Green v. Charlton County School District et al
Filing
61
ORDER granting 45 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on September 19, 2024. (jrb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION
DR. SHERILONDA GREEN,
Plaintiff,
V.
CV 522-053
CHARLTON COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al..
Defendants.
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint under the doctrine
of
res
judicata.
{Doc.
45.)
For
the
following
reasons.
Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her original complaint on September 9, 2022
(Doc. 1) and filed her first amended complaint on October 19,
2022 (Doc. 16).
Defendants moved for a more definite statement
and to strike immaterial allegations.
(Doc. 20.)
On September
11, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied as moot in part
Defendants'
motion,
found
the
first
amended
complaint
was
a
shotgun pleading and ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended
complaint.
(Doc.
36,
at
10-11.)
Plaintiff filed
her
second
amended
25,
complaint
2023.
(Doc.
retaliation
practices
{hereinafter,
for
in
the
40.)
Plaintiff
opposing
racially
violation
of the
Civil
violation
Rights
of
protection
the
capacities
Rights
at
four
Rights
Act
1866;
42
in
U.S.C.
She
their
§
brings
treatment
and
1983.
(4)
four
and
(Id.
(2)
in
equal
United States
all
official
1866;
violation of
disparate
of
(1)
employment
of
proceeding in
Act
September
claims:
discriminatory
(3)
30-40.)
Defendants
under
1866;
on
Fourteenth Amendment to the
(Id.
all
of
Civil
under the
Constitution.
against
Act
asserts
Civil
retaliation for participating in a
the
^^Complaint")
claims
individual
at
1,
30-40.)
Jurisdiction is proper based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 because
the
controversy
(Id. at 3.)
is
the
arises
under
the
laws
of
the
United
States.
Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this
district
in
which
Defendants
reside
or
do
business
where a substantial part of the relevant events occurred.
and
(Id.)
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action for damages and
injunctive
relief
based
on
workplace
conduct
caused
and
perpetuated by the Charlton County School District (the ''School
District"), members of the Charlton County Board of Education
("BOE"), and
John
Lairsey.
racially
the
School
(Id.
motivated
discrimination
was
at
District's former
2.)
conduct
pending
Plaintiff
she
superintendent.
seeks
experienced,
before
the
and
United
redresses
a
charge
States
Dr.
for
of
Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (^^EEOC") as of the filing of
the Complaint.
(Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff, an African American female, is the
Human
Resources
(Id. at 4.)
and
Student
Services
for
the
Director of
School
District.
She has '"devoted her entire life and the majority
of her professional career to Charlton County Schools."
6.)
(Id. at
Plaintiff alleges the School District has a long history of
subjecting
African
discrimination.
American
(Id.)
educators,
In
2022,
like
her,
Plaintiff
to
sued
unlawful
the
School
District in the Superior Court of Charlton County (the "Superior
Court") under the Georgia Open Records Act.
(Id.)
The Superior
Court found the School District violated the Open Records Act.
(Id. at 7.)
District
Plaintiff states she "was forced to sue" the School
in
the
discrimination
(Id. at 9.)
Superior
relating
Court
to the
"for
claims
hiding
brought
evidence
in
this
of
case."
The Superior Court held the "record is replete with
evidence of systemic discrimination and discrimination against
[Plaintiff]
Plaintiff's]
personally.
testimony
and
The
[Superior]
evidence
of
systemic
Court
and
[found
personal
discrimination compelling and relevant to establish motive" in
the Superior Court action.
Plaintiff's employment
(Id. (citation omitted).)
history is
as follows.
Plaintiff
first applied to the School District in June 1999 and was not
hired.
(Id.
at
10-11.)
Plaintiff
spent
six
years
as
an
educator in another district, and in August 2006, she joined the
School District as a second-grade teacher at Bethune Elementary.
(Id. at 11.)
In July 2008, she was named Assistant Principal at
Folkston
Elementary,
School.
(Id.)
In
forty-five people.
which
this
was
role,
(Id.)
later
she
renamed
was
second
2013,
Elementary
in
Middle
command
of
In July 2011, Defendant Lairsey was
named Superintendent of the School District.
May
Bethune
Plaintiff
applied
School.
(Id.)
to
be
She
Lairsey but did not get the job.
(Id. at 12.)
Principal
interviewed
(Id.)
at
St.
with
In
George
Defendant
In May 2015, Defendant
Lairsey approached Plaintiff and informed her that he knew she
wanted to be the next Principal of Bethune Middle School.
at 13.)
