Corbitt et al v. Coffee County, Georgia et al

Filing 19

ORDER GRANTING in part all other claims of the remaining Plaintiffs - Stewart, Corbitt, Rich, AMB, ERA, JDS, and MS and DENYING in part as to SDC's § 1983 claim re 4 Motion to Dismiss. Wooten's Motion to Dismiss all remaining claims against him is hereby GRANTED. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/5/2017. (ca)

fn

Btsftritt Conirt

for tbe ^ontbrm IBtsitrttt of 4^eorgta
Wsiftxosii SitbtOton
AMY

individually

*

and as parent and natural
guardian
of
SDC;
JERRY
RICH,
individually;

CORBITT,

*
*
*

ELIZABETH BOWEN, as parent
and natural guardian of
AMB;
TONYA
JOHNSON,
as
parent
and
natural
guardian of ERA; DAMION
STEWART, individually and
as
parent
and
natural
guardian of JDS and as
parent
and
natural
guardian of MS,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

NO. 5:16-CV-51

Plaintiffs,
V.

DOYLE

WOOTEN,

*

individually; and MICHAEL
VICKERS, individually,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*
ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No.

4) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This

Motion has been fully briefed and orally argued, and is now ripe

for review.

For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

At this stage of the case, the facts are taken from the

Complaint and assumed to be true pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Vickers

(''Vickers")

Sheriff s

and

On July 10, 2014, Defendant Michael
other

Department and the

participated

in

an

officers

Georgia

operation

Christopher Barnett.

to

of

the

Coffee

County

Bureau of Investigation

apprehend

Dkt. No. 1 SI 23.

criminal

suspect

They entered Plaintiff

Amy Corbitt's (^'Corbitf') property at 145 Burton Road, Lot 19
and ordered all persons to get down on the ground.

Id. SI 24.

Inside the property were Plaintiff Corbitt and non-party minors
JVR and ST.
and

minor

Id.

Outside the property were Plaintiff Stewart

Plaintiffs

Rich,

JDS,

MS,

SDC, AMB, and

ERA.

Id.

Officers handcuffed Plaintiff Stewart and placed the barrel of a

gun in his back in the presence of his two children under the
age of three.

Id.

Those children roamed the adjacent street,

screaming and crying.

each

held

at

Id. at SI 25.

gunpoint,

lying

on

The remaining minors were

the

ground,

when

Defendant

Vickers intentionally fired two shots at the family pet named
^^Bruce."

Id. at SI 27, 28.

The first shot missed.

Id. at SI 28.

The second shot missed the pet and hit ten-year-old SDC in the
back of his right knee.
None

of the

Id. at SISI 28, 32.

Plaintiffs

Christopher Barnett.

had

Id. SI 23.

ever

met the

criminal suspect

All of the plaintiffs followed

Defendant Vickers's orders.

that

no

officer

firearm.

at

Id. 1 29.

the

Id. f 32.

scene

was

The complaint alleges

required

to

discharge

a

At the time he fired two bullets at the

pet, Vickers was armed with a gun, a Taser, and pepper spray.
Id.

SI

41.

Before

Vickers shot

at Bruce,

neither

he

nor

any

other agent attempted to restrain the animal, whether directly
or otherwise.

Id. SI 28.

Vickers was only eighteen inches from

SDC when he shot the child.

Tests

run

at

University Medical

Coffee

Center

Id. SI 29.

Regional

in

Medical

Savannah,

GA

Center

confirmed

and

the

multiple

bullet fragments throughout the area of SDC s wound, and, at the
time the Complaint was filed, SDC was under evaluation by an
orthopedic surgeon for the removal of the bullet fragments.

Id.

SI 33-34.

Eight

Plaintiffs filed suit, asserting

federal claims

against the County, the

various state and

sheriff,

and

Vickers.

