Bryant v. Pilgrims
Filing
30
ORDER granting Defendant's 17 Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to enter the appropriate judgment and to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 3/14/2016. (csr)
3n the ?JJniteb tcte Ditritt Court
for the 6outbern 1Ditritt of Oeorqta
aptto lDthiton
GREGORY BRYANT,
*
Plaintiff,
*
V.
*
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORPORATION,
Defendant.
*
*
*
CV 514-101
*
*
*
ORDER
Plaintiff, a Black male, filed this race discrimination
action after Defendant terminated his employment at its poultry
processing facility. Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the Court is
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 17), which the
parties have fully briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 22, 27. For the
following reasons, Defendant's Motion (dkt. no. 17) is GRANTED.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
BACKGROUND'
Plaintiff worked at Defendant's poultry processing plant
(the "Plant") in Douglas, Georgia, from 1986 to 2009. SUF,
9191
1-2. In May 2009, Defendant shut down the Plant completely and
laid off all of its approximately 800 employees, including
Plaintiff. Id. at 191 1, 3. Defendant offered Plaintiff a
comparable job at another one of its facilties in Live Oak,
Florida, but Plaintiff declined the offer. Id. at ¶ 5.
P±aintiff does not allege to have suffered any unlawful
discrimination or harassment based on his race during this
initial period of employment. Id. at ¶ 4.
Defendant reopened the Plant in Douglas, Georgia, in 2010.
Id. at 91 6. Plant Manager Ralph Baker ("Baker"), a White male,
interviewed and hired Plaintiff for a supervisory position at
the Plant beginning in October 2010. Id. at 191 6-7. From
October 2010 to January 2011, Plaintiff worked as Debone
Supervisor and also assisted the personnel department in hiring
staff for the reopened Plant. Id. at 9191 8-9.
' Defendant has filed a Statement of Material Facts (dkt, no. 17-1),
and Plaintiff has filed a Response (dkt. no. 25) largely agreeing with
Defendant's recitation of the facts of this case. Accordingly, the
Court, for ease of exposition, cites only to Defendants' version of
the facts (dkt. no. 17-1) as the Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SUF")
and specifically notes herein any facts with which Plaintiff
disagrees. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a separate Statement of
Disputed Material Facts (dkt. no. 23), and, to the extent that
Defendant's Reply (dkt. no. 27) raises no objection thereto, the Court
treats these facts as undisputed and relies upon the same to
supplement the SUF as set forth herein.
O 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
2
In January 2011, Plaintiff transferred to the position of
Production Supervisor in the Plant's "cut-up, leg quarter,
chiller, and re-hang department." Id. at ¶ 9. In this
position, Plaintiff was responsible for ensuring that the
department's production line "maintained the proper flow of
chickens through the processing and production process"—which
included keeping the chickens chilled while they were cut up,
assessed by United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
officials and quality assurance personnel, and then sent forward
to the packaging area. Id. at ¶91 9, 12. Plaintiff supervised
roughly forty to fifty employees in his department during any
given shift. Id. at ¶ 10. He remained in this position until
nis termination on July 19, 2012. Id. at ¶ 11.
I. Regulations and Policies for Operating the Plant
As a food processing facility, the Plant is subject to
oversight and regulation by the USDA and the Food Safety and
Inspection Service ("FSIS"), a department within the USDA. Id.
at ¶91 12-13. The FSIS requires that USDA personnel inspect and
grade any meat that is produced. Id. at ¶ 13. Consequently,
USDA employees are physically present at the Plant to monitor
operations and ensure compliance with USDA and FSIS rules and
regulations. Id. at ¶ 14.
USDA personnel work twelve-hour shifts, and Defendant may
operate production lines at the Plant only when such personnel
AC) 2A
(Rex. /82)
3
are physically present to oversee operations. Id. at 191 14-15.
Plaintiff's department thus had to have all of the product off
of the floor at the end of the USDA personnel's shift and could
not run its processing line after that time. Id. at ¶ 15. If
Defendant were to run any of the Plant's production lines after
the USDA-mandated stop time, it could face severe consequences—
such as a fine, a shutdown of the Plant, or an order to destroy
any chickens processed after the stop time and thus forfeit
thousands of dollars in lost product. Id. at ¶ 16.
