Bradley v. Hart et al

Filing 77

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court GRANT 57 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint, as amended, without prejudice, based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative reme dies prior to the filing of his Complaint, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation is ordered to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 4/7/2016). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 3/24/2016. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

SHANNON BRADLEY,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:13-cv-127

v.
COI REGINALD JACKSON,
Defendant.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Hays State Prison in Trion, Georgia, filed a
cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended, which in relevant part contested
certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville,
Georgia. 1 (Docs. 1, 14, 20.) Defendant Jackson filed a Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 57), and
Plaintiff filed a Response. (Doc. 62.) Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 65.) Plaintiff filed a
Surreply. (Doc. 66.) For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, as amended, without prejudice,
based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his
Complaint, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND
that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 4, 2013,
contesting certain conditions of his confinement at Ware State Prison in Waycross, Georgia;
1

As noted below, Plaintiff alleged constitutional violations in his Complaint which allegedly occurred at
several penal institutions in this District and the Middle District of Georgia.

Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia; Valdosta State Prison in Valdosta, Georgia; and
Hays State Prison in Trion, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) As pertinent to the present Motion, Plaintiff
alleged in his original Complaint and the amendments thereto that members of the Ware State
Prison staff were responsible for placing defamatory information in his file, which falsely
indicated he is a member of a gang. Plaintiff contended he was transferred to Georgia State
Prison as a result of this information in December 2011. (Doc. 1, p. 5; Doc. 20, p. 5.)
Plaintiff stated that Defendant, a correctional officer at Georgia State Prison, was
deliberately indifferent to his safety on or about February 21, 2012. Specifically, Plaintiff stated
an unknown inmate was moved to his cell on February 20, 2012. (Doc. 20, p. 5.) Plaintiff
asserted this inmate began questioning him about the “Good Fellas” gang and stated that he was
a member of this gang. Plaintiff alleged he told this inmate he had no knowledge about this
gang. Plaintiff also alleged he asked Defendant to move him out of this cell on February 21,
2012, because he “was having problems with his cell mate.” (Id. & at p. 7.) According to
Plaintiff, he told Defendant that his cell mate told him “one of us is going to have [to] go.” (Id.
at p. 7.) Plaintiff contended Defendant did not notify the officer in charge about this issue and
told Plaintiff he was not going to move anyone, so Plaintiff and his cell mate would have to find
a way to get along with each other. Plaintiff asserted Defendant walked away from the cell door,
and his cell mate assaulted him immediately thereafter. (Id.)
The Court directed service of Plaintiff’s Complaint, as twice amended, on Defendant by
Order dated July 27, 2015. 2 (Doc. 54.) Defendant then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.

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Service of Plaintiff’s Complaint upon Defendant occurred after the other named Defendants moved for
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against them, this Court granted that motion, and Plaintiff filed an
interlocutory appeal of this Court’s Order. (Docs. 31, 41, 44, 47.)

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DISCUSSION
Defendant raises several grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint in his Motion.
First, Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his
Complaint. Next, Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot sustain his Eighth Amendment claims
against him based on Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant failed to protect him from a known
threat to his safety. Defendant also maintains he is entitled to qualified immunity.
As set forth below, the undersigned agrees Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to the filing of his Complaint, and Defendant’s Motion is due to be granted on this
basis.

Consequently, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds for dismissal in

Defendant’s Motion.
I.

Standard of Review
The determination of whether an inmate exhausted his available administrative remedies

prior to filing a cause of action in federal court is a matter of abatement and should be raised in a
motion to dismiss. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008). “Because exhaustion
of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and not generally an adjudication on the
merits, an exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment;
instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for
summary judgment.” Id. at 1374–75 (internal citation omitted). “Even though a failure-toexhaust defense is non-jurisdictional, it is like” a jurisdictional defense because such a
determination “ordinarily does not deal with the merits” of a particular cause of action. Id.
at 1374 (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

Further, a judge “may resolve factual

questions” in instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies is a defense before the
court. Id. In these instances, “it is proper for a judge to consider facts outside of the pleadings

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and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not decide the merits and the
parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” Id. at 1376.
II.

Exhaustion Requirements
A.

