Jordan v. City of Waycross, Georgia et al
Filing
44
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. The summary judgment motion on the official capacity claims against Martin, Maddox, and Eddins is GRANTED. The summary judgment motion against Maddox and the City of Waycr oss on all claims is DENIED. The City's summary judgment on the Substantive Due Process claim is GRANTED. The City's summary judgment motion on the Procedural Due Process claim is DENIED. The summary judgment motion on Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim is DENIED. The summary judgment motion on Plaintiff's claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act is DENIED. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 8/27/2018. (csr)
ifti
tiSmteb States! litsittict Court
for tl^e ^outliem IBiotrtct of ((Georgia
^apcrooo Btbtoton
WILLIAM N. JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
V.
No. 5:17-cv-33
CITY OF WAYCROSS, GEORGIA;
DAVID E. EDDINS, fire chief for
the city of Waycross, Georgia,
in his individual and official
capacities; TRINIJA MOLINAMARTIN, individually and in her
official capacity as director
of human resources and risk
management of the city of
Waycross, Georgia; and RAPHEL
MADDOX, individually and in his
official capacity as city
manager of the city of
Waycross, Georgia,
Defendants.
ORDER
This Matter comes before the Court on the summary judgment
motion
of
Defendants
City of
Waycross
(^'the
City"),
Eddins, Trinija Molina-Martin, and Raphel Maddox.
David E.
Dkt. No. 25.
This Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
For
the following reasons, this Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part.
A0 72A
(Rev. 8/82)
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
William
Jordan
joined
Department as a firefighter in 1987.
the
Waycross
Fire
Defendants' Statement of
Material Facts Not in Dispute SI 1 (^^SUMF"), Dkt. No. 25-1;
No. 26 at 13.
Dkt.
Defendant Eddins, at the times relevant to this
lawsuit, is the Fire Chief for the City of Waycross, having
assumed the position in March 2008.
10-11.
SUMF SI 13; Dkt. No. 28 at
Defendant Maddox was the City Manager since 2013 and the
Human Resources Director before that.
SUMF SI 79; Dkt. No. 29 at
28.
Human
Defendant
Martin
since December 2014.
has
been the
Resources
Director
SUMF SI 79; Dkt. No. 30 at 6.
In the early morning hours of December 15, 2013, City of
Waycross firefighters responded to a house fire ("the Fire") in
a condemned building on Isabella Street in Waycross.
Dkt.
No. 26 at 57-59;
Dkt.
No. 28
at
125-26.
SUMF SI 33;
The
parties
dispute whether and for how long some supervising firefighters
on
the
scene
building,
inside.
87.
but
may
have
ultimately
believed
it
was
that
somebody
determined
was
that
in
the
nobody
was
SUMF SI 36; Dkt. No. 39-1 at 50-51; Dkt. No. 28 at 185-
At some point, one of the firefighters inside the condemned
building, Robert Sumerall, was ordered from the back Of the
house
to
the
front
of
the
house
in
order
to
^^salvage
and
^ Throughout this order, the Court cites only those paragraphs
from Defendants' SUMF which Plaintiff explicitly admits.
overhaul."
Dkt. No. 28 at 146; Dkt. No. 39-1 at 62, 63, 70-71.
Sumerall thought this a strange order because ''you don't salvage
and overhaul mode unless you're in a residential structure, not
a condemned structure."
In
response
to
Dkt. No. 39-1 at 62.
Eddins's
"salvage
and
overhaul"
Lieutenant Little and his crew entered the building.
Shortly thereafter, the ceiling collapsed.
164, 171.
Id. at 73.
Id.; Dkt. No. 28 at
Then Plaintiff arrived on the scene.
No. 28 at 161-62.
order.
SUMF f 38; Dkt.
He rushed into the building to help extricate
the trapped Lieutenant Little.
SUMF f 38; Dkt. No. 26 at 67.
The firefighters successfully pulled Little out of the building,
but he lost his life shortly thereafter.
that
Eddins
survive,
and
apologized
sought
Dkt. No. 39-1 at
on
the
scene,
forgiveness
81-82.
from
Summerall testified
prayed
the
for
other
Little
to
firefighters.
Eddins denies making such an apology.
Dkt. No. 28 at 185.
In the aftermath of the Fire and Little's death, many began
to
blame
Eddins
for
Little's
death.