Since the Principal
would
not be
(Id.
retiring for three
years. Defendant Lairsey encouraged her to apply to be Director
of
Exceptional
desired,
she
Programs
could
Principal retired.
persuaded
Principal.
the
her
to
(Id.)
do
at
the
when
the
trick
to
not
to
apply to
be
In July 2015, Defendant Lairsey transferred
Middle
male as Interim Principal.
(Id.)
July
she
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lairsey
a
School
if
(Id.)
as
Middle
and
to
this
Bethune
Office,
return
Principal at Bethune
From
Central
2015
to
present.
School and
Plaintiff
appointed
has
a
served
white
as
a
Director and has been given more responsibility than anyone else
for less pay.
(Id. at 14.)
She wears multiple hats, including:
4
Pre-K
Director; Special
Education
Director; Title
I
Director;
Title III Director; Teacher of the Year Coordinator; Technology
Coordinator;
Title
IX
Coordinator;
District
Coordinator;
Mental
Behavior
Intervention
and
McKinney-Vento
Coordinator.
District
(Id.
at
Family
Health
14-15.)
and
Partnership
Coordinator;
Supports
Liaison;
School
District
Coordinator;
Consolidated
Despite
these
Positive
Application
different
jobs,
Plaintiff is consistently underpaid compared to white Directors
and has been denied the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, conditions, and equal employment opportunities within her
contract
because
Plaintiff
rights
she
alleges
by
is
African
Defendants
denying
her
April
30,
continue
employment
opportunities for employment.
On
American.
2019,
impair
at
her
privileges
15.)
of
and
her
equal
(Id. at 16.)
the
Charlton County High School.
to
(Id.
Principal
(Id. at 17.)
position
opened
at
Plaintiff met with
Defendant Lairsey about applying, but she also told him she was
interested in becoming a superintendent and participating in the
Superintendent Professional Development Program ("^SPDP").
(Id.)
Defendant Lairsey told Plaintiff the SPDP would open more doors
for her and if she wanted to become a superintendent one day,
that
is
the
route
recommendation.
applied
for
the
he
Plaintiff
SPDP.
recommended.
stayed
(Id.)
in
In
(Id.)
the
Based
Central
September
on
his
Office
and
2019,
Defendant
Lairsey
told
Plaintiff
he
wanted
to
nominate
her
for
the
Mclntosh County Superintendent position, and Plaintiff believes
he tried to encourage this only because he knew he was retiring
soon and wished to recommend a white male to replace him in the
School District.
(Id. at 18-19.)
On July 25, 2020, the Superintendent vacancy was announced
for
the
School
District.
(Id.
at
19.)
The
BOE
hired
King-
Cooper & Associates ("KC&A") to assist with the search.
On
August
3,
2020,
qualifications
Plaintiff
and
information.
job
(Id.)
called
KC&A
description
to
and
find
was
(Id.)
out
the
denied
the
On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff received a
letter from KC&A stating she had been nominated as a candidate
for Superintendent, but she was never interviewed.
On
September
stating
11,
they
received
qualifications,
September
25,
(Id.
21.)
at
2020,
Plaintiff
her
application,
but
she
was
2020,
the
BOE
On
received
never
met
October
and
email from
she
had
interviewed.
to
1,
an
(Id. at 20.)
decide
2020,
who
KC&A
excellent
(Id.)
to
On
interview.
Plaintiff's
Georgia
Association of Educators ('"CAE") representative, Velesa Henton,
called KC&A to request the qualifications and job description
for the
On
Superintendent position,
October
discuss
his
8,
2020,
Plaintiff
discrimination
but they refused
met
against
with
her
Defendant
throughout
her.
(Id.)
Lairsey
the
to
years,
complain of discrimination, and confront him as to why she would
not be considered for an interview.
(Id. at 21-22.)
round
took
of
Superintendent
interviews
place
on
The first
October
2020, and the second round took place on October 11, 2020.
9,
(Id.
at 22.)
On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Lairsey an
open
records
request
discrimination.
Defendants,
members
(Id.)
having
of
the
discrimination.
letter
it
She
obtain
also
delivered
BOE,
(Id.)
to
to
detailing
evidence
submitted
a
Defendant
her
of
letter
Lairsey
complaint
racial
to
all
and
all
of
race
The same day, a white male was named the
Superintendent finalist.
