Meskel v. Simon
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Meskel's 1 Petition, and DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE this case. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Meskel leave to proceed in forma pauperis o n appeal. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 9/12/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 8/29/2017. (ca)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION
TEDROS AFRHOM MESKEL,
Petitioner,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-41
v.
PATRICK GARTLAND, 1
Respondent.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Tedros Afrhom Meskel (“Meskel”), who was previously in the physical
custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Folkston ICE
Processing Center in this District, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) After the Court ordered service, Respondent filed a Response arguing
that the Court should dismiss the Petition.
(Doc. 8.)
For the reasons which follow, I
RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Meskel’s Petition,
(doc. 1), DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case, and DENY Meskel in forma
pauperis status on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Meskel, a native and citizen of Eritrea, applied for admission to the United States on
April 29, 2016, at the Port Hidalgo, Texas, port of entry by claiming a fear of returning to his
country. (Doc. 8-1, p. 1.) After referral for a credible fear interview, an Asylum Pre-Screening
Officer with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services referred Meskel’s case to an
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Patrick Gartland is the Warden of the Folkston Processing Center and is the proper Respondent to this
Petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 436 (2004). Therefore, the Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to amend the caption of this case to name Patrick Gartland as the proper Respondent.
Immigration Judge. (Id.) On August 31, 2016, the Immigration Judge ordered Meskel removed
to Eritrea or in the alternative to France because there was a reason to believe that he had lawful
immigration status in France. (Id. at p. 2) Meskel did not file an appeal, and the removal order
became administratively final. (Id.)
However, Meskel has not yet been removed to Eritrea or France. On September 8, 2016,
ICE mailed a request to the Embassy of Eritrea for issuance of travel documents, but Eritrea has
yet to issue those documents. (Id.) On January 9, 2017, ICE received additional information that
Meskel may have legal immigration status in France. (Id.) On April 26, 2017, ICE contacted the
consulate of France in Miami, Florida to verify Meskel’s status in France. At the time of the
Response to the Show Cause Order, ICE was awaiting a response from the Consulate of France
and from the Embassy of Eritrea. ICE Detention and Deportation Officer Haylean Berry avers
that ICE will schedule Meskel’s removal as soon as Eritrea or France issues his travel
documents. (Id.)
ICE conducted reviews of Meskel’s custody conditions on November 30, 2016 and
February 24, 2017. (Id.) After those reviews, ICE found that Meskel’s removal was likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future, and thus, decided to continue Meskel’s detention. (Id.)
Meskel filed this Section 2241 action April 24, 2017. (Doc. 1.) Therein, he requests that
he be released from ICE custody while his removal proceedings are pending. The Court ordered
the United States Marshal to serve the Respondent with a copy of the Petition and to respond to
the Petition within twenty days of service. (Doc. 3.) The Marshal served Respondent on May
24, 2017, (doc. 4), and Respondent filed his Response, through counsel, on June 6, 2017, (doc.
8). Meskel filed additional pleadings after the response, as well as a Notice of Change of
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Address on July 7, 2017, following his transfer to Broward Transition Center in Pompano Beach,
Florida. (Doc. 11.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Dismissal of Meskel’s Section 2241 Petition
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, “when an alien is ordered removed, the
Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.”
8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A).
8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2).
During that period, the Attorney General must detain the alien.
However, any continued detention under that statute must not be
indefinite. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held
that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. 533 U.S. at 701. Thus,
once an order of removal becomes final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien
within a reasonable time. Id. The Supreme Court found that six months is a presumptively
reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id.
However, this does not entail that every alien detained longer than six months must be
released.
Id.
