Pelka v. Ware County, Georgia et al

Filing 91

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 42 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion to Dismiss. Count One and Nine are DISMISSED against City and County only; and Count Seven is DISMISSED, with respect to Sheriff Royal, in his official capacity. All other counts remain. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 9/29/2017. (csr)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS

SUSI EMERITA PELKA,

DIVISION

as the

Surviving Spouse & Personal
Representative of the Estate of
JEFFERY DAVID PELKA,

Deceased,

*

*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*
*

v.

*
*

WARE COUNTY,

GEORGIA;

RANDY ROYAL,

*

Individually and in his Official
Capacity as Sheriff of Ware
County, Georgia; Danny Christmas,
Individually and in his Official
Capacity as Administrator of the
Ware County Jail; CITY OF

*
*
*
*
*
*

WAYCROSS,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

GEORGIA;

JEFFREY

NICHOLS, BELENDA MCELROY, DWAYNE
HOWELL, DONNY SPRADLEY, JAMES
SOWELL, JAMES ALDRIDGE, NATHANIEL
ROBERTS, MICHAL DEAN, JOSHUA
RYLEE, GARY SIMMONS, HUBERT

RYALS,

and JAMES LEE,

in

their Individual Capacities;
PETER WROBEL, M.D., Individually
and in his Official Capacity
as Medical Director of

the Ware

County Jail; PETER WROBEL, M.D.,

*
*
*
*

*

P.C.;

SOUTHEAST GEORGIA PRIMARY

*

CARE,

P.C.;

*

MEDICINE,

SOUTHERN CORRECTIONAL

LLC;

and DONNA BENNET,

*

MICHELLE CHANCEY, JOHNNY LEE
JONES, JR., SUSAN MARTIN, SHARON

*
*

RAY, LYNN STREAT, and KRISTY
WHITE, in their Individual

*
*

Capacities,

*
*

Defendants.

*

CV 516-108

ORDER

This

matter

is

before

the

Court

on

the

two

Motions

to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by City of Waycross, Georgia
("City"),
Sheriff,

Danny

and

Ware

Randy Royal,

Christmas

Nichols,
Sowell,

Rylee,

County,

("Administrator

James Aldridge,

Gary Simmons,

opposition
support.

to

the

(Docs.

47.)

motions

59,

Christmas");

65,

and

Jeffrey

Michael Dean,

and James Lee

James
Joshua

(collectively,

Plaintiff

filed

responses

in

Defendants

and

69,

County

Donny Spradley,

Nathaniel Roberts,

42,

Ware

and Jail Administrator,

Dwayne Howell,

Hubert Ryals,

(Docs.

("County");

("Sheriff Royal")

Belenda McElroy,

"Jailers"),

Georgia

filed

replies

in

71,

83,

84,

87.)

The Court heard

oral arguments on the motions and Plaintiff and Defendants filed
supplemental
Defendants'
review.

briefs.
motions

For the

are GRANTED

(Docs.
have

been

reasons

IN PART

Friday,

Waycross,

and DENIED

probation.

December

Georgia,

(Id.

fully

84,

87.)

briefed

and

Accordingly,
are

ripe

the Defendants'

for

motions

IN PART.

BACKGROUND

12,

revoked

H 40.)

83,

stated herein,

I.

On

82,

2014,

Jeffrey

the

David

Municipal

Pelka's

Court

of

("Pelka")

That court's incarcerated persons are

held at Ware County Jail

("WCJ") according to a contract between

County and City.

% 118.)

Royal.

(Id.

(Id.

t 6.)

WCJ

During intake at

is operated by Sheriff
WCJ, Pelka was evaluated

by a nurse who noted that Pelka had prescriptions for methadone

and oxycodone
times

a

for pain management;

day;

complained

of

drank alcohol

delirium

tremens,

five to
which

seven
is

a

condition caused by alcohol withdrawal; and would be placed in a

medical

segregation

unit.

%%

(Id.

38,

45.)

Additionally,

Pelka's pharmacy faxed his prescription records to WCJ.
47.)

However,

first being examined by a physician who was

scheduled to visit on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
WCJ's policy recognized that withdrawal

On

(Id. 1f1f 49, 50.)

is a potentially fatal

(Id. K 112.)

December,

symptoms

13,

2014,

including

hallucinations.

(Id.

