Johnson v. Brooks Auto Parts, Inc.
Filing
54
ORDER denying 33 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 10/17/2013. (csr)
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SANDY DEMOND JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BROOKS AUTO PARTS, INC.
d/b/a/ NAPA AUTO PARTS,
Defendant.
CV 512-067
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 33. For the reasons stated below,
Defendant's motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is a Title VII case in which Plaintiff contends he was
fired from his employment based on racial animus. Dkt. No. 45,
28: 21-24. Plaintiff began working for Brooks Auto Parts, Inc.
("Brooks Auto") on June 18, 2004. Dkt. No. 34, ¶ 3. From June
24, 2005 through his last day of work, Plaintiff worked as a
counter sales person. Id. Plaintiff was fired from Brooks Auto
on October 14, 2011. Dkt. No. 34, ¶ 26. Division Manager Art
Perry ("Perry") fired Plaintiff for issuing a cash refund for
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batteries that were not returned and for violating official
store policy. Dkt. No. 34, ¶ 25. Plaintiff notes that the
returned batteries were present in the store during an inventory
check, and contends that he was actually fired because he is
African American. Dkt. No. 39, pg. 8-10.
According to Plaintiff, Shirley Ratliff returned two
batteries to Brooks Auto, and Plaintiff and another sales
person, Gabriel Abbott ("Abbott"), handled the returns. Dkt. No.
40 191 20-22. The batteries Ratliff returned had been stolen by
former employee Anthony Loyless ("Loyless"), but Plaintiff did
not know this. Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 48. The referenced invoice number
was associated with a battery sale to Robert Deaver, who is
unconnected to Shirley Ratliff, and who did not return the
batteries that he purchased. Dkt. No. 35, pg. 4. It is
undisputed that the batteries actually purchased by Robert
Deaver were never returned. Dkt. 50, pg. 3. However, according
to Plaintiff, because Shirley Ratliff provided sufficient
information, Plaintiff found the invoice number that she claimed
to be associated with the batteries she returned, and completed
the cash refund according to "effective store policy." Dkt. No.
39, pg. 5. According to Plaintiff, the "effective store policy"
enables sales persons to return merchandise without receipts if
the customer provides the purchase date. Dkt. No. 39, pg. 4.
This practice differs from the documented store policy, but
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according to Plaintiff, his manager, Jonathan Harris, and other
co-workers, taught him to use the "effective store policy." Id.
Defendant claims Perry fired Plaintiff because he violated the
official company policy, which requires that a refund only be
issued on the correct invoice number. Dkt. No. 50, pg. 3.
Perry requested Americus Police Department presence when he
terminated Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 35, pg. 7. Perry contends that he
called the police based on "Plaintiff's physical stature and
strength, and his concern over how Plaintiff was going to handle
the news of his termination." Id. at 8. Perry further stated
that he did not intend for the police to arrest Plaintiff and
was surprised when they did so. Id. at 7. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, maintains that Perry stated he was pressing charges
(Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 44) and that calling the police was
discriminatory because the police had never been called in
response to similar allegations leveled against white employees.
Dkt. No. 39, pg. 11. Perry's intention in calling the police is
a factual dispute in this case. Plaintiff has brought forth
evidence that the police were not called when a large white
male, Dale Feister ("Feister"), was fired. Dkt. No. 40 ¶I 60-61.
Defendant also did not involve the police when Gabriel Abbott,
who is not African-American, was fired for participating in the
same activity on the same day as Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 54.
Lastly, according to Plaintiff, Anthony Loyless ("Loyless"), a
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white man, was not fired when he falsified a cash refund. Dkt.
No. 40 191 63-64. Although Loyless was eventually fired after the
stolen battery incident, the police were not called. Dkt. No. 40
¶ 66. Whether or not Loyless retained his job after he falsified
a cash refund is another key dispute in this case.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is only appropriate "if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a) . A material fact is one that could impact the outcome
in a case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A dispute is genuine only where the jury could issue a
verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. In determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court will view the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party."
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
The moving party bears the burden of showing a lack of
genuine issue of material fact. Adickes, 389 U.S. at 157. The
moving party should do so by identifying "particular parts of
materials in the record" which indicate "the absence . . . of a
genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1) (A) . It is only after
the moving party has fulfilled this burden that the party
opposing summary judgment bears a burden of responding. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmovant will
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defeat a motion for summary judgment by presenting evidence
"such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
DISCUSSION
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1). Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973), the plaintiff in a Title VII case bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of race
discrimination. Demonstrating a prima fade case only requires
the plaintiff to put forth facts that create an inference of
discrimination. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1997) . After establishing a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff then
bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence of pretext.
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248
(1981)
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
plaintiff must prove that he: 1) belonged to a racial minority;
2) was subjected to adverse job action; 3)was treated less
favorably than similarly situated, non-minority employees; and
4) was qualified for the job. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562;
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Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999) . A
Plaintiff is subjected to an adverse employment action when he
suffers "a serious and material change in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment." Rainey v. Holder, 412 Fed.Appx.
