Figueras v. Johns et al

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Figueras's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE this case. It is further RECO MMENDED that the Court DENY Figueras leave to proceed in forma pauperis status on appeal. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 10/4/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 9/20/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

JOEL FIGUERAS,
Petitioner,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-12

v.
TRACY JOHNS,
Respondent.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Joel Figueras (“Figueras”), who is currently incarcerated at D. Ray James
Correctional Facility in Folkston, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Response. (Doc. 8.) For the reasons which
follow, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Figueras’s Petition without prejudice, DIRECT
the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case, and DENY Figueras in forma pauperis status on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Figueras is serving a 160-month term of incarceration for conspiracy to interfere with
interstate commerce by threat and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and § 924(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 8-1, pp. 12–17.) He has a projected release date
of September 17, 2019, via good conduct time release, to be followed by 5 years of supervised
release.

(Id. at pp. 7–9.)

On July 25, 2010, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service, issued a detainer
against Figueras. (Id. at p. 21.)

The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) assigned a Public Safety Factor (“PSF”) of Alien to
Figueras’s Custody Classification, because ICE classified him as an alien subject to deportation.
(Id. at pp. 3, 23.) As Respondent explains:
BOP defines a PSF as relevant factual information regarding the inmate’s current
offense, sentence, criminal history, or institutional behavior that requires
additional security measures to be employed to ensure the safety and protection of
the public. Public Safety Factors normally are applied prior to an inmate’s initial
assignment to an institution; however, additions or deletions may be made at any
time thereafter. A maximum of three PSFs may be applied to any given inmate.
However, if more than three apply, those which would provide the greatest
security and public safety will be utilized. [Doc. 8-1] at ¶ 8, Attach. 6.
A Public Safety Factor of Alien is applied upon a male or female inmate who is
not a citizen of the United States. All long-term detainees will have this PSF
applied. When applied, the inmate or the long-term detainee is housed in at least a
Low security level institution. The PSF is not applied, or is removed, when ICE or
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have determined that
deportation proceedings are unwarranted or there is a finding not to deport at the
completion of deportation proceedings. Id. at ¶ 10, Attach. 6.
BOP policy provides that inmates who have been assigned a Public Safety Factor
of Alien ordinarily are not eligible for placement into a Residential Reentry
Center. Id. at ¶ 11, Attach. 7.
(Doc. 8, pp. 4–5.)
DISCUSSION
Figueras attacks his ICE detainer and the BOP’s PSF. In his Petition, Figueras argues
that his “ICE Detainer has not been taken care of within 180 days.” (Doc. 1, pp. 6.) In his
supporting brief, he argues his due process rights have been violated because his immigration
case has been pending without any action for more than six and a half years. (Doc. 1-1, p. 2.)
Figueras asks that the Court cancel the detainer against him and remove his PSF so that he can be
placed in a halfway house or home detention. (Id. at pp. 2–3.)
Respondent advances numerous grounds to dismiss Figueras’s Petition.

(Doc. 8.)

Respondent contends Figueras failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his

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Petition. (Id. at pp. 7–9.) Moreover, Respondent contends that Figueras’s claims challenge the
conditions of his confinement, and therefore, cannot be brought under Section 2241. (Id. at
pp. 5–6.) Respondent also asserts that the immigration detainer against Figueras is not “custody”
for Section 2241 purposes. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) 1
I.

Whether Figueras Exhausted his Administrative Remedies
A.

Legal Requirements for Exhaustion

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a Section 2241 petitioner’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785
F.3d 467, 474 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Fleming v. Warden of FCI Tallahassee, 631 F. App’x
840, 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Section] 2241’s exhaustion requirement was judicially imposed, not
congressionally mandated, and . . . nothing in the statute itself support[s] the conclusion that the
requirement [is] jurisdictional.”).

Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit has noted “that the

exhaustion requirement is still a requirement and that courts cannot ‘disregard a failure to
exhaust . . . if the respondent properly asserts the defense.’” Id. (citing Santiago-Lugo, 785 F.3d
at 475). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, and inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently “held that the
PLRA’s [“Prison Litigation Reform Act’s”] text suggests no limits on an inmate’s obligation to
exhaust—irrespective of any ‘special circumstances.’ And that mandatory language means a

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Respondent also asserts that Figueras does not have a liberty interest in his security classification and
that the BOP’s placement decisions are not subject to judicial review. (Doc. 8, pp. 9–11.) Whether
Figueras’ putative constitutional claims are viable at this time is of no moment. Figueras cannot raise
constitutional claims regarding the conditions of his confinement in this Section 2241 Petition, and
furthermore, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding such claims. Moreover, the Court
agrees that an inmate ordinarily has no constitutional right to placement in any particular institution. See
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at
the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”).
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court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take such circumstances into account.” Ross
v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 2016 WL 3128839, at *5 (June 6, 2016).
The requirement that the exhaustion of remedies occur “first in an agency setting allows
‘the agency [to] develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be
based’ and giv[es] ‘the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors.’” Green v. Sec’y
for Dep’t of Corr., 212 F. App’x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alexander v. Hawk, 159
F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) (first alteration in original)).