The only remaining claims are by all Plaintiffs against Vickers
in his individual capacity and by Plaintiffs ERA, Stewart, JDS,

and MS against Wooten in his individual capacity.^

^At an oral hearing on this Motion on August 31, 2017, Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed claims against Coffee County and Vickers and Wooten in their
official capacities, as well as the Equal Protection claim and all state law
claims. The most recent filing of Plaintiffs Corbitt, SDC, Rich, and AMB
also makes clear that those Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims against

Wooten in his individual capacity. The claims against Wooten in his
individual capacity brought by EEW, Stewart, JDS, and MS remain.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

8(a)

requires

that

a

plaintiff's complaint contain ^^a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Civ.

P.

8(a).

In

order

to

state

a

claim

for

Fed. R.

relief,

a

plaintiff's complaint must include ^^enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face."
Twombly,

550

plausibility
allows

the

U.S.

when
court

544,

the
to

570

(2007).

plaintiff
draw

Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

the

claim

pleads

factual

reasonable

has

content

inference

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009).

The

facial

that

that
the

Ashcroft v.

Court

accepts

the

allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Ray v. Spirit Airlines,

Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2016).

However, the Court

does not accept as true threadbare recitations of the elements of
the claim and disregards legal conclusions unsupported by factual

allegations.
complaint
allegations

Iqbal,

should

556

U.S.

""contain

respecting

at

678-79.

either

all the

direct

At

a

minimum,

a

or

inferential

material elements

necessary to

sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory."

Fin. Sec.

Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe

v. Aware Woman Ctr. for

Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs have brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserting

that Vickers and Wooten^ deprived them of their constitutional
rights to be free from excessive force.
and

Wooten

have

In response, Vickers

raised the defense of qualified immunity and

argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which
relief may be granted.

The

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

^^all

claims

that

law

enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in

the course of [a] ^seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed
under

the

Graham

Fourth

v.

Amendment

Connor,

490

and

U.S.

its

386,

^reasonableness'

394

(1989).

standard."

The

Fourth

Amendment provides that ^Mt]he right of the people to be secure

in

their

persons,

unreasonable
U.S.

houses,

searches

Const,

amend.

and

IV.

papers,

seizures,
''To

and
shall

assert

a

effects,
not

Fourth

be

against

violated."

Amendment

claim

based on the use of excessive force, the plaintiffs must allege
(1)

that

a

seizure

occurred

and

(2)

effect the seizure was unreasonable."

that

the

force

used

to

Troupe v. Sarasota Cnty.,

Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005).

Vickers
"The

has

defense

of

raised
qualified

the

defense

immunity

of

qualified

requires

courts

immunity.
to

enter

judgment in favor of a government employee unless the employee's
^ Only Plaintiffs ERA, Stewart, JDS, and MS have remaining claims against
Wooten.

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007).

plaintiff

to

show

that,

when

the

Morse v.

'MT]he burden is on the

defendant

acted,

the

law

established the contours of a right so clearly that a reasonable
official would have understood his acts were unlawful."

Post v.

City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993).
^Once

the

affirmative

advanced . . .,

claim

of

[u]nless

violation

of

defense

the

of

qualified

plaintiff's

clearly

immunity

allegations

established

law,

a

state

is
a

defendant

pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the
commencement of discovery.'"

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d
1014,

1022

(11th

Cir.

2001)

(en

banc)).

''Absent

such

allegations, '[i]t is . . . appropriate for a district court to
grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss
stage.'"

Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, at *3

(11th Cir. 2003)).

The

inquiry.

defense

of

qualified

immunity

presents

a

two-step

First, the government official must prove that he was

acting within his discretionary authority.
F.3d 1188, 1194

(11th Cir. 2002).

Lee v. Ferraro, 284

Then, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to show that the defendant's actions
constitutional

right,

and

that

such

right

violated a

was

clearly

established.

Id.

Vickers argues throughout his brief that no

Fourth Amendment violation occurred because he did not intend to
shoot

SDC.

He

does

not articulate

whether

seizure occurred or that the force

he

means that

no

was not excessive, so the

Court will address the argument under both prongs.
A. Seizure

A

Fourth

Amendment

seizure

occurs

"when

there

is

a

governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied.''

