Lewis v. Whisenant
Filing
19
ORDER granting in part and dismissing in part as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss. The Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against Defendant, and this claim is hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The Motion is DISMISSE D as moot as it relates to Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim, because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim and DISMISSES the claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this time. The Clerk of Court if DIRECTED to close this case. Signed by Chief Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/9/2016. (csr)
3n the aniteb 'tate flitrttt Court
for the boutbern attrict of Otorgia
39aperoo aibiion
JOHN ALLEN LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
V.
JACK WHISENANT, in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of Brantley County, Georgia,
Defendant.
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CV 515-77
ORDER
This case is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed
by Defendant Jack Whisenant, in his official capacity as Sheriff
of Brantley County, Georgia ("Defendant"). Dkt. No. 8.
Plaintiff John Allen Lewis ("Plaintiff") has filed a Response in
opposition to Defendant's Motion, dkt. no. 14, and Defendant has
filed a Reply thereto, dkt. no. 15. For the reasons set forth
below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (dkt. no. 8) is GRANTED in
part and DISMISSED in part as moot:
the Motion is GRANTED to the
extent that it seeks a dismissal of Plaintiff's federal cause of
action, and, because the Court finds that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claim,
AO 72A
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the Motion is DISMISSED as moot insofar as it requests a
dismissal of the same for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff, a resident of Brantley County, was stopped by an
officer of the Brantley County Sheriff's Office for a traffic
violation on August 20, 2013. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 7-14 ("Pl.'s
Compi."), 1191 1, 6. The officer noted that Plaintiff "was very
unsteady on his feet, his speech was very slurred, and he
couldn't walk heal [sic] to toe." Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff had
certain prescribed medications with him and showed the officer
copies of his written prescriptions. Id. at ¶ 8. The officer
arrested Plaintiff for driving under the influence and
transported him to the Brantley County Detention Center, where
an emergency medical services provider drew his blood. Id. at
¶91 7, 9.
Soon after Plaintiff's arrest, his friend called the
Brantley County Sheriff's Office and reported that Plaintiff was
not intoxicated and, instead, had been suffering from a severe
headache and was going to be taken to the hospital on the day of
his arrest. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff's mother also called the
office to advise that Plaintiff was not intoxicated and needed
medical treatment for his headache. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff's
daughter then visited him at the detention center two days after
his arrest and, upon noticing that his face was drooping and his
2
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speech was slurred, she notified the jail staff that he was not
well and needed medical attention immediately. Id. at ¶ 12.
According to Plaintiff, sometime during his three-day
detainment, "a jail nurse examined him and determined that he
was still intoxicated and could not receive any medical
treatment for his severe headache." Id. at ¶I 13, 16.
Plaintiff alleges that throughout his detainment, he required
assistance to use the restroom and "repeatedly requested medical
treatment and medication for his severe headache." Id. at ¶ 14.
Plaintiff maintains that he never received the necessary medical
treatment or medication for his headache during that time. Id.
at ¶ 15.
On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff was released from the
Brantley County Detention Center on bail. Id. at ¶ 16.
Plaintiff went to the Emergency Department in Waycross, Georgia,
where he was diagnosed as having a "large intracranial
hemorrhage, brain aneurysm." Id. According to Plaintiff, he
was advised that if he had received proper and timely medical
care for his headache, he would not have suffered as much from
the aneurysm. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff asserts that he has
continued to suffer neurological defects as a result of the
delay in medical treatment. Id. at ¶ 18.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant on August 17, 2015.
Id. at p. 14. Count one of Plaintiff's Complaint claims that
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Defendant was negligent in violation of Georgia law, as he owed
a duty to provide reasonable and necessary medical treatment to
detainees and breached that duty by failing to act to provide
Plaintiff with such treatment during his period of confinement.
Id. at IT 19-25. Plaintiff's count two is brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and alleges a violation of
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶I 26-33.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant, while acting
under color of state law, was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff's serious medical needs, in that he "knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to [Plaintiff's] health and safety
and/or was aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed." Id. at
¶ 29. Plaintiff also asserts the following:
Defendant . . . [,] as the chief policy maker, caused
the alleged constitutional deprivation by (1) conduct
of the policy maker himself, (2) an express policy
promulgated by the policy maker, and/or (3) an implied
policy from a custom or practice that is sufficiently
persistent from which to infer the imprimatur of the
policy maker, such as lack of suitable training and
staff of jail and medical personnel.
