Green v. Charlton County School District et al

Filing 61

ORDER granting 45 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on September 19, 2024. (jrb)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION DR. SHERILONDA GREEN, Plaintiff, V. CV 522-053 CHARLTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.. Defendants. ORDER Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. {Doc. 45.) For the following reasons. Defendants' motion is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed her original complaint on September 9, 2022 (Doc. 1) and filed her first amended complaint on October 19, 2022 (Doc. 16). Defendants moved for a more definite statement and to strike immaterial allegations. (Doc. 20.) On September 11, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied as moot in part Defendants' motion, found the first amended complaint was a shotgun pleading and ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 36, at 10-11.) Plaintiff filed her second amended 25, complaint 2023. (Doc. retaliation practices {hereinafter, for in the 40.) Plaintiff opposing racially violation of the Civil violation Rights of protection the capacities Rights at four Rights Act 1866; 42 in U.S.C. She their § brings treatment and 1983. (4) four and (Id. (2) in equal United States all official 1866; violation of disparate of (1) employment of proceeding in Act September claims: discriminatory (3) 30-40.) Defendants under 1866; on Fourteenth Amendment to the (Id. all of Civil under the Constitution. against Act asserts Civil retaliation for participating in a the ^^Complaint") claims individual at 1, 30-40.) Jurisdiction is proper based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 because the controversy (Id. at 3.) is the arises under the laws of the United States. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this district in which Defendants reside or do business where a substantial part of the relevant events occurred. and (Id.) Plaintiff brings this civil rights action for damages and injunctive relief based on workplace conduct caused and perpetuated by the Charlton County School District (the ''School District"), members of the Charlton County Board of Education ("BOE"), and John Lairsey. racially the School (Id. motivated discrimination was at District's former 2.) conduct pending Plaintiff she superintendent. seeks experienced, before the and United redresses a charge States Dr. for of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (^^EEOC") as of the filing of the Complaint. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff, an African American female, is the Human Resources (Id. at 4.) and Student Services for the Director of School District. She has '"devoted her entire life and the majority of her professional career to Charlton County Schools." 6.) (Id. at Plaintiff alleges the School District has a long history of subjecting African discrimination. American (Id.) educators, In 2022, like her, Plaintiff to sued unlawful the School District in the Superior Court of Charlton County (the "Superior Court") under the Georgia Open Records Act. (Id.) The Superior Court found the School District violated the Open Records Act. (Id. at 7.) District Plaintiff states she "was forced to sue" the School in the discrimination (Id. at 9.) Superior relating Court to the "for claims hiding brought evidence in this of case." The Superior Court held the "record is replete with evidence of systemic discrimination and discrimination against [Plaintiff] Plaintiff's] personally. testimony and The [Superior] evidence of systemic Court and [found personal discrimination compelling and relevant to establish motive" in the Superior Court action. Plaintiff's employment (Id. (citation omitted).) history is as follows. Plaintiff first applied to the School District in June 1999 and was not hired. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff spent six years as an educator in another district, and in August 2006, she joined the School District as a second-grade teacher at Bethune Elementary. (Id. at 11.) In July 2008, she was named Assistant Principal at Folkston Elementary, School. (Id.) In forty-five people. which this was role, (Id.) later she renamed was second 2013, Elementary in Middle command of In July 2011, Defendant Lairsey was named Superintendent of the School District. May Bethune Plaintiff applied School. (Id.) to be She Lairsey but did not get the job. (Id. at 12.) Principal interviewed (Id.) at St. with In George Defendant In May 2015, Defendant Lairsey approached Plaintiff and informed her that he knew she wanted to be the next Principal of Bethune Middle School. at 13.) Since the Principal would not be (Id. retiring for three years. Defendant Lairsey encouraged her to apply to be Director of Exceptional desired, she Programs could Principal retired. persuaded Principal. the her to (Id.) do at the when the trick to not to apply to be In July 2015, Defendant Lairsey transferred Middle male as Interim Principal. (Id.) July she Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lairsey a School if (Id.) as Middle and to this Bethune Office, return Principal at Bethune From Central 2015 to present. School and Plaintiff appointed has a served white as a Director and has been