Majeed v. Sessions et al

Filing 9

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS this action, without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by D awuda Abdul Majeed. I further recommend that the Court DENY Majeed leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 7/25/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 7/11/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

DAWUDA ABDUL MAJEED,
Petitioner,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-72

v.
PATRICK GARTLAND,
Respondent.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner Dawuda Abdul Majeed’s (“Majeed”)
failure to comply with the Court’s Order of June 15, 2017, (doc. 2), and his failure to prosecute
this action. For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Majeed’s
action without prejudice for failure to follow the Court’s directive and failure to prosecute. 1 I
further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Majeed leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

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A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is
fair. . . . To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its
intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir.
2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int’l Bhd. Of
Elec. Workers Local Union, 349, 262 F. App’x 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating that a party has
notice of a district court’s intent to sua sponte grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a
report recommending the sua sponte granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc.,
678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting that R&R served as notice that claims would be sua
sponte dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Plaintiff that his suit is
barred and due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present his
objections to this finding, and the District Court will review de novo properly submitted objections. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-3562-TWT-JFK,
2012 WL 5930633, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining that magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner’s opportunity to file objections provided a
reasonable opportunity to respond).

BACKGROUND
On May 30, 2017, Majeed, a detainee previously housed at the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) Facility, in Folkston, Georgia filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) The Court directed service on June 15, 2017, and
ordered Majeed to “immediately inform this Court in writing of any change of address. Failure
to do so will result in dismissal of this case, without prejudice.” (Doc. 2, p. 2.) However, on
June 22, 2017, the Court’s Order was returned as undeliverable because Majeed was released
from the ICE Facility. (Doc. 4.) Majeed has not made any filing in this case since filing his
Petition on May 30, 2017, (doc. 1), and has not notified the Court of any change of his address.
DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine how to address Majeed’s failure to comply with this
Court’s Order and failure to prosecute this action.

For the reasons set forth below, I

RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Majeed’s Petition and DENY him leave to appeal in
forma pauperis.
I.

Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute and Follow this Court’s Orders
A district court may dismiss a petitioner’s claims for failure to prosecute pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) and the court’s inherent authority to
manage its docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); 2 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cty.
Jail, 433 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies,
Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows
for the involuntary dismissal of a petitioner’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those
claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order.
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In Wabash, the Court held that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without
affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, the Court
advised Plaintiff that his failure to notify the Court of any change of address would result in dismissal.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660,
2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192
(11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of
record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without
prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis
omitted)). Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority
to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police
Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458
(11th Cir. 1983)).
It is true that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be
utilized only in extreme situations” and requires that a court “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of
delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser
sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623,
625–26 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x
616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without
prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are
afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619;
see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this
action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal
without prejudice for failure to prosecute, where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply
defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding

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dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, where plaintiff failed to follow court order to
file amended complaint and court had informed plaintiff that noncompliance could lead to
dismissal). With Majeed having failed to update the Court with his current address, the Court
has no means by which it can communicate with him. Thus, the Court is unable to move forward
with this case. Furthermore, Majeed has failed to diligently prosecute his claims—he has not
taken any action in this case since filing his Petition.
Thus, the Court should DISMISS Majeed’s Section 2241 Petition, (doc. 1), without
prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case for failure to prosecute and
failure to follow this Court’s Order.
II.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Majeed leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Majeed

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address that issue in the
Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not
taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or
after the notice of appeal is filed, that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective
standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not
proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the
factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Or,
stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith,

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if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531
(11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL
307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Majeed’s failure to follow this Court’s directives and
failure to prosecute, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not
be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Majeed in forma pauperis status on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS this action,
without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of
dismissal and to CLOSE this case. I further recommend that the Court DENY Majeed leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the undersigned failed to address any
contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions herein.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

See 28 U.S.C.

Objections to a Report and

Recommendation are not the proper vehicle to raise issues and arguments not previously brought
before the Court. A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States
District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in

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whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein. Objections not meeting the
specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by the District Judge. The Court
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Majeed
and Respondent.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 11th day of July, 2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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