Furthermore, requiring

exhaustion in the prison setting “eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the
administration of prisons” and allows “corrections officials time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 93 (2006). 2
The Supreme Court has noted exhaustion must be “proper.”

Id. at 92.

“Proper

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules
because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure
on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90–91. In other words, an institution’s requirements
define what is considered exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. It is not the role of the court to
consider the adequacy or futility of the administrative remedies afforded to the inmate.
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000). The court’s focus should be on
what remedies are available and whether the inmate pursued these remedies prior to filing suit.
Id.

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Although Woodford was a civil rights suit rather than a habeas petition, the Court “noted that the
requirement of exhaustion is imposed by administrative law in order to ensure that the agency addresses
the issues on the merits.” Fulgengio v. Wells, CV309-26, 2009 WL 3201800, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6,
2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90) (internal punctuation omitted). Thus,
exhaustion requirements are applicable to habeas petitions.
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Thus, under the law, prisoners must do more than simply initiate grievances; they must
also appeal any denial of relief through all levels of review that comprise the agency’s
administrative grievance process. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (“To
exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must ‘properly take
each step within the administrative process.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152,
1157 (11th Cir. 2005)); Sewell v. Ramsey, No. CV406-159, 2007 WL 201269 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 27,
2007) (finding that a plaintiff who is still awaiting a response from the warden regarding his
grievance is still in the process of exhausting his administrative remedies).
B.

Standard of Review for Exhaustion

“Even though a failure-to-exhaust defense is non-jurisdictional, it is like” a jurisdictional
defense because such a determination “ordinarily does not deal with the merits” of a particular
cause of action. Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Further, a
judge “may resolve factual questions” in instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies
is a defense before the court. Id. In these instances, “it is proper for a judge to consider facts
outside of the pleadings and to resolve factual disputes so long as the factual disputes do not
decide the merits and the parties have sufficient opportunity to develop a record.” Id. at 1376.
In Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit set forth a
“two-step process” that lower courts must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 3 First, the court is to take the plaintiff’s version of the facts regarding
exhaustion as true. Id. at 1082. If, even under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the plaintiff has
not exhausted, the complaint must be dismissed. Id. However, if the parties’ conflicting facts
3

Although Turner involved exhaustion requirements within the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, it
appears the two-step process set forth in Turner would be no less applicable to a Section 2241 proceeding.
See McCoy v. Glidewell, Civil Action No. 4:11-cv-1683-JFA-TER, 2012 WL 3716872, at *5 (D.S.C.
June 18, 2012) (noting Section 2241’s exhaustion requirements and Turner’s application of exhaustion
standards to a Section 2241 petition).
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leave a dispute as to whether plaintiff has exhausted, the court need not accept all of plaintiff’s
facts as true. Id. Rather, “the court then proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve
the disputed factual issues[.]” Id. “Once the court makes findings on the disputed issues of fact,
it then decides whether under those findings the prisoner has exhausted his available
administrative remedies.” Id. at 1083. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court may
consider materials outside of the pleadings and resolve factual disputes regarding exhaustion in
conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss so long as the factual disputes do not decide
the merits of the case. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376–77.
C.

Analysis of Figueras’s Efforts at Exhaustion

In his Petition, Figueras admits that he did not “appeal the decision [he is challenging],
file a grievance, or seek an administrative remedy.” (Doc. 1, p. 2.) Thus, on the plain language
of his Petition, he has failed to exhaust any administrative remedies before filing this action.
Inmates at D. Ray James must exhaust administrative remedies, beginning their grievance
process locally with the Warden by using the contractor’s grievance procedures. (Doc. 8-1, p. 4.)
This involves an attempt at informal resolution, which, if unsuccessful, is followed by a formal
complaint via a Step 1 administrative remedy form. (Id. at p. 45.) An inmate may appeal the
Step 1 administrative remedy to the Warden via a Step 2 administrative remedy form. (Id. at pp.
46.) If the inmate is not satisfied with the resolution of the formal complaint, the inmate may
appeal to the BOP’s Administrator of the Privatization Management Branch using a BP-10 form,
so long as the appeal involves BOP-related matters. 4 (Id. at p. 47.) If the inmate is not satisfied
with the Privatization Administrator’s response, the inmate may make a final appeal to the