(Id.
at 23.)
On
October
16,
2020,
Plaintiff sent Defendant Lairsey a follow-up email asking when
she would receive a response to her open records request, and
she copied her CAE representative, but she received no response.
(Id.)
On October 20, 2020, the BOE met, and Plaintiff asked a
board member after the meeting if they were aware of her open
records request and was informed Defendant Lairsey told the BOE
about it.
(I^ at 23-24.)
On October 29, 2020, the BOE held
the final vote for a new Superintendent, and all voted for a
white male.
(Id. at 24.)
On November 4-6, 2020, Defendant Lairsey continued to deny
Plaintiff
the
enjoyment
of
all
benefits,
privileges,
terms,
conditions, and equal employment opportunities of her contract.
(Id.)
Defendant Lairsey allowed three white male administrators
to
attend
("GAEL'')
the
Georgia
conference
in
Plaintiff to attend
(Id.)
Association
Athens,
because
she
of
Georgia
Educational
but
complained
did
Leaders
not
allow
of discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges she was excluded from this conference
in retaliation for making a race discrimination complaint.
at 25.)
She alleges individual board members began ostracizing
her, ignoring
hostility
(Id.
her,
when
visibly rolling their eyes, and
they
saw
her.
(Id.)
Defendants
displaying
failed
to
produce responsive documents to her open records request to try
to
hide their overt acts of race
(Id. at 26.)
discrimination
and
retaliation.
Thus, as outlined above. Plaintiff sued the School
District for violations of the Georgia Open Records Act.
Defendants
12(b)(6)
45.)
to
move
under
dismiss the
Federal
Complaint
Rule
under
of
res
Civil
(Id.)
Procedure
judicata.
(Doc.
Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 48), Defendants filed a
reply brief (Doc. 52), Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (Doc. 53-2)^,
and
Defendants filed a sur-reply (Doc. 55).
Thus, the motion
has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Scheuer v.
^ Plaintiff filed a motion for leave/notice of intent to file her sur-reply.
(Doc. 53.)
The Court considers Plaintiff's sur-reply (Doc. 53-2); thus, her
motion for leave to file (Doc. 53) is GRANTED.
8
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Davis V. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" to give the defendant fair notice of both
the
claim
and
the
supporting
grounds.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
allegations"
unadorned,
are
not
required.
Bell
Atl.
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
v.
Although ^'detailed factual
Rule
8 ''demands
more
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Ashcroft V.
Corp.
662, 678
than
an
accusation."
(2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
A
plaintiff s
labels
and
pleading
conclusions,
obligation
and
a
"requires
formulaic
recitation
elements of a cause of action will not do."
at
555.
"Nor
assertions'
does
devoid
a
of
complaint
'further
suffice
factual
more
than
of
the
Twombly, 550 U.S.
if it
tenders
enhancement.'"
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
'naked
Iqbal,
The Court
need not accept the pleading's legal conclusions as true, only
its well-pleaded facts.
Id. at 677-79.
Furthermore, "the court
may dismiss a complaint pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)] when, on the
basis
of
a
dispositive
issue
of
law,
no
construction
factual allegations will support the cause of action."
of
the
Marshall
Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Exec. 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty./
922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991)).
''Under the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, federal courts give preclusive effect to a state-court
judgment
whenever
the
courts
of
the
judgment emerged would do the same."
state
from
Lawsuit
applies.
was
resolved
by
the
Richardson v. Miller, 101
F.3d 665, 668 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
First
which
Georgia
courts,
Because the
Georgia
law
"In Georgia, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the
re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated,
or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties
or
their
privies
First Guar.
in
Mortg.
identical
Corp.,
CV
causes
419-055,
of
action."
2019
WL
Shuman
5198470,
v.
at *3
(quoting Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins., 629 S.E. 2d 260, 262
(Ga. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
party trying
to
invoke
judgment must establish
three
parties,
of
(2)
identity
res
judicata
based
on
a
prior
prerequisites: "(1) identity of
the
causes
of
action,
and
(3)
adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
in which the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the relevant issues."
Id. (quoting Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d
1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1993)).
10
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint based on
res judicata.
(Doc. 45, at 2.)
They argue Plaintiff put at
issue the same facts in
her Superior Court action against the
School
four
District
nearly
years
ago.
(Id.)
