JACKSON v. PERRY et al

Filing 13

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS this action and DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE this case re 1 Complaint filed by TERRY ROBERT JACKSON. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendat ion to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 8/7/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 7/24/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

TERRY ROBERT JACKSON,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-11

v.
SGT. PERRY; OFFICER HUTCHINGSON;
SGT. PRESTON; and OFFICER TOLER,
Defendants.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is presently confined at Augusta State Medical Prison, submitted a
Complaint in the above-captioned action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to contest
conditions of his confinement at Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia. (Doc. 1.)
For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS this action and
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. Additionally, I RECOMMEND the Court
DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff alleges that on November 21, 2014, Officer Hutchingson, Sgt. Preston, and
Officer Toler placed him in the back of a transport van to travel to a location outside Coffee
Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1, pp. 3–4.) Plaintiff contends that Officer Hutchingson drove the
transport van over the legal speed limit and slammed on the breaks to avoid an accident. (Id. at
p. 3.) Because the transport van did not have seatbelts, Plaintiff was thrown into the guard cage

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The Court construes the following facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint as true, as it must at this stage.

of the van and became unconscious. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this impact caused injuries to his
neck, head and back. (Id.)
After this incident, Defendants transported Plaintiff back to Coffee Correctional Facility,
where he received pain relievers. (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges he repeatedly complained about
his lack of adequate medical treatment until he received an MRI on December 29, 2014. (Id.)
On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a grievance that was denied “at the wardens [sic] level.” (Id.)
In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation in the amount of one
million dollars. (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment
of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows
an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which
shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must
dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.
Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is
guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . .

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a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set
of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that
standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse
mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We
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have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).
DISCUSSION
I.

Dismissal of Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff cannot sustain Section 1983 claims for monetary relief against Defendants in

their official capacities.

States are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment and traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–
13 (1999). Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit
without its consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a
lawsuit against a state officer in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the
[s]tate itself,” such a defendant is immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the
State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit against Defendants in their official
capacities as employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment immunizes Defendants from suit in their official capacity. See Free v. Granger, 887
F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity, Plaintiff cannot sustain any
constitutional claims against Defendants in their official capacities. Therefore, the Court should
DISMISS all official capacity claims.
II.

Dismissal of Claims Against Defendant Perry
Section 1983 liability must be based on something more than a defendant’s supervisory

position or a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A
supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged

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violations. Id. at 802. “To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege
(1) the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the
existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful
action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the
supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.” Barr v. Gee, 437 F.
App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011).
It appears Plaintiff sues Defendant Perry, the Warden of Coffee Correctional Facility,
based solely on his supervisory position. Plaintiff makes no mention of Defendant Perry in the
statement of his claim. Plaintiff simply states his grievance was denied “at the wardens [sic]
level.” (Doc. 1, p. 4.) As set forth above, such supervisory positions are an insufficient basis for
Section 1983 liability. Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Perry had any personal
involvement in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights or that there is a casual
connection between his conduct and the violation.
Additional grounds also support dismissal of claims against Defendant Perry.

“An

allegation that prison officials denied grievances does not ‘support a finding of constitutional
violations on the part of’ those defendants.” Gresham v. Lewis, No. 6:15-CV-86, 2016 WL
164317, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2016) (citing Bennett v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No.
4:12CV32-MP/CAS, 2012 WL 4760856, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:12-CV-00032-MP-CAS, 2012 WL 4760797 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 2,
2012) (quoting Raske v. Dugger, 819 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (M.D. Fla. 1993))); see also Ludy v.
Nelson, No. 5:14-CV-73-MTT-CHW, 2014 WL 2003017, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2014),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:14-CV-73 MTT, 2014 WL 2003096 (M.D. Ga. May

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15, 2014) (“However, the mere fact that a prison official denies a grievance is insufficient to
impose liability under § 1983.”) (citing Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir.
2009), and Baker v. Rexroad, 159 F. App’x 61, 62 (11th Cir. 2005)). Thus, insofar as Plaintiff
wishes to hold Defendant Perry liable based on the denial of Plaintiff’s grievances, his claims
still fail. Plaintiff only alleges that his grievances were denied “at the wardens [sic] level.”
(Doc. 1, p. 4.) This basis of liability is insufficient under Section 1983.
Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendant Perry was
personally involved in, or otherwise causally connected to, the alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, the Court should DISMISS all claims against Defendant Perry.
III.

Dismissal of Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claims
The cruel and unusual punishment standard of the Eighth Amendment requires prison

officials to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Generally speaking, however, “prison conditions
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation only when they involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quotations omitted). Thus, not all deficiencies and inadequacies in prison conditions amount to
a violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. Id. Prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment only when the prisoner is deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Id. at 347. However, “[c]ontemporary standards of decency must be brought to
bear in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312,
1316 (11th Cir. 1999).

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In the medical care context, the standard for cruel and unusual punishment, embodied in
the principles expressed in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), is whether a prison
official exhibits a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 828. However, “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical
treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505
(11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Rather, “an inmate must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994).
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) a serious
medical need; (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between
that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th
Cir. 2010). A medical need is serious if it “‘has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or [is] one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187) (emphasis supplied). As for the subjective component, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently required that “a defendant know of and disregard an excessive
risk to an inmate’s health and safety.” Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir.
1995).