4

Examples of BOP-related matters which must be appealed through the BOP are: sentence computations,
reduction in sentences, removal or disallowance of good conduct time, participation in certain programs,
and an inmate’s eligibility for early release. Pichardo v. Zenk, CV511-69, 2011 WL 5102814, at *2 n.4
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2011), adopted by 2011 WL 5103758 (Oct. 26, 2011).
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BOP’s Office of General Counsel using a BP-11 form. (Id. at p. 4.) If an inmate files an
administrative remedy concerning a BOP-related matter, the administrative remedies will be
recorded in the BOP’s SENTRY computer database. (Id. at p. 5.)
Figueras’s claims concern BOP-related matters that must be appealed through the abovedescribed process. However, the evidence before the Court reveals that Figueras has not filed
any administrative remedy filings related to the allegations raised in his Petition. (Doc. 8-1, pp.
5, 50–51.)

Additionally, based on Respondent’s submissions, it appears that the BOP’s

administrative remedies are available to Figueras, despite any contentions he may raise to the
contrary.
For all of these reasons, the Court should DISMISS Figueras’s claims for failure to
exhaust.
II.

Whether Figueras can Challenge his PSF via Section 2241
Additionally, Figueras cannot challenge his public safety factor and other conditions of

his confinement in this Section 2241 action. Such claims would ordinarily be brought pursuant
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The distinction between claims which may be brought under Bivens and those which must be
brought as habeas petitions is reasonably well settled. Claims in which prisoners challenge the
circumstances of their confinement are Bivens actions, not habeas actions. See, e.g., Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006). Habeas actions, in contrast, explicitly or by necessary
implication, challenge a prisoner’s conviction or the sentence imposed on him by a court (or
under the administrative system implementing the judgment). Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973). Thus, for example, when a prisoner makes a claim that, if successful, could
shorten or invalidate his term of imprisonment, the claim must be brought as a habeas petition,

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not as a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Caba v. United States, No. CV310-082, 2010 WL 5437269 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5441919 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2010), this Court
determined a petitioner’s allegations concerning his security classification—specifically the
BOP’s “imposition of a PSF of ‘Alien’”—was a challenge to the conditions of the petitioner’s
confinement and were not cognizable in a Section 2241 petition. 2010 WL 5437269, at *2.
However, this Court has since determined a petitioner can challenge his security classification or
place of confinement via Section 2241. 5 Baranwal v. Stone, No. CV 314-098, 2015 WL 171410,
at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2015); Herrera v. Johns, Civil Action No. CV513-031, 2013 WL
5574455, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2013). Other courts have reached this same conclusion.
See United States v. Saldana, 273 F. App’x 845 (11th Cir. 2008); Becerra v. Miner, 248 F. App’x
368 (3d Cir. 2007); Wrobel-Molina v. United States, Civ. No. 09-1080-CV-W-NKL-P, 2010 WL
1486055, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 14, 2010).
Courts in the Fifth Circuit note the distinction between a Section 2241 and a civil rights
action “becomes ‘blurry’ when an inmate challenges an unconstitutional condition of
confinement or prison procedure that affects the timing of his release from custody.” Pham v.
Wagner, No. 5:14-CV-67(DCB)(MTP), 2016 WL 5852553, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 6, 2016)
(citing Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997)). As a result, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has “‘adopted a simple, bright-line rule for resolving such questions.’ If a
favorable determination of an inmate’s claims would not automatically entitle the inmate to
accelerated release, the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit.” Id. (quoting Carson, 112 F.3d at
5

Respondent’s citation to case law finding Section 2241 is not the proper vehicle by which to challenge a
PSF is not erroneous. (Doc. 8, p. 6.) The above contrary citations merely illustrate that, as a whole, there
is not a consensus on this issue.
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820–21). If a petitioner is not seeking immediate or early release from custody and is instead
seeking to have his PSF of “Deportable Alien” removed so that he will be eligible for programs
that could reduce his sentence, he has not alleged that a favorable determination would
automatically entitle him to a speedier release from custody. Thus, the proper vehicle for raising
his claims would be a civil rights suit. Id.; see also Boyce v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 911, 914 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“Prisoners who raise constitutional challenges to other prison decisions—including
transfers to administrative segregation, exclusion from prison programs, or suspension of
privileges, e.g., conditions of confinement, must proceed” with a civil rights lawsuit.).
I find the Fifth Circuit’s test to be proper for resolving this question. Based on that test,
Figueras cannot pursue his claims in this Section 2241 Petition because he is not seeking
immediate or early release from custody. While a favorable determination may entitle him to
participate in programs that could reduce his sentence, a favorable determination does not
automatically entitle him to a speedier release from custody.

