Cleland et al v. Dollar General
Filing
59
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 36 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 47 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/31/2016. (thb)
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS
REBA GAIL CLELAND,
TERRY W. CLELAND,
and
DIVISION
*
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
*
v,
*
CV
514-076
*
DOLGENCORP, LLC,
Dollar General,
d/b/a
*
Defendant,
ORDER
Three
motions
Plaintiffs'
for
motion
summary
Cleland's
are
currently
to
amend
judgment
with
claims
(doc.
35);
(doc.
47);
respect
and
before
(2)
to
the
Defendant's
Plaintiff
Defendant's
motion
judgment with respect to Terry Cleland's claim
the
reasons
DENIED,
below,
Plaintiff's
(doc.
motion
motion
Reba
for
to
(1)
Gail
summary
36).
amend
For
is
Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to
Plaintiff
GRANTED
discussed
Court:
Reba
Gail
in part,
and
Cleland' s
claim
Defendant's
is
motion
DENIED
for
in
summary
part
and
judgment
with respect to Plaintiff Terry Cleland's claim is GRANTED.
I.
Factual Background
The claims presented in the case all arise out of Plaintiff
Reba
Gail
Cleland's
employment
("Dollar General").
with
The claims,
and distinct events.
Below,
Defendant
however,
DOLGENCORP,
are based on separate
for the sake of clarity,
separates the facts surrounding the different claims.
presented
are
the
facts
taken
in
the
LLC
light
most
the Court
The facts
favorable
to
Plaintiffs.
1.
The Missing Money and Ms . Cleland' s Termination
Ms.
Cleland worked as
Georgia
Dollar General
Thomas,
and
Page.
As
the
store.
district
part of Ms.
an assistant manager at
Her direct
manager
Cleland's
for
job
the Nahunta,
supervisor was
that
location
duties,
she
not
Ms.
been deposited.
Ms.
of the
day's
According to Ms.
earnings
On February
Cleland,
she
called Ms.
and Ms. Thomas informed her to leave
at the
store and deposit
the
other.
Cleland maintains that she did so.
At some point,
and
Anna
Cleland discovered that the February 8 receipts had
Thomas about her discovery,
one
was
would deposit
Dollar General's daily receipts with a local bank.
9, 2013,
Tonya
informed
February 8.
prevention
it
Dollar General's bank called Dollar General
that
the
bank
had
not
received
any
money
for
Anna Page and someone from Dollar General's loss-
division
visited
the
store
and
interviewed
Ms.
Cleland
about
the
missing
money.
Ms.
Cleland
maintained that she took the money to the bank.
is not
clear as to whether Ms.
apparently
But the record
Cleland ever specified that she
had been directed to deposit only a portion of the money.
Dollar
local
General
was
police.
unable
interviewed Ms.
Cleland,
locate
from
Someone
to
the
and
she
the
money,
Nahunta
it
called
Police
again maintained
After
the
Department
that
she
had
following
the
deposited the money.
Dollar
incident,
General
placed
Ms.
Cleland
on
leave
and it terminated her employment on March 19.
employee
found
instructed
the
that
discovery.
missing
employee
money
not
That employee,
Cleland
alleges
accused
her
that
of
to
July
tell
however,
Dollar
stealing
in
Ms.
Tonya
Cleland
did tell Ms.
General
the
2013.
acted
missing
Another
Thomas
about
the
Cleland.
Ms.
negligently when
money
and
that
it
Dollar
General's negligence caused her emotional distress.
2.
Ms.
Ms.
Cleland's
Cleland's
Job Duties
position
she be a "key-holder."
available
to
the
with
Dollar
General
required
As such, Ms. Cleland was required to be
cashiers
and
customers
while
in
the
This included being available during her lunch break.
Ms.
Cleland claims
that
that
she
had been
instructed that
store.
Indeed,
she
could
not leave during her lunch break when she was the only manager
on duty.
And she asserts that,
anytime she was the only key-
holder on duty, she worked during her lunch break.
however,
did not
clock back in during her
Ms. Cleland,
lunch break because
Ms. Thomas had informed her that she was required to take a onehour
lunch break.
the-clock
hours
Ms.
at
Cleland also
the
end
of
claims
many
that
days.
she
worked off-
Specifically,
she
maintains that she would often clock out and then make sure that
the bathrooms had been cleaned and the floors mopped.
II.
