Dunn v. Hart et al

Filing 45

ORDER ADOPTING the Magistrate Judge's 16 Report and Recommendation, as supplemented herein. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Adams, Georgia Correctional Healthcare, Bradford, Nichols, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and Joe Doe are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is DENIED. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/11/2014. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION
CLEVELAND D. DUNN,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV513-131

V.

DARRELL HART, Warden, Ware
State Prison; Lt. FNU ADAMS;
JOHN DOE, Correctional Officer,
Ware State Prison; BARBARA
J. MOORE, LPN, Ware State
Prison; MARY GAIL FERRA, NP,
Ware State Prison; H. VAUGHN,
Director of Nursing, Ware State Prison;
LARRY EDWARDS, Physician's
Assistant, Calhoun State Prison;
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; BRIAN OWENS,
Commissioner; THOMAS E. SITTNICK,
Director of Health Services, Georgia
Department of Corrections; GEORGIA
CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE
("GCHC"); ROBERT BRADFORD,
Managing Director - GCHC; and
DR. BILL NICHOLS, State Medical
Director, GCHC,
Defendants.

ORDER
After an independent and de novo review of the entire record, the undersigned
concurs with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, to which Plaintiff
filed Objections through his counsel. In his Objections, Plaintiff asserts that Lieutenant
Adams was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because Adams

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escorted Plaintiff to the medical unit after witnessing Plaintiffs injuries, took pictures and
a video of his condition and the scene, relayed information to Nurse Moore regarding
Plaintiffs preexisting medical condition and planned surgery, and tried to have Nurse
Moore authorize Plaintiffs transport to another facility for more assistance. As the
Magistrate Judge advised Plaintiff, the evidence establishes that Adams realized
Plaintiff needed medical attention and escorted him to the medical unit to receive
attention. Even if Adams took Plaintiff to segregation after taking Plaintiff to medical for
medical attention and sought no further assistance, as Plaintiff alleges, Plaintiff simply
fails to show how Adams could have done more than he did or that Adams' actions
constitute deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Georgia Correctional Healthcare, Nichols,
and Bradford should not be dismissed because he should have the opportunity to
develop the allegations in his Complaint and discover additional information regarding
policies he alleges resulted in the denial of adequate medical care. Plaintiff alleges that
these Defendants are liable based on their failure to train their subordinates properly.
Plaintiff fails to identify the policy or policies in place or the lack of training which
resulted in the alleged denial of adequate medical care for his injuries. The
undersigned notes that a plaintiff need not set forth every detail in his complaint to have
his claims survive initial screening. However, a plaintiff is to give enough detail in his
complaint so that a defendant will know why he is being sued. This is especially true
when a plaintiff is represented by counsel. "A complaint must state a facially plausible
claim for relief, and '[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

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liable for the misconduct alleged." Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Icibal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A pleading that
offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action" does not suffice. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." j4, (internal punctuation
and citation omitted). While a court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
true, this tenet "is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are insufficient.

j.ç.

Plain'tiff's assertions against Defendants Georgia Correctional Healthcare, Bradford, and
Nichols are conclusory and do not reach the plausibility standard.
Plaintiff avers that his claims against Defendant John Doe should not be
dismissed. Prison officials have a duty to ensure the safety of inmates. However, a
prison official cannot be held liable under deliberate indifference principles if an inmate
in his charge is harmed and that prison official was unaware of a substantial risk of
serious harm to that inmate. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).
At best, Plaintiffs allegations against John Doe reveal that John Doe may have been
negligent by not being at his post at the time of Plaintiffs attack, but negligence is an
insufficient basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith v. Req'l Dir. of Fla. Dep't of
Corr., 368 F. App'x 9, 14(11th Cir. 2010) ("[S]imple negligence is not actionable under §

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1983, and a plaintiff must allege a conscious or callous indifference to a prisoner's
rights.").
Plaintiffs Objections are overruled.

The Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation, as supplemented herein, is adopted as the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Adams, Georgia Correctional Healthcare, Bradford,
Nichols, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and John Doe are DISMISSED.
Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is DENIE
SO ORDERED, this \ \\ day of

2014.

LISA GO D WOO CiEF1UDGE
\ UNITE IJ STATES DISTRICT COURT
\LJJTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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