Defendant's employee handbook emphasizes that "[c]ompliance
with company safety policies, rules and regulations is a
condition of employment." SUF, Ex. 1 ("White Aff."), ¶ 25 & Ex.
C. A violation of a policy, rule, or regulation "may be subject
to disciplinary action, up to and including termination." Id.
at Ex. C, p. 22. The handbook further provides that
"[m]anagement is responsible for modeling, maintaining and
enforcing safe work practices and conditions." Id. Defendant
requires each employee to whom it distributes the handbook to
sign an acknowledgment confirming his or her receipt thereof and
agreement "to abide by and follow all company rules and
policies." Id. at Ex. C, p. 29.
On or around March 14, 2011, Plaintiff and other
supervisors at the Plant signed documents stipulating that they
had attended various meetings at which they discussed product
A0 72A
Re-,. /82)
4
rotation and that issues therewith would "result in disciplinary
action and up to discharge." SUF, ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 20.2 On
April 22, 2011, Defendant issued Plaintiff a written memorandum
specifying the requirements and expectations of him as
Production Supervisor, including that he was to comply with the
USDA and FSIS time limit for finishing all operations and having
all of the product off of the floor in his department. SUF, ¶
21. The memorandum concluded, "Sy signing this you understand
the expectation as stated above and that improvement in this
drea is expected and will be evaluated weekly." Id. Plaintiff
signed the memorandum, acknowledging his receipt of the document
and agreement with its content. Id.
On several occasions, including on May 4, 2011, Plaintiff
had conversations with his supervisor about "the need for
Plaintiff to comply with USDA and quality assurance .
requirements in his department." See id. at ¶ 22; Dkt. No. 25,
¶ 22. Defendant has produced internal memoranda dated May 5 and
16, 2011, neither of which identifies or contains a signature of
its author but which both Plaintiff and Defendant believe to
have been written by Plaintiff's supervisor and Shift Manager at
While Defendant contends that Plaintiff was counseled regarding
these issues, SUF, ¶ 20, Plaintiff asserts that he and the other
supervisors were simply asked to sign documents acknowledging that
they had attended meetings at which such counseling took place, dkt.
no. 25, ¶ 20.
According to Plaintiff, these conversations took place because his
supervisor did not understand the process. Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 22.
AO 7 2A
(Rex. 8/82)
5
the Plant, Tammy Gardino ("Gardino") . See SUF, ¶ 23; Dkt. No.
25, ¶ 23; Dkt. No. 20 ("Pl.'s Dep."), 68:18-69:8, 70:18-24,
72:24-74:5. The May 5, 2011, memorandum states that the author
had had disagreements with Plaintiff regarding the operations of
his department; that his department had been getting backed up;
Lhat another employee had reported that Plaintiff had not been
on the floor during some of the backups; and that Plaintiff, in
turn, had issued a verbal warning to this employee for not
carrying out his duties in a timely manner. SUF, ¶ 23. In the
May 16, 2011, memorandum, the author purports to have
"repeatedly told" Plaintiff not to run past the cut-off time.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Sometime shortly before July 18, 2012, Defendant held one
or more meetings with Plaintiff and other supervisors to
reiterate "the absolute importance of ensuring that all
operations on the chicken production line were completed and all
product off of the production floor prior to the USDA-mandated
cut-off ti[m]e." Id. at ¶ 25. With regard to the cut-off time,
Plaintiff has since testified, "We had meetings about
that. . . . Everybody knew. Supervisors knew." Id. (alteration
While Defendant represents that Gardino wrote the statements set
forth in these memoranda, SUF, ¶I 23-24, Plaintiff denies these facts
only insofar as the memoranda do not reference or contain signatures
oZ the author or an acknowledgement that Plaintiff ever received or
reviewed the same, dkt. no. 25, 9191 23-24. It thus appears that
Plaintiff disputes neither the existence nor contents of these
memoranda, but that a factual dispute exists as to the author or
authors thereof.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
6
in original) . Plaintiff also has acknowledged that at these
I
meetings, Defendant informed him that "if operations were not
completed by the USDA required time, the [P]iant could be shut
down altogether." Id. at ¶ 26.