Id. at ¶ 30. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages for his medical
expenses and pain and suffering, as well as the costs of this
litigation. Id. at ¶91 25, 33.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
plaintiff's complaint contain both "a short and plain statement
of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1)-(2). A responding
party thus may move to dismiss the complaint based on a "lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction," Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), or a
"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) ("Rule 12(b) (6)"). In addition, a
district court must dismiss an action if it finds at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h) (3)
A Rule 12(b) (6) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of
the complaint in setting forth a claim to relief. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) (6). While a complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))
(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). To be plausible on its
face, a complaint must set forth enough facts to "allow[] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A plaintiff,
therefore, must plead more than mere labels and conclusions, and
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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a particular cause of
action does not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, at
a minimum, a complaint should "contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."
Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276,
1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware
Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.
2001))
In evaluating a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, a court must "accept
as true the facts as set forth in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010) . Ordinarily, a
court's review on a motion to dismiss is limited to the factual
allegations on the face of the complaint, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, and a party's presentation of matters outside of the
pleadings transforms the motion into one for summary judgment,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, there are certain instances in
which a court may consider matters outside of the pleadings at
the dismissal stage, see Davis v. Self, 547 F. App'x 927, 929
(11th Cir. 2013), including, for example, facts that are subject
to judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(d); Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
DISCUSSION
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Defendant now moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint-for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6).
Dkt. No. 8-1. Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible Section 1983 claim for several reasons: (1) Defendant
is entitled to sovereign immunity; (2) he is not a "person"
subject to suit under the statute; (3) Plaintiff does not
sufficiently allege a policy or custom of inadequate medical
care in the county jail for which Defendant could be liable as a
supervisor; and (4) Plaintiff does not adequately plead any
constitutional violation involving deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Id. at pp. 5-21. Defendant also contends
that Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim is subject to
dismissal, because county sheriffs are afforded sovereign
immunity against negligence claims by jail inmates concerning
the provision of medical care. Id. at pp. 4-5 (citing Tattnall
Cty. v. Armstrong, 775 S.E.2d 573, 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015),
overruled on other grounds by Rivera v. Washington, 784 S.E.2d
775 (Ga. 2016))
Plaintiff responds that each of Defendant's arguments to
dismiss his Section 1983 claim lacks merit. Dkt. No. 14,
pp. 3-
7. Even so, Plaintiff asks that if the Court finds his pleading
under Section 1983 to be insufficient, that it allow him to
amend his Complaint to cure this deficiency, rather than dismiss
it at this time. Id. at p. 5. Plaintiff concedes that the
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recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Tattnall County, 775
S.E.2d at 573, forecloses his negligence claim against Defendant
in his official capacity; however, he maintains that he will
file a separate motion requesting the Court's leave to amend the
Complaint so as to assert this claim against Defendant
individually. Id. at pp. 2_3.1
I. Section 1983 Claim
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action in federal
court against a state, its agencies, and its officials in their
official capacities, unless the state has waived its sovereign
immunity or there has been a valid congressional override. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Abusaid
v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1303
(11th Cir. 2005) ("Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits
brought in federal court when an 'arm of the State' is sued."
(quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003))).
It is well established that Section 1983 does not abrogate state
sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of St. Police, 491 U.S.
58, 67 (1989). Thus, at issue here is whether Defendant
constitutes an "arm of the State" such that he is entitled to
immunity in this case.
1
While alluded to in his Response, Plaintiff has not made any motion
to the Court to amend either count of the Complaint.
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The question of whether a defendant entity is an arm of the
state for immunity purposes "must be assessed in light of the
particular function in which the defendant was engaged when
taking the actions out of which liability is asserted to arise."
Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308).
To determine whether the entity, while engaging in that
particular function, acted as an arm of the state, a court must
consider the following: "(1) how state law defines the entity;
(2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity;
(3) the source of the entity's funds; and (4) who bears
financial responsibility for judgments entered against the
entity." Id. (citing Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309).
In Manders, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
conducted an in-depth analysis of the Georgia Constitution, as
well as Georgia statutes and case law, to ascertain the role and
duties of sheriffs within Georgia's local governance regime.
