Wheeler v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP

Filing 16

ORDER denying 9 Motion to Stay Rule 26 Deadlines and Discovery on September 11, 2015. The Court will issue a Scheduling Order in this matter. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 10/29/2015. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

ALAN WHEELER,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:15-cv-73

v.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Stay Rule 26 Deadlines and
Discovery on September 11, 2015.

(Doc. 9.)

On September 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a

Response opposing Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. 12.) After careful consideration and for the
reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion to Stay is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed this slip and fall action in the Superior Court of Ware County.
Defendant removed the case to this Court on September 9, 2015. (Doc. 1.) On that same date,
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Four of the Complaint which alleges that Defendant
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and O.C.G.A. § 30-40-2. (Doc. 8.)
Through that Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s proposed modifications are not
reasonable or necessary and that they would place an undue burden on Defendant, would
fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s services and accommodations, and do not
constitute cognizable claims under the ADA and Georgia law. (Doc. 8-1.)

Defendant then filed a Motion to Stay all discovery deadlines on September 11, 2015.
(Doc. 9.) Defendant argues that allowing the parties to engage in discovery while the Motion to
Dismiss is pending will cause the parties unnecessary trouble and expense. Id. Plaintiff has
filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff contends that even if
his ADA claims are dismissed, the parties will still have to engage in discovery on the remaining
counts and that the ADA claims do not significantly alter the scope of discovery.
DISCUSSION
With regard to the timing of discovery, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized that
[i]f the district court dismisses a nonmeritorious claim before discovery has
begun, unnecessary costs to the litigants and to the court system can be avoided.
Conversely, delaying ruling on a motion to dismiss such a claim until after the
parties complete discovery encourages abusive discovery and, if the court
ultimately dismisses the claim, imposes unnecessary costs. For these reasons,
any legally unsupported claim that would unduly enlarge the scope of discovery
should be eliminated before the discovery stage, if possible.
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
Consequently, this Court, and other courts within the Eleventh Circuit, routinely find good cause
to stay the discovery period where there is a pending motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Habib v. Bank
of Am. Corp., No. 1:10-cv-04079-SCJ-RGV, 2011 WL 2580971, at *6 n.4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15,
2011) (citing Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1368) (“[T]here is good cause to stay discovery obligations
until the District Judge rules on [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss to avoid undue expense to
both parties.”); Berry v. Canady, No. 2:09-cv-765-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 806230, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 2, 2011) (quoting Moore v. Potter, 141 F. App’x 803, 807 (11th Cir. 2005)) (“[N]either
the parties nor the court have any need for discovery before the court rules on the motion [to
dismiss].”).

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However, courts typically base the stay of discovery on a finding that the motion to
dismiss could dispose of the entire case or significantly alter the scope of discovery. “‘A request
to stay discovery pending a resolution of a motion is rarely appropriate unless resolution of the
motion will dispose of the entire case. In this regard, the Court must take a ‘preliminary peek’ at
the merits of a dispositive motion to see if it ‘appears to be clearly meritorious and truly case
dispositive.’” Massey v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, No. CV412-102, 2012 WL 3685959, at *1
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting McCabe v. Foley, 233 F.R.D. 683, 685 (M.D. Fla. 2006)).
A preliminary review of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss indicates that even if it is
granted, it will not significantly alter discovery in this case. Defendant only seeks dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and O.C.G.A. § 30-40-2. These claims will not unduly enlarge
the scope of discovery. As Defendant states in the instant Motion,“[t]he Motion to Dismiss
involves minimal issues of fact.” (Doc. 9, p. 2.) The most fact-intensive issues in this case,
and, thus, those likely to lead to the most discovery, are the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s
fall in Defendant’s store. Regardless of the outcome on the Motion to Dismiss, the parties will
have to conduct discovery on these issues, and it behooves them to do so efficiently.
Additionally, many of the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s ADA claims are likely intertwined with
Plaintiff’s other claims.
Lastly, the Court disagrees with Defendant that a stay will not cause any harm or
prejudice. (See Doc. 9, p. 5.) A stay of discovery would necessarily involve the prejudice
inherent in a delay in litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (Rules of Civil Procedure should be
“construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”) (emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the passage of time frequently fades witnesses’ memories and can make it more

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difficult to locate key witnesses and evidence. The incident giving rise to this case occurred
nearly nine months ago, and this lawsuit has been pending for three months. Thus, it will benefit
all parties to begin discovery expeditiously.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Stay is DENIED. The Court will
issue a Scheduling Order in this matter.
SO ORDERED, this 29th day of October, 2015.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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