Id. (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo,

489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original)).

A seizure is

an "intentional acquisition of physical control" by a government
actor.

Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.

A person is "^seized' within the meaning of the
Amendment

only

surrounding
believed

the

that

Mendenhall,

did

he

was

view

not

U.S.

that

not

in

incident,

446

circumstances

person

if,

of

a

attempt

free

to

the

leave,

even

be

the

have

States

"Examples

seizure,

would

would

United

(1980).

a

circumstances

person

leave."

554

indicate

to

of

reasonable

544,

might

all

Fourth

where

v.

of

the

threatening

presence of several officers [and] the display of weapons by an
officer . . . ."

person

or

thing

taking . . . but
willful."

Id.

"A seizure occurs even when an unintended

is

the

the

object

detention

Brower, 189 U.S. at 596.

or

of

the

taking

detention

itself

must

or
be

The Supreme Court applied these rules in Brewer.

There,

the plaintiff was killed when the stolen car he had been driving
at high speeds to elude police crashed into a police roadblock.
Id. at 594.
occurred

The Court of Appeals had held that no seizure

because

his freedom of movement

was

never

prior to his decision not to stop at the roadblock.
That

would

stretch

the

definition

Supreme Court reasoned.

the

intended

plaintiff.

the

roadblock

seizure

Id. at 598-99.

roadblock to stop the plaintiff.
stopped

of

Id.
to

stop

did

him

Id. at 595.

too

thin,

the

The police set up a

Id. at 599.
It

restrained

not

by

The roadblock

matter

preventing

that

they

him

from

driving down a particular road and it in fact stopped him by
killing him when he crashed into it.
The

Eleventh

Circuit

has

Id.

also

applied

these

rules

in

defining a seizure in the context of an excessive force claim.
In Vaughan v. Cox, the plaintiff asserting a Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim against the officer who shot him was a
passenger in a truck.

343 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2003).

The officer intended to shoot the truck, thereby disabling it

and

ramming

plaintiff.
to

shoot

it

off

the

Id. at 1327.
the

plaintiff,

road,

but

he

ultimately

hit

Because the officer had not intended
the

district

court

held

that

plaintiff had not suffered a Fourth Amendment seizure.
1328.

The

Eleventh

the

Circuit

reversed,
8

explaining

that

the

Id. at
because

the plaintiff was hit by a bullet that was meant to and did stop
him, he was subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
1328-29.

In

other

words,

a

seizure

occurs

when

Id. at

an

officer

intentionally sets into motion an instrumentality that has the
effect of restricting the plaintiff's movement.

When an officer

intends to stop or seize a person, and does so, it does not
matter that he does so in a way other than the way in which he
intended.

1. Corbitt^, SDC, AMB, ERA, and Rich v. Vickers
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Vickers seized SDC, AMB,

ERA, and Rich—the minor Plaintiffs held at gunpoint outside the

property.

Plaintiffs SDC, Rich, AMB, and ERA claim that their

Fourth Amendment seizures were effected by the placement of gun
barrels in their backs.

The Complaint alleges that Vickers (and fellow

officers)

demanded the children get down on the ground with the barrel of
loaded guns shoved into their backs.

Dkt. No. 1

24, 27.

It

further alleges that while they were lying on the ground obeying
Vickers, Vickers discharged his firearm twice.

Id. 5 28.

This

would cause reasonable people to believe they were ""not free to
leave."

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.

It is exactly the type of

situation that Mendenhall prescribes as constituting a seizure:

^Corbitt's claim is derivative of her minor child (SDC)'s claim, and they
progress or fall together.

"the threatening presence of several officers [and] the display
of weapons by an officer."
Vickers

effectuated

a

seizure

But he did fire his weapon.
first element of a

Id.

These allegations show that

even

before

firing

his

weapon.

And even though that satisfies the

Fourth Amendment violation, the Court

will

now address Vickers's argument that unintentionally shooting SDC
means no seizure occurred.

No Eleventh Circuit case directly addresses how to handle
the case where an officer shoots someone he was not aiming to

hit.

Regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment to an

accidental discharge of a weapon, the circuits are split, and

the Eleventh Circuit has not been faced with the question. ^
The Second Circuit declared that the Fourth Amendment only

applies to shootings designed for "the purpose of seizing" the
suspect.

Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1987),

cert, denied, 484

U.S. 1007 (1988).

It explained that "[i]t

makes little sense to apply a standard of reasonableness to an
accident"
claims.

because
Id.

at

that
7-8.

would
That

extend
case

liability

dealt

with

shooting of an already apprehended burglar.

to

the

Id.

negligence
inadvertent

On the other

hand, the Sixth Circuit in Pleasant v. Zamieski held that the

'^This is not an accidental firing case because the weapon was intentionally
fired.

Instead, this is an accidental shooting case.

That is, the weapon

was fired in order to shoot the pet. The shot hit the child accidentally.
Vickers inaccurately defines the constitutional right at issue as the right
to be free from the accidental application of force. Still, it is worth
examining the circuit split on that analogous issue.
10

use

of

standard

force

should

even

if

intentional—that

be

the

is,

examined

seizure

where

under

was

the

the

reasonableness

negligent

shooting

rather

was

than

undisputably

accidental and not the result of the deliberate use of force.
895 F.2d 272, 276-77 {6th Cir. 1990).
At

least

one

district

court

in

the

Eleventh

chosen to follow the second line of reasoning.^
District

of

Georgia

held

in

Speight

v.

Circuit

has

The Northern

Griggs

that

the

accidental discharge of a firearm resulting in an unintentional

shooting during the course of an arrest may constitute excessive
force

under

conduct

the

Fourth

preceding

circumstances.

13

Amendment

shooting

the
F.

if

is

Supp.

3d

the

officer's

unreasonable

1298,

1319

(N.D.

course

under
Ga.

of

the

2013),

vacated on other grounds, 579 Fed. Appx. 757 (11th Cir. 2014).

In reaching its decision, the Speight court noted the Supreme

Court's reasoning in Brower that the line defining a seizure
cannot be drawn too fine lest one be determined not seized

^who

has been stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which
he was meant only to be bludgeoned.'"

Id. at 1320 (quoting

Brower, 489 U.S. at 598).

In the present case, Vickers had ordered Plaintiffs to the
ground at gunpoint before any "accident" occurred.

A reasonable

The Court finds no courts in this Circuit that have chosen to follow the

first line of reasoning.
11

inference

from

Plaintiffs'

the

favor

allegations

for

the

in

the

purpose

of

Complaint,
this

drawn

Motion,

is

in

that

Vickers fired his weapon at the animal in order to keep control
of SDC, AMB, ERA, and Rich-that is, in order to continue their
seizure.

In

other

words,

a

jury

could

find

that

Vickers

intended to shoot the animal in order to maintain his control of

the situation and keep Plaintiffs from escaping while the animal
distracted

Plaintiffs.

And

his

action

had

the

effect

of

continuing to seize the Plaintiffs—they did not budge when he

fired his gun.

Because Vickers shot his gun for the purpose of

carrying out the seizure, and a seizure occurred, Vickers's not

intending to shoot SDC does not negate that seizure.

Just as in

Vauqhan, while the result of discharging the weapon may be an
accident, the actual discharge was intentional.

And the force

he exerted intentionally is certainly capable of excess.
Vickers

asks

the

Court

to

follow

the

decision

in

City of Miamisburq, 1997 WL 1764770 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
blush,

the

facts

of

that

case

are

directly

Dahm

v.

At first

analogous

to

the

facts in this case—while attempting to arrest the plaintiff, an

officer fired toward the plaintiff's dog but actually hit the
plaintiff himself.

Id. at *8.

The court looked closely at the

Supreme Court's direction in Brower and noted that a jury could

find that the officer shot the advancing dog in order to seize
the plaintiff.

Id.

A closer look at the facts:
12

the officer

arrived at the plaintiff's home to execute a search warrant.
Id. at *4.

