Nurideen v. Ware State Prison Medical Department et al

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re: Dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Objections to R&R due by 9/5/2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge James E. Graham on 8/19/2014. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

SAEED ISHMAEL NURIDEEN,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV514-041

WARE STATE PRISON MEDICAL
DEPARTMENT, and WARDEN,
Ware State Prison,
Defendants.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Ware State Prison in Waycross, Georgia,
filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A prisoner proceeding in a civil
action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the
mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In
determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro
se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable
claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the
complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 191 5A(b)(1) and (2).
In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly
identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6),the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints
filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in
Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this court in applying the identical
language of § 1915A.
Plaintiff contends that he suffered from three (3) asthma attacks over the course
of two years' time. Plaintiff also contends that "Defendant" (though he fails to mention a
name) failed to "complete a promised diagnosis[.]" (Doc. No. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff alleges
that he accepted "Defendant's" offer for medical care and treatment, and that contract
has been breached. Plaintiff names as Defendants "Ware State Prison Medical
Department" and 'Ware State Prison Warden."
A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
[he] is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to state a claim for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that
an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579,
1582 (11th Cii. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was

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committed by "a person acting under color of state law." Id . Plaintiff makes no factual
.

allegations against the named Defendants, and his claims against the Defendants
should be dismissed.
In addition, it appears that Plaintiff wishes to hold the Warden liable based on his
supervisory position. In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something
more than a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th
Cii. 2009); Braddv v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th
Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged
constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's
conduct and the alleged violations.

J.cL at 802. "To state a claim against a supervisory

defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the
violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted
in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an
inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent
it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged
deprivation that he then failed to correct." Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir.
2011). Plaintiff has failed to make this basic showing, and his claims against the
Warden should be dismissed for this reason, as well.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
imposes on the government an affirmative obligation to provide minimally adequate
medical care to inmates whom they are punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991).
Society's "contemporary standards of decency" do not condone the unnecessary and

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wanton denial of medical care to inmates, who cannot care for themselves while
incarcerated. Este l le, 429 U.S. at 105. Otherwise, the "denial of medical care [to
inmates] may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose." jj at 103. Therefore, under the Eighth Amendment, the
government cannot deliberately ignore or withhold minimally adequate medical care to
those inmates suffering from serious medical needs.

J.cL

at 103-04.

However, the Supreme Court cautioned in Estelle that not "every claim by a
prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the
Eighth Amendment." 429 U.S. at 105. A difference in opinion between the prison's
medical staff and the prisoner as to diagnosis or course of treatment amount to a claim
under the Constitution. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505 (citation omitted). Only when
deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs is demonstrated to be
"repugnant to the conscience of mankind" or offensive to "evolving standards of
decency" will it give rise to a valid claim of mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.

A heavy burden is placed on prisoners alleging a violation based on deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. To succeed on a claim of inadequate medical
treatment, an inmate must set forth evidence of an objectively serious deprivation of
medical care demonstrating: (1) an objectively serious medical need, and (2) deliberate
indifference to that need. Binciham v. Thomas, 654 F3d 1171, 1175-76 (11th Cir. 2011).
To the extent Plaintiff makes a deliberate indifference claim, his claim should be
dismissed because it appears that he disagrees with the course of treatment he

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received. In addition, Plaintiff fails to name any person responsible for the lack of
proper medical treatment.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff contends that Defendants' alleged actions resulted
is a breach of duty (i.e., negligence or malpractice), he cannot sustain a cause of action
on this basis. An allegation that a defendant acted with negligence in causing a plaintiff
injury is not sufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights
protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law."
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be
dismissed for this reason, as well.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's Complaint
be DISMISSED based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this /
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of August, 2014.

'v...-

AES E. GRKHAM
ITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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