Jordan
testified
that
firefighters at the scene "were all up in a rage" about Little's
death and Eddins's role in it by ordering firefighters into a
building
with
nobody in it.
Dkt. No. 26 at 94.
himself began to voice this sentiment.
And
He complained to his
direct supervisor the first working day after the Fire.
95.
Jordan
Id. at
He complained to Battalion Chief James Brown at Little's
funeral.
Id.
at
96.
He testified that this sentiment
shared and voiced at the firehouse for a couple months.
was
Id. at
94, 97.
Plaintiff
asserts
that
Eddins's
ordering
Little
into
an
empty condemned building violated then existing firefighting
policy.
Summerall testified that the policy was "'You don't go
inside no condemned building that bad."
Dkt. No. 39-1 at 85-86.
And a year later, Eddins issued a new policy providing:
(1)
We will risk our lives a lot, in a calculated manner,
to save SAVABLE lives.
(2)
We
will
risk
our
lives
a
LITTLE, in
a
calculated
manner, to save SAVABLE property.
(3)
We WILL NOT risk our lives at all for a building or
lives that are already lost.
Dkt. No. 40-9 (emphasis in original).
The complaints in the aftermath of the Fire prompted Eddins
to
send
weeks
an
after
interoffice
the
Fire),
memorandum
entitled
on
December
^^Rumors
and
30,
2013
(two
Opinions" that
stated:
In the last few days I have been hearing about different
rumors
and
opinions
being
floated
around
the
department
concerning the fire on Isabella Street
and the devastating
death of Lt. Little.
There
is no doubt that this has sent
Shockwaves
throughout
created
the
department
and
a
lot
concern and confusion, that is only natural.
of
I
wished I had answers to give each of you but I do
not. However, I
will not sit idly by and let
anyone give false information,
spread
harmful
rumors, state unfounded and harmful opinions
make
. or
any statements that are totally out of line.
This is to stop Immediately.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health
(NIOSH)
will
be
coming
to
Waycross
to
investigate the fire.
Based on their findings they
will provide recommendations.
Dkt. No. 40-7.
True
to
his
word,
multiple
investigations
began.
The
Waycross Fire Department Fire Marshall, the State Fire Marshal's
Office,
NIOSH,
involved.
and
the
Waycross
Police
Department
were
all
SUMF 1 41; Dkt. No. 31 at 4, 40; Dkt. No. 26 at 77-
78; Dkt. No. 31 at 8, 41-42.
Then
Jordan's
surrounding
Little's
department.
complaints
death
about
expanded
the
outside
circumstances
of
the
fire
He contacted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms and James Atkins, the local arson investigator with the
state fire
marshal's
office, in
March
2015, Gordon
Henderson,
Director of Georgia Firefighters Standards & Training Council in
April, 2015, the Governor of Georgia in May 2015, and the United
States Department of Justice in May or June 2015.
100, 114-15.
Id. at 98-
He also unsuccessfully attempted to contact Ralph
Hudgens, the Georgia Insurance Commissioner, in July or August
2015.
Id.
at
165-67;
SUMF
i 77.
Plaintiff
Little's widow and urged her to file a lawsuit.
also
contacted
SUMF SI 78.
The record contains a factual dispute as to whether Martin
and Eddins had knowledge that Plaintiff made these complaints.
Investigator Atkins testified that he never called Eddins to
tell him Plaintiff had complained.
Dkt. No. 31 at 28.
On the
other hand, Henderson testified that he informed Eddins that
^^someone" had complained.
Dkt. No. 36 at 51, 81.
Jordan had
previously complained to Eddins about not being able to attend
an interview with an investigator from NIOSH.
90.
Dkt. No. 26 at
Eddins and Martin knew of Little's wife's lawsuit against
Eddins, which named Jordan in the pleadings and alleged that
Eddins
^^fraudulently
kept
those
involved
in
the
fire
from
speaking publically about the fire."
Dkt. No. 40, Ex. 39; Dkt.
No. 30 at 99; Dkt. No. 29 at 14-15.
A member of the Waycross
Fire Department testified that complaints about the Fire were
^^common knowledge" at the firehouse.
Dkt. No. 33 at 7.
Plaintiff injured his shoulder when extricating Little from
the
Fire.
SUMF
SI 66;
Dkt".
No.
26 at
115-16.