given more responsibility than anyone else for less pay. (Id. at 14.) She wears multiple hats, including: 4 Pre-K Director; Special Education Director; Title I Director; Title III Director; Teacher of the Year Coordinator; Technology Coordinator; Title IX Coordinator; District Coordinator; Mental Behavior Intervention and McKinney-Vento Coordinator. District (Id. at Family Health 14-15.) and Partnership Coordinator; Supports Liaison; School District Coordinator; Consolidated Despite these Positive Application different jobs, Plaintiff is consistently underpaid compared to white Directors and has been denied the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, conditions, and equal employment opportunities within her contract because Plaintiff rights she alleges by is African Defendants denying her April 30, continue employment opportunities for employment. On American. 2019, impair at her privileges 15.) of and her equal (Id. at 16.) the Charlton County High School. to (Id. Principal (Id. at 17.) position opened at Plaintiff met with Defendant Lairsey about applying, but she also told him she was interested in becoming a superintendent and participating in the Superintendent Professional Development Program ("^SPDP"). (Id.) Defendant Lairsey told Plaintiff the SPDP would open more doors for her and if she wanted to become a superintendent one day, that is the route recommendation. applied for the he Plaintiff SPDP. recommended. stayed (Id.) in In (Id.) the Based Central September on his Office and 2019, Defendant Lairsey told Plaintiff he wanted to nominate her for the Mclntosh County Superintendent position, and Plaintiff believes he tried to encourage this only because he knew he was retiring soon and wished to recommend a white male to replace him in the School District. (Id. at 18-19.) On July 25, 2020, the Superintendent vacancy was announced for the School District. (Id. at 19.) The BOE hired King- Cooper & Associates ("KC&A") to assist with the search. On August 3, 2020, qualifications Plaintiff and information. job (Id.) called KC&A description to and find was (Id.) out the denied the On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter from KC&A stating she had been nominated as a candidate for Superintendent, but she was never interviewed. On September stating 11, they received qualifications, September 25, (Id. 21.) at 2020, Plaintiff her application, but she was 2020, the BOE On received never met October and email from she had interviewed. to 1, an (Id. at 20.) decide 2020, who KC&A excellent (Id.) to On interview. Plaintiff's Georgia Association of Educators ('"CAE") representative, Velesa Henton, called KC&A to request the qualifications and job description for the On Superintendent position, October discuss his 8, 2020, Plaintiff discrimination but they refused met against with her Defendant throughout her. (Id.) Lairsey the to years, complain of discrimination, and confront him as to why she would not be considered for an interview. (Id. at 21-22.) round took of Superintendent interviews place on The first October 2020, and the second round took place on October 11, 2020. 9, (Id. at 22.) On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Lairsey an open records request discrimination. Defendants, members (Id.) having of the discrimination. letter it She obtain also delivered BOE, (Id.) to to detailing evidence submitted a Defendant her of letter Lairsey complaint racial to all and all of race The same day, a white male was named the Superintendent finalist. (Id. at 23.) On October 16, 2020, Plaintiff sent Defendant Lairsey a follow-up email asking when she would receive a response to her open records request, and she copied her CAE representative, but she received no response. (Id.) On October 20, 2020, the BOE met, and Plaintiff asked a board member after the meeting if they were aware of her open records request and was informed Defendant Lairsey told the BOE about it. (I^ at 23-24.) On October 29, 2020, the BOE held the final vote for a new Superintendent, and all voted for a white male. (Id. at 24.) On November 4-6, 2020, Defendant Lairsey continued to deny Plaintiff the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, conditions, and equal employment opportunities of her contract. (Id.) Defendant Lairsey allowed three white male administrators to attend ("GAEL'') the Georgia conference in Plaintiff to attend (Id.) Association Athens, because she of Georgia Educational but complained did Leaders not allow of discrimination. Plaintiff alleges she was excluded from this conference in retaliation for making a race discrimination complaint. at 25.) She alleges individual board members began ostracizing her, ignoring hostility (Id. her, when visibly rolling their eyes, and they saw her. (Id.) Defendants displaying failed to produce responsive documents to her open records request to try to hide their overt acts of race (Id. at 26.) discrimination and retaliation. Thus, as outlined above. Plaintiff sued the School District for violations of the Georgia Open Records Act. Defendants 12(b)(6) 45.) to move under dismiss the Federal Complaint Rule under of res Civil (Id.) Procedure judicata. (Doc. Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 48), Defendants filed a reply brief (Doc. 52), Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (Doc. 53-2)^, and Defendants filed a sur-reply (Doc. 55). Thus, the motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's review. II. LEGAL STANDARD In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Scheuer v. ^ Plaintiff filed a motion for leave/notice of intent to file her sur-reply. (Doc. 53.) The Court considers Plaintiff's sur-reply (Doc. 53-2); thus, her motion for leave to file (Doc. 53) is GRANTED. 8 Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis V. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" to give the defendant fair notice of both the claim and the supporting grounds. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). allegations" unadorned, are not required. Bell Atl. Iqbal, 556 U.S. v. Although ^'detailed factual Rule 8 ''demands more the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me Ashcroft V. Corp. 662, 678 than an accusation." (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff s labels and pleading conclusions, obligation and a "requires formulaic recitation elements of a cause of action will not do." at 555. "Nor assertions' does devoid a of complaint 'further suffice factual more than of the Twombly, 550 U.S. if it tenders enhancement.'" 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 'naked Iqbal, The Court need not accept the pleading's legal conclusions as true, only its well-pleaded facts. Id. at 677-79. Furthermore, "the court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)] when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction factual allegations will support the cause of action." of the Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Exec. 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty./ 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991)). ''Under the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts give preclusive effect to a state-court judgment whenever the courts of the judgment emerged would do the same." state from Lawsuit applies. was resolved by the Richardson v. Miller, 101 F.3d 665, 668 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). First which Georgia courts, Because the Georgia law "In Georgia, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies First Guar. in Mortg. identical Corp., CV causes 419-055, of action." 2019 WL Shuman 5198470, v. at *3 (quoting Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins., 629 S.E. 2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party trying to invoke judgment must establish three parties, of (2) identity res judicata based on a prior prerequisites: "(1) identity of the causes of action, and (3) adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction in which the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issues." Id. (quoting Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1993)). 10 III. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint based on res judicata. (Doc. 45, at 2.) They argue Plaintiff put at issue the same facts in her Superior Court action against the School four District nearly years ago. (Id.) Although Plaintiff only brought a claim under the Open Records Act in the Superior Court, they argue she cannot now be heard on additional claims (Id.) her same that arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. As such. Defendants argue Plaintiff was required to plead discrimination facts in and retaliation Superior Court and claims arising cannot do so out of now. the (Id.) Plaintiff argues her suit is not barred by res judicata. (Doc. 48.) As outlined above, ''[r]es judicata prevents plaintiffs from bringing claims related to prior decisions when ^the prior decision (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies; and (4) involved the same causes of action.'" Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., No. 22-13300, 2024 WL 3643133, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024) (quoting TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins., 959 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020)). ''The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of showing that the later-filed suit is barred." quotation marks omitted and Id. at *6 (citation and alteration 11 adopted). Thus, Defendants bear the burden here. The Court addresses each element below. A. Court: of Compe'tent: Jurisdic-tion and Final Judgment Defendants assert ^'[i]t cannot be disputed that the final judgment in the [Superior Court] action . . . is an adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction." at 23 (citing Doc. 40-1).) Plaintiff does not (Doc. 45, dispute the Superior Court is a court of competent jurisdiction or that it issued a final judgment. the cause of actions addresses below. (Doc. 48, at 15.) and (Id.) parties Plaintiff disputes matching, which the Court As such, the Court finds the Superior Court is a court of competent jurisdiction and issued a final judgment. B. Cause of Acbion To action determine for substance, res and Rodemaker, 2024 whether judicata not F.3d marks "'We same cases purposes, form, involve the of the two same cause concerns of ""the proceedings." Trustmark Ins, v. 