Although
Plaintiff only brought a claim under the Open Records Act in the
Superior Court, they argue she cannot now be heard on additional
claims
(Id.)
her
same
that
arise
from
the
same
nucleus
of
operative
facts.
As such. Defendants argue Plaintiff was required to plead
discrimination
facts
in
and
retaliation
Superior
Court
and
claims
arising
cannot
do
so
out
of
now.
the
(Id.)
Plaintiff argues her suit is not barred by res judicata.
(Doc.
48.)
As outlined above, ''[r]es judicata prevents plaintiffs from
bringing
claims
related
to
prior
decisions
when
^the
prior
decision (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies;
and (4) involved the same causes of action.'"
Rodemaker v. City
of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., No. 22-13300, 2024 WL 3643133, at *4
(11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024) (quoting TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth
Life
&
Annuity
Ins.,
959
F.3d
1318,
1325
(11th
Cir.
2020)).
''The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of showing
that the later-filed suit is barred."
quotation
marks
omitted
and
Id. at *6 (citation and
alteration
11
adopted).
Thus,
Defendants
bear
the
burden
here.
The
Court
addresses
each
element below.
A. Court: of Compe'tent: Jurisdic-tion and Final Judgment
Defendants assert ^'[i]t cannot be disputed that the final
judgment in the [Superior Court] action . . . is an adjudication
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction."
at
23
(citing
Doc.
40-1).)
Plaintiff
does
not
(Doc. 45,
dispute
the
Superior Court is a court of competent jurisdiction or that it
issued a final judgment.
the
cause
of
actions
addresses below.
(Doc. 48, at 15.)
and
(Id.)
parties
Plaintiff disputes
matching,
which
the
Court
As such, the Court finds the Superior
Court is a court of competent jurisdiction and issued a final
judgment.
B. Cause of Acbion
To
action
determine
for
substance,
res
and
Rodemaker, 2024
whether
judicata
not
F.3d
marks
"'We
same
cases
purposes,
form,
involve
the
of
the
two
same
cause
concerns
of
""the
proceedings."
Trustmark Ins, v.
1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002)) (quotation
ask
whether
the
nucleus of operative facts, or
factual predicate."
the
inquiry
WL 3643133, at *9 (quoting
ESLU, Inc., 299
omitted).
the
two
claims
are
"arise
based
out of the
upon
the
same
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted
and alterations adopted).
"When a court enters judgment on the
merits, the effect of the judgment extends to the litigation of
12
all
issues
whether
relevant
or
not
to
raised
the
same
claim
at trial."
between
Simplis
v.
the
JP
parties,
Morgan
Chase
Bank, No. CV 417-183, 2018 WL 11217094, at *2 {S.D. Ga. May 22,
2018) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng^g & Mach.,
Inc.,
575
F.2d
530,
535
(5th
Cir.
1978))
marks omitted and alteration adopted).
(internal
quotation
''Causes of action share
a nucleus of operative fact if 'the same facts are involved in
both
cases,
so
that
the
present
claim
effectively litigated with the prior one.'"
3643133,
F.3d
at
882,
*9
(quoting
893 (11th
Cir.
Lobo
v.
Celebrity
2013)); see
also
could
have
been
Rodemaker, 2024 WL
Cruises,
Inc.,
N.A.A.C.P.
v.
704
Hunt,
891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Res judicata applies not
only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case,
but to all legal theories and
nucleus
claims arising out of the same
of operative fact." (citation
omitted)).
But if full
relief was unavailable in the prior case, res judicata will not
bar the second.
Plaintiff
Id. (citation omitted).
only
brought
an
Open
Records
Act
claim
in
Superior Court, yet Defendants argue she pled and attempted to
place at issue the facts she contends demonstrate discrimination
and
retaliation.
(Doc.
45,
at
15.)
Defendants
argue
a
comparison of the pleadings here and the Superior Court action
demonstrate the facts were identically pled in both cases.
at 15-17.)
(Id.
They argue "Plaintiff placed at issue almost every
13
one
of those facts at the [Superior Court trial] in
final judgment was rendered."
(Id. at 17.)
which
a
Defendants assert
Plaintiff cannot now plead claims she could have asserted, but
chose not to, in the Superior Court action arising out of the
same facts.
(Id. at 18.)
In response. Plaintiff argues none of the rights and issues
in the two cases are identical, so Defendants failed to show her
claims
are
barred
by
res
many
of
the
acknowledges
judicata.
(Doc.
allegations
in
48,
the
at
two
11.)