Therefore, the Court should

DISMISS Figueras’s Petition for lack of jurisdiction. Even if this Court has jurisdiction over
Figueras’s Petition, his claims would still be subject to dismissal for the reasons discussed in
Section I of this Report.
III.

Whether Figueras is “in Custody” Pursuant to the ICE Detainer for Section 2241
Purposes
According to Respondent, Figueras’s ICE detainer does not constitute custody for Section

2241 purposes. Respondent states Figueras’s assertions are premature because he is in BOP
custody, and removal proceedings have yet to begin. (Doc. 8, pp. 6–7.)
“A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the [Department of
Homeland Security] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the
purpose of arresting and removing the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). “The detainer is a request

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that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department
to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either
impracticable or impossible.” Id.
Respondent states that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has held that challenges to immigration
detainers may only be brought under certain limited circumstances not present here.” (Doc. 8,
p. 7 (citing Orozco v. U.S. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990).) 6 However, the Eleventh
Circuit has also held that the filing of a detainer, standing alone, does not cause a prisoner to
come within the custody of the Department of Homeland Security or ICE. Oguejiofor v. Att’y
Gen. of the U.S., 277 F.3d 1305, 1308 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002); Orozco, 911 F.2d at 541. This
position is in accord with several other Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 539 (5th Cir. 2003); Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 303–04 (9th Cir.
1994); Santana v. Chandler, 961 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); Prieto v. Gulch, 913 F.2d 1159,
1162 (6th Cir. 1990); Mohammed v. Sullivan, 866 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1989).

“The

underlying rationale of these courts is that a detainer, as distinguished from other [ICE] orders,
does not put a ‘hold’ on” the individual.

Ryan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.

3:09cv399/LAC/MD, 2010 WL 1433166, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2010); accord Galaviz-Medina
v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the lodging of a detainer, without
more, is insufficient to render the alien “in custody”).
Generally, a detainer is viewed as “an informal process advising prison officials that a
prisoner is wanted on other pending charges and requesting notification prior to the prisoner’s
6

Since Orozco, the Eleventh Circuit has held that challenges to removal proceedings cannot be brought
under Section 2241. Themeus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 643 F. Appx 830, 832 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“Following enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, district courts lack habeas jurisdiction to entertain
challenges to final orders of removal.”).

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release.” Orozco, 911 F.3d at 541 n.2 (citing United States v. Shahryar, 719 F.3d 1522, 1524 n.3
(11th Cir. 1983)). “In the immigration context, a detainer usually serves only as a notice to
prison authorities that . . . ICE is going to be making a decision about the deportability of the
alien in the future.” Ryan, 2010 WL 1433166, at *1 (citing Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593,
595 (8th Cir. 1988)). “The reasoning follows that the detainer does not serve to establish
conclusively either present or future restraints on the prisoner’s liberty.” Id. “Because there is
no actual claim to the individual following the completion of his criminal sentence, there is no
custody.” Id.
Thus, Figueras is not “in custody” of ICE for purposes of Section 2241 simply because
ICE lodged a detainer against him. Furthermore, Figueras does not contend that ICE served him
with an order to show cause or a final deportation order or that there was some other reason he
should be considered to be in the custody of ICE. See Alanis-Bustamonte v. Reno, 201 F.3d
1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2000) (a show cause order, in combination with a warrant on a detainer,
are prerequisites to formal commencement of removal proceedings). Because Figueras is not “in
custody” of ICE at this time, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
to address his claim.
Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS this portion of Figueras’s Petition.
IV.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Figueras leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Figueras

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in
the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of
party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal
is filed”).

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An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Given the above analysis of Figueras’s Petition and Respondent’s Response, there are no
non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus,
the Court should DENY Figueras in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS without prejudice
Figueras’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (doc. 1), and
DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND that the Court
DENY Figueras leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later

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challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Figueras and Respondent.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 20th day of September,
2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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