Legal Requirements for Exhaustion

Where Congress explicitly mandates, prisoners seeking relief for alleged constitutional
violations must first exhaust inmate grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Section 1997e(a) of Title 42 of the United States
Code states, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”

In Porter, the United States Supreme Court held that exhaustion of available

administrative remedies is mandatory. Porter, 534 U.S. at 523; see also O’Brien v. United
States, 137 F. App’x 295, 301–02 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding lack of exhaustion where prisoner
“prematurely filed his civil complaint . . . and . . . ‘failed to heed that clear statutory command’
requiring that his administrative remedies be exhausted before bringing suit”).
The requirement that the exhaustion of remedies occur “first in an agency setting allows
‘the agency [to] develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be
based’ and giv[es] ‘the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors.’” Green v. Sec’y
for Dep’t of Corr., 212 F. App’x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alexander v. Hawk, 159
F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) (first alteration in original)).

Furthermore, requiring

exhaustion in the prison setting “eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the
administration of prisons” and allows “corrections officials time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

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The Supreme Court has noted exhaustion must be “proper.” Woodford v. Ngo, 541 U.S.
81, 92 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other
critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90–91. In other words,
an institution’s requirements define what is considered exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
218 (2007).
Thus, under the law, prisoners must do more than simply initiate grievances; they must
also appeal any denial of relief through all levels of review that comprise the administrative
grievance process.

Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (“To exhaust

administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must ‘properly take each step
within the administrative process.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th
Cir. 2005)); Sewell v. Ramsey, No. CV406-159, 2007 WL 201269 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2007)
(finding that a plaintiff who is still awaiting a response from the warden regarding his grievance
is still in the process of exhausting his administrative remedies).
Furthermore, an inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns the
administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of
the PLRA. Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157–59; Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2000) (inmate’s belief that administrative procedures are futile or needless does not excuse
the exhaustion requirement). Additionally, “[t]he only facts pertinent to determining whether a
prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his
original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012).
“However, ‘while [Section] 1997e(a) requires that a prisoner provide as much relevant
information as he reasonably can in the administrative grievance process, it does not require

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more.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000)). Nevertheless, the
purpose of Section 1997e(a) is not that “fact-intensive litigation” result over whether every fact
relevant to the cause of action was included in the grievance. Hooks v. Rich, CV605-65, 2006
WL 565909, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2006) (internal citation omitted). “‘As long as the basic
purposes of exhaustion are fulfilled, there does not appear to be any reason to require a prisoner
plaintiff to present fully developed legal and factual claims at the administrative level.’” Id.
(quoting Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp.2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001)).

Rather, Section

1997e(a) is intended to force inmates to give state prison authorities a chance to correct
constitutional violations in their prisons before resorting to federal suit and to prevent patently
frivolous lawsuits. Id.
In Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit set forth a
“two-step process” that lower courts must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. First, the court is to take the plaintiff’s version of the facts regarding
exhaustion as true. Id. at 1082. If, even under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the plaintiff has
not exhausted, the complaint must be dismissed. Id. However, if the parties’ conflicting facts
leave a dispute as to whether plaintiff has exhausted, the court need not accept all of plaintiff’s
facts as true. Id. Rather, “the court then proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve
the disputed factual issues[.]” Id. “Once the court makes findings on the disputed issues of fact,
it then decides whether under those findings the prisoner has exhausted his available
administrative remedies.” Id. at 1083. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court may
consider materials outside of the pleadings and resolve factual disputes regarding exhaustion in
conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss so long as the factual disputes do not decide
the merits of the case. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376–77.

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B.

The Georgia Department of Corrections’ Grievance Procedure

Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) IIB05-0001 sets forth the three (3) steps an
inmate had to complete under the Georgia Department of Corrections’ grievance procedure in
effect at the time the events giving rise to this cause of action arose. 3 First, an inmate had to file
an informal grievance “no later than 10 calendar days from the date” the inmate was aware or
should have been aware “of the facts giving rise to the grievance.” (Doc. 59, p. 15.) An inmate
was to be given a written response to his informal grievance within ten (10) calendar days of the
counselor’s receipt of the inmate’s informal grievance.

(Id. at p. 16.)

If the inmate was

dissatisfied with the resolution of his informal grievance, he was to file a formal grievance within
five (5) days of his receipt of the written resolution of his informal grievance. (Id.) Once an
inmate received the Warden’s response to his formal grievance and was dissatisfied with that
response, he had five (5) business days to file an appeal with the Commissioner. (Id.) In the
alternative, if the Warden’s response time was exceeded, the inmate was to file an appeal of his
grievance with the Commissioner’s Office, unless a one-time extension of ten days’ time was
authorized and the inmate was notified. (Id. at p. 14.) The Commissioner’s Office had 90
calendar days after receipt of the appeal to respond. (Id. at p. 19.) Time limits could be waived
for “good cause” shown. (Id. at p. 17.)
An inmate could file a grievance regarding “[a]ny condition, policy, procedure, action or
lack thereof that affects inmates and is in the control of the Department of Corrections[ ]”, other
than, for example, housing assignments. (Id. at p. 13.) Grievances were to be “filled out using
blue or black ink.” (Id. at p. 14.) If an inmate attempted “to grieve an item that is not
grievable . . ., is out of time, . . . or otherwise does not comply with the requirements of [SOP
3

This SOP was amended with an effective date of December 10, 2012, and no longer requires an inmate
to file an informal grievance. (Doc. 59, p. 4.) However, because this cause of action arose prior to the
amendment, the previous version of this SOP is relevant for this Court’s purposes.

