Rowland v. Colvin

Filing 15

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner re 1 Complaint filed by Amy Rowland. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE this case. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 3/24/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPROT AND RECOMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 3/10/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

AMY ROWLAND,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:15-cv-61

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff contests the decision of Administrative Law Judge John H. Maclean, (“the ALJ”
or “ALJ Maclean”) denying her claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income benefits. Plaintiff urges the Court to remand this case for a proper
determination of the evidence.
affirmed.

Defendant asserts the Commissioner’s decision should be

For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND the Court AFFIRM the

Commissioner’s decision. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to
CLOSE this case.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and
supplemental security income benefits on November 16, 2012, alleging that she became disabled
on July 1, 2012, due to chronic migraine headaches, as well as back, neck, and feet impairments.
(Doc. 9-5, p. 2; Doc. 9-6, p. 6.) After her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration,
Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. On November 6, 2014, ALJ Maclean conducted a
video hearing at which Plaintiff, who was represented by Andrew S. Youngman, a non-attorney

representative, appeared and testified in Waycross, Georgia, while the ALJ presided in
Savannah, Georgia. (Doc. 9-2, p. 19.) Kenneth L. Bennett, a vocational expert, also appeared at
the hearing. (Id.) ALJ Maclean found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. (Id. at p. 28.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of
the ALJ’s decision, and the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner
for judicial review. (Id. at p. 2.)
Plaintiff, born on August 20, 1979, was thirty-five (35) years old when ALJ Maclean
issued his final decision. She has a high school education. (Doc. 9-6, p. 7.) Plaintiff’s past
relevant work experience includes employment as a cashier/checker, nurse assistant, and
dispatcher. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I.

The ALJ’s Findings
Pursuant to the Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step process to determine

whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137, 140 (1987). The first step determines if the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful
activity.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity,
then benefits are immediately denied. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in such activity, then
the second inquiry is whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of
impairments as defined by the “severity regulation.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c);
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140–41. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments is
severe, then the evaluation proceeds to step three. The third step requires a determination of
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the Code of
Federal Regulations (“the Regulations”) and acknowledged by the Commissioner as sufficiently

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severe to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) & 416.920(d); 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1; Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). If
the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the plaintiff is presumed disabled.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed impairments, the sequential
evaluation proceeds to the fourth step to determine if the impairment precludes the claimant from
performing past relevant work, i.e., whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work. Id.; Stone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 503 F. App’x
692, 693 (11th Cir. 2013). A claimant’s RFC “is an assessment . . . of the claimant’s remaining
ability to do work despite h[er] impairments.” Id. at 693–94 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Lewis
v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). If the claimant is unable to perform her past
relevant work, the final step of the evaluation process determines whether she is able to make
adjustments to other work in the national economy, considering her age, education, and work
experience. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. Disability benefits will be awarded only if the claimant
is unable to perform other work. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 142.
In the instant case, the ALJ followed this sequential process to determine that Plaintiff
did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of
July 1, 2012, through the date of ALJ Maclean’s decision on January 15, 2015. (Doc. 9-2, p. 21.)
At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had migraine headaches, obesity, and
anxiety/depression, conditions considered “severe” under the severity regulation. However, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments did not meet or medically
equal a listed impairment under the Regulations. (Id. at p. 22) ALJ Maclean also determined
Plaintiff suffers from bilateral foot pain, hypertension, and low back pain, but concluded these

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conditions were non-severe impairments. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC,
through the date of his decision, to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b), except that Plaintiff should perform simple, repetitive, and routine work; interact
with the public, co-workers, and supervisors occasionally; be required to do no fast-paced work;
occasionally flex the neck; should not work around hazardous machinery; can occasionally
stoop; and can frequently crawl, kneel, and crouch. (Id. at p. 24.) At the next step, ALJ Maclean
noted Plaintiff was not able to perform her past relevant work. (Id. at p. 27.) The ALJ
concluded at the fifth and final step that Plaintiff could perform the jobs of cafeteria attendant
and cleaner, all of which are light work with a Specific Vocational Preparation of 2, and exist in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at p. 28.)
II.