338 F.3d at 1309-18. The specific issue before the Manders
Court was whether the defendant sheriff functioned as an arm of
the State in establishing a force policy in a jail and training
and disciplining his deputies regarding that policy. Id. at
1319. Applying the four-factor test discussed supra, the Court
found that the first three factors weighed in favor of immunity,
while only the fourth weighed against, and, therefore, concluded
that the sheriff was an arm of the State in the performance of
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the challenged functions and was entitled to sovereign immunity
as a result. Id. at 1328; see also Pellitteri v. Prine, 776
F.3d 777, 780-83 (11th Cir. 2015) (following the Manders
analysis and holding that the defendant sheriff was an arm of
the State when engaging in the hiring and firing of deputies and
thus was immune from suit).
1.
Allegations Based on Staffing and Training
In the case at bar, the Court concludes that Defendant
functioned as an arm of the State in staffing and training the
officers or employees who allegedly were involved in Plaintiff's
arrest and detention. The first and second Manders factors—how
Georgia law defines a sheriff's office and where the law vests
control over it—weigh in favor of granting Defendant immunity.
See Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 780-81 (citing Manders, 338 F.3d at
1312-13, 1319-21). Although sheriffs are labeled as "county
officers" under the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. art. IX, §
1, para. 3(a), Georgia law provides that the "essential
governmental nature" of a sheriff's office is to (1) "enforce
the law and preserve the peace on behalf of the sovereign State"
and (2) "perform specific statutory duties, directly assigned by
the State, in law enforcement, in state courts, and in
corrections," Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 780 (quoting Manders, 338
F.3d at 1319).
"',
[
S]heriffs in Georgia derive their power and
duties from the State, are controlled by the State, and counties
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cannot, and do not, delegate any law enforcement power or duties
to sheriffs." Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 780 (quoting Manders, 338
F.3d at 1313). Defendant's authority to employ and train
personnel in the areas of law enforcement and corrections is
thus derived from the State. See Id. (hiring and firing);
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1319 (training).
Additionally, Georgia law vests control over a sheriff's
exercise of these dutiesin the State. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at
781; Manders, 338 F.3d at 1320. The State requires annual
training of sheriffs in all counties, and parts of that training
focus on the subjects of contemporary law enforcement and
corrections practices. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1320 (citing
O.C.G.A. § 15-16-3(a)). It is reasonable to assume that this
training includes instruction on a sheriff's hiring and training
of deputies in these areas. See Id. Furthermore, the State
Governor has "broad investigation and suspension powers" with
regard to any misconduct by sheriffs in the performance of these
duties. Id. at 1321 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-16-26). Thus, to the
extent that Defendant's duties to provide general law
enforcement and to administer the corrections facility in
Brantley County involve making staffing and training decisions,
the State retains "direct and substantial control over [his]
duties, training, and discipline[,]" whereas the county has
none. See Id. at 1322; see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d
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1326, 1347 (11th Cir. 2003)
("[The] County does not, and cannot,
direct the Sheriff . . . how to operate his office.").
The third factor cuts both ways because—while the State
funds annual training for sheriffs, the Governor's disciplinary
procedure over sheriffs, and the placement of certain state
offenders in the county jails—counties fund most of the expenses
of a sheriff's office and the county jail, as mandated by the
State. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323. Still, the fact that the
State requires counties to supply a sheriff's budget by itself
does not establish county control over the sheriff's office in
the performance of law-enforcement and corrections functions,
including how the sheriff staffs and trains his officers. See
Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 782 ("[A]lthough each county sets the
total budget for the sheriff's office, it cannot dictate how the
sheriff spends those funds." (citing Manders, 338 F.3d at
1323)). Because Brantley County funds the Brantley County
Sheriff's Office and the Brantley County Detention Center
according to State law, "[S]tate involvement is sufficient to
tilt the third factor . . . toward immunity." See Manders, 338
F.3d at 1324; see also Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 782_83.2
2
The Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit stated the following in
its analysis of the third factor in Pellitteri:
Because Lowndes County funds the sheriff's department
according to State law requirements, we cannot conclude
that this factor weighs in favor of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Ross v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Health, 701
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As for the fourth factor, Georgia counties are not liable
for judgments against sheriffs in tort or civil rights actions,
but, at the same time, there is no law expressly requiring the
State to pay such judgments. Pellitteri, 776 F.3d at 783
("[T]he financial independence afforded the sheriff's office
'creates something of a lacuna' because neither the State nor
the County will be required to directly pay for any adverse
judgment against the Sheriff's office." (citing Keene v. Prine,
477 F. App'x 575, 579 (11th Cir. 2012); and Manders, 338 F.3d at
1327)). Any adverse judgment against Defendant thus would have
to be paid out of the budget of the Brantley County Sheriff's
Office, which has the potential to implicate both State and
county funds. See id. (citing Manders, 338 F.3d at 1327). As
the State treasury would not be required to "foot the bill" in
any event, the final factor weighs in favor of denying immunity
in this case. See id. (citing Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1313).