In the days just prior to July 18, 2012, Defendant issued a
mandate stating that all members of the processing management
Leam, which included Plaintiff, were to have completed
production and be off of-the production floor by 6:30 PM to
comply with USDA and FSIS requirements. Id. at ¶ 19. Defendant
informed Plaintiff of the consequences to the company and to him
individually if operations were carried out in violation of USDA
and P515 regulations. Id.
Ii. Operational Issues at the Plant
Jeff Moss ("Moss"), a White male, was Shift Manager at the
Plant and took over Plaintiff's duties on one occasion while
Plaintiff was on vacation. Dkt. No. 23, ¶ 8.
Plaintiff has
testified that while under Moss's supervision, his department
did not get the chicken off of the floor on time, and the USDA
shut down the Plant. Pl.'s dep., 96:22-97:6. Moss was not
terminated, dkt. no. 23, ¶ 8, but Defendant held a meeting upon
Plaintiff's return from vacation, at which Moss, Plaintiff, and
Defendant's briefing refers to this individual as "Jeff Maas," see,
e.g., dkt. no. 27, p. 7; however, as Defendant has not objected to
Plaintiff's factual statement on the matter, the court uses the
designation as it appears therein.
\O 72A
(Re\. 8182)
7
others discussed the incident and strategies to prevent its
reoccurrence, Pl.'s dep., 98:11-99:1.
Plaintiff also has testified that Vanessa Smith ("Smith"),
a White female in the packaging department, once put the wrong
dates on packages of meat. Pl.'s Dep.,
122:16_123:5.6 Defendant
had to recall the truck carrying these meat packages and redo
the labels before sending the packages back out for delivery.
Id. at 123:10-11. Smith was not terminated as a result of this
incident. Dkt. No. 23, ¶ 9.
At some point in time, Plaintiff's department began running
past the USDA time limit. Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff consistently
reported to management the issues that he believed to be causing
the backups, including production delays in other departments as
well as problems with the hangers in his department. Id. at ¶91
3 10-11. According to Plaintiff, management disregarded these
reports without taking any corrective action, but gave Plaintiff
. high performance review and a bonus in 2012 partially due to
these efforts.
Id. at ¶91 5, 7, 11.
In July 2012, Plaintiff was working the "first shift,"
which ran from 8:30 AM to 6:30 PM, at which time Plaintiff
needed to have the production line in his department completely
shut down. SUF, ¶ 17. On July 13, 2012, Plaintiff's department
6
At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that he was unsure whether
Smith made this error, or whether it was the other employee who was
authorized to print date labels. Pl.'s Dep., 122:25-123:4.
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
8
came very close to running operations past the cut-off time.
Id. at ¶ 27. On July 18, 2012, the product flow in this
department backed up severely, resulting in product falling onto
the floor and needing to be discarded. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff
continued to run operations past the USDA time limit on this
day, and the USDA shut down the Plant as a result. Id.
III. Investigation into the July 18, 2012, Incident
The Plant's upper management launched an investigation into
the circumstances that caused or contributed to the July 18,
2012, shutdown. See Id. at 191 34-36. complex Manager David
White ("White"), who is a White male, White aff., ¶ 5,
instructed Baker and Human Resources Manager LaRahn Phillips
"'Phillips"), who is a Black female, to interview witnesses and
determine what had happened, whether any employee was at fault,
and what could be done to address the situation, SUE', ¶ 35.
Plaintiff is not personally aware of what Defendant's upper
management did to investigate the incident or whom they
interviewed regarding the incident. Id. at ¶ 34. Nevertheless,
he has since maintained that the incident was the fault of other
individuals, including those who designed the Plant, as well as
supervisors and workers in other departments. Id. at ¶ 29. For
example, Plaintiff has cited the Manager of the evisceration
department, whom he had approached shortly before the July 18,
\U 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
2012, incident, about operations in that department repeatedly
running late. Id.