Issues Presented
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to rule on her post hearing objections

regarding the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony. (Doc. 11, p. 3.) Specifically,
Plaintiff avers that the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could perform jobs inconsistent
with the limitations noted in her RFC and that the ALJ failed to address this inconsistency. Next,
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he found Plaintiff’s migraine headaches to be a “severe
impairment,” yet did not evaluate that condition under the appropriate listing at Step Three.
Finally, Plaintiff avers the ALJ erred by failing to include any migraine-related limitation in his
RFC finding. (Id. at p. 6.)
III.

Standard of Review
It is well-established that judicial review of social security cases is limited to questions of

whether the Commissioner’s factual findings are supported by “substantial evidence,” and
whether the Commissioner has applied appropriate legal standards.

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Cornelius v. Sullivan,

936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
A reviewing court does not “decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence or substitute” its judgment
for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Even if
the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s factual findings, the court must affirm a
decision supported by substantial evidence. Id.
However, substantial evidence must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of
the fact to be proved. The evidence relied upon must be relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind would find adequate to support a conclusion. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496
F. 3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). The substantial evidence standard requires more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. In its review, the
court must also determine whether the ALJ or Commissioner applied appropriate legal standards.
Failure to delineate and apply the appropriate standards mandates that the findings be vacated
and remanded for clarification. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1146.
IV.

Whether the ALJ Erred by Failing to Rule on Plaintiff’s Post Hearing Objections
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to address her post

hearing objections regarding the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony. At Plaintiff’s
hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert involving an individual with
Plaintiff’s RFC and additional limitations and then asked whether a person with those limitations
could perform any jobs. (Doc. 9-2, p. 50.) The vocational expert testified that “such an
individual” with Plaintiff’s limitations “could work as a cafeteria attendant, DOT number
311.677-010” or as a “cleaner, DOT number 323.687-014[.]” 1 (Id.) The vocational expert

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Based upon the vocational expert’s statement, it is apparent that he relied upon the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”), as opposed to the Occupational Outlook Handbook (“OOH”), when
formulating his opinion. Accordingly, the Court will presume that the ALJ also based his Step 5
determination upon the DOT, as opposed to the OOH.
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testified that approximately 100,000 cafeteria attendant and 150,000 cleaner positions exist in
that national economy, while 2,000 cafeteria attendant and 3,000 cleaner positions exist in the
regional economy. (Id.) The ALJ then asked the vocational expert whether those positions were
consistent with the DOT, to which the vocational expert replied in the affirmative.

(Id.)

Following the hearing, Plaintiff submitted a post-hearing memorandum to ALJ Maclean,
in which she argued that the jobs cited by the vocational expert are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
RFC. (Doc. 9-7, p. 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff objected that, “according to the Occupational
Outlook Handbook, [cafeteria attendant and cleaner jobs] require more than occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors[.]” (Id.) Because Plaintiff’s RFC requires that
Plaintiff interact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors occasionally, Plaintiff averred that
the vocational expert’s testimony that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform the jobs
of cafeteria attendant and cleaner was not reliable. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ’s failure to
address her objections regarding the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony requires the
Court to remand this case for a proper determination of the evidence. (Doc. 11, p. 5.) Defendant
responds that the ALJ’s failure to rule upon Plaintiff’s post hearing objections resulted in
harmless error and that the ALJ’s Step 5 determination is supported by substantial evidence.
(Doc. 12, p. 10.)
“The Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Manual (“HALLEX”) is a policy manual written
by the Social Security Administration to provide guidance on procedural matters.” Warren v.
Astrue, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
“has not decided whether HALLEX carries the force of law.” McCabe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
661 F. App’x 596, 599 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing George v. Astrue, 338 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th
Cir. 2009) (calling the assumption that HALLEX carries the force of law “a very big

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assumption”)). “While the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed whether the HALLEX
creates judicially-enforceable rights, ‘[w]hat is certain, however, is that—if it does—remand is
mandated only when the ALJ violates procedures in the HALLEX.’” Warren, 830 F. Supp at
1372 (citing Tarver v. Astrue, No. CA 10-0247-C, 2011 WL 206217, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan 21,
2011)).