Plaintiffs
amended
their
rights;
complaint
(1)
("FLSA");
a
(2)
(3)
distress;
initiated
this
on
action
January
violation
a
of
violation
defamation;
and
8,
October
2015.
(5)
of
(4)
loss
the
Fair
Ms.
6,
2014,
(Docs.
Cleland's
negligent
of
Dollar General now moves
of
claims,
and
Labor
1,
and
17.)
Plaintiffs
Standards
Fourth
infliction
consortium
Cleland.
these
on
amended complaint essentially asserts five causes of
Plaintiffs'
action:
Procedural Background
for
Act
Amendment
of
emotional
Plaintiff
Terry
for summary judgment on each
request
leave
to
amend
their
complaint.
III.
Summary
genuine
entitled
judgment
dispute
to
as
judgment
Legal Standard
is
to
as
appropriate
any
a
material
matter
of
only
fact
law."
if
and
"there
the
Fed.
is
no
movant
is
R.
Civ.
P.
56(a).
the
Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of
suit
under
Liberty Lobby,
view
the
party,
U.S.
in
in
587
(1986),
substantive
U.S.
242,
light
most
Elec.
favor."
1437
477
the
Matsushita
[its]
governing
Inc.,
facts
574,
1428,
the
Indus.
248
law.
(1986).
favorable
Co.
Anderson
v.
v.
The Court must
to
Zenith
the
non-moving
Radio
Corp.,
475
and must draw "all justifiable inferences
U.S.
(11th Cir.
v.
Four Parcels of
1991)
(en banc)
Real
Prop.,
941
F.2d
(internal punctuation and
citations omitted).
The
Court,
moving
by
motion.
How
party
reference
Celotex
to
carry
to
this
the
initial
materials
Corp.
proof at trial.
1115
has
v.
burden
Catrett,
depends
Fitzpatrick v.
(11th Cir.
1993) .
on
When
burden
file,
477
on
of
the
U.S.
who
showing
basis
317,
bears
City of Atlanta,
the
non-movant
has
for
323
the
the
the
(1986).
burden
of
2 F.3d 1112,
the
burden
of
proof at trial,
the movant may carry the initial burden in one
of
by
two
ways
—
negating
an
essential
element
of
the
non-
movant 's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a
fact necessary to
Clark,
Inc.,
Adickes
Corp.
v.
v.
929
S.H.
Catrett,
the non-movant's case.
F.2d 604,
Kress
477
&
606-08
Co.,
U.S.
398
317
See Clark v. Coats
(11th Cir.
U.S.
(1986)).
144
1991)
(1970)
Before
evaluate the non-movant's response in opposition,
consider
whether
the
movant
has
met
its
&
(explaining
and
the
Celotex
Court
can
it must first
initial
burden
of
showing that
there
are
no
that it is entitled to
City
of
Columbus,
curiam).
meet
genuine
issues
of material
judgment as a matter of
120
F.3d
248,
254
(11th
fact
law.
Cir.
and
Jones v.
1997)
(per
A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot
the
burden
at
trial
is
insufficient.
Clark,
929
F.2d
at
608.
If —
the
and only if —
non-movant
"demonstrat[ing]
that
bears
its
may
that
precludes
the movant
avoid
there
summary
initial
to
burden.
the
If
negating
a
evidence
summary
is
at
method
fact,
sufficient
to
initial burden,
judgment
Id.
trial,
by
the
which
the movant
material
its
indeed a material
judgment."
the burden of proof
response
carries
When
the
a
the
movant
evidence
non-movant
withstand
issue
F.3d
at
material
1116.
fact,
If
the
the movant
non-movant
shows
must
an
respond
verdict
absence
either
its
with
motion
at
Fitzpatrick,
of
show
tailor
carried
trial on the material fact sought to be negated."
2
fact
affirmatively
"must
directed
of
by
non-movant
non-movant must
presents
the
only
evidence
that
the
on
a
record
contains evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant
or
"come
withstand
forward
a
with
directed
additional
verdict
motion
alleged evidentiary deficiency."
cannot
carry
repeating
its
burden
conclusory
by
evidence
at
trial
Id.
at
1117.
relying
on
the
allegations
sufficient
contained
in
based
The
the
non-movant
pleadings
the
on
to
or
by
complaint.
See
Morris
Rather,
v.
Ross,
the
663
F.2d
non-movant
1032,
must
1033-34
respond
(11th
with
Cir.
