Moore v. Coffee County School District

Filing 29

ORDER denying without prejudice to reurge it following discovery 8 Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Lisa G. Wood on 12/21/2018. (ca)

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BRENDA MOORE,

Plaintiff,
V.

CV 5:18-004

COFFEE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff filed this action seeking damages pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Dkt. No. 1 at 1.

Before the

Court is Defendant Coffee County School District's (^^CCSD") Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56.

Dkt. No. 8.

Since the Court converted Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 20, this
Motion has become fully briefed and is ripe for review.

For the

reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2018, Defendant filed a ''Motion to Dismiss, or

in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment."

Dkt. No. 8.

Along with the Motion, Defendant filed a brief in support of the

Motion, dkt. no. 8-1, and an Exhibit of an EEOC charge filed by

A0 72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Plaintiff, dkt. no. 8-3.

On October 3, 2018, the Court entered an

Order converting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Dkt. No. 20.

Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment is presently before the Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff

is

Defendant CCSD.

an

African

American

Dkt. No. 1 SI 3.

who

was

employed

with

On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff

was given a written employee warning notice from Dr. Christina
Tucker of CCSD.

Dkt. No. 16-2 at 1-2.

The warning set forth

several reasons that Plaintiff was being reprimanded.

Id. at 1.

On January 29, 2016, Plaintiff was placed on Administrative Leave

with pay.

Dkt. No. 16-6.

placed

a

in

department.

new

On February 19, 2016, Plaintiff was

position

with

Id.; Dkt. No. 16-7.

CCSD,

in

the

transportation

Plaintiff's prior position with

CCSD was that of a paraprofessional, for which she was compensated
$16.26 an hour.

Dkt. No. 12-8; Dkt. No. 12-13.

Plaintiff was compensated $9.00 an hour.

After the demotion.

Dkt. No. 12-8; Dkt. No.

12-13.

On

October

21,

2016,

Plaintiff

filed

a

^^Charge

of

Discrimination" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
{^'EEOC").
in

January

Dkt. No. 16-4.
2016

she

In the Charge, Plaintiff alleged that

complained

to

the

CCSD

Human

Resources

department about a hostile work environment and unfair treatment.

Id.

She further alleged that her pay was reduced in February 2016

and that she was demoted to bus monitor in September 2016.

Id.

On the Charge, she noted that the last date that discrimination
took place was October 20, 2016, the day before the Charge was
filed.

Id.

Finally, she noted that the discrimination was a

^'Continuing Action."
On

November

Id.

18,

2016,

Plaintiff

Discrimination with the EEOC.

filed

another

Dkt. No. 16-5.

Charge

of

This Charge was

almost identical in substance to the October 2016 Charge, except

that the date Plaintiff was allegedly demoted to bus monitor was
changed from "September 2016" to "February 19, 2016."
Dkt. No. 16-4

dating

of

with

Dkt. No. 16-5.

Plaintiff's

demotion

to

Compare

The November 2016 Charge's

bus

monitor

corroborates

a

February 19, 2016 letter to Plaintiff from the CCSD superintendent:
"I am sending this letter as a follow up to our meeting on February

19, 2016 concerning your job placement in the school district.
we

discussed,

monitor."

you

have

been

assigned

to

the

position

of

As
bus

Dkt. No. 16-7.

In an email with Kim Cook, a CCSD employee, dated February
24, 2016, Kim Cook detailed Plaintiff's salary for the "60 days
remaining in this school year" and also explained that pursuant to
her new hourly wage she would get "[$]1506.03 monthly salary to be
paid Feb - Aug."

Dkt. No. 12-8.

emailed

employees

two

Grievance

CCSD

Policy"; she

asking

received a

On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff

about

information

on

"our

reply from Kim Clayton, the

Director of Personnel and Public Relations for CCSD, that day.

Dkt. No. 12-9.

Finally, Plaintiff stated on May 31, 2018, in an

email to the EEOC office, that she was "a recently retired state

employee through the Public School System receiving a monthly check
from the Teacher Retirement System."
Plaintiff filed

this

action

to

Dkt. No. 16-13 at 3.
recover

damages and

other

compensation, which Plaintiff claims is owed to her under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).

the

Fed. R. Civ. P.

A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of

suit

under

FindWhat.com,

the

658

governing

F.3d

1282,

law."
1307

FindWhat
(11th

Cir.

Inv^r

Grp.

2011)

(quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

v.

A

dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."

Id.

In

making this determination, the court is to view all of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor.

Johnson v. Booker T.

Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The movant must show the court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party's case.
burden,

the

Id. at 325.
burden

If the moving party discharges this

shifts to the

nonmovant

to

go

beyond

the

pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine
issue of fact does exist.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in two ways.

First,

the nonmovant ""may show that the record in fact contains supporting
evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which

was

^overlooked or ignored' by the moving party, who has thus

failed

to

evidence."

meet

the

initial

burden

of

showing

an

absence

of

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
additional

Second,

evidence

the

nonmovant

sufficient

to

^'may

withstand

come
a

forward

directed

verdict

motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency."
at 1117.

with

with

Id.

Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden instead

nothing

more

''than

a

repetition

of

his

conclusional

allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only proper
but required."

Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir.

1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION

"An

employee

must

exhaust

administrative

remedies

before

filing a complaint of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act . . .

Stamper v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.Sd 1336,

1339 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270
F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The first requirement on the

path to exhaustion is that the employee file a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC.
1317).

Id.

(citing Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at

''"For a charge to be timely in a non-deferral state such as

Georgia,

it

must

be

discriminatory act."
(5)(e)(1)).

filed

within

180

days

of

the

last

270 F.3d at 1317 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

Further, when a charge is based on ^'discrimination in

compensation," then "an unlawful employment practice occurs . . .
when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory

compensation

decision

or

other

practice,

including

each

time

wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole
or in part from such a decision or other practice."
§ 2000e-5(e)(3)(A).

Based

on

the

record.

42 U.S.C.

Defendant

has

not

satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of timeliness, the
only ground that it has moved for summary judgment on.

Plaintiff initially filed a charge with the EEOC on October
21,

2016,

Defendant

and

180

argues

days

that

before

the

last

that

date

alleged

was

act

April

of

24,

2016.

discrimination

occurred on February 19, 2016, when Plaintiff was demoted to bus

monitor.

While this may be when Plaintiff's pay was reduced,

because Plaintiff alleges that she was paid less as a result of

discrimination based on her race. Plaintiff has alleged that she

was affected by a discriminatory compensation decision.

Pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A), ''each time [Plaintiff's] wages

. . . [were] paid," an "unlawful employment practice occur[ed]."
Defendant has the burden of showing that there is no issue of
material fact that Plaintiff did not receive wages based on the
reduced hourly rate after April 24, 2016.
this burden at this time.

Defendant has not met

This is not to say that Defendant may

never be able to meet this burden, but at this early stage, it has
not.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is DENIED without prejudice

to reurge it following discovery.
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of December, 2018.

HOWf LISA GODBKY WOOD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF GEORGIA