Under the subjective prong, an inmate “must prove three things: (1) subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than
[gross] negligence.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. “The meaning of ‘more than gross negligence’
is not self-evident[.]” Id.
“A medical treatment claim [will] not lie against non-medical personnel unless they were
personally involved in the denial of treatment or deliberately interfered with prison doctors’

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treatment. Prison officials are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment and expertise of a prison
medical staff to determine a medically necessary and appropriate cause of treatment for an
inmate.” Baker v. Pavlakovic, No. 4:12-CV-03958-RDP, 2015 WL 4756295, at *7 (N.D. Ala.
Aug. 11, 2015) (citing Williams v. Limestone Cty., 198 F. App’x 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2006)).
“[It] is widely held that non-medical prison personnel are generally entitled to rely on the
expertise of the medical staff and are not required to second-guess the medical staff’s judgment
regarding an inmate’s care.”

Stallworth v. Graham, No. 4:14-CV-00134-RDP, 2015 WL

4756348, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2015) (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011
(7th Cir. 2006) (“Except in the unusual case where it would be evident to a layperson that a
prisoner is receiving inadequate or inappropriate treatment, prison officials may reasonably rely
on the judgment of medical professionals[.]”). See also Kelly v. Ambroski, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1320,
1343 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of a reason to believe, or actual knowledge, that
medical staff is administering inadequate medical care, non-medical prison personnel are not
chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference[.]”).
Here, Plaintiff has not named any prison medical personnel as defendants. Additionally,
he does not allege that Defendants Hutchingson, Preston, and Toler were personally involved in
any decisions regarding his medical treatment. Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Hutchingson, Preston, and Toler were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, Plaintiff’s
claims fail. The officers were entitled to rely upon the medical staff’s opinions and treatment of
Plaintiff including the provision of pain relievers. Plaintiff does not plausibly allege facts that
would make it evident to a layperson that he was receiving inadequate or inappropriate
treatment. For all of these reasons, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs.

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IV.

Dismissal of Deliberate Indifference to Safety Claims
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a

constitutional duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
prison inmates. “‘To show a violation of [his] Eighth Amendment rights, [a p]laintiff must
produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.’” Smith v. Reg’l Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 368 F. App’x 9, 14 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs
Cty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005)). “To be deliberately indifferent a prison official
must know of and disregard ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319–20).
Whether a substantial risk of serious harm exists so that the Eighth Amendment might be
violated involves a legal rule that takes form through its application to facts. However, “simple
negligence is not actionable under § 1983, and a plaintiff must allege a conscious or callous
indifference to a prisoner’s rights.” Smith, 368 F. App’x at 14. In other words, “to find
deliberate indifference on the part of a prison official, a plaintiff inmate must show: (1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is
more than gross negligence.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010).
Like any deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a
subjective inquiry. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the
objective component, a plaintiff must prove the condition he complains of is sufficiently serious
to violate the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). As for the
subjective component, “the prisoner must prove that the prison official acted with ‘deliberate

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indifference.’” Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837). To prove deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that prison officials
“‘acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’” with regard to the serious prison condition at
issue. Id. (quoting Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289–90).
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendants disregarded his
safety with conduct exceeding gross negligence. Plaintiff’s Complaint attributes the lack of
seatbelts to the Corrections Corporation of America, yet does not name this entity as a
Defendant.

Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that

transportation of inmates without seat belts, alone, does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. Smith v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 252 F. App’x 301, 304 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Moreover,
we cannot say that riding in a van equipped with the manufacturer’s car seats, seat belts, and
windows is a necessity, such that riding in a van without these characteristics is a deprivation of
the minimal measure of life’s necessities or is something that modern society would find
intolerable.”). As for Defendant Hutchingson, driving at a rate over the speed limit may amount
to negligence, but does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to establish a constitutional
violation. See Grigsby v. Cotton, No. 08–CV–214, 2009 WL 890543, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 31,
2009) (dismissing Eighth Amendment claim, where inmate was transported in a bus that was not
equipped with seat belts, and driver exceeded speed limit and collided with a truck stopped at a
red light, causing inmate lower-back and neck injuries); Ingram v. Herrington, No. 4:06–CV–
P65–M, 2007 WL 2815965, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 26, 2007) ( “the weight of authority from other
circuits requires a finding that no Eighth Amendment violation occurs simply by transporting a
prisoner unseatbelted in a prison vehicle,” even where the plaintiff alleges that the driver
exceeded the speed limit); Young v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 04-10309, 2007 WL 2214520, at *6

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(E.D. Mich. July 27, 2007) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (“Refusing to seat belt a prisoner
during transport and then exceeding the speed limit does not constitute an ‘excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.’”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege any personal involvement by
the other named defendants that would rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Thus, the
Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference to safety.
V.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 2

Though

Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that
appeal is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Or, stated another way, an in forma pauperis action
is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

2

A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.

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Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY
Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS this action
and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. Additionally, I RECOMMEND the Court
DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final

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judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 24th day of July, 2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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