Rather, to state a claim for habeas relief under Zadvydas, an alien must
(1) demonstrate that he has been detained for more than six months after a final order of
removal; and (2) “provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d
1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). If a petitioner makes these showings, the burden shifts to the
Government to respond with evidence to rebut that showing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Meskel has satisfied the first prong of Akinwale (i.e., detention beyond the six-month
removal period). His order of removal became administratively final on August 31, 2016. Thus,
the six-month mark passed on March 1, 2017. Nevertheless, he has failed to satisfy the second
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prong of Akinwale. He has not presented any evidence of a good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Akinwale, 287 F.3d at
1052. Meskel has not argued, much less presented evidence, that any department of the United
States has hindered his removal. Rather, in his Petition, he generally states that he would not be
a threat to the community if he was released in the United States. (Doc. 1, p. 7.)
Any conclusory and generalized allegations regarding Eritrea or France’s intentions and
practices are insufficient to state a claim that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future. Fahim v. Ashcroft, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (Egyptian petitioner’s “bare allegations are insufficient to demonstrate a significant
unlikelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). Meskel’s wholly conclusory
allegations lack any support in the record and do not require consideration by this Court, let
alone entitle him to any relief. See Caderno v. United States, 256 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir.
2001) (vague, conclusory allegations in a Section 2255 motion insufficient to state basis for
relief); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Stano v. Dugger, 901
F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir. 1990) (petitioner not entitled to habeas relief “when his claims are
merely ‘conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics’ or ‘contentions that in the face of the
record are wholly incredible.’”)).
Equally unavailing is Meskel’s argument in his Reply to Respondent’s Response, (doc.
10), that the Court should presume that he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future because he was not removed within 180 days of the removal order. Under this line of
reasoning, the Court must grant relief any time a petitioner is held for longer than six months
after a removal order. This would render the second prong of Akinwale meaningless and
contradict the holding of Zadvydas. Furthermore, Meskel does not explain how the past lack of
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progress in the issuance of his travel documents means that Eritrea will not produce the
documents in the foreseeable future. See Fahim, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (“The lack of visible
progress since the INS requested travel documents from the Egyptian government does not in
and of itself meet [petitioner’s] burden of showing that there is no significant likelihood of
removal. ‘[I]t simply shows that the bureaucratic gears of the INS are slowly grinding away.’
[Khan v. Fasano, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137 (S.D. Cal. 2001).] In other words, the mere fact
that the Egyptian government has taken its time in responding to the INS request for travel
documents does not mean that it will not do so in the future.”). While Meskel has shown
bureaucratic delays in his removal proceedings, he has not demonstrated a significant
unlikelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to accept Meskel’s speculation regarding Eritrea and
France’s inaction on his proceedings, Respondent has rebutted that showing. The Government
has presented evidence that ICE is working with both the Eritrean Embassy and the Consulate of
France to secure travel documents for Meskel. (Doc. 8-1, p. 2.) Additionally, Respondent has
produced an affidavit from Officer Haylean Berry, an ICE Deportation Officer, who declares
ICE will schedule Meskel’s removal as soon as his travel documents are issued. (Id.) Moreover,
it appears that Meskel’s removal from the United States is imminent (if not already effectuated),
as ICE has transferred him to the Broward Transition Center in Pompano Beach, Florida.
(Doc. 11.)
Meskel has failed to present any facts indicating that ICE is incapable of executing his
removal order and that his detention will be of an indefinite nature. However, circumstances
could eventually change in Meskel’s removal situation to the point that he could present a
plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS his Petition WITHOUT
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PREJUDICE. Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 (“Because circumstances may ultimately change in
[petitioner’s] situation, we affirm the dismissal without prejudicing [petitioner’s] ability to file a
new § 2241 petition in the future that may seek to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be
granted.”).
II.
Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Meskel leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Meskel
has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in
the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of
party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal
is filed”). An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal
is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Meskel’s Petition and Respondent’s Response, there are
no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus,
the Court should DENY in forma pauperis status on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Meskel’s Petition, (doc. 1), and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case.
I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Meskel leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge.
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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and
Recommendation upon Meskel and Respondent.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 29th day of August,
2017.
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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