As he entered the front door, the first thing he saw

was the plaintiff's dog charging at him.
the dog but missed and

Id. at *5.

hit the plaintiff.

He shot at

Id.

The Court

concluded that the situation was too attenuated to constitute a

Fourth Amendment violation, that the plaintiff was not ^^stopped

by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in
order to achieve that

result."

even

had

if

the

intended,
because

it

officer

that

action

would

at *9.

successfully

would

merely

Id.

have

allowed

shot

the

seized

the

dog

the

as

he

plaintiff

officers to

safely

Those facts are distinguishable from the ones here.

While

enter the residence.

have

not

It reasoned that

Id.

the officer in Dahm had not come into contact with the plaintiff

before shooting the dog, Vickers had already ordered SDC to the

ground at gunpoint.
have

eliminated

While shooting the dog in Dahm would only

one

barrier

in

locating

and

seizing

the

plaintiff, shooting the pet here, according to the allegations
in

the

barrier

Complaint,
to

Vickers'

would

have

complete

eliminated
control

the

of the

only

potential

Plaintiffs.

In

other words, the officer in Dahm did not shoot his weapon at the

dog in order to restrict the plaintiff's movement.

Shooting the

dog would have simply allowed him to later take steps to seize
the plaintiff, albeit only moments later.
13

Here, in contrast, a

reasonable jury could conclude that Vickers shot at Bruce in
order to prevent any of the Plaintiffs from escaping from his
control.

Shooting Bruce would have ensured that.

Therefore,

the decision in Dahm does not change the conclusion that a jury
could find that Vickers shot toward Bruce in furtherance of the
seizure of the Plaintiffs.

2. Plaintiffs Stewart, JDS, MS
Plaintiff Stewart claims that his Fourth Amendment seizure

was effected by the application of handcuffs.

The problem with

this claim is that the Complaint does not allege that Vickers
himself

handcuffed

another to do so.

Stewart,

whether

directly

Id. SI 24.

seizure

analyze
and

ordering

Without linking this action to

Vickers, no claim can be stated against him.

not

by

It merely states that ^^Plaintiff Stewart was

brutally handcuffed."

need

or

whether

whether

the

that

use

of

alleged

Thus, the Court

handcuffs
seizure

constitutes

was

a

reasonable.

Stewart's claim against Vickers must be dismissed.
The

claims

against

Vickers

brought

by

Stewart's

children, JDS and MS, fail for the same reason.

makes

minor

The Complaint

no allegations that Vickers himself caused any type of

injury to JDS and MS.

The only injury occurred as a result of

their father's handcuffing (Id. 1 25) in which Vickers played no
part.

These claims are also dismissed.

14

B. Qualified Immunity

Here,

it

discretionary

is

clear

that

authority.

Vickers

Actions

was

fall

acting

under

official's discretionary function when they

under

a

government

^are of a type that

f[a]ll within the employee's job responsibilities.'"
Monroe

Cnty.,

394

F.Sd

1328,

1332 (11th

his

Cir.

Crosby v.

2004)

(quoting

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th

Cir. 2004)).

And, ''making an arrest is within the official

responsibilities

of

a

sheriff's

deputy."

sheriff's deputy performing an arrest.

Vickers

was

a

Dkt. No. 1 SISl 14, 23.

Second, the Court must decide whether Vickers violated a

clearly

established

constitutional

right.

"It

is

clearly

established that the use of excessive force in carrying out an
arrest

constitutes

a

violation

of

the

Fourth

Amendment."

Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998).

Thus, Vickers is not entitled to qualified immunity if he used
excessive force in firing his weapon.
No

constitutional

violation

can

be

shown

where

an

official's actions are "'objectively reasonable'—that is, if a
reasonable

officer

that the force
Anderson

v.

factually
for

it

in

used

the

Creighton,

be

very

situation

was not excessive."
483 U.S.

particularized,

to

same

635

preexisting

obvious

to
15

would

believed

Id. at 1400 (citing

(1987)).

case

every

have

law

Sometimes, "no

[is]

objectively

necessary
reasonable

officer

facing

[the

defendant's]

situation

that

[his]

conduct . . . violated [the plaintiff's] right to be free of the
excessive use of force."