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002)) (quotation ask whether the nucleus of operative facts, or factual predicate." the inquiry WL 3643133, at *9 (quoting ESLU, Inc., 299 omitted). the two claims are "arise based out of the upon the same Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). "When a court enters judgment on the merits, the effect of the judgment extends to the litigation of 12 all issues whether relevant or not to raised the same claim at trial." between Simplis v. the JP parties, Morgan Chase Bank, No. CV 417-183, 2018 WL 11217094, at *2 {S.D. Ga. May 22, 2018) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng^g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978)) marks omitted and alteration adopted). (internal quotation ''Causes of action share a nucleus of operative fact if 'the same facts are involved in both cases, so that the present claim effectively litigated with the prior one.'" 3643133, F.3d at 882, *9 (quoting 893 (11th Cir. Lobo v. Celebrity 2013)); see also could have been Rodemaker, 2024 WL Cruises, Inc., N.A.A.C.P. v. 704 Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Res judicata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all legal theories and nucleus claims arising out of the same of operative fact." (citation omitted)). But if full relief was unavailable in the prior case, res judicata will not bar the second. Plaintiff Id. (citation omitted). only brought an Open Records Act claim in Superior Court, yet Defendants argue she pled and attempted to place at issue the facts she contends demonstrate discrimination and retaliation. (Doc. 45, at 15.) Defendants argue a comparison of the pleadings here and the Superior Court action demonstrate the facts were identically pled in both cases. at 15-17.) (Id. They argue "Plaintiff placed at issue almost every 13 one of those facts at the [Superior Court trial] in final judgment was rendered." (Id. at 17.) which a Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot now plead claims she could have asserted, but chose not to, in the Superior Court action arising out of the same facts. (Id. at 18.) In response. Plaintiff argues none of the rights and issues in the two cases are identical, so Defendants failed to show her claims are barred by res many of the acknowledges judicata. (Doc. allegations in 48, the at two 11.) She suits are similar but argues the causes of actions are based on different allegations of misconduct. the misconduct in the (Id. at 11-12.) Superior Court Plaintiff asserts action was the School District's failure to respond to the Open Records Act request, but here, it is Defendants' failure to grant her professional advancement opportunities similarly situated argument is constitute Pleming v. that separate white and employment privileges counterparts. 'Ms]eparate causes of Universal-Rundle (Id.) allegations action." Corp., 142 F.3d her Plaintiff's of (Id. like at 1354 misconduct 12 (citing (11th Cir. 1998)).) The Court must determine whether this ^^case arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based up on the same factual predicate, as [the] former action." TVPX ARS, Inc., 959 F.3d at 1325 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 14 The Court finds the claims in both the Superior Court action and here grow out of the same nucleus of operative facts - the alleged racial discrimination Plaintiff faced at the District and those involved with it. hands of the School While the Superior Court action involved a violation of the Open Records Act, it involved records Plaintiff retaliation The claims. Complaint and both recap sought Those the to support are the exact complaint in Plaintiff's career her and claims asserted the Superior the history of unlawful discrimination. discrimination School and here. Court action District's long (Doc. 40; Doc. 45-1.) The Superior Court complaint rehashes the same events that serve as the basis of this Complaint - including Plaintiff's desire to be hired as Superintendent, not being considered for the job, and submitting a complaint of discrimination to the BOE after they failed to interview her and hired someone else. 7-10.) (Doc. 45-1, at While the Superior Court action dealt with the School District's failure to produce responsive documents to Plaintiff's Open Records requests, she alleged they did so ^'in an effort to hide their overt retaliation against [Plaintiff]." (Id. at 12.) same of nucleus acts African operative of race American discrimination employees and like In this case. Plaintiff asserts the facts, outlining her throughout her long tenure with the School District. treatment (Doc. 40.) The biggest difference between the allegations in this Complaint 15 and the Superior Superior Court Court findings complaint and is that evidence as she includes support allegations of discrimination and retaliation here. 27-30.) for the her (Doc 40, at Beyond these additions, the Complaint contains almost identical allegations of Plaintiff's treatment. ''"Res judicata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same 3643133, nucleus at *9 of operative (citation and fact." Rodemaker, quotation marks 2024 omitted). WL The claims here arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact as the Superior Court action, thus making them the same cause of action for res judicata purposes. Plaintiff tries to argue she could not have raised her present claims in her prior suit because she did not yet have evidence of race suspicions, Superior racial and Court discrimination she did compelled discrimination. Furthermore, she argues not and retaliation, she possess defendants (Doc. 48, she the to at had evidence turn 4; not over Doc yet only had until evidence 53-2, at exhausted the of 5-6.) her administrative remedies because her EEOC charge was and is still pending. (Doc. 48, at 4; Doc. 53-2, at 6.) Defendants argue these assertions are irrelevant to the disposition of the res judicata arguments. (Doc. 55, at 5-6.) 