He
continued
working until he began medical leave on March 18, 2015, in order
to undergo surgery.
at 118.
would
Eddins
SUMF SI 67; Dkt. No. 28 at 220; Dkt. No. 26
On June 16, 2015, Eddins asked Martin whether Plaintiff
be
absent
needed
Training.
to
from
work
report
SUMF SI 89;
much
longer
Plaintiff s
Dkt.
medical leave lasted about a
No.
28
because,
absence
to
at 278-73.
if
so,
then
Standards
&
Plaintiff's
year—he returned to work without
restrictions on March 29, 2016.
SUMF SI 91; Dkt. No. 26-18.
The
leave would have lasted exactly one year-Plaintiff's doctor was
prepared to release him on March 18, 2016, but substituted the
March 29 date after Plaintiff explained that he could not begin
in the middle of a pay period.
SUMF SI 92; Dkt. No. 26 at 120.
(As it turns out, the City does not require an employee's start
date to correspond with pay periods.
SUMF SI 93; Dkt. No. 30 at
54, 106-07.)
Eddins
learned
on
March
returning on March 29.
(Eddins)
called
HR
24
that
Plaintiff
would
SUMF SI 94; Dkt. No. 28 at 231.
Director
Martin
to
discuss
the
be
He
training
requirements that Jordan must satisfy after returning to work
following an extended absence.
Dkt. No. 28 at 231.
Henderson
testified that the Standards & Training regulations require a
firefighter to retake the basic Firefighter I test following a
leave exceeding 365 days.
Dkt. No. 36.
test date for Plaintiff was March 31.
The first available
Dkt. No. 30 at 50.
Jordan started back to work on March 29.
day
that
he
Defendants
SUMF SI 98.)
learned
assert
that
of
the
this
retest
It was on that
requirement.
information
was
(However,
available
online.
In any event, nobody had warned Jordan that he
needed to be recertified.
SUMF SI 99; Dkt. No. 30 at 83.
On that first day of Plaintiff's return to work. Plaintiff
had an 8:00a.m. meeting with Eddins, Martin, and Nicole Price,
another employee of the City of Waycross.
Dkt. No. 28 at 231.
There, Martin presented Jordan with a letter ('^the Letter"),
which read, in pertinent part:
We
have
been
advised
that
your
medical
leave
of
absence which began 3/19/2015 through 3/28/2016 has
caused your firefighter certification to lapse.
You
will be given an opportunity to retake the basic
Firefighter I written exam and the requisite remedial
training required to have your state firefighter
certification reinstated and subsequently be restored
to
your previous position of certified firefighter.
Your written exam is scheduled for Thursday, March 31,
2016, at the GFSTC Office in Forsyth, GA. This is the
only test date you will be given; I encourage you to
do your best.
Dkt. No. 40-1.
Also at the meeting, Jordan was informed that he would be
^^temporarily reassigned" to the Community Improvement Department
(one of eight departments within the City of Waycross) until his
test results were received.
asked
Plaintiff to
sign
Id.; Dkt. No. 30 at 27.
the
Letter,
but
Plaintiff
Martin
declined,
choosing not to accept the reassignment or the recertification
requirement.
explained
that
reviewed it.
refusal
to
resignation.
on
the
package.
SUMF ^ 115;
he
couldn't
Dkt.
No.
sign
Dkt. No. 26 at 127.
sign
the
Letter
Letter
and
began
at
anything
158.
until
be
his
lawyer
considered
a
voluntary
Martin typed ^^REFUSED TO SIGN"
preparing
Plaintiff's
SUMF SI 127; Dkt. No. 30 at 79, 89, 97-98.
informed Maddox of the happenings at the Meeting.
8
Plaintiff
Plaintiff was told that his
would
Dkt. No. 30 at 78.
26
separation
Martin then
SUMF SI 128;
Dkt. No. 30 at 89-90.
The City considered Plaintiff's refusal
to sign the Letter to be a voluntary resignation.
City
employees have no ability to appeal a separation resulting from
a voluntary resignation.
Dkt. No. 30 at 93.
lasted about thirty-five minutes.
Following
the
Meeting,
This Meeting
Dkt. No. 26 at 122.
Plaintiff
contacted
an
attorney
(Deen Strickland) who had represented him in a previous matter.
SUMF SlSl 130, 131; Dkt. No. 26 at 122.
Although Strickland was
in court that day, he told his office to ^'^tell Mr. Jordan to
please let him have an opportunity for me to look at [the
Letter] before he signed it."