Vinyard v. Wilson^ 311 F.3d 1340, 1355

(11th Cir. 2002).

In Thornton, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the use of

any force was excessive where the plaintiffs were not suspected
of having committed a serious crime, posed no threat to anyone,
and did not actively resist the officers.

132 F.3d 1998.

1. SDC V. Vickers

The Court turns again to Vaughan v. Cox.

While it is not

analogous in all aspects, it is a case where the officer shot an
individual

he

was

not

aiming

to

hit,

and

the

officer

had

intentionally seized the plaintiff and intentionally fired his
weapon.
truck

There, the officer aimed to hit either the driver of a

or

the

truck

passenger instead.
not

aiming

conducting
Eleventh
that the
whether

to
an

itself.

Id.

hit

did

excessive

343

F.3d

at

1327.

He

hit

the

That the officer shot a person he was
not

stop

force

the

Eleventh

analysis.

In

Circuit
so

doing,

from
the

Circuit was examining the excessiveness of the force
officer
shooting

had
the

intentionally

applied.

It

did

not

ask

passenger

excessive

on

its

own

but

was

whether it was excessive even for the officer to shoot according

to his plan.

The Eleventh Circuit examined the excessiveness of

the force exerted in Cooper v. Rutherford in a similar way.
16

503

Fed. App'x 672 (11th Cir. 2012).

There, the plaintiffs were

seriously injured when an armed bank robber attempted to elude
the police by attempting to steal the car in which they were
riding.

Id. at 673.

The officers fired their guns at the

suspect to prevent him from escaping with the hostages, but he
hit

the

plaintiffs

instead.

Id.

The

court

examined

the

excessiveness of the force as though it was exerted against the

suspect

the

officer

clearly

established

aimed
that

the

shots were unreasonable.

Here,

though

to

hit

and

officer's

held

that

actions

it

in

was

firing

not
24

Id. at 676.

Vickers

did

not

intend

to

exert

any

force

against SDC, he did intend to exert force against the animal.
This Court must therefore analyze whether or not that exertion
of force was excessive or objectively reasonable.
^'The

touchstone

for

reasonableness

cases is typically officer safety."®
3908187, *3(M.D. Fla. 2014).

in

[animal]

shooting

Schutt v. Lewis, 2014 WL

In Schutt, the officer reasonably

shot a dog that was rapidly approaching him and disobeying its
owner's order.

Id.

Here, in contrast, the Complaint alleges

that Vickers discharged
immediate

threat

or

his firearm ^'without necessity or any

cause."

Dkt.

No.

1

^ 28.

It

alleges

further that Vickers never attempted to restrain the animal or
ask anyone else to do so.

Id.

The first shot occurred 'Mw]hile

®At this point, the record does not indicate what kind of animal the pet was.
17

the children were lying on the ground obeying the orders of
Defendant Vickers," and the second shot occurred as the animal

^^was approaching his owners."

Id.

No one besides the officers

possessed firearms, ^'nor did anyone appear to be threatened by
[Bruce's] presence."
obstruction

to

the

Id. SI 29.
efforts

SDC ''offered no hindrance or

of

Defendant

Vickers

and

during the apprehension of Cristopher [sic] Barnett."

others

Id. SI 32.

Specifically, no allegations suggest that Vickers was unsafe in
any way or that Bruce exhibited any signs of aggression.
It

may

different

details

well

be

that the

fashion.

about

the

Facts

pet,

record

remain

its

will

develop

be

developed

including

appearance,

behavior,

to

history,

relationship to Plaintiffs, etc.

in

a

much

At this stage, the complaint

makes sufficient allegations to proceed.

Therefore, Vickers's

Motion to Dismiss SDCs claim is denied at this time.