She
suits
are
similar but argues the causes of actions are based on different
allegations of misconduct.
the
misconduct
in
the
(Id. at 11-12.)
Superior
Court
Plaintiff asserts
action
was
the
School
District's failure to respond to the Open Records Act request,
but here, it is Defendants' failure to grant her professional
advancement
opportunities
similarly
situated
argument
is
constitute
Pleming
v.
that
separate
white
and
employment
privileges
counterparts.
'Ms]eparate
causes
of
Universal-Rundle
(Id.)
allegations
action."
Corp.,
142
F.3d
her
Plaintiff's
of
(Id.
like
at
1354
misconduct
12
(citing
(11th
Cir.
1998)).)
The
Court
must
determine
whether
this
^^case
arises
out
of
the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based up on the same
factual predicate, as [the] former action."
TVPX ARS, Inc., 959
F.3d at 1325 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
14
The Court
finds the claims in both the Superior Court action and here grow
out of the same nucleus of operative facts - the alleged racial
discrimination
Plaintiff
faced
at
the
District and those involved with it.
hands
of
the
School
While the Superior Court
action involved a violation of the Open Records Act, it involved
records
Plaintiff
retaliation
The
claims.
Complaint and
both
recap
sought
Those
the
to
support
are
the
exact
complaint in
Plaintiff's
career
her
and
claims
asserted
the Superior
the
history of unlawful discrimination.
discrimination
School
and
here.
Court action
District's
long
(Doc. 40; Doc. 45-1.)
The
Superior Court complaint rehashes the same events that serve as
the basis of this Complaint - including Plaintiff's desire to be
hired as Superintendent, not being considered for the job, and
submitting a complaint of discrimination to the BOE after they
failed to interview her and hired someone else.
7-10.)
(Doc. 45-1, at
While the Superior Court action dealt with the School
District's
failure
to
produce
responsive
documents
to
Plaintiff's Open Records requests, she alleged they did so ^'in
an
effort
to
hide
their
overt
retaliation
against
[Plaintiff]."
(Id. at 12.)
same
of
nucleus
acts
African
operative
of
race
American
discrimination
employees
and
like
In this case. Plaintiff asserts the
facts,
outlining
her
throughout her long tenure with the School District.
treatment
(Doc. 40.)
The biggest difference between the allegations in this Complaint
15
and
the
Superior
Superior
Court
Court
findings
complaint
and
is
that
evidence
as
she
includes
support
allegations of discrimination and retaliation here.
27-30.)
for
the
her
(Doc 40, at
Beyond these additions, the Complaint contains almost
identical allegations of Plaintiff's treatment.
''"Res judicata
applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the
prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of
the
same
3643133,
nucleus
at
*9
of
operative
(citation
and
fact."
Rodemaker,
quotation
marks
2024
omitted).
WL
The
claims here arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact as
the Superior Court action, thus making them the same cause of
action for res judicata purposes.
Plaintiff
tries
to
argue
she
could
not
have
raised
her
present claims in her prior suit because she did not yet have
evidence
of race
suspicions,
Superior
racial
and
Court
discrimination
she
did
compelled
discrimination.
Furthermore,
she
argues
not
and
retaliation, she
possess
defendants
(Doc.
48,
she
the
to
at
had
evidence
turn
4;
not
over
Doc
yet
only had
until
evidence
53-2,
at
exhausted
the
of
5-6.)
her
administrative remedies because her EEOC charge was and is still
pending.
(Doc. 48, at 4; Doc. 53-2, at 6.)
Defendants argue
these assertions are irrelevant to the disposition of the res
judicata arguments.
(Doc. 55, at 5-6.)
16
The
not
Court is
having
Superior
the
by Plaintiff s argument about
relevant evidence
Court
Plaintiffs
not persuaded
case.
Complaint
(See Doc. 45-1.)
As
until the
outlined
matches
her
conclusion
above,
the
Superior
of the
majority
Court
of
complaint.
The extra allegations in this Complaint citing
the Superior Court Judge's ruling do not change the nature of
the
allegations.
suit,
would
evidence
arguments
Discovery,
have
given
necessary
are
to
conducted
Plaintiff
prove
insufficient
her
the
after
avenue
claims.
justification
the
to
initiating
uncover
Thus,
for
why
the
Plaintiffs
she
did
not
bring these claims in Superior Court.