235, 238 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park,
245 F. 3d 1232, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2001)) . "To make a comparison
of the plaintiff's treatment to that of non-minority employees,
the plaintiff must show that he and the employees are similarly
situated in all relevant respects." Holifield, 115 F.3d 1555 at
1562. Determining whether employees are similarly-situated
requires the Court to look at whether they "are involved in or
accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in
different ways." Brown v. Jacobs Engineering, Inc., 401 Fed.
Appx. 478, 480 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171
F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Prima Facie Case
It is undisputed that Plaintiff, as an African American
man, belonged to a racial minority, that he was subjected to an
adverse job action through termination, and that he was
qualified for his job.
A factual dispute exists regarding whether Plaintiff was
treated less favorably than similarly situated non-minority
employees. Plaintiff alleges three instances of similarlysituated, non-African American employees participating in
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similar conduct yet being disciplined differently than he was.
Plaintiff contends that Anthony Loyless, a white male, retained
his job after falsifying a cash refund by forging a signature on
a return invoice and giving a cash refund without receiving
inventory in return. Dkt. No. 39, pg. 18. Plaintiff testified
that Loyless "did not produce the starter that he got money off
of from doing a return" (Dkt. No. 45, 32: 24-25) and that "'[h]e
didn't lose his job at the time." Dkt. No. 45, 36: 6-7.
Defendant disputes this, noting that neither the store manager
nor division manager recalls the event and that the event is
undocumented in records. Dkt. No. 50, pg. 10. The finder of fact
will be tasked with resolving this disputed and material fact.
Plaintiff next shows that Defendant did not press charges
against Gabriel Abbott, a Hispanic male, for the same acts as
those in which Plaintiff participated. Id. at 17. "He returned a
battery also on the same day of the same number, part number,
but he was not arrested or charged with anything." Dkt. No. 45,
30: 24-25, 31: 1-2. Lastly, Plaintiff notes that Dale Feister, a
white male, was disciplined differently for making an incorrect
invoice for a cash refund, because Defendant did not call the
police when firing Feister. Id. at 19.
There is sufficient evidence in the record by which the
jury could find Plaintiff has established a prima fade case.
First, there is a factual dispute about whether Perry pressed
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charges. Defendant contends that the police were called merely
to keep the peace when firing a big strong employee. Conversely,
Plaintiff swears that Perry announced his intention to press
charges against him, but took no similar action against the nonAfrican Americans who violated the same rule. Johnson contends
that he alone was the only employee who left his job in
handcuffs. Defendant explains that Abbott was not terminated in
person and Perry only called the police for Plaintiff's
termination to "stop a potential conflict before one arose." Id.
at 8.
The Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate
because disputes over genuine issues of material fact exist with
regard to whether Plaintiff was treated less favorably than
similarly situated, non-minority employees. Specifically,
whether Loyless, a white male, was permitted to keep his job for
the same offense for which Plaintiff was fired and whether
Defendant pressed charges against Plaintiff but not against
Abbott. Because these questions of fact exist, summary judgment
is not appropriate. Rather, a jury must resolve the factual
disputes.
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or pretext?
Issues of material fact also exist with regard to
Defendant's proffered reason for firing Plaintiff. After a
plaintiff establishes a Title VII prima facie case, the burden
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of production, but not the burden of persuasion, shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
802. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Tex. Dept.
of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 248. A plaintiff shows pretext by
providing enough evidence to "cast sufficient doubt on the
defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer's proffered
'legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its
conduct.'" Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538
(11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry. Co., 37
F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir.1994)). Here, Plaintiff casts sufficient
doubt.
Perry stated that he fired Plaintiff for violating Brooks
Auto policy regarding cash refunds. Plaintiff explains, however,
that this reason is a pretext because the store managers and
cashiers actually follow the "effective store policy" rather
than official store policy. Dkt. No. 39, pg. 23. Plaintiff
further explains that other employees continue to follow the
"effective store policy" without being disciplined. Dkt. No. 39,
pg. 24. Thus, whether the proffered reason is a pretext is in
dispute.
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The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence such that a jury could determine that Defendant's
proffered reason for firing Plaintiff was a pretext. Whether
violating the official store policy constituted actual grounds
for firing Plaintiff is disputed. Also in dispute is whether
Plaintiff involved the police when Plaintiff was fired but not
when a large white male was fired. It is true that the Court's
job is not to "reexamine[] an entity's business decisions."
Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470
(11th Cir. 1991). However, Plaintiff has highlighted factual
disputes such that a jury could determine that Perry fired
Plaintiff for an illegitimate, racially-motivated reason.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Dkt. No. 33, is DENIED. SO ORDERED, this 17 " day of
October, 2013.
LISA GODBEY OOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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