Pelka

began

disorientation,
% 53.)

to

exhibit

withdrawal

confusion,

and

was

"touching

the

walls

building something while he was
Defendant Jones,
about

list

Pelka's

Jr.,

and

acting

in his cell."

called Defendant Dr. Wrobel,

condition and was

for the next visit."

and

Throughout the day, WCJ's medical

staff noted Pelka had a temperature of 100.1 degrees,
tremor,

%

WCJ's policy prohibited inmates from taking their

medication without

condition.

(Id.

(Id.

as

a slight
if

(Id.

he

K 56.)

to inform him

told to place Pelka on the

f 57.)

was

When Pelka's

"MD

family

came to visit later that day, they brought Pelka's medications

but

were

told

he

was

too

sick

for

would not deliver his medications.
By

Sunday

morning,

a

visit

and

that

called Defendants

December

14,

who had come to

2014,

Pelka

was

(Id.

for

that when he entered the cell,

Pelka charged Nichols

that

Pelka

was

(Id.

68.)

tray,
Pelka

Nichols claims
and Pelka

Plaintiff counters that Pelka

Nichols never entered Pelka's cell;

pepper-sprayed

return his tray.

f 65.)

when

(Id.

never posed any threat;

K 67,

back-up

failed to hand over his tray.

(Id. f 68.)

found

retrieve Pelka's meal

Spradley and Nichols

was pepper-sprayed.

staff

(Id. UK 58-59.)

shaking his cell door and speaking incoherently.
Defendant McElroy,

the

as

t 71.)

punishment

for

failing

and
to

Defendants then washed off the

pepper-spray and Pelka was assessed by a nurse for any signs of

physical injury.

(Id.

ff 74,

75.)

Nichols described Pelka as

"shaky," "unstable," and "unsteady on his feet."
That

afternoon,

segregation
wander

cell";

around;

Pelka

would

"was

playing with the

sporadically

complained

of

(Id. f 74.)

lie

down

walls

and get

hallucinations;

and

80.)

This

led to

Pelka being placed

which was under video surveillance.

in a

up

the

to

eventually

stripped naked and began to rub the walls of his cell.
79,

in

(Id. %%

"rubber room,"

(Id. % 80.)

During the night and into the morning of December 15, 2014,

Pelka collapsed at least eight times.

(Id. % 85.)

duty that night observed Pelka's behavior.

(Id.

Jailers on

ff

90-96.)

When Defendant
were

blue

checked on Pelka at

a

suggested

and

nurse

(Id. %% 97, 98.)

withdrawal.
that

Sowell

Pelka's

vitals

be

6:30

he

was

At 9:30 a.m.,

checked,

but

a.m.,

his

suffering

When

Simmons

and

Defendant

Sowell

from

a nurse recommended
Simmons

Defendant Sowell to wait until after the inmate count.
101-03.)

legs

went

to

ordered

(Id. fH

retrieve

Pelka

approximately forty minutes later,

he was shaking, vomiting,

mucus

his

coming

(Id.

from

Ht 106,

his

108.)

nose,

and

legs

had

turned

had

purple.

While being transferred to medical,

Pelka

became limp and lifeless and was taken to the emergency room but

pronounced dead at 11:20 a.m.

On December 11,

2016,

(Id. %% 108, 110-11.)

Plaintiff filed this suit.

(Doc.

1.)

Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss on January 3, 2017,

and January

17,

2017.

The

motions on August 4, 2017.

8(a)(2)

of

heard oral

arguments

on the

(Doc. 81).

II.

Rule

Court

the

LEGAL

STANDARD

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

requires a complaint to contain "a short plain statement of the

claim

showing

that

the

pleader

gives a defendant notice
Atl.

Corp.

v. Twombly,

Rule 12(b)(6)

facts

is

entitled

of the claim and

550 U.S.

motion to dismiss,

544,

555

to

relief,"

which

its grounds.

Bell

(2007) .

To survive a

a complaint must include enough

that demonstrate the plaintiff's right to relief is more

than speculative,
to relief.

Id.

and those

at 570.

facts must

While a complaint does not need to be

bursting with factual allegations,
than

Id.

a

at

bare

bone

a

of

the

complaint

beyond a

circumstances

Gibson,

recital

there must be something more

elements

of

a

cause

of

action.

555.

However,
appears

state a plausible claim

355

doubt

that

U.S.

that

would

41,

should

not

be

denied

the plaintiff

entitle

45-46

him

(1957) .

to

The

"unless

can prove no
relief."