As to the EEOC charge, the Eleventh Circuit has ^^held that
the fact a plaintiff did not have when [s]he filed [her] first
lawsuit a right to sue letter that was necessary for the claim
[s]he raised in [her] second lawsuit does not prevent it from
being barred by res judicata."
*10
(citing
Jang
v.
(11th Cir. 2000)).
not
have
brought
her
United
Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at
Techs.
Corp., 206
F.3d
1147,
1149
Thus, Plaintiffs argument that she could
discrimination
and
retaliation
claims
in
Superior Court because she did not yet have her EEOC right to
sue letter is irrelevant to the Court's analysis.
Therefore,
the Court finds the cause of actions the same for res judicata
purposes and turns to the parties' similarity.
17
C. Parties
For res judicata to apply, both lawsuits must involve the
same parties or ones in privity with them.
3643133,
at
*7.
District are
Defendants
parties to both
argue
school
board
Plaintiff
actions, so the
same for res judicata purposes.
individual
Rodemaker, 2024 WL
and
the
parties are
(Doc. 45, at 19.)
members
and
School
the
the
As to the
superintendent,
Defendants argue they are in privity with the School District,
the
named
defendant
in
Superior
Court.
(Id.
at
20.)
In
response. Plaintiff asserts the individual Defendants could not
have
been
were
not
included
responsible
responsive records.
The
in
Eleventh
the
under
Superior
the
Court
Open
action
Records
because
Act
to
they
produce
(Doc. 48, at 14.)
Circuit
has
defined
privity
^'somewhat
circularly . . . as the relationship between one who is a party
of
record
and
a
nonparty
that
is
sufficiently
close
so
a
judgment for or against the party should bind or protect the
nonparty."
Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (quoting Hunt, 891
F.2d at 1560) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme
Court has a non-exhaustive list of factors that favor a finding
of privity:
(1) the nonparty agreed to be bound by the litigation
of others; (2) a substantive legal relationship
existed between the person to be bound and a party to
the
judgment;
(3)
the
nonparty
was
adequately
represented by someone who was a party to the suit;
18
(4) the nonparty assumed control over the litigation
in
which
the
judgment
was
issued;
(5)
a
party
attempted to relitigate issues through a proxy; or (6)
a statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by
nonlitigants.
Id. {citations omitted).
The Superior Court action was filed by Plaintiff against
Charlton
County
Schools
Defendant here.
(Doc.
School District are the
Defendants
Lairsey,
Matthew
here
that
—
the
45-1,
same
were
at 2.)
in
named
as
Plaintiff and
a
the
But there are additional
the
Curtis
District
Thus,
Parties.
not
the Superintendent;
School
Superior
Nixon,
P. Sands, member of BOE; John
Court
member
of
action:
BOE;
Dr.
Canaday, member of BOE;
Lucille Hannans, member of BOE; and Pender Lloyd, member of BOE.
(Doc.
40,
at
4-6.)
Defendants
argue
the
superintendent
and
individual BOE members are in privity with the School District,
thus
satisfying the
Defendants
argue
superintendent
color
of
and
law" as
School District.
res
judicata
Plaintiff's
allegations
individual
agents,
element.
BOE
members
employees,
(Id. at 21.)
In
or
(Doc.
45, at 20.)
against
were
board
response.
both
taken
members
the
''under
of
the
Plaintiff again
argues that the individual Defendants could not have been part
of the Open Record claim because they had no duty to produce
responsive records.
(Doc. 48, at 14.)
She asserts that because
the conduct at issue is different, the individual Defendants are
not in privity with the School District.
19
(Id.)
While the' Court agrees with Plaintiff that the individual
Defendants were not parties in the Superior Court action because
they were not liable under the Open Records Act, that does not
mean
she
could
not
have
included
them
as
defendants
if
she
brought discrimination and retaliation claims.
Thus, the Court
finds
to
this
individual
argument
without
Defendants
are
merit
in
and
privity
turns
with
the
whether
School
the
District
for res judicata purposes.
Plaintiff
lists
the
individual
Defendants
in
their
individual and official capacities, but then brings each claim
against them in their individual capacities only.
1,
30,
33,
alleged
their
to
36,
be
38.)
Defendants
operating
individual
as
argue
agents
capacities
as
and
that
under
agents,
(Doc. 40, at
since
color
^'they
were
of law
employees,
in
[and]
representatives of the School District, they are in privity with
the School District."