Management, however, determined from their investigation of
the incident that, in their opinion, the following had occurred:
Plaintiff had disregarded certain directions that had
been given to him regarding operations in his
department[;] he had failed to properly follow certain
standard operating procedures, policies and USDA
directives[;] he had failed to properly notify
USDA/FSIS and [c]ompany officials of the impending
crises[;] and that he had further failed to take
proper ownership of the situation as events unfolded
and thereafter.
id. at ¶ 36. Management found that, in their opinion,
"[Plaintiff's] decision to continue to run outside of USDA and
[c]ompany guidelines, and his failure to inform the USDA in
advance of the issue, resulted in thousands of dollars of
product being wasted." White Aff., ¶ 15. Management concluded
that the incident on July 18, 2012, "was a chaotic situation
that could have been better handled and managed by Plaintiff
particularly . . . because the very circumstances at issue
(not running past [the] cut-off time) had just been discussed
with Plaintiff several times in the days just prior to July 18,
2012." SUF, ¶ 37.
The Plant's senior management wrote a letter to USDA and
FSIS on July 19, 2012, with the subject line, "Exceeding 12
hours on 7/18/12." Id. at ¶ 32. The letter summarized the
events that had taken place in Plaintiff's department on the
10
AO 72.\
(Rev. 8/82)
I
previous day, including that "the leg quarter area still had
product on the line at and after 1830 [the USDA-mandated stop
time] ." Id. (alteration in original) . The letter noted that
"mistakes were made by management not properly communicating to
FSIS that working past the cut-off time was a real possibility
and having quality assurance wait until the last moment to act."
Id. at ¶ 33. The letter outlined certain operational changes
that would be made to prevent such mistakes in the future and
concluded with a plea for the USDA to agree to resume
inspections so that production at the Plant could continue. Id.
Defendant required that all management, including Plaintiff,
sign the letter to acknowledge the significance of the problems
and to reflect their commitment to executing all necessary
corrective actions. Id.
IV. Plaintiff's Termination and Administrative Action
In a meeting on July 19, 2012, Baker and Phillips informed
Plaintiff of management's decision to terminate his employment
at the Plant. Id. at ¶ 38, As to the reasons for his
termination, White has since explained that "[e]ven though
[Plaintiff] had previously been a good, long-term employee in
general, [management] felt that the circumstances were serious
enough that it warranted his immediate termination." White
Aff., ¶ 22. White has further stated that, "The circumstances
leading up to [Plaintiff's] termination were unique. To my
AO 72A
(Rev. S,2)
11
knowledge, no similar instances had occurred previously,
particularly right after management had been told not to let
cnis happen." Id. at ¶ 23. Notably, White began working at the
Plant in 2011. Id. at ¶ 3.
Phillips, whose employment at the Plant likewise began in
2011, has similarly indicated that she is "not aware of any
similar situations prior to this where a supervisor, who had
lust recently been warned against letting his line under his
direct and regular supervision run past the cut-off time,
allowed his line to run [past] the cut-off time, causing the
[P]lant to shut down." Dkt. No. 27, Ex. 1 ("Phillips Decl."),
191 2, 5. Specifically, Phillips has represented that she is
"unaware of [Moss] running a production line past the USDA cutoff time or otherwise engaging in any situations similar to the
events that lead to [Plaintiff's] termination." Id. at ¶ 6.
Nor is she "[]aware of . . . Smith engaging in any misprint of
labels incident." Id.