Court

set of

Conley

must

it

accept

v.

all

factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable

to

F.3d 1153,

the

1155

plaintiff.

(11th Cir.

Belanger

liable

under

alleges
state

in

and

Salvation

Army,

556

Defendants

are

2009).

III.

Plaintiff

v.

DISCUSSION

her

complaint

federal

law.

that

Plaintiff

also

seeks

punitive damages and attorneys' fees.
A.

LIABILITY OF

CITY AND

Plaintiff's

COUNTY

substantive

state-law

claim

against

City

and

County under O.C.G.A.

§ 42-5-2 fails due to sovereign immunity.

Under

cities

Georgia

sovereign

Agency,

immunity.

719

Richardson,

law,

S.E.2d
452

and

Godfrey

412,

S.E.2d

414
476,

v.

(Ga.

counties
Ga.

protected

Interlocal

2011)

478-79

are

(cities);

(Ga.

1994)

Risk

by

Mgmt.

Gilbert

v.

(counties).

Sovereign

immunity

Godfrey,

719

Plaintiff

asserts

with

may

S.E.2d

respect

only

at

that

be

414;

overcome

by

Gilbert,

O.C.G.A.

§

42-5-2

to providing medical

express

452

S.E.2d

includes

services

waiver.

to

at

such a

478.
waiver

inmates.

While

that statute imposes a duty to provide medical care to inmates,
it

does

S.E.2d

not

900,

waive

sovereign

907-08

Columbus,

521

sovereign

immunity

claim against

(Ga.

S.E.2d

Gish

Ct.

App.

2010);

65

(Ga.

Ct.

51,

has

immunity.

not

been

v.

Thomas,

Howard

App.

v.

691

City

of

Because

Plaintiff's

waived,

1999) .

state-law

City and County for breach of

a duty to provide

medical care fails.

City and County also claim they cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 for Sheriff Royal's deliberate indifference because they

had no control over Sheriff Royal's policies.

counties

are

"persons"

for

the purposes

of

§ 1983

held liable for constitutional deprivations.
Soc.

Sec.

Servs. , 436

government

liable,

deliberate

conduct,

a

U.S.

plaintiff
the

Brown,

520

U.S.

397,

690

must

show

404

was

and can be

Monell v. Dept.

(1978) .

municipality

behind the injury alleged."
v.

658,

Both cities and

To

"that,
the

hold

a

local

through

xmoving

of

its

force'

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.
(1997)

local government can be liable

(emphasis

in two ways:

policy promulgated by the entity;

or (2)

in original) .

(1)

A

an official

an unofficial policy

shown by the repeated actions of the entity's final policymaker.
Grech v.

2003) .

Clayton Cnty.,

Importantly,

protections

and

Pembaur

City

v.

(holding a

Ga.,

335

F.3d 1326,

1329-30

(11th Cir.

an entity cannot circumvent constitutional

allow
of

others

to

do

what

it

475

U.S.

469,

liable

for

Cincinnati,

municipality may be

could

not.

480-81

the

See

(1986)

decisions

of

an

official if i t has delegated final authority).

According to Plaintiff,

City only lacked control because i t

delegated authority over housing and providing medical

care

inmates

County.

through

However,

City's

delegated.
705-06
and

an

duty

Ancata v.

(11th Cir.

therefore

Sheriff

inter-governmental
provide

medical

Prison Health Servs.,

1985).

has

Royal,

to

agreement

no

care

Inc.,

Cir.

1984)

(holding

became

control

over

responsible

City of Tampa,

a

be

769 F.2d 700,

the

for

policies

Sheriff

policies when it entrusted him with its inmates.
see also Trezevant v.

cannot

While City is a separate entity from -

direct

City

with

to

city

liable

for

-

Royal's

Id. at n.ll;1

741 F.2d 336,

partly

of

339-40

(11th

constitutional

violations that occurred after the county took custody).

Next,
entrusting

City

argues

inmates

to

that

it

Sheriff

did

not

Royal

know

its

would

policy

lead

to

of
a

1 Although Ancata dealt with delegating to a private entity, the decision's
language suggests that the analysis would be the same.
Ancata, 769 F.2d at
706 (*[I]f the county permitted the sheriff and/or prison health officials
that it contracted with to establish such a policy or custom,
liable.") .