1981).
affidavits
or
as
otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In
this
action,
the
Clerk
of
the
Court
gave
Plaintiffs
notice of the motions for summary judgment and informed them of
the
summary
judgment
other materials
(Docs.
Therefore,
v. Wainwright,
courts
the
to
as
affidavits
825
requirements
(11th Cir.
1985)
or
default.
of
Griffith
(per curiam),
discussed more thoroughly below,
generally
Court
See
Nemours and Co.,
motion
notice
governed by Federal Rule of
appropriate.
a
file
and the motion is now ripe for consideration.
amend is
However,
to
The time for filing materials in opposition has
Additionally,
and
right
and the consequences of
the
772 F.2d 822,
are satisfied.
to
the
in opposition,
37-38.)
expired,
rules,
freely
has
Fla.
is
Evergreen
filed
Court's scheduling order,
1041
outside
Procedure
when
deny
v.
(11th Cir.
the
of
necessary.
leave
E.I.
when
DuPont
2006).
deadline
15,
set
De
And when
by
the
the moving party must demonstrate good
IV.
Plaintiffs
to
Foliage
cause to amend the scheduling order.
1. Plaintiffs'
leave
discretion
470 F.3d 1036,
amend
grant
Civil
a motion
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16.
Discussion
Motion to Amend
wish
to
amend
their
7
complaint
to
bolster
the
factual
allegations
points out,
§ 34-4-3,
that
Pursuant
Id.
have
to
A
as
Dollar
General
not
shown
good
Dollar General argues
cause
under
Federal
Rule
16.
to
Federal
issue
other things,
(b) .
and,
Georgia's minimum-wage statute.
Procedure
required
it
to add a claim for unpaid wages pursuant to O.C.G.A.
Plaintiffs
Civil
contained within
a
Rule
of Civil
scheduling
order
Procedure
that
must
a deadline to amend pleadings.
scheduling
order
may
be
amended
16,
court
is
include,
among
R. Civ.
P. 16
Fed.
only
a
for
good
cause.
"The good cause standard precludes modification unless the
schedule
cannot
seeking the
1417,
1418
In
met
extension."
(11th Cir.
this
required
be
the
case,
despite
Sosa v.
to
the
parties
amend
Court
to
eight
Plaintiffs have not
their
of
facts
With
motion
that
respect
admits
support
to
Plaintiffs
assert
additional
facts
Airprint
issued
make
all
of
Sys.,
the
Inc.,
14.)
party
133
F.3d
order
that
the
every
this
claim
arises
claim
Plaintiffs'
additional
merely
discovery
that
that
support
their
8
pleadings
deadline.
Indeed,
Plaintiffs'
other
to
no
Plaintiffs filed their
after
§ 34-4-3,
that
scheduling
amendments
(Doc.
months
a
shown good cause.
the claim under O.C.G.A.
of
diligence
1998).
later than January 9, 2015.
motion
the
with respect to
brief in support
from
raised
factual
in
claims.
And
this
the
in
same
this
set
case.
allegations,
case
Neither
unveiled
of
these
reasons
establish
good
cause.
Accordingly,
the
Court
DENIES
Plaintiffs' motion to amend.1
2. Dollar General's Motions for Summary Judgment
As a
Fourth
preliminary matter,
Amendment
claim
involved and that
her
has
run.
judgment
respect
Cleland has
because
defamation
of limitations
with
fails
Ms.
there
is
claim fails
those
no
state
the
statute
summary
claims.
because
action
the Court GRANTS
Accordingly,
to
conceded that her
The
Court
will
now
address the remaining claims.
a. Ms.
Cleland's
emotional
claim
distress
for
and
negligent
Mr.
infliction
Cleland's
of
loss-of-
consortium claim
Ms.
Cleland
negligently when
and
she
seeks
essentially
it
argues
accused her
damages
General argues that Ms.
for
her
of
that
Dollar
stealing
emotional
General
acted
the missing money,
distress.
Dollar
Cleland's claim must fail under Georgia
law because she has not produced evidence that establishes that
she suffered either an impact or a pecuniary loss.
Under Georgia law,
a plaintiff asserting a negligence claim
may generally recover emotional-distress
damages
only if he
she suffered an impact that resulted in a physical injury.
1
or
0B-
Dollar General also argues that, even if Plaintiffs were given leave
to amend, an amendment adding the alleged claim under O.C.G.A. § 34-4-3 would
be futile because that code section only applies in claims against employers
not subject to federal minimum-wage laws.