Dkt. No. 34 at 3.
Later that
afternoon, Strickland spoke directly to Jordan, reviewed the
Letter, and advised Jordan to sign it in the morning.
Plaintiff
Training
and
recertified.
also
contacted
confirmed
individuals
that
he
really
at
did
SUMF 1 142; Dkt. No. 26, Ex. 22.
the Meeting (March 30), Plaintiff called in sick.
at 122-28.^
Standards
need
to
Id*
&
be
The day after
Dkt. No. 26
He also called Eddins and explained that he had not
refused to sign the Letter the day before but simply sought to
speak with his attorney first.
SUMF SI 137; Dkt. No. 28 at 248.
At some point (the record does not provide a date), Plaintiff
contacted
Martin,
informing
her
that
he
wanted
to
sign
the
^ There is some lack of clarity regarding whether Plaintiff had a
scheduled surgery at that time, but it is not material to the
present dispute.
Letter and return to work, but she told him that his resignation
had already been accepted.
SUMF ^ 140; Dkt. No. 30 at 126.
A few days later, on April 1, 2016, Strickland contacted
the City Attorney about appealing any adverse action against
Plaintiff.
SUMF
Attorney
f 143;
explained
appealable.
Dkt.
that
a
No.
26
at
voluntary
SUMF SI 144; Dkt. No. 34 at 19.
at 21.
Maddox
responded
that he
The
City
is
resignation
an exception could be made for Plaintiff.
34
133-34.
not
Strickland asked if
SUMF SI 145; Dkt. No.
doubted
it,
because of
Plaintiff's history of a troubled relationship with the City.
Id.
(Previously,
supervisors,
Plaintiff
suffered
had
various
filed
adverse
convicted of minor criminal charges.
grievances
actions,
against
and
been
See Dkt. No. 26 at 21-23,
24, 27-28.)
Plaintiff filed
Waycross,
Eddins,
violation
of
the
the
present lawsuit against the
Martin,
Georgia
and
Maddox,
Whistleblower
alleging
Act,
City of
claims
First
for
Amendment
retaliation, violation of substantive due process, and violation
of procedural due process.
Dkt. No. 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is required where '^the movant shows that
there
is
no
genuine
dispute
as
to
any
material fact
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Civ. P. 56(a).
and
the
Fed. R.
A fact is "^material" if it ^'might affect the
10
outcome of the suit under the governing law."
Grp.
V.
FindWhat.com,
658
F.3d
1282,
1307
FindWhat Inv^ r
(11th
Cir.
2011)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)).
A dispute is ''genuine" if the "evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Id.
In making this determination, the court is to view all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and
draw
Johnson
all
reasonable
v. Booker T.
inferences
Washington
in
that
party's
favor.
Broad. Serv., Inc., 234
F.3d
501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
court
that
there
is
an
nonmoving party's case.
absence
of
Celotex Corp.
The movant must show the
evidence
Id. at 325.
to
support
the
If the moving party
discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go
beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show
that a genuine issue of fact does exist.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
257.
The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in one of two ways.
First, the nonmovant "may show that the record in fact contains
supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion, which was 'overlooked or ignored' by the moving party,
who
has thus failed to meet the initial burden
11
of showing an
absence of evidence."
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta^ 2 F.3d
1112, 1116 (llth Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
332 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
forward
directed
with
additional
verdict
Second, the nonmovant '"may come
evidence
motion
at
evidentiary deficiency."
sufficient
trial
to
based
Id. at 1117.
on
withstand
the
a
alleged
Where the nonmovant
attempts to carry this burden instead with nothing more ^ than a
repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for
the defendants [is] not only proper but required."
Morris v.
Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (llth Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants
raise
several
grounds
for
summary
judgment.
First, they seek dismissal of the official capacity claims
against the individual defendants.
Second, they argue that
Maddox and the City cannot be liable under respondeat superior.
Third, they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity
on
each
constitutional
Plaintiff's
claim.
whistleblower
claim
Fourth,
must
fail
they
argue
because
alleged a specific law that Eddins violated.
he
that
never
The Court will
take up each in turn.
I.
Official Capacity claims against individual Defendants
Defendants
Martin,
Maddox,
and
Eddins
move
for
summary
judgment on the official capacity claims against them because of
12
their redundancy with the claims against the City of Waycross.