8

it may also be

constitutional violation.

imposed

for

appropriate
happens
Marsh

single

the

Butler

policy
Cnty.,

Plaintiff

Pembaur,

itself

268

alleges

unconstitutional,

"municipal liability may be

decision by municipal

circumstances."

when

v.

Since

a

However,

is

F.3d

U.S.

facially

1014,

Sheriff

City may be

475

policymakers

1036

Royal's

at

480.

This

unconstitutional.
(11th

Cir.

2001).

policy

is

liable

despite

its

showing

Sheriff

Royal

held

under

facially
lack of

notice.

Plaintiff

also

City policymaker.

alleges

facts

In the Eleventh Circuit,

was

a

whether an officer's

decisions are subject to review is dispositive in determining if
he
116

is a final policymaker.
F.3d 1396,

delegated

1401

all

See Scala v.

(11th Cir.

responsibility

1997).

over

final

authority

to

entity's actions.
1328,

1334-35

McKinney

v.

F.2d at 705.

Royal

an

See Hearn v.

(11th Cir.

Pete,

entity,

20

1982),

F.3d

1550

it

Plaintiff

its

through an inter-governmental agreement.

City of Winter Park,
alleges

prisoners

to

County

When a city delegates

remains

liable

for

City of Gainesville,
overruled on other

(11th

City

Cir.

1994);

that

688 F.2d

grounds

Ancata,

by

769

The allegations demonstrate that City gave Sheriff

complete

authority

over

its

liable for Sheriff Royal's decisions.

inmates

and

is

therefore

Next,

County

Royal's

actions

Whether

a

claims

because

county

that

he

sheriff

it

was
is

cannot

be

liable

acting on behalf
an

arm

of

the

of

McMillian v.

520 U.S.

it depends

sheriff

was

785

(1997) .

serving.

Instead,

Id.

Courts

look

at

the

state

answered categorically "yes or no."
781,

for

the entity;

(3)

(2)

Georgia

be

Monroe Cnty.,

on what

four

role a

factors
(1)

to
how

the control the state has over

the source of the entity's funds; and (4) who is

responsible for judgments against the entity.
338 F.3d 1304,

state.

cannot

determine if an entity is acting as an arm of the state:
state law defines the entity;

Sheriff

1328.

sheriff

acts

agent of the state.

Manders v.

Lee,

The Eleventh Circuit has found that when a

in

Id.

a

law enforcement

capacity,

he

is

an

(finding that a county was not liable

for sheriff's use-of-force policy at the jail).

However,

Plaintiff's allegations

stem from Sheriff Royal's

failure to provide adequate medical care.
decide

if

Sheriff Royal

was acting as

when served in this capacity.
to

address

this

issue,

a

Thus,

the Court must

county or state actor

Every district court in Georgia

including

the

Southern

District,

has

found that a Georgia county sheriff is an arm of the county when

he provides medical services.
2016

WL

4223721,

Integrative

Pet.

at

5

(S.D.

See,
Ga.

Health Servs.,

10

e.g.,

Aug.

Inc.,

9,
2014

Lewis v.
2016);
WL

Whisenant,
Robinson

1314947,

at

v.
*12

n.148

(M.D.

Ga.

Mar.

28,

4816731,

at *6-8

(M.D.

F. Supp.

2d 1298,

Ga.

at *3

the

Manders

first

three

Oct.

1319-22

2006 WL 156873,

2014);

Youngs

30,

Ga.

2006);

Jan.

factors,

Johnson,

2008); Dukes v.

(N.D. Ga.

(S.D.

v.

19,

while

2008

Georgia,

42-5-2(a)

medical

21.

specifically

treatment of

As

to

the

relating to

county
factors.

Royal

final

but

Id.

is a

inmates.

2006).

the

In regards to

state

at

this

local

Dukes,

factor,

inmate medical

funds

entrusts

a

616

Green v. Glynn Cty. ,

creates

has control over - a sheriff's duty to maintain jails,

§

WL

616

entities
F.

judgment

Supp.

-

O.C.G.A.

with

2d at

against

and

a

the
1319-

sheriff

care would implicate both state and

is

not

1321-22.

enough

Thus,

to

the

Court

county actor when he provides

outweigh
finds

medical

the

that

other

Sheriff

services

to

inmates.

Next,
demonstrate

County

disputes

deliberate

whether

indifference

To prove deliberate indifference,
had

a

serious

medical

need;

to

Plaintiff's

to

serious

allegations

medical

needs.

a plaintiff must show:
(2)

that

the

need;

defendant

deliberate

indifference

and

(3)

the

injury was

caused by defendant's wrongful conduct.

acted

(1)

he

with

plaintiff's

Goebert v.

Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
I.

Pelka's Serious Medical Need

A serious medical need "is one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
11

even a

lay person would easily recognize

doctorfs
Pet.

attention."

Ctr.,

40

F.3d

Id.

(quoting Hill

1176,

1187

(11th

part on other grounds by Hope v.

(2002)).

County

does

not

the

v.

Cir.

Pelzer,

explicitly

necessity for

Dekalb Reg'l
1994),

dispute

Youth

overruled

536 U.S.

Court

Lancaster

1997)

is
v.

satisfied
Monroe

(holding

that

Cnty.,

the

clearly established),
Warden,

as

to

its

116

F.3d

739 n.9

whether

Pelka's

seriousness

seriousness.
1419,

of

in

730,

condition was sufficiently serious to satisfy this element,
the

a

See,

1425-26

alcohol

and

e.g. ,

(11th

Cir.

withdrawal

is

overruled on other grounds by Caldwell v.

FCI Talladega,

748 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir.

2014).

2. Sheriff Royal's Deliberate Indifference

The second element requires a showing that Defendants were

deliberately

indifferent

A plaintiff must show:
risk of

serious

harm;

to

(a)
(b)

Pelka's

serious

Defendants'

condition.

subjective knowledge of

disregard of

that

conduct that is more than gross negligence.
at

medical

risk;

and

Goebert,

(c)

510

by

F.3d

1327.

A plaintiff can show subjective knowledge by demonstrating
the defendant was aware of facts that would allow him to infer a
risk

of

Farmer v.

serious

harm

Brennan,

and

511 U.S.

the

defendant

825,

demonstrated by actual knowledge.

12

837

made

(1994) .

that

inference.

This can only be

Burnette v. Taylor,

533 F.3d

1325,

1331

(11th

Cir.

2008).

Here,

Plaintiff

alleges

that

Sheriff Royal's written policy acknowledged that withdrawal was

potentially fatal.

To

satisfy

This demonstrates subjective knowledge.

the

second sub-element,

a

plaintiff

must

show

the defendant disregarded the risk by failing to take reasonable
measures.

Ga.

Keele v.

2 013) .

Even

Glynn Cnty.,

if

a

938

defendant

F.Supp.2d 1270,

is

instance of misconduct may suffice.
1052,

1062

(11th Cir.

1986) .

generally

Rogers v.

1327.

to

Plaintiff

take

reasonable

alleges

Evans,

Goebert,

that Sheriff Royal's

measures

to

abate

the

(S.D.

attentive,

one

792

This is also a question of

which can be shown by the "standard methods."
at

1292

F.2d
fact,

510 F.3d

policy failed

danger

of

Pelka's

withdrawal and thereby disregarded that risk.
The
conduct

1327;

final
was

requires

than gross

negligence.

more

Rogers,

something

sub-element

792 F.2d at 1060

more

than

a

showing

a

defendant's

Goebert,

510

F.3d at

(holding that gross negligence is

medical

judgment

call).

A

defendant's

conduct can go beyond gross negligence when she fails to obtain
medical treatment,

delays treatment,

provides grossly inadequate

treatment,

an

less

treatment,
no

takes

medical

but

effective

course

of

or provides treatment so cursory that it amounts to

treatment

(11th Cir.

easier

at

all.

1999).

care,

McElligott

County argues

Plaintiff

cannot
13

v.

Foley,

182

F.3d 1248,

1255

that since Pelka did receive
show

deliberate

indifference.

Although

courts

when an
liable

if

inmate

if

the

care

Plaintiff

hesitant

care

was

provided

Evans,

has

to

find

received medical

that

Waldrop v.

unable

are

871

was

care,

easier

that

the

the

entity may

still

be

less

effective

method

or

incompetent

1036

he

who

facts

that

demonstrate

care

was

inadequate.

1989).

treated

needed and

was only scheduled to come in twice a week.

out

or

(11th Cir.

nurses

treatment

indifference

an

and

grossly

F.2d 1030,

alleged

to provide

an

deliberate

Here,

Pelka

that

Dr.

Wrobel

Plaintiff has

grossly

were

set

incompetent,

inadequate, or was an easier and less effective method.

