Jackson v. Correctional Corporation of America et al

Filing 6

ORDER directing the United States Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiffs Complaint and a copy of this Order upon Defendants McKerrocher and Fountain. Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. Signed by Magistrate Judge James E. Graham on 1/13/2015. (csr)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION ARTHUR JACKSON, Plaintiff, yj CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV514-095 CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; JOSEPH McKERROCHER; DR. PIERRE FONTAINE; DR. SHARON LEWIS; FNUK PANZER; and GRADY PERRY, Defendants. ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, who is currently housed at the Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia, filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) claim upon which relief may granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 191 5A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this court in applying the identical language of § 1915A. Plaintiff contends that Defendant McKerrocher and Fountaine were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants McKerrocher and Fountain know that he has diabetes and did nothing to treat his infected foot, which led to Plaintiff having gangrene and having his toe amputated. Plaintiff also names Corrections Corporation of America, the Georgia Department of Corrections, Sharon Lewis (Medical Director for the Georgia Department of Corrections), Clinical Supervisor Panzer, and Warden Grady Perry as Defendants. A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him "of some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, AO 72A (Rev 8/82) 1 2 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by "a person acting under color of state law." I d. Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Corrections Corporation of America, Georgia Department of Corrections, Lewis, Panzer, or Perry, and his claims against these Defendants should be dismissed. A lawsuit against a state official or a state agency in its official capacity is no different from a suit against a state itself; such a defendant is immune. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71(1989). In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress did not intend to abrogate "well-established immunities or defenses" under the common law or the Eleventh Amendment. I d. at 67. Because the State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit against the Georgia Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes this department from suit. Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, Plaintiffs claims against the Georgia Department of Corrections should be dismissed for this reason. As noted above, Plaintiff names Corrections Corporation of America, Lewis, Panzer, and Perry as Defendants. Corrections Corporation of America is a private entity which contracts with the Georgia Department of Corrections to provide services "traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state and becomes the functional equivalent of the municipality under section 1983." Craig v. Floyd Cntv., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cii. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) 3 liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. Id. at 802. "To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct." Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff fails to set forth sustainable claims against Corrections Corporation of America, Lewis, Panzer, or Perry, and his claims against these Defendants should be dismissed for this reason, as well. However, the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a constitutional duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prison inmates. This duty to safeguard also embodies the principle expressed by the Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), forbidding prison officials from demonstrating deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These allegations, when read in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, arguably state colorable claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A against Defendants McKerrocher and Fountaine for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment. A copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and a copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendants McKerrocher and Fountaine by the United States Marshal without AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) 4 prepayment of cost. If any Defendant elects to file a Waiver of Reply, then he or she must file either a dispositive motion or an answer to the complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing of said Waiver of Reply.' INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANTS Even though the Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs that service be effected by the United States Marshal. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendants by firstclass mail and request that the Defendants waive formal service of summons. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.7. Individual and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are hereby granted leave of court to take the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Defendants shall ensure that the Plaintiff's deposition and any other depositions in the case are taken within the 140-day discovery period allowed by this court's local rules. In the event that Defendants take the deposition of any other person, Defendants are ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 as set forth herein. As the Plaintiff will likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, Prior to the undersigned's requisite frivolity review, an answer was filed on behalf of Corrections Corporation of America and Grady Perry. AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) 1 Defendants shall notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on Defendants, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10) days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. Defendants shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c). INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorneys, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendants or their counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 5. "Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and] the file number." FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a caption or a certificate of service will be disregarded by the court and returned to the sender. Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this court and defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this case. Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to obtain facts and information about the case from Defendants, Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq. Plaintiff does not need the AO 72A (Rev. 8182) 6 permission of the court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within 120 days after the filing of the answer. Local Rule 26.1. Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or organizations who are not named as Defendants. Interrogatories shall not be filed with the court. Local Rule 26.6. Interrogatories are not to contain more than twenty-five (25) questions. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the court. If Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he should first contact the attorneys for Defendants and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2)(A); Local Rule 26.7. Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard cost of fifty ($.50) cents per page. If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of prosecution. FED. R. Civ. P.41; Local Rule 41.1. It is the Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by Defendants. Upon no less than five (5) days' notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) 7 subject matter of the pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including dismissal of this case. As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to "counsel of record" directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which may be scheduled by the court. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Under this Court's Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. "Failure to respond shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion." Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if you fail to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that you do not oppose the Defendants' motion. Your response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twenty one (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact set forth in the Defendants' statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by an opposition statement. Should Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, you are advised that you will have the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) 8 case. That burden cannot be carried by reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendants motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, you must file counter-affidavits if you desire to contest the Defendants statement of the facts. Should you fail to file opposing affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, the consequences are these: any factual assertions made in Defendants' affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment will be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this day of January, 2015. L/// AMES E. GRAHAM N lIED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AO 72A (Rev. 8182) 9

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