Plaintiff responds that ^^[t]his is a correct statement of law."
Dkt. No. 41 at 16.
The parties are right.
^'For liability purposes, a suit against a public official
in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local
government entity he represents."
Owens v . Fulton Cnty., 877
F.2d 947, 952 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).
The presence of both claims is
^'redundant and possibly confusing to the jury."
of Orlando,
931
F.2d
764,
776 (11th
Cir.
Busby v. City
1991).
Therefore,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the official capacity
claims is GRANTED.
II.
Respondeat Superior Claims against Maddox and the City of
Waycross
Defendants Maddox and the City of Waycross argue that they
cannot be
held
liable
under a theory of respondeat superior.
Plaintiff responds, in effect, that he is not seeking to hold
them
liable
on
such
a
basis
but,
rather,
for
their
final
policymaking authority.
To begin, the parties are right that respondeat superior
liability does not apply to § 1983 claims.
City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d
city or
1275, 1295 (11th
local government agency
constitutional
deprivations
See Oladeinde v.
on
13
^may
the
not
be
theory
Cir. 2000)
(^^A
held liable for
of
respondeat
superior.'") (quoting Denno v. School Bd. of Volusia Cnty., 218
F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Instead, ''to impose § 1983
liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his
constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality
had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference
to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom
caused the violation."
(11th Cir. 2004).
those
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289
And, "a municipality is held liable only for
deprivations
resulting
from
the
decisions
of
its
duly
constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts
may fairly be said to be those of the municipality."
392 F.3d at 1290.
liable
[only]
constitutional
between
if
Similarly, the "supervisory officials can be
they
personally
violation
actions
McDowell,
of
the
or
where
participate
there
supervising
is
a
official
in
the
causal
and
alleged
connection
the
alleged
constitutional deprivation."
This can be established when the
supervisor's
or
improper
custom
policy
results
indifference to constitutional rights."
Id.
decision
the
that
is
officially
adopted
by
in
deliberate
"A policy is a
municipality,
or
created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said
to
be
acting
on
behalf of
the
municipality.
A
custom
is
a
practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the
force of law."
Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,
489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
14
In § 1983 employment
cases, "[in] unicipality liability may arise
employment decision, such
with regards to an
as a termination, provided that the
decision maker ^possesses final authority to establish municipal
policy with respect to the action ordered.'"
Quinn v. Monroe
Cty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting
Pembaur
v.
City
of
Cincinnati,
475
U.S.
469,
481
(1986)).
So-did the person who effected Plaintiff s resignation have
final
authority
resignation?
to
establish
the
City's
position
as
to
that
Martin was the one who wrote ^'REFUSED TO SIGN" and
characterized that refusal as a voluntary resignation.
Maddox
and
(i.e.,
Eddins
testified
that
the
human
resources
Martin) makes that final determination.
No. 28 236, 251.
contrary.
director
Dkt. No. 29 at 9; Dkt.
No record evidence suggests anything to the
Additionally, in this case, the City's own policy had
a role in the relevant adverse action: it is the City's policy
that
employees
presents
that
the
cannot
evidence,
City
is
appeal
sufficient
a
proper
^'voluntary
to
resignations."
withstand
defendant
in
a
summary
§ 1983
That
judgment,
employment
claim.
On the subject of supervisor liability, Maddox asserts that
he did not participate in the meeting with Plaintiff regarding
his temporary reassignment and was not involved in the decision
to accept Plaintiff's resignation.
15
His testimony is that he is
only involved in decisions concerning separation from employment
when an employee appeals.
Dkt. No. 29 at 15-16, 19.
record does not establish as a matter of law
involvement
in
hiring
and
firing
But the
that Maddox
decisions.
While
had no
Martin
testified that department managers (i.e., Eddins) had authority
for hiring decisions with the support of Human Resources (i.e.,
Martin),
Eddins
testified
recommendations for
Maddox).
And
such
that
his
process
decisions to the
was
to
city manager
make
(i.e.,
Compare Dkt. No. 30, 32-33 with Dkt. No. 28, 285.
the
record
particular case.
Maddox in
shows some
involvement
by Maddox
in
this
Specifically, Plaintiff's attorney contacted
an attempt to appeal the separation
and explicitly
asked Maddox to make an exception allowing Plaintiff to appeal.