3. Defendants' Policy Caused Pelka's Constitutional Injury
Finally, a deliberate indifference claim must demonstrate
how

the

established

violation.
despite

Ancata,

inmates

prescribed

policy

resulted

769 F.2d at 705-06.

not

being

medication

able

without

a

to

This

is

the

constitutional

Plaintiff alleges that

receive

physician's

their

previously-

authorization,

Dr.

Plaintiff argues that,

Wrobel only visited twice a week.

for this policy,

in

but

Pelka would have had access to his medication.

sufficient

to

establish

a

causal

connection

between

Sheriff Royal's policy and Pelka's constitutional injury.2
The

state

law

claims

Plaintiff

brings

County are barred by sovereign immunity.

against

However,

City

and

Plaintiff has

2 Because a suit against an agent in her official capacity is essentially a
suit against the entity itself, the Court comes to the same conclusion with
respect to Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Royal and Administrator
Christmas,
159,

165-66

in their official

capacities.

(1985).

14

See Kentucky v.

Graham,

473

U.S.

alleged

facts

showing

City

and

County

are

liable

for

the

deliberate indifference of Sheriff Royal.
B.

SHERIFF ROYAL,

Next,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

County

argues

against Sheriff Royal,
sovereign immunity.

has

been

waived

that

Plaintiff's

in his official

state

capacity,

law

claims

are barred by

Plaintiff responds that sovereign immunity

pursuant

to

O.C.G.A.

§§

15-16-5,

15-16-23.

Those statutes waive sovereign immunity for the official actions
of

a

sheriff

Cantrell v.
overruled

he

Thurman,

on

S.E.2d 573,

when

other

576

is

499

sued

Ct.

his

S.E.2d 416,

grounds

(Ga.

on

by

App.

sheriff's

421

(Ga.

Tantall

Cnty.

2015).

A

bond.

Ct.

v.

App.

See

1998),

Armstrong,

775

sheriff has a duty to

provide medical care to inmates and a breach of that duty could

implicate

647,

648

the

sheriff's bond.

(Ga.

recovery is

Ct.

App.

limited to

146 S.E.2d 127,

745

Kendrick v.

1938).

The

Anderson,

extent

the applicable bond.

(Ga. Ct. App.

1965).

condition

Therefore,

but

Sheriff

Royal

failed

S.E.

Plaintiff's

Meeks v.

Douglas,

Plaintiff alleges that

Sheriff Royal's policy recognized withdrawal was
fatal

of

180

to

a potentially

abate

that

risk.

Sheriff Royal can be held liable since he was

aware

of the illegality of his conduct or failed to exercise ordinary

care to prevent it.

3

O.C.G.A. § 15-16-24.3

Plaintiff also argues that sovereign immunity has been waived under

O.C.G.A. § 15-16-24.

However, that statute establishes the prerequisites for

collecting under a sheriff's bond and does not provide a separate source of
liability.
15

County
capacity,

is

use-of-force
force.
the

The

State"

Manders

argues

that

his

official

protected by sovereign immunity when he

creates a

policy

excessive

and

Sheriff

cannot

be

Eleventh Amendment
brought

under

specifically

§

held

bars

1983.

held

Royal,

in

liable

claims

against

Manders,

that

when

338

a

force policy for inmates,

arm

and

the

immunity.

state

Manders,

338

is

protected

F.3d at

1328

Sheriff

Royal

is

immune

from

by

§

F.3d

Eleventh

(11th Cir.

a

"arm of
at

1328.

sheriff

he does so as an

the pepper-spray incident involves the use of

inmate,

an

Georgia

establishes a use of
of

for

Amendment

2003).

Since

force against an

1983

suit

based

on

excessive force.
C.

INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF

Plaintiff

individual
adequate

also

seeks

capacity,

care

and

JAILERS

to

liable

hold

for

excessive

the

failing

force.

Jailers,

County

Jailers are entitled to qualified immunity.

their

provide

to

in

Pelka

argues

that

the

County then argues

that even if the Jailers are not entitled to qualified immunity,
Pelka's

treatment

did not

rise

to

the level

of

a

constitutional

violation.

1. Some Jailers May Have Been Deliberately Indifferent
Plaintiff

must

show

Jailers

acted

with

deliberate

indifference to Pelka's serious medical need and this caused his

injury.

Goebert, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
16

In her

complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that each of

exhibiting withdrawal

symptoms

responded

inadequately.

ramblings,

fever,

limbs.

his

and either

Pelka's

undressing,

failed to

symptoms

repeated

need

to

Furthermore,
demonstrate
surpasses

receive

each
a

falls,

officer's
of

negligence.