F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that
the source of funding for the Health Department does not
"tip the balance against immunity because state law
requires the county to supply those funds" (quotation
omitted)).
776 F.3d at 782. While this statement initially appears to be
inconsistent with the outcome in this case, the parenthetical
information appended thereto, along with the Court's unequivocal
conclusion later in the opinion that "the first three factors . .
weigh[ed] in favor of immunity," id. at 782-83, convince this Court
otherwise.
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On balance, the Manders factors dictate that Defendant
enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity against Plaintiff's Section
1983 claim insofar as it generally alleges a failure to properly
staff and train officers in the areas of law enforcement and
corrections. Defendant's Motion is, therefore,
GRANTED in this
regard.
2.
Allegations Based on Inadequate Medical Care
Defendant, however, did not act as an arm of the State in
fulfilling his duty to provide medical care to jail inmates.
Significantly, every district court that has addressed this
issue has determined that a Georgia county sheriff is an arm of
the county when furnishing medical services to inmates.
Robinson v. Integrative Det. Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-20
CAR, 2014 WL 1314947, at *12 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2014)
(collecting cases); see, e.g., Youngs v. Johnson, No. 4:06-CV19(CDL), 2008 WL 4816731, at *6_8 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2008);
Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1319-22 (N.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 212 F. App'x 916 (11th Cir. 2006); Green v. Glynn Cty.,
No. CIV.A. CV201-52, 2006 WL 156873, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19,
2006)
Significant in assessing the first three Manders factors in
these cases was that Georgia law-while creating a county
sheriff's general duty to maintain corrections facilities and
vesting control over the same in the State-specifically defines
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the provision of inmate medical treatment as a county function:
"It is counties that have the 'physical custody' of inmates in
their jails and are therefore bound to maintain them, as by
furnishing 'food, clothing, and any needed medical and hospital
attention.'" See, e.g., Dukes, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1320 (quoting
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1334 (Barkett, J., dissenting); and citing
O.C.G.A. § § 42-5-2(a)). Indeed, the Manders Court stressed
that that case concerned a use-of-force policy and "[did] not
involve medical care, which counties have a statutory obligation
to provide to inmates in county jails." 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43
(citing O.C.G.A. § 42-5-2). A county fulfills this obligation
through its sheriff, and Georgia law provides a county governing
authority "some oversight" of the sheriff's administration of
the jail "through the investigative powers of grand juries which
must inspect jails annually and make appropriate recommendations
to the county commission." Dukes, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1321
(citing O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-71(c), 15-12-78 (relating to the
inspection of sanitary conditions at jails)); see also O.C.G.A.
§ 42-4-4 (a) (2) (sheriff's duties include providing inmates in
the county jail with medical aid). Furthermore, it is the
county that furnishes the funds for the sheriff to provide
medical necessities to inmates. Dukes, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 1321
(citing Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43). As to the final
Manders factor, the courts in these cases noted that a judgment
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against a sheriff relating to inmate medical care would
implicate both State and county funds, but nevertheless
concluded that this factor did not outweigh the strength of the
first three factors, which leaned strongly against granting
immunity. See, e.g.,
id.
Defendant asks that the Court depart from this line of
authority on the grounds that it is "entirely reliant on an
incorrect statement of law found in a footnote in Manders and
constituting only dicta." See Dkt. No. 8-1, PP. 11-13 (citing
Manders, 338 F.3d at 1323 n.43). Defendant's argument is
unavailing, because, as cited above, several provisions of
Georgia law clearly place inmate medical care within the realm
of activities for which a county is responsible and in which a
sheriff functions on its behalf. Moreover, that the Manders
Court discussed this statutory scheme in a footnote does not in
any way take away from its instructiveness on this issue.