16 The not Court is having Superior the by Plaintiff s argument about relevant evidence Court Plaintiffs not persuaded case. Complaint (See Doc. 45-1.) As until the outlined matches her conclusion above, the Superior of the majority Court of complaint. The extra allegations in this Complaint citing the Superior Court Judge's ruling do not change the nature of the allegations. suit, would evidence arguments Discovery, have given necessary are to conducted Plaintiff prove insufficient her the after avenue claims. justification the to initiating uncover Thus, for why the Plaintiffs she did not bring these claims in Superior Court. As to the EEOC charge, the Eleventh Circuit has ^^held that the fact a plaintiff did not have when [s]he filed [her] first lawsuit a right to sue letter that was necessary for the claim [s]he raised in [her] second lawsuit does not prevent it from being barred by res judicata." *10 (citing Jang v. (11th Cir. 2000)). not have brought her United Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at Techs. Corp., 206 F.3d 1147, 1149 Thus, Plaintiffs argument that she could discrimination and retaliation claims in Superior Court because she did not yet have her EEOC right to sue letter is irrelevant to the Court's analysis. Therefore, the Court finds the cause of actions the same for res judicata purposes and turns to the parties' similarity. 17 C. Parties For res judicata to apply, both lawsuits must involve the same parties or ones in privity with them. 3643133, at *7. District are Defendants parties to both argue school board Plaintiff actions, so the same for res judicata purposes. individual Rodemaker, 2024 WL and the parties are (Doc. 45, at 19.) members and School the the As to the superintendent, Defendants argue they are in privity with the School District, the named defendant in Superior Court. (Id. at 20.) In response. Plaintiff asserts the individual Defendants could not have been were not included responsible responsive records. The in Eleventh the under Superior the Court Open action Records because Act to they produce (Doc. 48, at 14.) Circuit has defined privity ^'somewhat circularly . . . as the relationship between one who is a party of record and a nonparty that is sufficiently close so a judgment for or against the party should bind or protect the nonparty." Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (quoting Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1560) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has a non-exhaustive list of factors that favor a finding of privity: (1) the nonparty agreed to be bound by the litigation of others; (2) a substantive legal relationship existed between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment; (3) the nonparty was adequately represented by someone who was a party to the suit; 18 (4) the nonparty assumed control over the litigation in which the judgment was issued; (5) a party attempted to relitigate issues through a proxy; or (6) a statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by nonlitigants. Id. {citations omitted). The Superior Court action was filed by Plaintiff against Charlton County Schools Defendant here. (Doc. School District are the Defendants Lairsey, Matthew here that — the 45-1, same were at 2.) in named as Plaintiff and a the But there are additional the Curtis District Thus, Parties. not the Superintendent; School Superior Nixon, P. Sands, member of BOE; John Court member of action: BOE; Dr. Canaday, member of BOE; Lucille Hannans, member of BOE; and Pender Lloyd, member of BOE. (Doc. 40, at 4-6.) Defendants argue the superintendent and individual BOE members are in privity with the School District, thus satisfying the Defendants argue superintendent color of and law" as School District. res judicata Plaintiff's allegations individual agents, element. BOE members employees, (Id. at 21.) In or (Doc. 45, at 20.) against were board response. both taken members the ''under of the Plaintiff again argues that the individual Defendants could not have been part of the Open Record claim because they had no duty to produce responsive records. (Doc. 48, at 14.) She asserts that because the conduct at issue is different, the individual Defendants are not in privity with the School District. 