For these reasons, the facts viewed in the light most favorable
to Jordan establish that Maddox's role in the adverse action was
not limited to that of a supervisor without direct involvement.
In
conclusion,
Maddox
and
the
City's
^'point"
that
they
cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior is welltaken,
but
there
are
no
claims
Plaintiff
has
raised
that
strictly base liability on that theory.
Ill.
Qualified Immuni-by
Qualified immunity protects government officials acting in
their
discretionary
authority
from
liability
unless
they
violated ^^clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
16
of
which
a
reasonable
Fitzgerald,
qualified
457
U.S.
immunity,
person
800,
would
818
have
known."
(1982).
discretionary
In
Harlow
context
the
authority
is
v.
of
defined
more
broadly than requiring the exercise of independent judgment but
asks
whether
legitimate
within
power
Harland, 370
to
employee
function
(b)
utilize.
within
his
circumstances
or
compel
was
her
(a)
through
Holloman
F.Sd 1252, 1265 (11th
acts
objective
government
job-related
his
official
the
ex
means
rel.
Cir. 2004).
conclusion
that
a
were
Holloman
v.
''A government
discretionary
the
performing
authority
that
if
challenged
actions occurred in the performance of the official's duties and
within the scope of this authority."
Hill v. Dekalb Reg'1 Youth
Pet. Ctr., 40 F.Sd 1176, 1185 n.l7 (11th Cir. 1994).
^MT]he
inquiry is not whether it was within the defendant's authority
to commit the allegedly illegal act."
Harbert Int'l, Inc. v.
James, 157 F.Sd 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998).
first
step
immunity,
of
the
the
discretionary
defendant
must
have
function
been
So, ''to pass the
test
for
performing
qualified
a
function
that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have
fallen
within
his legitimate job description."
Holloman,
S70
F.Sd at 1266.
Here, the actions in question are discussing an employee's
return
to
accepting
work,
a
implementing
resignation.
certification
The
17
first
requirements,
question
and
regarding
discretionary authority is whether these actions were legitimate
job-related functions of Martin and Eddins.
contest that these
These
actions
were
fall
Plaintiff does not
job-related functions,
under
the
duties
of
and they
a
human
were.
resources
director and the fire chief.
It is the second prong of the discretionary authority test
that
Plaintiff
performed
power.
contests.
their
duties
This
prong
asks
whether
through
means
that
were
Defendants
within
their
Plaintiff asserts that none of these Defendants had the
power to transfer Plaintiff from one department to another or to
unilaterally
make
a
determination
that
an
voluntarily resigned instead of being terminated.
employee
had
In support of
this assertion. Plaintiff points to the lack of a written policy
explicitly
allowing
reassignment
of
employees
from
one
department to another or unilateral decisions that an employee
had resigned.
Dkt. No. 41 at 19 (citing Dkt. No. 30 at 68).
Plaintiff's
identification
of
the
parses too finely the relevant actions.
taken
pursuant
to
^^discretionary."
a
stated
written
job
powers
at
issue
An action need not be
policy
in
order
to
be
Whether Defendants took the right actions has
no bearing on whether they had authority to take those actions.
Meeting with an employee about his return to work, reassigning
to
a
different
recertification,
department
and
accepting
within
a
18
the
resignation
City,
were
arranging
within
the
powers of the human resources director and the fire chief—that
is,
the
acting
powers
of
Martin
and
Eddins.
Thus,
within their discretionary authority.
Defendants
were
Therefore, they
are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated clearly
established
constitutional
rights.
As
discussed
below.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Substantive
Due Process claims; however, material factual disputes surround
the remaining federal claims such that summary judgment is not
proper—that is, if a finder of fact were to resolve the factual
disputes in favor of Plaintiff, clearly established law
would
have been violated.
A. Substantive Due Process
Defendants argue that the actions Plaintiff complains of in
this
suit
Clause.
are
not
protected
They are right.
by
the
Substantive
Due
Process
The Eleventh Circuit has held that ''an
employee with a property right in employment is protected only
by the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, not its
substantive component."
{11th Cir. 1994).
as much.
Circuit
McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560
And Plaintiff's response essentially concedes
See Dkt. No. 41 at 20-2i (conceding that the Eleventh
evaluates
similar
claims
as
procedural
due
process
claims).
Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to Defendants
on Plaintiff's Substantive Due Process claims.
19
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