Goebert,

and

failure
the

his

discolored

delay.

F.3d

at

to

report

this

of

Pelka's

death

risk

Keele,

510

938

F.

Supp.

2d

after being told to bring Pelka to medical,

ordered Sowell to wait until after inmate count,

1326.

could

at

that
1292.

Simmons

a forty-minute

A delay related to non-medical reasons shows deliberate

indifference.

Bozeman v.

Orum,

422

F.3d 1265,

1273

(11th Cir.

(a delay of fourteen minutes was actionable as deliberate

indifference).

Although

Plaintiff

brought Pelka to medical personnel,

concedes

that

some

Jailers

Plaintiff might be able show

that Jailers response was grossly inadequate.
at

included

enough to put a layperson on notice

treatment.

disregard

gross

For example,

2005)

respond or

The Court finds the physical symptoms Pelka is alleged

to have displayed would be
of

the Jailers saw Pelka

Waldrop,

871 F.2d

1036.

2.

The

Eighth

Excessive Force

Amendment's

proscription

against

cruel

and

unusual punishment governs the amount of force prison officials

may use against inmates.
(11th Cir. 1999).

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374

Such a claim has an objective and subjective
17

component.

Sims v. Mashburn,

To

the

satisfy

force

was

825,

834

was

objective

sufficiently

(1994).

used

for

serious.

punitive

Albers,

force

used

force,

component,

an

(11th Cir.

inmate

Farmer

reasons

v.

475 U.S.

in

good

rather

312,

320-21

faith,

must

1994).

show

Brennan,

than

511

restoring

(1986).

courts

the
U.S.

order.

To determine if

consider

the

need

for

the relationship between that need and the force applied,

the extent of the inmate's injuries,
to

983

The subjective element requires showing force

Whitley v.

was

25 F.3d 980,

other

staff

and

inmates,

and

severity of a forceful response.

the danger the inmate posed

efforts

taken

to

temper

the

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that McElroy ordered Pelka to return his
meal

tray

Plaintiff

and

called

claims

for

Pelka was

backup

after

sprayed while

he
the

failed

to

do

so.

other guards were

outside his cell and Pelka was lying face-down on the floor.4
The Court rejects County's argument that pepper-spray could not

produce

injuries

constitutional
F.3d

1340,

on

Pelka

was

are

violation.

1348

allegations,

that

the

(11th

Court

See,
Cir.

cannot

appropriate;

Pelka posed a danger to

sufficiently
e.g.,

serious

Vinyard

v.

Based

on

2002).

to

cause

Wilson,

a
311

Plaintiff's

conclude that using pepper-spray

Pelka's

injuries

inmates or staff;

were

de

minimis;

or that efforts were

4 County points out that this recitation is at odds with what prison staff
reported, but on a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Belanger, 556 F.3d at 1155.
18

taken to temper the severity of Jailers response.

Stallworth v. Tyson,

of

pepper-spray

danger

he

was

posed

alleged facts

578 F. App'x 948,

not

was

that

excessive

when

fabricated).

show force was

953

Id. ; see also

(refusing to find use

plaintiff

Therefore,

alleged

the

Plaintiff

has

sufficiently serious and was

used in bad faith or was malicious or sadistic.

3. A Finding of Qualified Immunity is not Appropriate at this
Point

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability so long as they do not
violate clearly established law.
748 F.3d 1316,

1321,

1321 n.15

Morris v. Town of Lexington,

(11th Cir.

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must:

2014).

To survive a

(1) allege sufficient facts

to state a violation of his constitutional rights; and (2)
demonstrate that those constitutional rights were clearly
established at the time of the violation.

Id.

at 1322.

Clearly

established rights are those set by precedent of the United
States Supreme Court,
Supreme Court.
1325,

1328

the Eleventh Circuit, and the Georgia

Snider v. Jefferson State Cmty. Coll., 344 F.3d

(11th Cir.

2003).

The case does not need to be

directly on point and only needs to give the defendant fair
notice.

Mitello v.

Sherriff of the Broward Sheriff's Office,

684 F. App'x 809, 813

(11th Cir. 2017).

19

The Complaint demonstrates that Defendants' failure to
treat Pelka's alcohol and methadone withdrawal violated a

clearly established right.
deliberate

The Eleventh Circuit has found that

indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs

violates a clearly established right.
at 1425.