Rather, the Court agrees with the reasoning set forth in the
cases that have considered this issue and finds that Defendant
was not an arm of the State with respect to his role in
providing medical care to Brantley County inmates. Defendant
thus is not entitled to immunity against Plaintiff's Section
1983 claim alleging inadequate medical care, and, as such,
Defendant's Motion cannot be granted on this basis.
B. Supervisor Liability
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In Section 1983 actions, liability must be based on
something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v.
Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla.
Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998).
A supervisor may be liable only "when the supervisor personally
participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between the actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation." Braddy, 133 F.3d at 802 (quoting Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, to
state a claim for relief against a supervisory defendant, a
plaintiff must allege one of the following:
(1) the supervisor's personal involvement in the
violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the
existence of a custom or policy that resulted in
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's
constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an
inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful
action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a
history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on
notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed
to correct.
Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App'x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing West
v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendant could be
held liable for any potential constitutional violation arising
from his medical care at the Brantley County Detention Center.
Aside from describing Defendant's position as Sheriff for
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jurisdictional purposes, Plaintiff's only mention of Defendant
in the Complaint appears in the following claims: (1) that he
"knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [Plaintiff's]
health and safety and/or was aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
existed"; and (2) that he caused the alleged constitutional
violation through "conduct of the policy maker himself," "an
express policy promulgated by [him]," or "an implied policy from
a custom or practice that is sufficiently persistent from which
to infer [his] imprimatur." Pl.'s Compi., 191 29-30. These
claims purportedly connecting Defendant to the alleged
constitutional deprivation are wholly conclusory and, therefore,
must be disregarded at this stage. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Significantly, Plaintiff's factual averments make no
reference to Defendant, much less indicate that he had any
personal involvement in Plaintiff's arrest or medical care.
Without pointing to a single overt act taken by Defendant that
could possibly have contributed to a constitutional violation,
Plaintiff fails to plead facts to support any claim against
Defendant on a personal-involvement theory. See Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) ("While we do not
require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the
complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts
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of the defendant caused a legal wrong." (quoting Pamel Corp. v.
P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980))); see also
Anderson v. Bradley, No. 3:11-CV-126-CDL--CHW, 2011 WL 6740745,
at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2011) (recommending a dismissal of
Section 1983 claims against a county sheriff, in part because
the plaintiff made no allegation of any overt act on the
sheriff's part (citing Douglas, 535 F.3d at 1322)), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:11-CV-126 CDL, 2011 WL 6749820
(M.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 2011). Nor do Plaintiff's allegations that
he and his family and friends informed certain unidentified
officers and jail staff of his condition, see Pl.'s compl., 9TT
8-14, permit an inference that Defendant had any knowledge or
awareness of his need for medical attention. See Burnette
Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th dr. 2008)
V.
("[I]mputed or
collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of
deliberate indifference." (citing Gray v. City of Detroit, 399
F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005); and Whiting v. Marathon Cty.
Sheriff's Dep't, 382 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2004))).
Even if the Court were to assume that Defendant was among the
unidentified officers whom Plaintiff maintains were informed of his
symptoms, Plaintiff's Complaint would nevertheless be subject to
dismissal for failing to state a constitutional claim of deliberate
indifference. Deliberate indifference requires, in part, that a
defendant "have been 'subjectively aware of the substantial risk of
serious harm in order to have had a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.'" Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834-38 (1994)). Plaintiff does not satisfy the subjective
component of a deliberate indifference claim at this stage, because,
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Rather, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant
liable for an alleged constitutional deprivation based solely on
his role as supervisor of the officers and employees who were
allegedly involved in the underlying events. Plaintiff,
however, does not plead any facts indicating that Defendant had
any custom or policy that resulted in his inability to obtain
adequate medical care. Plaintiff asserts that he did, in fact,
have bloodwork done upon arriving at the Brantley County
Detention Center, and that he was seen by the jail nurse after
complaining of a severe headache. Pl.'s Compl., ¶91 9, 13.
