Green v. Charlton County School District et al

Filing 61

ORDER granting 45 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. Signed by District Judge J. Randal Hall on September 19, 2024. (jrb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION

DR. SHERILONDA GREEN,

Plaintiff,
V.

CV 522-053
CHARLTON COUNTY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al..
Defendants.

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to

dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint under the doctrine
of

res

judicata.

{Doc.

45.)

For

the

following

reasons.

Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her original complaint on September 9, 2022
(Doc. 1) and filed her first amended complaint on October 19,
2022 (Doc. 16).

Defendants moved for a more definite statement

and to strike immaterial allegations.

(Doc. 20.)

On September

11, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied as moot in part
Defendants'

motion,

found

the

first

amended

complaint

was

a

shotgun pleading and ordered Plaintiff to file a second amended
complaint.

(Doc.

36,

at

10-11.)

Plaintiff filed

her

second

amended
25,

complaint

2023.

(Doc.

retaliation
practices

{hereinafter,

for

in

the

40.)

Plaintiff

opposing

racially

violation

of the

Civil

violation

Rights
of

protection

the

capacities

Rights

at

four

Rights

Act

1866;

42

in

U.S.C.

She

their
§

brings

treatment
and

1983.

(4)

four

and

(Id.

(2)

in

equal

United States

all

official

1866;

violation of

disparate
of

(1)

employment

of

proceeding in

Act

September

claims:

discriminatory

(3)

30-40.)

Defendants

under

1866;

on

Fourteenth Amendment to the

(Id.

all

of

Civil

under the

Constitution.

against

Act

asserts

Civil

retaliation for participating in a
the

^^Complaint")

claims

individual

at

1,

30-40.)

Jurisdiction is proper based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 because
the

controversy

(Id. at 3.)
is

the

arises

under

the

laws

of

the

United

States.

Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this

district

in

which

Defendants

reside

or

do

business

where a substantial part of the relevant events occurred.

and

(Id.)

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action for damages and

injunctive

relief

based

on

workplace

conduct

caused

and

perpetuated by the Charlton County School District (the ''School

District"), members of the Charlton County Board of Education
("BOE"), and
John

Lairsey.

racially

the

School
(Id.

motivated

discrimination

was

at

District's former
2.)

conduct

pending

Plaintiff

she

superintendent.
seeks

experienced,

before

the

and

United

redresses

a

charge

States

Dr.
for

of

Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (^^EEOC") as of the filing of
the Complaint.

(Id. at 2-3.)

Plaintiff, an African American female, is the
Human

Resources

(Id. at 4.)

and

Student

Services

for

the

Director of

School

District.

She has '"devoted her entire life and the majority

of her professional career to Charlton County Schools."
6.)

(Id. at

Plaintiff alleges the School District has a long history of

subjecting

African

discrimination.

American

(Id.)

educators,

In

2022,

like

her,

Plaintiff

to

sued

unlawful

the

School

District in the Superior Court of Charlton County (the "Superior
Court") under the Georgia Open Records Act.

(Id.)

The Superior

Court found the School District violated the Open Records Act.
(Id. at 7.)

District

Plaintiff states she "was forced to sue" the School

in

the

discrimination
(Id. at 9.)

Superior

relating

Court

to the

"for

claims

hiding

brought

evidence

in

this

of

case."

The Superior Court held the "record is replete with

evidence of systemic discrimination and discrimination against
[Plaintiff]
Plaintiff's]

personally.
testimony

and

The

[Superior]

evidence

of

systemic

Court
and

[found
personal

discrimination compelling and relevant to establish motive" in
the Superior Court action.

Plaintiff's employment

(Id. (citation omitted).)

history is

as follows.

Plaintiff

first applied to the School District in June 1999 and was not

hired.

(Id.

at

10-11.)

Plaintiff

spent

six

years

as

an

educator in another district, and in August 2006, she joined the
School District as a second-grade teacher at Bethune Elementary.

(Id. at 11.)

In July 2008, she was named Assistant Principal at

Folkston

Elementary,

School.

(Id.)

In

forty-five people.

which
this

was

role,

(Id.)

later
she

renamed

was

second

2013,

Elementary

in

Middle

command

of

In July 2011, Defendant Lairsey was

named Superintendent of the School District.
May

Bethune

Plaintiff

applied

School.

(Id.)

to

be

She

Lairsey but did not get the job.

(Id. at 12.)

Principal

interviewed
(Id.)

at

St.

with

In

George

Defendant

In May 2015, Defendant

Lairsey approached Plaintiff and informed her that he knew she
wanted to be the next Principal of Bethune Middle School.
at 13.)

Since the Principal

would

not be

(Id.

retiring for three

years. Defendant Lairsey encouraged her to apply to be Director
of

Exceptional

desired,

she

Programs

could

Principal retired.
persuaded

Principal.
the

her

to

(Id.)

do

at

the

when

the

trick

to

not

to

apply to

be

In July 2015, Defendant Lairsey transferred
Middle

male as Interim Principal.

(Id.)