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IIB05-0001], it will be rejected, noting the specific reason for this action.” (Id.) An inmate was
limited to having two pending, non-emergency grievances at the institutional level per week.
(Id.)
With these standards and procedures in mind, the Court now addresses Defendant’s
argument that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claims against
Defendant.
III.

Assessment of Plaintiff’s Exhaustion
Defendant asserts Plaintiff filed three grievances while he was housed at Georgia State

Prison from 2011 until 2012. Defendant alleges all three of these grievances were rejected.
(Doc. 57-1, p. 9.) Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff grieved about topics which were unrelated
to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant in each of these three grievances. Thus, Defendant
contends Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this cause of
action, as set forth in the Georgia Department of Corrections’ grievance procedures. (Id.)
Defendant offers the Affidavits of Jacquelyn Ayeni, a counselor and the Grievance Coordinator
at Georgia State Prison; Murriel Jackson, the Administrative Segregation Counselor at Georgia
State Prison at the time of events giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint; and Milton Smith, the
former Grievance Coordinator at Georgia State Prison, in support of his contention that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this cause of action. (Doc. 59, pp. 2–
9; Docs. 65-1, 65-2.)
In response, Plaintiff states that he asked for a grievance form on several occasions on
February 21, 2012, and was not given one on that date. (Doc. 62, p. 3.) However, Plaintiff
maintains he was given a grievance form on February 23, 2012, and he gave it to the
Administrative Segregation Counselor. Plaintiff asserts he never received a response. (Id.)

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Plaintiff also maintains he did exhaust his administrative remedies, but his grievance was not
processed per policy. According to Plaintiff, “staff members” were aware of “the incident and
were trying to help out a fellow staff member grieved upon or civil action(s) being brought upon
him in a timely matter (sic).” (Id.) Plaintiff aver he “made efforts to exhaust’s (sic) his remedies
but they were ‘thwart’ (sic)[.]” (Id.)
Defendant counters that Plaintiff admits he had the ability to submit a timely grievance,
yet he fails to submit any evidence supporting his claim that the grievance was not processed
properly or was lost. (Doc. 65, p. 2.) Defendant asserts that, even assuming Plaintiff did file a
grievance, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not file an
appeal of the alleged non-response to this grievance.
Plaintiff asserts that the only time an inmate can file an appeal is when a decision is made
at the institutional level. (Doc. 66, p. 1.) Plaintiff also asserts the counselors only come by the
cells once a week to gather grievances, and that often occurred when inmates were not actually
in their cells. Plaintiff contends he and other inmates were told to place their grievances through
the sides of their cell doors so that they would not miss the counselors. Plaintiff explains that,
due to the grievance not being turned in or received, “any of the staff members could have thwart
(sic) me from exhausting my remedies because I am unable to see out of the [tray] flaps which
are closed of whom (sic) comes by a (sic) take’s (sic) them[.]” (Id. at p. 2.)
A.

Informal Grievance Number 106965

Plaintiff filed Informal Grievance Number 106965 on December 17, 2011, and alleged he
had taken some pictures at Ware State Prison and did not receive these pictures upon his arrival
at Georgia State Prison. This informal grievance was rejected, (doc. 59, p. 28), and Plaintiff did
not resubmit this informal grievance or otherwise appeal the rejection. (Id. at p. 26.)

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B.

Informal Grievance Number 108518

Plaintiff’s Informal Grievance Number 108518 is dated January 16, 2012, and he stated
he slipped and fell when he was coming out of the shower that day. Plaintiff asserted his hands
were cuffed behind his back, causing him to hit his face, to bruise his left shoulder, and to injure
his knee. (Doc. 59, p. 29.) This informal grievance was rejected. (Id. at p. 26.)
C.

Informal Grievance Number 109141

Plaintiff then filed Informal Grievance Number 109141 on or after January 19, 2012, in
which he complained about the same events set forth in Informal Grievance Number 108518. In
this Informal Grievance, Plaintiff stated the informal grievance he filed on the date of the shower
incident (January 16, 2012), was rejected on January 19, 2012, because he had set forth too many
issues in his previously-filed informal grievance. (Doc. 59, p. 30.) Informal Grievance Number
109141 was also rejected, (id.), and there is no evidence Plaintiff resubmitted it. (Id. at p. 26.)
D.