As to their meeting to terminate Plaintiff, "[n]obody told
PLaintiff that he was terminated by [Defendant] because he is
[S]ack." SUF, ¶ 42. "Nobody said or indicated anything to
Plaintiff that his race was a factor at all in the [c]ompany's
decision to terminate his employment." Id. at ¶ 43. Nor had
Plaintiff ever gone to the human resources department or to
upper management during his employment to complain of any kind
12
(Re. S,82)
of discriminatory or harassing treatment of him based on his
race. Id. at ¶ 45,
Nevertheless, Plaintiff filed a charge of race
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") on November 16, 2012. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff stated
in the EEOC charge that he "was told by . . . Baker (White),
Plant Manager, that [he] was discharged due to failure to leave
the floor on time." Id. at ¶ 40. Plaintiff asserted, however,
that he was discriminated against because he was terminated on
the basis of his race. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff subsequently
2eceived a notice from the EEOC, dated September 4, 2014,
informing him of his right to sue. Dkt. No. 1-2.
V.
Plaintiff's Causes of Action
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in this Court
on December 1, 2014. Dkt. No. 1. The Complaint alleges one
count of disparate treatment race discrimination, in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"). Id. at ¶I 17-24. Plaintiff requests
that the Court enjoin Defendant from engaging in unlawful
employment practices and award him compensatory damages,
punitive damages, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees. Id.
at pp. 7-8.
A0 72A
(Rex. 8/82)
13
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
imvant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law." FindWhat Inv'r
Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011)
quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)) . A dispute over such a fact is "genuine" if the
"evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Id. In making this determination,
the court is to view all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Johnson v. Booker T.
Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir.
2000).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) . To
satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Id. at 325. If the moving party discharges this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and
AO 72A
Si2)
14
present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of
fact does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in two ways: First,
the nonmovant "may show that the record in fact contains
supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion, which was 'overlooked or ignored' by the moving party,
who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an
absence of evidence." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
332 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) . Second, the nonmovant "may come
forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a
directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged
evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117. Where the nonmovant
attempts to carry this burden instead with nothing more "than a
repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for
the defendants [is] not only proper but required." Morris v.
Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R.
("iv. P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION
Defendant now moves for summary judgment in its favor on
Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Dkt. No. 18. Defendant contends
that Plaintiff cannot establish two essential elements of his
prima fade case: first, that he was qualified for the position
that he held, and, second, that Defendant treated similarly
A0 72A
(Rev.
2)
15
situated employees outside of his minority class more favorably.
Id. at pp. 6-8. Even if Plaintiff could make such a showing,
Defendant argues, he cannot demonstrate that Defendant's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging him were
merely pretext. Id. at pp. 8-15. Plaintiff has filed a
Response urging the Court to deny Defendant's Motion because the
evidence in the record sufficiently supports a prima facie case
of discrimination and a finding of pretext. Dkt. No. 22. In
support, Plaintiff relies primarily on the evidence of prior
incidents involving Moss and Smith, as well as Plaintiff's
repeated reports of production problems that management
disregarded. Id. at pp. 8-11.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a) (1) . Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the plaintiff
in a Title VII case bears the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of race discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) . To do so, a plaintiff must show that she (1) belongs to
a racial minority; (2) was subjected to an adverse employment.
action; (3) was treated less favorably than similarly situated,
ionminority employees; and (4) was qualified for the job.
Plaintiff initially argues that he has properly exhausted his
administrative remedies as to his discrimination claim, dkt. no. 22,
p. 5-6; however, as Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff's claim on
exhaustion grounds, see dkt. no. 18, the Court finds no reason to
dress this issue here.
AO 72A
(Rex.
2)
16
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Coutu v. Martin Cty.
Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995); and
Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.
1994)) . This burden is not a heavy one, as the plaintiff need
only put forth facts that permit an inference of discrimination
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. (citing Williams v.
Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994)). However,
"[i]f a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly
situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate where no
other evidence of discrimination is present." Id.
Should the plaintiff succeed in establishing a prima facie
case, the burden shifts then to the defendant "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If the
defendant is able to do so, the plaintiff "must then have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804).
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the first two
elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case are satisfied, because
Plaintiff, who is Black, is a member of a racial minority, and
AO 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
17
his termination on July 19, 2012, constituted an adverse
employment action. See Dkt. No. 18,
p. 6; Dkt. No. 22, p. 7.
