Taylor et al v. Prudential Insurance Company of America

Filing 62

ORDER granting 28 Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps on 11/21/2016. (maa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION
JAMES T. TAYLOR, JR. and TERESA
HUTCHESON,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
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v.
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)
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
)
OF AMERICA,
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)
Defendant.
)
_________

CV 516-009

ORDER
_________
Pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”), Plaintiffs challenge a plan administrator’s determination their
decedent father never designated beneficiaries for a life insurance policy. Before the Court is
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Jury Demand, which the Court GRANTS. (Doc.
no. 28.)
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are the only biological children of James T. Taylor, Sr., a retired employee

of Sears Roebuck and Co. who died on September 25, 2013. (Doc. no. 13, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1,
15; doc. no. 27, Answer ¶¶ 1, 15.) The decedent had a universal term life insurance policy
with a value of $180,000 and a basic term life insurance policy with a value of $6,380. (Id. ¶
22.) Defendant The Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”) issued both
policies through an Employee Welfare Benefit Plan (“Plan”) sponsored and administered by

Sears Holding Corporation (“Sears”) for retired employees of Sears Roebuck and Co. (Id. ¶¶
15-20.) Prudential provided administrative services on behalf of Sears and made decisions
regarding Plaintiffs’ claims for Plan benefits. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Prudential determined the decedent designated Plaintiffs as the only beneficiaries of
the basic policy and split between Plaintiffs the payout of $6,380. In contrast, Prudential
determined the decedent failed to designate any beneficiaries of the universal policy and
divided equally the payout of $180,000 among the four surviving children, i.e. Plaintiffs and
two step-children.

(Id.)

Plaintiffs allege the decedent designated them as the only

beneficiaries of both policies, and Prudential erred by including the step-children in the
universal policy payout. (Id. ¶ 54-55.)
Plaintiffs originally filed this action challenging Prudential’s determination in the
Superior Court of Bacon County, and Defendants removed to this Court. (See generally doc.
no. 1.) After removal, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking recovery of benefits
under the decedent’s ERISA plan and alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty. (Doc. no. 13, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 64-81.) With agreement of the parties, the Court
dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim. (See doc. nos. 29, 35, 60.)
Defendants move to strikePlaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial, contending ERISA does
not allow jury trials.

(See generally doc. nos. 28, 39.)

Plaintiffs argue the Seventh

Amendment requires a jury trial because their claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) is a
common-law breach of contract claim for monetary damages. (See generally doc. no. 34.)
Plaintiffs also contend the Court should determine the applicable standard of review before
determining whether a jury trial is appropriate. (See id. at 22-24.)

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II.

DISCUSSION
This Court and many others within the Eleventh Circuit have long held there is no

right to a jury trial in suits under ERISA because claims to recover plan benefits are equitable
rather than legal. Rolland v. Textron, Inc., No. CV105-23, 2007 WL 2345245, at *6 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 13, 2007); see also Broaddus v. Fla. Power Corp., 145 F.3d 1283, 1287 n. ** (11th
Cir. 1998); Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 930 (1996); Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d
1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 620, 623
(11th Cir. 1987); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1987).
Nothing in this case warrants departure from this well-settled rule.
“The mere fact that the [plaintiff] would receive a monetary award if he prevailed
does not compel the conclusion that he is entitled to a jury trial.” Calamia v. Spivey, 632
F.2d 1235, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1980)1 (internal citations omitted). As the Eleventh Circuit
explained in Blake:
The nature of an action under section 502(a)(1)(B) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)] is for
the enforcement of the ERISA plan. Although the plaintiffs assert that they are
claiming money damages, in effect they are claiming the benefits they are allegedly
entitled to under the plan. Although here the medical treatment has been completed
so that a money judgment would satisfy their demands, if the claimant were still
under treatment, only an order for continuing benefits would be sufficient. This is
traditionally equitable relief so that the cases relied upon by the appellants are not
applicable.
Blake, 906 F.2d at 1526 (internal citations omitted).

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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions that were handed down
prior the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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As in Blake, Plaintiffs characterize their ERISA claim as one for breach of contract
seeking money damages. However, they are in fact “claiming benefits they are allegedly
entitled to under the plan,” a form of equitable relief. Id. Furthermore, the medical benefits
sought in Blake and the life insurance benefits sought here are indistinguishable for purposes
of this ERISA analysis. Therefore, like the plaintiffs in Blake, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a
jury trial because their claim under ERISA is equitable rather than legal, and the Seventh
Amendment does not demand a different result. See Stewart, 75 F.3d at 1527 (“For purposes
of Seventh Amendment analysis, ERISA has been interpreted as an equitable statute [and] no
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial exists in actions brought pursuant to ERISA.”).
Finally, the standard of review is irrelevant.

Whether under the arbitrary and

capricious or the de novo standard, an ERISA claim is equitable and does not require a jury
trial. See Blake, 906 F.2d at 1526 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument de novo standard of review
converts equitable claim to breach of contract); see also Shaw v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 353 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (remanding case applying de novo standard for
bench trial because jury trial not proper in ERISA cases). Plaintiffs’ assertion the Court
should determine the standard of review before ruling on Defendants’ motion is incorrect.
Because Plaintiffs’ claim arises under ERISA, they are not entitled to a jury trial and
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike Jury Demand. (Doc. no. 28.)

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Jury Demand. (Doc. no. 28.)
SO ORDERED this 21st day of November, 2016, at Augusta, Georgia.

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