Dollar General asserts that it is
subject to those federal laws.
Because Plaintiffs have not shown good cause
under Federal Rule of Civil
merits of this argument.
Procedure
16,
the
Court
declines
to
reach
the
GYN
Assocs.
1989),
of
Albany
abrogated on
v.
Littleton,
other grounds,
Co., 533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2000).
386
Lee
S.E.2d
v.
146,
(Ga.
Farm Mut.
State
149
Ins.
Specifically,
[i]n cases where mere negligence is relied on, before
damages for mental pain and suffering are allowable, there
must be an actual physical injury to the person, or a
pecuniary loss resulting from an injury to the person
which is not physical;
such an injury to a person's
reputation, or the mental pain and suffering must cause a
physical injury to the person.
Littleton,
386 S.E.2d at
149
(citation omitted).
That
is,
the
pecuniary loss must be the result of an injury to the plaintiff.
Phillips
(Ga.
v.
Ct.
App.
pecuniary
could
did
at
2010)
loss
not
not
Marquis
stem
Zion-Morrow,
(finding
when
recover
Mt.
her
that
wallet
a
was
an
injury
to
699
plaintiff
stolen
emotional-distress
from
LLC,
her
and
damages
S.E.2d
who
suffered
car
61
a
vandalized
because
person) .
58,
The
the
loss
Court
of
Appeals of Georgia has also stated that "a plaintiff may recover
damages for emotional distress based upon an injury to property
that results in pecuniary loss if injury to the person is also
present,
Fire.
even if that injury is not physical."
Ins.
Co.
v.
Lam,
546 S.E.2d 283,
Nationwide Mut.
284
(Ga.
Ct.
she
suffered
App.
2001)
(emphasis in original).
Ms.
Instead,
Cleland
she
has
claims
not
that
alleged
she
is
that
entitled to
an
impact.
emotional-distress
damages because she suffered a pecuniary loss when she lost her
10
job.
Although the law on this issue is fairly muddled,2 it is
clear
that
either
a
(1)
plaintiff
an
injury
pecuniary loss,
property that
show
(physical
Phillips,
resulted
by an injury, Lam,
Ms.
must
699
at
or
least
nonphysical)
S.E.2d at
in a pecuniary
61,
loss
or
that
(2)
suffered
caused
accompanied
Cleland argues that she suffered a pecuniary loss when
Ms.
Cleland has
argued that
she
recover,
not
argued that she
This argument fails.
suffered any injury
suffered emotional damages
and
such
damages
have
not
She has
only
for which she
seeks
traditionally
been
considered a separate injury.
See
Owens v. Gateway Mgmt.
490
App.
1997)
S.E.2d
501,
plaintiff's
type
of
a
an injury to
and was
arising from Dollar General's alleged negligence.
to
she
546 S.E.2d 284-85.
Dollar General terminated her employment.
First,
that
502
(Ga.
Ct.
emotional-distress
injury
contemplated
(concluding
damages themselves
under
the
were
Co.,
that
the
not the
pecuniary-loss
rule
because "[t]o hold otherwise would be to allow bootstrapping of
an extreme nature"); but see Oliver v. McDade,
(Ga
Ct.
App.
2014)
(finding
that
a
762 S.E.2d 96, 99
plaintiff
who
suffered
depression that resulted in medical bills as a result of alleged
negligence had satisfied the pecuniary-loss rule).
Putting
aside
any
confusion
as
to
what
constitutes
an
injury for purposes of the pecuniary-loss rule, Ms. Cleland has
2
2014)
see generally, Oliver v. McDade, 762 S.E.2d 96, 102-106 (Ga. Ct. App.
(Andrews,
J., dissenting).
11
not established that her pecuniary loss resulted from an injury.
Ms.
Cleland's
employment,
pecuniary
alleged
and
she
loss
differently,
has
can
Ms.
pecuniary
be
not
arises
attempted
traced
to
a
from
to
her
explain
personal
loss
how
of
this
injury.
Said
Cleland has failed to produce any evidence that
her pecuniary loss "result[ed]
Littleton,
loss
386
S.E.2d
at
from an
149.
injury to
Ms.
Cleland
[her]
is
person."
essentially
arguing that Dollar General's negligence caused her to lose her
job
(her
pecuniary
loss)
(whether
Even
physical
assuming
prevail
her
her
or
she
on her
caused
She has not argued that any injury to
emotional distress.
and
that
nonphysical)
suffered
claim by
some
the
negligence
caused
the
injury,
Ms.
simply arguing that
pecuniary
loss.