Whether Plaintiff’s Informal Grievances Constitute Exhaustion

The filing of these informal grievances does not satisfy Plaintiff’s obligation to have
exhausted his administrative remedies pertaining to his claims against Defendant prior to filing
his Complaint. The subject matters contained in and the dates of these grievances are not related
in any way to the claims against Defendant which Plaintiff set forth in his Complaint, as
amended.

Accepting as true Plaintiff’s contentions that he wrote a grievance, presumably

regarding the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant, on or about February 23,
2012, gave this grievance to the administrative segregation counselor, and did not receive a
response after the passage of several weeks’ time, Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative
remedies under the first Turner step. If Plaintiff had not received a response to his grievance
after several weeks had elapsed, he then was to file an appeal to properly exhaust his

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administrative remedies. (Doc. 59, p. 14.) Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the
warden’s failure to respond to his grievance did not excuse Plaintiff from further pursuit of his
administrative remedies.

Bettencourt v. Owens, 542 F. App’x 730, 734 (11th Cir. 2013)

(“Despite [the plaintiff’s] protestations to the contrary, when the warden failed to respond to the
formal grievance within the allotted thirty-day period [the plaintiff] was required to pursue an
appeal in order to exhaust his claim.”); Milton v. Fleckenstein, No. 6:10-CV-377, 2011 WL
208310, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2011) (“although Plaintiff never received responses to his
formal grievances, grievances must be pursued through to the final level, even where no response
is received.”). There is nothing before the Court indicating Plaintiff filed an appeal or otherwise
pursued this grievance.
If, on the other hand, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s contention that he attempted to
access the grievance procedures and his efforts were thwarted by unnamed “staff members”,
Plaintiff arguably exhausted his available administrative remedies under the first Turner step.
However, in proceeding to the second Turner step and resolving the parties’ factual dispute, it is
apparent Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claims against Defendant.
The evidence before the Court belies Plaintiff’s contention that some unnamed staff
members thwarted his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. First, as discussed above,
Plaintiff was able to access the grievance procedures at Georgia State Prison in 2011 and 2012,
as shown by the filing of three informal grievances, two of which were filed a few weeks before
the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s

resubmission of rejected Informal Grievance Number 108518 in the form of Informal Grievance
Number 109141 to correct the reason for the original rejection indicates Plaintiff’s understanding
of the requirements of SOP IIB05-0001. Further, Murriel Jackson, who was the Administrative

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Segregation Counselor at Georgia State Prison in February 2012, declared she did not receive
any written grievances from Plaintiff on or after February 20, 2012, concerning an incident
occurring on that date or any failure of an officer to protect Plaintiff from a known threat to his
safety. (Doc. 65-1, p. 3.) This negates Plaintiff’s assertion that he gave a written complaint to
the Administrative Segregation Counselor on or after February 23, 2012, and Plaintiff offers no
evidence to refute Jackson’s declaration. Finally, and as noted above, even assuming Plaintiff
did submit a written grievance to Jackson on or after February 23, 2012, he also asserts that
several weeks passed without receiving a response. Plaintiff did not file an appeal, as he could
have done and was required to do, and offers no explanation as to why he failed to comply with
the requirements of the grievance procedures.
Put succinctly, even accepting Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true and viewing all of
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to filing his Complaint. For these reasons, the Court should GRANT this portion of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, as amended, without
prejudice. As a result, it is unnecessary to address the remaining portion of Defendant’s Motion.
IV.

Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 4 Though Plaintiff

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in
the Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. R. 24(a)(1)(A) (“A party who was permitted to
proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court action, . . ., may proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis without further authorization, unless the district court—before or after the notice of
appeal is filed—certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith[.]”). An appeal cannot be
4

A Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) is not required to file an appeal in a Section 1983 action. See
Fed. R. App. P. 3 & 4; Morefield v. Smith, No. 607CV010, 2007 WL 1893677, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 2,
2007) (citing Mathis v. Smith, No. 05-13123-A (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005) (unpublished)).

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taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or after the notice of appeal is
filed, that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s potential in
forma pauperis status on appeal should be DENIED, as there are no non-frivolous issues to raise
on appeal, and any appeal would not be taken in good faith.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss, (doc. 57), DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, as amended, without prejudice, based on
Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his Complaint, and
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND that the Court
DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address

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any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 24th day of March,
2016.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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