19 (Id.) While the' Court agrees with Plaintiff that the individual Defendants were not parties in the Superior Court action because they were not liable under the Open Records Act, that does not mean she could not have included them as defendants if she brought discrimination and retaliation claims. Thus, the Court finds to this individual argument without Defendants are merit in and privity turns with the whether School the District for res judicata purposes. Plaintiff lists the individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities, but then brings each claim against them in their individual capacities only. 1, 30, 33, alleged their to 36, be 38.) Defendants operating individual as argue agents capacities as and that under agents, (Doc. 40, at since color ^'they were of law employees, in [and] representatives of the School District, they are in privity with the School District." (Doc. 45, at 21 (citing Echeverria v. Bank of Am., N.A., 632 F. App'x 1006, 1008 (11th Cir. 2015)).) Defendants assert the School District represented the interests of the individual Defendants in Superior Court because it objected and resisted the introduction of all evidence Plaintiff claimed They demonstrated argue privity discrimination exists because and the retaliation. individual (Id.) Defendants, non-parties, were adequately represented by the School District, a party to the suit. (Doc. 20 52, at 14 (citing Taylor v. Sturqell, 553 U.S. 880, 894-95 (2008)).) They also argue the BOE members are responsible for and control litigation involving the School District, thus on that privity with the School District. basis alone, they are in (Id. at 15.) Claims against individuals in their official capacities are generally treated as a claim against the entity. Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). Although Plaintiff names the individual Defendants in both their official and individual capacities in the Complaint's caption, she brings the claims against them only in their individual capacities. 38.) (Doc. 40, at 1, 30, 33, 36, Thus, there is not automatic privity from suing them in their official capacity. See Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8. Nevertheless, finds Defendants the and Court the School privity District between because the the individual allegations against the individual Defendants all pertain to actions taken through their involvement with the School District and the BOE. (Doc. 40, at 30-40.) As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, 'Mw]hen one party's actions are legally another party's actions, those two parties have the kind of substantive legal relationship that establishes privity." and Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citation omitted emphasis in original). The individual Defendants are School District's Superintendent and members of the BOE. 21 the (Doc. 40, at 4-6.) School Plaintiff alleges the BOE made decisions for the District, including hiring KC&A to assist in the Superintendent search, deciding who to interview, and ultimately voting on the new Superintendent. also alleges the "School including against She District, by and through its agents, Superintendent, discriminated (Id. at 19, 21, 24.) and her. each (Id. at member 30.) of Thus, its by [BOE]," her own allegations, the individual Defendants were agents of the School District. Although Plaintiff identifies the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, she seeks liability for actions they took on behalf of the BOE, and ultimately the School District. Plaintiff's allegations refer to actions the individual Defendants took in their capacity as board members, and only the BOE and School District, as entities, could take those actions. Based on these findings, the Court finds privity exists because the individual Defendants' relationship with the School District is so close as to border on "near identity." Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999)). D. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendants met their burden of showing this suit is barred by res judicata. They showed the prior decision issued by the Superior Court was rendered by a court of competent 22 jurisdiction, was final, involved same the causes (quoting same of TVPX parties or action. ARS, their privies, Rodemaker, Inc., 959 2024 F.3d and WL at involved 3643133, 1325). the at As *4 such. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 45) is GRANTED. E. Collateral Estoppel In argues response Defendants whether 15.) to evidence Defendants' are of Defendants motion collaterally race argue to estopped discrimination the dismiss. Court from exists. should Plaintiff relitigating (Doc. not 48, consider at this assertion because it is asserted without legal grounds and was inappropriately raised in a response brief. (Doc. 52, at 16- 17.) Collateral estoppel prevents parties from relitigating issues which were actually litigated and decided in a previous adjudication. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264- 65 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Because the Court finds Plaintiff's claims barred by res judicata, it does not address Plaintiff's collateral estoppel arguments. IV. CONCLUSION For the Defendants' complaint foregoing motion under the to reasons, dismiss doctrine of 23 IT IS HEREBY Plaintiff's res judicata ORDERED second (Doc. that amended 45) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this September, 2024. HONOp^BLE J.ORAND^ flALL UNITmc&tTES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUTHeS district of GEORGIA 24 day of

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