While he includes facts suggesting that these measures failed to
detect the true cause of his symptoms, see Id. at ¶91 13, 16-17,
Plaintiff does not set forth any factual matter tending to show
that this was not an isolated incident but rather reflected a
larger custom or policy of providing inadequate medical care at
the facility. See Craig v. Floyd Cty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310
(11th Cir. 2011) ("Proof of a single incident of
unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
as discussed above, Plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations that
Defendant had knowledge of an "excessive risk to [his] health and
safety" or was aware of certain "facts from which the inference could
be drawn" that such a risk existed, see Pl.'s compl., ¶ 29. Even if
Plaintiff had included facts demonstrating that Defendant learned of
Plaintiff's headache, slurred speech, and drooping face, Plaintiff
fails to make any allegation that Defendant understood that those
symptoms were characteristic of a brain aneurysm and thus actually
drew an inference from those facts. See Walker v. Huntsville, 310 F.
App'x 335, 339 (11th Cir. 2009) (no liability for officers and jailers
under Section 1983, because "mistakenly failing to identify a brain
aneurysm [was] not deliberate indifference").
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I
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I
liability." (quoting City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823-24 (1985))). Contrary to Plaintiff's protestation, see dkt.
no. 14, p. 4, these are facts that must be plausibly alleged in
the Complaint to survive dismissal. See Wood v. City of
Albertville, No. 4:12-CV-02670-KOB, 2013 WL 6839598, at *5 (N.D.
Ala. Dec. 23, 2013)
("[S]imply alleging that . . . a[n]
[unlawful] policy exists without providing any factual evidence
of the policy is not enough to meet the pleading requirement."
(citing Pierre v. City of Miramar, Fla., Inc., No. 13-10668,
2013 WL 4750080, at *4 (11th Cir. 2013))); see, e.g., Hampton v.
Macon Bibb Cty. Transit Auth., No. 5:14-CV-111 MTT, 2014 WL
2916849, at *5 (M.D. Ga. June 26, 2014) (complaint was subject
to dismissal, because the plaintiff's assertion that the
defendant had "acted pursuant to a policy, custom, and practice"
was "clearly insufficient to establish a claim for municipal
liability against the [defendant] . . . under a theory of
respondeat superior"). Plaintiff's Complaint also contains no
facts regarding any history of abuse by the Brantley County
Sheriff's Office or the Brantley County Detention Center
.4
To the extent that Plaintiff may wish to amend his Complaint so as
to add the factual matter necessary to meet the plausibility pleading
standard, see dkt. no. 14, p. 5, Plaintiff has not properly moved for
leave of Court to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (a party who seeks
to amend his pleading after the time for amending as a matter of
course may do so only with his opponent's consent or the court's
leave); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (a party's request for a
court order must be made by a written or oral motion stating with
particularity the basis for seeking an order and the relief sought).
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Plaintiff thus fails to make a plausible showing that
Defendant could be held liable as a supervisor for any
constitutional violation that may have occurred with regard to
medical treatment during his period of detainment. Accordingly,
the Court need not reach Defendant's remaining arguments to
conclude that Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 deliberate
indifference claim against him. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED
as to this claim.
II. Negligence Claim
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), a district court has
supplemental jurisdiction over any claim that is "so related" to
the claims over which it has original jurisdiction that it
"form[s] part of the same case or controversy." However, a
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
such claim where the court "has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3). In
fact, "dismissal of state law claims [is] strongly encouraged
when federal law claims are dismissed prior to trial," as it is
best for a state court to resolve claims arising under state law
in these instances. Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville,
117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
The Court preliminarily notes that it enjoys original
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim, see 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1331, and, therefore, has supplemental jurisdiction over his
related state-law negligence claim. Nevertheless, because
Plaintiff cannot proceed on his Section 1983 claim, his
remaining negligence claim should be adjudicated by a Georgia
court. The Court thus declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff's negligence claim. Defendant's
Motion seeking to dismiss this count of the Complaint for
failure to state a claim is DISMISSED as moot.
110) Zi
In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(dkt. no. 8) is GRANTED in part and DISMISSED in part as moot:
The Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim
against Defendant, and this claim is hereby DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim. The Motion is DISMISSED as moot as it
relates to Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim, because the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this
claim and DISMISSES the claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this time.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this 9TH day of August, 2016.
LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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