Rather, at issue here is whether Plaintiff was treated less
favorably than similarly situated, nonminority employees, and
whether he was qualified for his job, under the third and fourth
elements respectively.
In comparing an employer's treatment of a plaintiff to that
of nonminority employees, "the plaintiff must show that [s]he
and the employees are similarly situated in all relevant
respects." Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562 (citing Smith v. Stratus
Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1994); Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); and Smith v.
1ionsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985)).
In the
context of allegedly discriminatory discipline, this requires
showing that "the employees [were] involved in or accused of the
same or similar conduct and [were] disciplined in different
ways." Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th
Cir. 1999)). "[T]he quantity and quality of the comparator's
misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing
apples with oranges." Id. at 1323 & n.2 (quoting Maniccia, 171
F.3d at 1368).
AO 72A
(Rev. /2)
18
Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence that Moss,
Smith, or any other nonminority employee was sufficiently
similarly situated as to satisfy the third element of his prima
facie case. Plaintiff points only to his deposition testimony
that Moss, a White male, held the position of Shift Manager at
the Plant and once took over Plaintiff's duties while he was on
vacation. Dkt. No. 23, ¶ 8. Plaintiff related at his
deposition that Moss failed to complete operations in his
department by the USDA-mandated stop time and caused a Plant
shutdown, but that he was not terminated and, instead, was
required to meet with Plaintiff and other employees to discuss
the incident and strategies to prevent its reoccurrence. Pl.'s
Dep., 96:22-99:1. Plaintiff also has submitted deposition
testimony indicating that Smith, a White female who worked in
the packaging department, once misdated several packages of
meat—the result of which was that the truck carrying these
packages had to return to the Plant for relabeling prior to
delivery, without Smith facing discharge. Id. at 122 : 16_123 : 11 . 8
Significantly, Plaintiff's evidence shows that Moss and
Smith held different positions and had different
responsibilities than Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Aaron Rents,
Inc., 262 F. App'x 202, 208 (11th Cir. 2008) (no valid
While Plaintiff admitted that he was unsure as to whether Smith or
another employee made this error, Pl.'s dep., 122:25-123:4, Plaintiff
fails to show a viable comparator based on this incident in any event.
19
AC) 72A
(Rev. S/82)
I
comparator where another employee "held a different position
with job responsibilities" that were unlike those of the
plaintiff) . Moss was a Shift Manager, not the Production
Supervisor in the cut-up, leg quarter, chiller, and re-hang
department. See Dkt. No. 23, ¶ 8. The record reflects that
Moss filled in for Plaintiff in this position while he was on
vacation; however, it is undisputed that he did so only
temporarily, and that his regular duties did not include
supervising the production line and the employees in this
department. See id. While Smith's precise job title is
unclear, the evidence shows that she worked in the packaging
area and held responsibilities relating to packaging, labeling,
and dating the product—a position wholly dissimilar to
Plaintiff's supervisory role in the cut-up, leg quarter,
chiller, and re-hang department. See Pl.'s Dep., 122:16-123:11.
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the incidents
involving Moss and Smith varied drastically from Plaintiff's
situation. While it is true that Moss's incident involved a
oroduction backup that caused a violation of the USDA cut-off
time and a Plant shutdown, Id. at 96:22-99:1, nothing suggests
that Moss, unlike Plaintiff, had had several conversations and
meetings in the preceding months regarding the need to comply
with the USDA stop time to prevent a Plant shutdown and had
received a company mandate reiterating this message just days
AO '2
(Rev. 8182)
20
before, cf. SUE, ¶T 19, 22, 25 ("We had meetings about
that. . . . Everybody knew. Supervisors knew.") . As to Smith,
Plaintiff has offered no evidence that her misdating of meat
packages violated any USDA policy; that recalling the truck to
relabel these packages was similar to a complete Plant shutdown;
or that this mistake cost the Plant thousands of dollars, cf.
