'obvious alternative explanation[s]'
which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct
the plaintiff[s] would ask the court to infer." Am. Dental
Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Igbal and relying on Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Ultimately, if
the plaintiff has not "nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, [her] complaint must be dismissed."
Id. at 1289 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
DISCUSSION
I. Coffee County Sheriff's Department
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against the Coffee
County Sheriff's Department. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 7, Dkt. No. 9.
Plaintiff claims, "[The Coffee County Sheriff's Department]
employees [sic] deputy sheriffs, such as defendant Gaff. Thus,
it is an entity. And, as such, it is responsible for the
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

II

4

actions of its employees." Pl.'s Resp. 4, Dkt. No. 18.
Plaintiff goes on to cite several inapposite cases dealing with
the ability to sue counties for the conduct of sheriff's
deputies. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, it is wellsettled that sheriff's departments generally are not considered
legal entities subject to suit. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Dekaib
Cent. Prob., 144 F. App'x 793, 795 (11th Cir. 2005); Bunyon v.
Burke Cnty., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1328 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Coffee County
Sheriff's Department are dismissed.
II. Sheriff Pope in his Official Capacity
Defendants also seek dismissal of claims asserted against
Pope in his official capacity. Defendants explicitly limit
their motion to official-capacity claims, and do not seek
dismissal of any claims asserted against Pope in his individual
capacity.
A.

Federal Claims against Pope in his Official Capacity

Defendants argue that Pope is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from claims asserted against him in his
official capacity. Defendants rely on Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d
1304 (11th Cir. 2003) . Manders observed that "Eleventh
Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal court when the
State itself is sued and when an 'arm of the State' is sued."
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308. Manders recognized that in some
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

5

circumstances a Georgia sheriff acts as an arm of the State of
Georgia. Specifically, the Manders court held that a Georgia
sheriff acts as an arm of the state when establishing a use of
force policy in his jail and in training and disciplining his
deputies. Id. at 1328. Plaintiff agrees that "Pope is entitled
to [Eleventh Amendment] immunity for those claims centered upon
policies and administration of operation the [sic] correctional
institution as cited in the Manders case by counsel for
defendant." Pl.'s Resp. 3. Even under a liberal reading of
Plaintiff's complaint, the only claims asserted against Pope in
his official capacity are those based on Pope's use-of-force
policies or his training and disciplining of his deputies.'
Therefore, Pope is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on
all claims asserted against him in his official capacity, and
those claims are due to be dismissed.2

Further, in order to hold Pope liable in his official capacity, Plaintiff
would need to show that any deprivation of Davis's constitutional rights
resulted from: "(1) an action taken or policy made by an official
responsible for making final policy in that area of the County's business;
or (2) a practice or custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional
equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker." Lloyd v. Van
Tassell, 318 F. App'x 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Church v. City of
Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 1 1343 (11th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, by conceding
that Pope is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims associated
with his jail operations policies, Plaintiff is conceding that Pope is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on all potential claims asserted
against Pope in his official capacity.
2

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

It is important to note that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to §
1983 claims asserted against a government official in his individual
capacity. Jackson v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1576 (11th
Cir. 1994) . Additionally, Defendants have not sought dismissal of
Plaintiff's claims against Pope in his individual capacity. At this point,
none of the claims against Pope in his individual capacity have been
dismissed.
6

B. State Claims against Pope in his Official Capacity
Defendants argue that state-law claims against Pope in his
official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity. Defs.' Not.
Dismiss 8-9. Under Georgia law, Georgia counties are immune to
suits for any cause of action unless sovereign immunity is
expressly waived by a constitutional provision or a statute.
Kitchen v.CSX Transp., Inc., 6 F.3d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1993).
Georgia sheriffs sued in their official capacities may raise any
defense available to a county, including sovereign immunity.
Gilbert v. Richardson, 452 S.E.2d 476, 478 n.4 (Ga. 1994); Crisp
Crity. Sch. Sys. V. Brown, 487 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997) . Plaintiff has pointed to no waiver of sovereign immunity
for Sheriff Pope. 4 As such, suits based on state law against
Pope in his official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity,
and the claims are dismissed.
III. Constitutional Claims
Defendant's motion also seeks dismissal of some of
Plaintiff's constitutional claims asserted as § 1983 violations.

The Kitchen court held that a county waives its sovereign immunity to the
extent that it purchases liability insurance, but the insurance waiver
relied on by the Kitchen court has since been withdrawn with regards to
counties. Woodard v. Laurens Cnty., 265 Ga. 404 (1995). Sovereign immunity
for counties can only be waived by an explicit constitutional provision or
legislative act. Id.
Any attempt by Plaintiff to argue that the Georgia Tort Claims Act includes
a waiver of sovereign immunity for counties would be unavailing. Counties
are not subject to the provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act. O.C.G.A.
§ 50-21-22 (excluding counties from the definition of "State" as that term
is used in the GTCA).

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

7

In Count IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Gaff's
conduct violated Davis's constitutional rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. 19.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims based on the
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, but not the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mot. Dismiss. 3-4. Plaintiff concedes
that the First and Fourth Amendment claims are due to be
dismissed, but asserts that the Fifth and Eighth Amendment
claims remain viable. Pl.'s Resp. 2-3.

A. Fifth Amendment Claims
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment
claim on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment can only be
violated by the federal government, and none of the Defendants
represent the federal government. Plaintiff's response is
somewhat befuddling. Plaintiff asserts that state actors can be
held liable under § 1983, and therefore Plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment claim must not be dismissed. Pl.'s Resp. 2.
Presumably, Plaintiff misunderstands Defendants' argument, and
the distinction between the state actor requirement under § 1983
and the federal/state distinction under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Regardless, the Fifth Amendment applies only to
federal, not state, acts. See Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972
n.19 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The Fifth Amendment obviously does not
apply here - the acts complained of were committed by state
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

II

8

rather than federal officials."). Because none of the
Defendants are in anyway associated with the federal government,
Plaintiff's claims under the Fifth Amendment are dismissed.
B. Eight Amendment Claims
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
claim, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged that Davis was
charged, convicted, or sentenced, for any offense, and therefore
is not protected by the Eighth Amendment. Mot. Dismiss 5.
Plaintiff agrees with the principle that the Eighth Amendment
protects convicted prisoners from excessive force, but
concludes, without elaboration, that her Eighth Amendment claim
is valid. Pl.'s Resp. 2-3.
"Claims involving the mistreatment of . . . pretrial
detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by
convicted persons." Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490
(11th Cir. 1996)). However, "this distinction makes no
practical difference because the cases involving convicted
prisoners and decided under the Eighth Amendment apply equally
to cases involving pretrial detainees." Ellis v. Pierce Cnty.,
Ga.,, 415 F. App'x 215, 218 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bozeman, 422
F.3d at 1271)). While Defendants are correct that Plaintiff's
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

9

Complaint - and her Response - lack any indication as to Davis's
status a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate, the Court sees
no reason to dismiss her Eighth Amendment claim at this time.
In this context, the distinction between a Eighth Amendment
claim and Fourteenth Amendment claim is academic, and would be
more appropriately resolved at a later time, based on evidence
of Davis's status.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. All claims against Sheriff Pope in
his official capacity and against the Coffee County Sheriff's
Department are DISMISSED. Further, Plaintiff's claims under the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's
claims under the Eighth Amendment remains pending, for the time
being.

SO ORDERED, this 28th day of August, 2012.

L—^
LISA GODBEY W OD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)

10