Cleland
cannot
she
suffered both
emotional distress and a pecuniary loss.
Furthermore,
interpretation
of
Ms.
Cleland's
claim
the
pecuniary-loss
also
rule
fails
under
because
she
Lam's
did
not
suffer an injury to property when she lost her job because there
is no evidence that
Shores
v.
she possessed a property right in her job.
Modern Transp.
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) .
in
a
collision.
Id.
Servs.,
Inc.,
585
S.E.2d
664,
665-66
In Shores, a railroad worker was involved
at
664.
Although
he
did
not
suffer
a
physical injury as a result of the collision, he suffered post
traumatic
stress
disorder
arising
led to his inability to work.
Id.
12
out
of
the
collision,
which
The court held that he did
not suffer an injury to property as contemplated in Lam because
he
did not
have
employee.
Id.
at
injury exists,
loss
of
her
a
right
to
665-66.
his
job because
Here,
he
was
an
at-will
even assuming that a personal
Ms. Cleland cannot base her pecuniary loss on the
job
because
she
has
not
established
that
she
was
anything other than an at-will employee.
Because
Ms.
Cleland
pecuniary
loss
General's
negligence,
summary
as
judgment
Cleland's
a
has
not
result
her
on
this
an
that
injury
fails
issue.
loss-of-consortium
and
she
caused
the
Moreover,
claim
is
based
suffered
by
Dollar
Court
GRANTS
because
on
the Court GRANTS
a
Ms.
Terry
Cleland's
summary judgment
claim.
b. Ms.
As
for
of
claim
claim for emotional distress,
on that
established
time
Cleland's
noted above,
she
worked
FLSA claims
Ms.
off
Cleland claims
the
clock.
Ms.
that
she
Cleland
is
owed wages
claims
that
she
is owed for off-the-clock work performed during her lunch break
and for work she performed after she clocked out at night.
The
Court addresses these claims separately below.
i.
Dollar
the
alleged
because
and
(2)
(1)
she
Time worked over lunch
General
hours
contends
worked
that
Ms.
during
her
Cleland's
lunch
claim
break
based
must
on
fail
it did not suffer or permit her to work those hours
has
not
presented
13
evidence
to
support
that
she
worked while she was off the clock.3
Under
the
FLSA,
a
plaintiff
must
establish
that
the
employer "knew or should have known of the overtime work through
actual
or constructive
Commc'ns,
Ala.
No.
knowledge."
2:14-cv-01493-RDP,
March 9,
2016) .
Lopez-Easterling v.
2016
WL
892774,
at
*7
employee's overtime work when i t has
believe that
employee
(citation
omitted)
(N.D.
"An employer is said to have constructive
knowledge of its
its
Charter
is working beyond h[er]
(internal
quotation marks
reason to
shift."
omitted)
Id.
(emphasis
in original).
Here,
Dollar General
argues
that
it
did not
know
Cleland worked off the clock during her lunch break.
its position,
worked
response,
employee's
customary
Ms.
off
the
clock.
Cleland
that
assistant
Cleland testified
that
(Doc.
points
Ms.
to
35,
to
44
General
also
maintains
that
Ms.
1
14.).
Dollar
during
that
it
lunch
at
In
General
at 11-14.)
had been present
during lunch breaks when this work occurred.
Dollar
1
states
work
(See Doc.
Page
Ex.
another
essentially
managers
while remaining clocked out.
3
To support
Page avers that she was never aware that Ms.
affidavit
for
Ms.
Dollar General has produced the affidavit of Anna
Page in which Ms.
Cleland
that
was
breaks
And Ms.
the
store
(Doc. 35, Ex. 5 at
Cleland's
claims
should
be
dismissed because she did not plead them with the specificity required by
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Because this matter is before the Court on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court declines to apply this standard.
14
30.)
Notably,
Ms.
Cleland also testified that she had been told
that she was expected to help cashiers while on her break.
at
28.)
Drawing
all
reasonable
Cleland as the non-moving party,
factual
dispute
with
respect
inferences
in
favor
(Id.
of
Ms.
she has at very least created a
to
Dollar
General's
knowledge
of
her off-the-clock work.
Dollar
General
next
argues
that
Ms.
Cleland
has
presented sufficient evidence that she worked overtime.