Nonetheless, even if the ALJ violates HALLEX procedures, “remand is required

only . . . if the violation prejudices the claimant.” Weber v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv25-FtM-CM, 2017 WL 727765, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2017) (citing Cohan v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 6:10–cv–719–Orl–35DAB, 2011 WL 3319608, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 29,
2011)). See e.g., Carroll v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 453 F. App’x 889, 892–93 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding that agency’s violation of its own governing rules must result in prejudice to support
remand for agency noncompliance).
Here, the parties do not dispute that the ALJ violated HALLEX Rule I-2-6-74, which
requires that “the ALJ must . . . rule on any objection [to the vocational expert’s testimony] on
the record during the hearing, in narrative form as a separate exhibit, or in the body of his or her
decision.”

I-2-6-74. Testimony of a Vocational Expert, Social Security Administration,

https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-6-74.html (last updated June 6, 2016). However,
the parties do dispute whether the ALJ’s procedural violation resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to examine her objections, which highlighted the disparity
between the OOH definition of “food and beverage serving and related workers” and “maids and
housekeeping cleaners,” and Plaintiff’s RFC, “directly affect[ed] his Step 5 finding that there are
other jobs Plaintiff could perform[.]” (Doc. 11, p. 5.)
However, Defendant maintains that the ALJ’s failure to examine the OOH—and the job
descriptions contained within that source—after the hearing did not prejudice Plaintiff because

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the ALJ properly relied upon only the DOT and the vocational expert’s testimony. Defendant
submits that the OOH defines a wider array of “cafeteria attendant” and “cleaner” jobs than the
DOT jobs referenced by the vocational expert at the hearing, and, as a result, the ALJ’s
consideration of that source would have been unnecessary and unrelated to the narrow subset of
DOT-defined “cafeteria attendant” and “cleaner” jobs which were factored into the ALJ’s Step
Five Determination at the hearing. (Doc. 12, p. 11.) Accordingly, Defendant maintains that ALJ
Maclean’s consideration of the OOH would not have changed his Step Five finding.
Accordingly, the Court must determine if the ALJ’s failure to consider the OOH
description of “food and beverage serving and related workers” and “maids and housekeeping
cleaners,” resulted in prejudice to Plaintiff. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that
the ALJ is bound by the OOH or should have addressed that source when making his Step 5
determination. See Palomino v. Colvin, No. ED CV 14-212-SP, 2015 WL 2409881, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. May 20, 2015) (finding inapposite plaintiff’s contention that the vocational expert’s
testimony conflicted with the OOH, as “the OOH is one of several competent sources of job
information” and that the Commissioner’s regulations “do not provide that the OOH is the
controlling source”) (emphasis supplied). The ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert
who tailored his opinions to a narrow set of DOT-defined jobs. Plaintiff was not prejudiced
simply because the ALJ did not also consult the OOH in response to Plaintiff’s post hearing
objections.
Here, the vocational expert testified that Plaintiff could perform “cafeteria attendant” and
“cleaner” jobs as defined by the DOT. While Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have based
his Step Five analysis on a combination of the DOT’s description of “cafeteria attendant” and
“cleaner” jobs as well as the OOH’s description of “food and beverage serving and related

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workers” and “maids and housekeeping cleaners,” the two sources address different positions, as
evidenced by the different titles of those positions. Further, as demonstrated by the vocational
expert’s testimony at the hearing and the ALJ’s Step Five analysis, ALJ Maclean relied upon the
DOT and the vocational expert’s testimony regarding a DOT-defined set of jobs. Accordingly,
analysis of the OOH and consideration of jobs with different titles and different requirements
would have been unrelated to the ALJ’s specific finding as it pertained to Plaintiff’s ability to
perform the “cafeteria attendant” and “cleaner” jobs as defined by the DOT. As a result, ALJ
Maclean’s failure to address Plaintiff’s objections was harmless error, and the Court need not
remand this case.
V.

Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Consider Plaintiff’s Migraines at Step Three
Next, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ failed to determine whether Plaintiff’s migraine headaches

met or equaled a listed impairment. (Doc. 11, pp. 9–10.) Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ should
have evaluated her migraine headaches in accordance with Listing 11.03 for non-conclusive
epilepsy and that his failure to do so resulted in reversible error. Defendant responds that the
ALJ was not required to specify which listings he considered in his decision and that substantial
evidence supports his conclusion that “[c]laimant’s physical impairments do not meet or equal
any of the relevant listings.” (Doc. 12, pp. 3, 8; Doc. 9-2, p. 22.)
If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ must
then determine whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed
in the severity regulation of the Code of Federal Regulations and acknowledged by the
Commissioner as sufficiently severe to preclude substantial gainful activity.

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d) & 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1; Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238.
The claimant bears the burden of proving her impairment meets or equals one of the Listings.

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Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2012). If the
claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the Listings, the ALJ will find the claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii) and (d). “While the ALJ is required to consider the
Listing of Impairments in making a decision at step three,” he is not required to “‘mechanically
recite’ the evidence or listings [he] has considered.” Flemming v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 635
F. App’x 673, 676 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir.
1986)).

“There may be an implied finding that a claimant does not meet a listing.”

Id.

“Therefore, in the absence of an explicit determination, [the Court] may infer from the record
that the ALJ implicitly considered and found that a claimant’s disability did not meet a listing.”
Id. Accordingly, to determine if an ALJ considered a Listing, the Court must review the ALJ’s
findings and determine if there is an implied finding that Plaintiff did not meet or equal a listing.
Listing 11.03 requires that Plaintiff experience “alteration of awareness or loss of consciousness
and transient postictal manifestations of unconventional behavior or significant interference with
activity during the day.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Supbt. P, App.1 § 11.03.
Here, the ALJ’s failure to discuss Listing 11.03 at Step Three does not show that he did
not consider that listing. First, the ALJ specifically stated that, as to Plaintiff’s alleged physical
impairments, he considered the objective evidence and evaluated whether any medical source
had mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any listed impairment,
individually or in combination. (Doc. 9-2, p. 22.) The ALJ then found that the record contains
no evidence supporting Plaintiff’s contention that any of her physical impairments—which
includes her migraine headaches—meet or equal “any of the relevant listings.” (Id.) The
remainder of the ALJ’s decision reflects that he considered evidence of Plaintiff’s migraine
headaches. First, the ALJ noted that “claimant experiences frequent migraine headaches . . .

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[which are] associated with nausea, vomiting, photophobia, and sonophobia.” (Id. at p. 21.) The
ALJ then extensively reviewed Plaintiff’s medical history, which included her treatment for
migraine headaches, and implicitly found that her migraine headaches do not meet or equal any
listed impairment, including Listing 11.03.
The ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s credibility further demonstrates that he implicitly
found that Plaintiff’s migraine headaches did not meet or equal Listing 11.03. For example, ALJ
Maclean noted that Plaintiff’s alleged limitations are not consistent with her activities of daily
living, which includes attending to her personal care, laundry, occasional shopping, driving short
distances, some housework, recreational fishing, and walking and jogging for weight loss. (Id.)
For Plaintiff to show that her impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified
medical criteria. If an impairment manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely,
it does not qualify. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). The facts cited in the ALJ’s
decision pertaining to Plaintiff’s credibility support the proposition that Plaintiff’s migraine
headaches do not “significant[ly] interfere[ ] with activity during the day,” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Supbt. P, App.1 § 11.03, and, therefore, do not meet or equal Listing 11.03. Accordingly, a
review of the record and the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that the ALJ sufficiently considered
Plaintiff’s migraine headaches in combination with her other impairments, and implicitly
determined that her condition does not meet or equal Listing 11.03. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s implicit determination that Plaintiff did not meet or equal Listing
11.03, and this enumeration of error is without merit.
VI.