White aff., ¶ 15. Even if Plaintiff had introduced such
evidence, there is nothing in the record indicating when the
incident involving Smith took place, much less that it took
place just after Smith had engaged in numerous conversations and
meetings, and received a warning, about not taking the precise
action that caused the incident. Indeed, neither White nor
Phillips recalls any incidents in which employees—Moss and Smith
included—violated policies right after receiving directives not
to do so. See id. at ¶ 23; Phillips Deci., ¶ 5.
Nor is there any evidence that investigations into the Moss
and Smith incidents revealed further grounds—beyond violating
USDA or company policy—upon which to find these employees
culpable. Unlike in Plaintiff's case, see SUF, ¶ 36, nothing
indicates that management determined that either Moss or Smith
had disregarded specific directions that had been given to them
regarding the operations of their departments. The evidence
likewise does not suggest that management found that these
individuals had failed to properly notify USDA, FSIS, and
AO '2A
(Rc. S,2)
21
company officials of the impending crisis, or that they had
failed to take ownership of the situation after the fact. Cf.
id.
Plaintiff also has not put forth evidence that the same
decision-makers in his case handled the incidents involving Moss
and Smith. See Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
i989) (employees are not similarly situated where their
misconduct occurred under different supervisors, and the
supervisors who took an adverse action against the plaintiff for
the same misconduct were unaware of the prior instances) . The
record reflects that two of the primary decision-makers in
Plaintiff's investigation and termination, White and Phillips,
did not begin working at the Plant until 2011. White Aff., ¶ 3;
Phillips Deci., ¶ 2. While the timing of Moss's and Smith's
incidents remains unclear, both White and Phillips have stated,
under penalty of perjury, that they do not recall any incidents
similar to Plaintiff's having taken place at the Plant. White
Aff., ¶ 23; Phillips Decl., ¶ 5. Phillips, in particular, has
indicated that she is unaware of any prior incidents involving
Moss or Smith. Phillips Decl., ¶ 6.
Nor does Plaintiff offer any other evidence that would
allow for an inference of discrimination in the absence of
comparator evidence. Plaintiff has admitted that he never went
to the human resources department or to upper management during
22
AC) 72A
2)
his employment to complain of any kind of discriminatory or
harassing treatment of him based on his race. SUE, ¶ 45.
Rather, it is undisputed that Plaintiff's only basis for
alleging discrimination is his termination, and he has
acknowledged that "[n]obody said or indicated anything to [him]
That his race was a factor at all in the
[c]ompany's decision to
terminate his employment." Id. at ¶ 43. While Plaintiff
emphasizes that management ignored his repeated reports of
production issues and failed to take corrective action, see dkt.
no. 22, p. 9, these facts serve only to undermine the strength
of management's reason for terminating Plaintiff and do not, in
any way, change the very reason for termination itself. That
is, even if management's actions in ignoring Plaintiff's reports
suggest that perhaps Plaintiff was not solely to blame for the
July 18, 2012, incident, these actions have no bearing on
whether management acted with a discriminatory motive in
terminating Plaintiff. See Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters
Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 567 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Even if the
[c]ompany was wrong on its
. . determination, if that was the
reason for the employment action, its error in that
determination would not be a basis for claiming . .
discrimination." (citing Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738
F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The employer may fire an
employee for . . . a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no
AO 72A
(Rev. S1b2)
23
reason at all, as long as his action is not for a discriminatory
reason."))
As Plaintiff does not point to any evidence of a similarly
situated, nonminority employee, or any evidence that would
otherwise permit an inference that Defendant discriminated
against him on the basis of his race, Plaintiff fails to show
That there is any genuine issue for the jury under the third
element. In these circumstances, the court need not proceed to
he fourth element—his qualification for the job—to conclude
that summary judgment is appropriate. See Holifield, 115 F.3d
at 1562 ("If a plaintiff fails to show the existence of a
similarly situated employee, summary judgment is appropriate
where no other evidence of discrimination is present.")
Defendant's Motion is, therefore,
GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 17) is GRANTED in its entirety. The
Clerk of court is hereby DIRECTED to enter the appropriate
judgment and to close this case.
SO ORDERED,
this 14TH day of March, 2016.
LISA GODBEY aOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AO 72A
Rv. 8/82)
24
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?