Dollar
General
claims
that
there
performed the off-the-clock work.
Citing
(11th Cir.
must
fail
number
Johnson
2015),
Corr.
she
has
Corp.
off-the-clock
not
of
Am.,
presented
hours
that
Ms.
606
she
App'x
In
of
every
determined
plaintiff's
claim
at
947.
failed
The
because
court
she
"never
the
945
exact
Jackson,
10 hours
Id.
Cleland
Cleland's claim
evidence
worked.
F.
plaintiff claimed she was owed for 7.5 to
week.
Indeed,
The Court disagrees.
Dollar General argues that Ms.
because
of
v.
no evidence
is
not
of
stated
the
overtime
that
the
with
any
clarity or
precision the number of hours
she allegedly worked,
the
or
nature
or
or
anything
amount
completed,
of
that
else
work,
that
where
would assist
approximating Jackson's unpaid overtime."
Here,
however,
of the work,
Ms.
Cleland has
least some estimate of how many hours
the
work was
a factfinder
in
Id. at 951.
specified the
where the work took place,
15
when
exact
nature
and she has provided at
she worked.
Ms.
Cleland
has
produced evidence
when she was
indeed,
lunch breaks
only key-holder present,
she was
frequently —
always
almost
customers.
her
assist
cashiers
the
(See
indicating that,
Doc.
often would only be
—
44
required
at
able to
to 10 minutes per day.
4-5.)
to
And
not
produced
she worked.4
she
testified
that
or
she
sit down and enjoy her lunch for 5
(Doc. 35, Ex. 5 at 37.)
Dollar General relies heavily on
has
during
evidence
that
the fact that Ms.
shows
the
exact
Cleland
overtime
hours
The Court, however, is persuaded that Ms. Cleland
has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to
approximate
the
Easterling,
2016
plaintiff
during
hours
who
her
overtime
WL
claimed
Ms.
to
lunch
hour
she
about whether the
that
892774,
worked,
she
Cleland
hours
have
did
*11
worked.
(finding
frequently
not
produce
sufficiently
defendant
has
at
she
testified
to
the
that,
worked
records
created
violated the
See
a
although
off
the
the
dispute
Here,
nature
a
clock
detailing
factual
FLSA) .
exact
Lopez-
the
the
of
fact
work
she performed combined with the evidence that it was essentially
customary for Dollar General assistant managers to work through
lunch
while
dispute
4
claims
off
about
the
clock,
whether
is
sufficient
Dollar
General
to
create
violated
a
the
factual
FLSA.
Ms. Cleland's counsel has provided the Court with a chart that she
shows
the
exact
hours
Ms.
Cleland
worked
off
the
clock
on
certain
days.
Ms. Cleland's counsel, however, failed to produce any evidence that
explains how she prepared the chart.
The Court, therefore, declines to view
this
chart
as
admissible evidence
16
Accordingly, the Court DENIES summary judgment on this issue.
ii.
With
Time worked after clocking out
respect
to
Ms.
clocking out at night,
Cleland
has
failed
General
was
aware
produce
any
evidence
issue,
Ms.
the
Court
produce
this
that
agrees
evidence
work
she
with
and
that
performed
Dollar
she
worked
after
showing
she
the
General.
that
has
failed
work.
As
Dollar
On
noted
to
this
above,
Page averred in her affidavit that she was unaware that Ms.
Cleland ever worked off the clock.
to
claim that
Dollar General similarly argues that Ms.
to
of
Cleland's
any
record
evidence—and
the
Ms.
Court
Cleland has not pointed
has
not
located
any—that
rebuts this assertion with respect to this alleged off-the-clock
work.
Accordingly,
the
Court
GRANTS
issue.
17
summary
judgment
on
this
V.
For
amend
the
(doc.
judgment with
is DENIED
for
47)
is
respect
discussed
DENIED;
to
judgment
above,
Plaintiffs'
Defendant's
Plaintiff Reba
in part and GRANTED
summary
Cleland's
reasons
Conclusion
with
in part;
respect
motion
Gail
and
to
motion
for
to
summary
Cleland's
claims
Defendant's
motion
Plaintiff
Terry
W.
claim is GRANTED.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this ^T/^^day of March,
2016.
HONOE^BIE J. KANDAL HALL
\
UNITED STATES
SOUTHERN
18
DISTRICT JUDGE
DISTRICT
OF GEORGIA
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?