Whether the ALJ Erred by Failing to Include Plaintiff’s Migraine-related
Limitations in the RFC Finding
Despite finding Plaintiff’s migraine headaches were a “severe impairment,” the ALJ did

not include that limitation in his RFC finding. Plaintiff contends that, by definition, a “severe”

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impairment limits a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. (Doc. 11, p. 12 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1521(a).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ’s failure to include

migraine headaches as a limitation in his RFC determination is inconsistent with his finding that
she suffers from a severe impairment. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed
reversible error and that the Court should remand her case for a proper determination of
Plaintiff’s RFC.
Defendant maintains ALJ Maclean’s finding that Plaintiff could perform a range of light
work, with additional limitations, is based on a review of the entire record and in consideration
of Plaintiff’s impairments as a whole. (Doc. 12, p. 3.) Defendant states that the ALJ properly
discounted the credibility of Plaintiff’s statements concerning her migraine headaches and that
Plaintiff failed to show her migraine headaches resulted in any work-related limitations beyond
those the ALJ cited in his RFC determination. (Id. at pp. 3–4, 7–8.) Accordingly, Defendant
contends substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s migraine headaches do
not impede her ability to perform light work. (Id. at p. 8.)
In finding that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform work at the light exertional level, with
certain exceptions, ALJ Maclean stated he considered all symptoms and the extent those
symptoms could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and
other evidence of record.

(Doc. 9-2, p. 24.)

While the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, the ALJ
did not find Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
those symptoms to be “entirely credible[.]” (Id. at p. 25.) As to Plaintiff’s credibility concerning
her claim of debilitating migraine headaches, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations to be greatly
exaggerated. Plaintiff stated to consultative examiners that she has fifteen (15) migraines per

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month that each last between 4–5 days. (Id.) As the ALJ noted, Plaintiff’s allegations are
mathematically impossible, as there are not 60–75 days in a single month. Further, Plaintiff
reported to her neurologist that she has headaches only 2–3 times per week. The ALJ further
noted that Plaintiff’s treatment regimen is inconsistent with her allegations. (Id.) For example,
Plaintiff originally told doctors that she had experienced migraines since she was twelve (12)
years old, but reported to the consultative examiner that she first experienced migraines in 2006.
(Id.)
As to the debilitating nature of Plaintiff’s migraine headaches, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff stated she did not take any medications at a consultative examination in 2014, despite
the fact that she was prescribed several medications for headaches. (Id.) The ALJ further noted
that Plaintiff’s alleged limitations are not consistent with her activities of daily living, which
includes attending to her personal care, laundry, occasional shopping, driving short distances,
some housework, recreational fishing, and walking and jogging for weight loss. (Id.) Finally,
looking to the medical evidence, ALJ Maclean accorded little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s
neurologist, Dr. Harsh Singh, that Plaintiff would have significant difficulties concentrating due
to migraines. (Id. at p. 26.) Dr. Singh made this determination despite the fact that he had not
seen Plaintiff in over two years, and the ALJ noted that his determination appeared to largely be
a reiteration of Plaintiff’s allegations and was not based on any objective medical findings. (Id.)
ALJ Maclean looked at the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record, as
well as Plaintiff’s subjective allegations in reaching his conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of
performing light work, with certain limitations. The substantial evidence above supports the
ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC, despite any incidence of migraine headaches. This
enumeration of error is without merit.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court AFFIRM the decision of the
Commissioner. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE
this case.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action.
The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or
present additional evidence. Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set
out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate
Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered
by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation
directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made
only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.

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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and
Recommendation upon the parties.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 10th day of March,
2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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