This does

not

qualified

preclude

Vickers

from

raising

the

defense

of

immunity at a later stage of the case.
2. Other Plaintiffs v. Vickers

Even assuming the truth of the Complaint, the force that
Vickers

exerted

reasonable.
discharge

of

against

Plaintiffs

Rich,

AMB,

and

ERA

was

The only force that he exerted toward them was the
a

weapon

aimed

at

Bruce

that

hit

SDC.

The

Complaint does not allege that Vickers even pointed a gun at any

18

of these

Plaintiffs.^

Thus, the Complaint

provides an

even

weaker case of excessive force than the one deemed reasonable in
Groom v. Balkwill.

There,

the

645 F.3d 1240 (llth Cir. 2011).

deputy

pushed

the

elderly

plaintiff,

also

a

witness to an arrest, to the ground from her squatting position
and held her there with his leg for ten minutes.
53.

The

Eleventh

Circuit

affirmed

summary

Id. at 1252-

judgment

for

the

officer because no constitutional violation had been shown where

the plaintiff was in the front yard of a house known by law
enforcement

to

substances.

be

involved

Id.

The

in

the

Court

distribution

held

that

the

of

controlled

officers

were

authorized to exercise authority ^'by placing all the occupants

of

the

[p]remises

securing

the

home

officers or the

on

the

and

ground

ensuring

public."

for

there

several
was

no

minutes
danger

place

the

to

the

Here, the Complaint itself alleges

that Vickers knew the suspect was on the premises.
SI 35-36.

while

Dkt. No. 1

Hence, he and the other officers were authorized to

bystanders

on

the

ground

for

the

duration

of

the

arrest.

3. ERA, Stewart, JDS, and MS v. Wooten

The claims of ERA, Stewart, JDS, and MS against Wooten in

his

individual

capacity

are

still

asserted

in

the

case.

'The Complaint makes other allegations that Plaintiffs "were held at gun
point" with an "officer forcefully shov[ing] the barrel of a loaded gun into
their backs," but the Complaint does not allege that Vickers was the subject
of these actions.

Dkt. No. 1 I 27.
19

However, they are

due to

be

dismissed.

Just like

Vickers,

Wooten is entitled to qualified immunity for claims against him
in his individual capacity unless Plaintiffs can show that he
violated a constitutional right, and that that right was clearly
established.

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1158.

According to the

allegations in

the

complaint,

Wooten's

involvement with the incident giving rise to this litigation is
limited to
Dkt. No.

his supervisory role as Sheriff of Coffee County.

1 1 13.

As

Sheriff, the

complaint alleges, he

was

responsible for establishing customs, policies, and procedures
to regulate the conduct of agents and employees of the Coffee
County

Sheriff

Department

complied with the law.

and

for

ensuring

that

employees

Id.

'^The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his]

individual

capacity

extremely rigorous.

for

the

actions

of

a

subordinate

is

Cottone, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.

2003) (quoting Gonzales v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.
2003)).

[S]upervisory

when

supervisor

the

unconstitutional

liability

personally

conduct

or

when

under § 1983

participates
there

is

a

in

occurs
the

causal

either
alleged

connection

between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation."

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

necessary causal connection can be established

""^The

^when a history

of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of
20

the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do
so.'"

Id. {quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234).

Here, this Court has already found that the constitutional

rights of ERA, Stewart, JDS, and MS were not violated.

Wooten

cannot be liable under § 1983 for actions he supervised that do
not constitute a constitutional violation.

consider

whether

This Court need not

Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a

history of

widespread abuse that put a responsible supervisor on notice of
the need to correct a deprivation.

Wooten cannot be liable as a

supervisor, and all remaining claims against him are dismissed.
CONCLUSION

Vickers's
DENIED.

Motion

Vickers's

to

Motion

Dismiss
to

SDC's § 1983 claim

Dismiss

all

other

is

claims

hereby
of

the

remaining Plaintiffs—Stewart, Corbitt, Rich, AMB, ERA, JDS, and
MS—is GRANTED.

Wooten's Motion to Dismiss all remaining claims

against him is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this

5^^

day of

December , 2017.

HON. LISA GODBEY' WOOD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

21