See Lancaster,

116 F.3d

More specifically, there is well-established precedent

that withdrawal is a serious medical condition and failing to
treat it violates a clearly established right.

Id. at 1425-26.

At this point, the Court cannot conclude that the Jailers are
protected by qualified immunity.

County also moves to dismiss the excessive force claims on
the grounds of qualified immunity.

The Eleventh Circuit has

held, however, that qualified immunity does not apply to

excessive force claims because the subjective element is so

extreme that no reasonable person could believe her actions were
lawful.

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008),

overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott,

(11th Cir. 2010).

610 F.3d 701

Accordingly, since Plaintiff stated a cause

of action based on excessive force,

her claim will not be

dismissed.

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
against Jailers, in their individual capacities, under § 1983
for deliberate indifference and excessive force.

20

Since the

Court cannot decide Jailers are protected by qualified immunity,
these claims will proceed.
D.

PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against City and
County because municipalities

brought under § 1983.5
453

U.S.

1303,

247,

1322

Manders

v.

271

(11th

Lee,

immune

from punitive

damages

City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,

(1981);
Cir.

338

are

Alexander v.

2000),

F.3d

Fulton

overruled

1304

(11th

on

Cir.

Cnty.,

other

207

F.3d

grounds

2003) .

by

Similarly,

Plaintiff may not pursue punitive damages against either City or
County

under

state

law

since

Georgia

entities from punitive damages.

also

shields

government

Martin v. Hosp. Auth.

of Clarke

Cnty., 449 S.E.2d 827, 827 (Ga. 1994).6

However,

individual

punitive

Plaintiff

capacity

damages

also

claims.

against

granted against officers,
Apartments,

Cir.

Inc.

2008).

conduct

is

v.

These

government

§

are

evil

damages

1983

does

entities,

in their individual

damages

by

punitive

Although

Town of Jupiter,

motivated

indifferent to

seeks

529

not

they

F.3d 1027,

when

intent,

or

a

her

allow

may

capacity.

allowed

federally protected rights.

for

be

Young

1047

(11th

defendant's

was

Smith v.

recklessly
Wade,

461

5 Plaintiff concedes to this point and says she will no longer pursue these
(Docs. 65, 69.)

damages.

6 Plaintiff's punitive damages claim against Sheriff Royal and Administrator
Christmas,
in their official
represent a government entity.
Gilbert,

capacities,
must
also fail because they
See
Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1322 n.14;

452 S.E.2d at 478 n.4.

21

U.S.

30,

damages

she

56

(1983).

is against officers,

has

alleged

intent or was
the

Because

Court

that

their

Plaintiff's

claim

for

punitive

in their individual capacity,

conduct

was

motivated

by

and

improper

recklessly indifferent to Pelka's federal rights,

will

allow

Plaintiff

to

continue

fails

to

allege

City

and

pursuing

punitive

damages.

Therefore,

punitive
However,

Plaintiff

damages

against

grounds

County

could

upon

be

which

granted.

she has stated a claim for punitive damages against the

individual Defendants under §
IV.

1983.
CONCLUSION

At this stage, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, the
Court

concludes

Plaintiff

has

stated

a

claim

deliberate indifference against City, County,
and

Administrator

Christmas,

in

their

under

§

1983

for

and Sheriff Royal

official

capacities.

Plaintiff has also stated a claim against the Jailers,

in their

individual capacities, for deliberate indifference and excessive
force.

The

Court

cannot

conclude

that

from these claims by qualified immunity.

Jailers

are

protected

Plaintiff's state-law

claims against City and County are barred by sovereign immunity
and

are

valid

therefore

state

capacity.

law

DISMISSED.

claim against

Finally,

However,

Sheriff

Plaintiff

Royal,

has

in his

made

a

official

Plaintiff's excessive force claim against

Sheriff Royal, in his official capacity, is also DISMISSED.
22

Therefore,

dismiss
IN

(docs. 42-1,

PART;

County

Sheriff

upon

Count

only;

One

and

Royal,

in

due

consideration,

47-1)
and

Defendants'

motion

to

is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
Nine

are

DISMISSED

Count

Seven

is

DISMISSED,

his

official

capacity.

at

Augusta,

against

Georgia

with

All

City

and

respect

other

to

counts

remain.

ORDER

ENTERED

fan^

2017.

UNITED BTATES

DISTRICT

COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

23