(Doc. 45, at 21 (citing Echeverria
v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 632 F. App'x 1006, 1008 (11th Cir. 2015)).)
Defendants assert the School District represented the interests
of
the
individual
Defendants
in
Superior
Court
because
it
objected and resisted the introduction of all evidence Plaintiff
claimed
They
demonstrated
argue
privity
discrimination
exists
because
and
the
retaliation.
individual
(Id.)
Defendants,
non-parties, were adequately represented by the School District,
a
party
to
the
suit.
(Doc.
20
52,
at
14
(citing
Taylor
v.
Sturqell, 553 U.S. 880, 894-95 (2008)).)
They also argue the
BOE members are responsible for and control litigation involving
the
School
District,
thus
on
that
privity with the School District.
basis
alone,
they
are
in
(Id. at 15.)
Claims against individuals in their official capacities are
generally
treated
as
a
claim
against the
entity.
Rodemaker,
2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-66
(1985)).
Although
Plaintiff
names
the
individual
Defendants in both their official and individual capacities in
the Complaint's caption, she brings the claims against them only
in their individual capacities.
38.)
(Doc. 40,
at
1,
30, 33,
36,
Thus, there is not automatic privity from suing them in
their official capacity.
See Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8.
Nevertheless,
finds
Defendants
the
and
Court
the
School
privity
District
between
because
the
the
individual
allegations
against the individual Defendants all pertain to actions taken
through their involvement with the School District and the BOE.
(Doc. 40, at 30-40.)
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, 'Mw]hen one party's
actions are legally another party's actions, those two parties
have the kind of substantive legal relationship that establishes
privity."
and
Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citation omitted
emphasis in original).
The
individual
Defendants are
School District's Superintendent and members of the BOE.
21
the
(Doc.
40, at 4-6.)
School
Plaintiff alleges the BOE made decisions for the
District,
including
hiring
KC&A
to
assist
in
the
Superintendent search, deciding who to interview, and ultimately
voting on the new
Superintendent.
also alleges the "School
including
against
She
District, by and through its agents,
Superintendent,
discriminated
(Id. at 19, 21, 24.)
and
her.
each
(Id.
at
member
30.)
of
Thus,
its
by
[BOE],"
her
own
allegations, the individual Defendants were agents of the School
District.
Although
Plaintiff
identifies
the
individual
Defendants in their individual capacities, she seeks liability
for actions they took on behalf of the BOE, and ultimately the
School District.
Plaintiff's allegations refer to actions the
individual Defendants took in their capacity as board members,
and only the BOE and School District, as entities, could take
those actions.
Based on these findings, the Court finds privity
exists because the individual Defendants' relationship with the
School District is so close as to border on "near identity."
Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v.
Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999)).
D. Conclusion
Based
on
the
foregoing,
the
Court
finds
Defendants
met
their burden of showing this suit is barred by res judicata.
They showed the prior decision issued by the Superior Court was
rendered
by
a
court
of
competent
22
jurisdiction,
was
final,
involved
same
the
causes
(quoting
same
of
TVPX
parties
or
action.
ARS,
their
privies,
Rodemaker,
Inc.,
959
2024
F.3d
and
WL
at
involved
3643133,
1325).
the
at
As
*4
such.
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 45) is
GRANTED.
E. Collateral Estoppel
In
argues
response
Defendants
whether
15.)
to
evidence
Defendants'
are
of
Defendants
motion
collaterally
race
argue
to
estopped
discrimination
the
dismiss.
Court
from
exists.
should
Plaintiff
relitigating
(Doc.
not
48,
consider
at
this
assertion because it is asserted without legal grounds and was
inappropriately raised in a response brief.
(Doc. 52, at 16-
17.)
Collateral
estoppel
prevents
parties
from
relitigating
issues which were actually litigated and decided in a previous
adjudication.
Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264-
65 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Because the Court finds
Plaintiff's claims barred by res judicata, it does not address
Plaintiff's collateral estoppel arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For
the
Defendants'
complaint
foregoing
motion
under
the
to
reasons,
dismiss
doctrine
of
23
IT
IS
HEREBY
Plaintiff's
res
judicata
ORDERED
second
(Doc.
that
amended
45)
is
GRANTED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions
and deadlines and CLOSE this case.
ORDER
ENTERED
at
Augusta,
Georgia,
this
September, 2024.
HONOp^BLE J.ORAND^ flALL
UNITmc&tTES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHeS district of GEORGIA
24
day
of
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