July

she

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lairsey
a

School

if

(Id.)

as

Middle

and

to

this

Bethune

Office,

return

Principal at Bethune

From

Central

2015

to

present.

School and

Plaintiff

appointed

has

a

served

white

as

a

Director and has been given more responsibility than anyone else
for less pay.

(Id. at 14.)

She wears multiple hats, including:
4

Pre-K

Director; Special

Education

Director; Title

I

Director;

Title III Director; Teacher of the Year Coordinator; Technology

Coordinator;

Title

IX

Coordinator;

District

Coordinator;

Mental

Behavior

Intervention

and

McKinney-Vento
Coordinator.

District
(Id.

at

Family

Health

14-15.)

and

Partnership

Coordinator;

Supports

Liaison;

School

District

Coordinator;

Consolidated

Despite

these

Positive

Application

different

jobs,

Plaintiff is consistently underpaid compared to white Directors
and has been denied the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, conditions, and equal employment opportunities within her
contract

because

Plaintiff

rights

she

alleges

by

is

African

Defendants

denying

her

April

30,

continue

employment

opportunities for employment.

On

American.

2019,

impair

at

her

privileges

15.)

of

and

her

equal

(Id. at 16.)

the

Charlton County High School.

to

(Id.

Principal

(Id. at 17.)

position

opened

at

Plaintiff met with

Defendant Lairsey about applying, but she also told him she was

interested in becoming a superintendent and participating in the
Superintendent Professional Development Program ("^SPDP").

(Id.)

Defendant Lairsey told Plaintiff the SPDP would open more doors
for her and if she wanted to become a superintendent one day,
that

is

the

route

recommendation.

applied

for

the

he

Plaintiff

SPDP.

recommended.

stayed

(Id.)

in

In

(Id.)

the

Based

Central

September

on

his

Office

and

2019,

Defendant

Lairsey

told

Plaintiff

he

wanted

to

nominate

her

for

the

Mclntosh County Superintendent position, and Plaintiff believes
he tried to encourage this only because he knew he was retiring
soon and wished to recommend a white male to replace him in the
School District.

(Id. at 18-19.)

On July 25, 2020, the Superintendent vacancy was announced
for

the

School

District.

(Id.

at

19.)

The

BOE

hired

King-

Cooper & Associates ("KC&A") to assist with the search.

On

August

3,

2020,

qualifications

Plaintiff

and

information.

job

(Id.)

called

KC&A

description

to

and

find

was

(Id.)

out

the

denied

the

On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff received a

letter from KC&A stating she had been nominated as a candidate
for Superintendent, but she was never interviewed.
On

September

stating

11,

they

received

qualifications,
September

25,

(Id.

21.)

at

2020,

Plaintiff
her

application,

but

she

was

2020,

the

BOE

On

received

never
met

October

and

email from

she

had

interviewed.

to

1,

an

(Id. at 20.)

decide

2020,

who

KC&A

excellent

(Id.)
to

On

interview.

Plaintiff's

Georgia

Association of Educators ('"CAE") representative, Velesa Henton,
called KC&A to request the qualifications and job description
for the

On

Superintendent position,

October

discuss

his

8,

2020,

Plaintiff

discrimination

but they refused

met

against

with

her

Defendant

throughout

her.

(Id.)

Lairsey

the

to

years,

complain of discrimination, and confront him as to why she would

not be considered for an interview.

(Id. at 21-22.)

round

took

of

Superintendent

interviews

place

on

The first

October

2020, and the second round took place on October 11, 2020.

9,

(Id.

at 22.)

On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Lairsey an

open

records

request

discrimination.

Defendants,

members

(Id.)

having

of

the

discrimination.

letter

it

She

obtain

also

delivered

BOE,

(Id.)

to

to

detailing

evidence

submitted

a

Defendant

her

of

letter

Lairsey

complaint

racial
to

all

and

all

of

race

The same day, a white male was named the

Superintendent finalist.

(Id.

at 23.)

On

October

16,

2020,

Plaintiff sent Defendant Lairsey a follow-up email asking when
she would receive a response to her open records request, and
she copied her CAE representative, but she received no response.
(Id.)

On October 20, 2020, the BOE met, and Plaintiff asked a

board member after the meeting if they were aware of her open
records request and was informed Defendant Lairsey told the BOE

about it.

(I^ at 23-24.)

On October 29, 2020, the BOE held

the final vote for a new Superintendent, and all voted for a
white male.

(Id. at 24.)

On November 4-6, 2020, Defendant Lairsey continued to deny

Plaintiff

the

enjoyment

of

all

benefits,

privileges,

terms,

conditions, and equal employment opportunities of her contract.
(Id.)

Defendant Lairsey allowed three white male administrators

to

attend

("GAEL'')

the

Georgia

conference

in

Plaintiff to attend
(Id.)

Association
Athens,

because

she

of

Georgia

Educational
but

complained

did

Leaders

not

allow

of discrimination.

Plaintiff alleges she was excluded from this conference

in retaliation for making a race discrimination complaint.
at 25.)

She alleges individual board members began ostracizing

her, ignoring
hostility

(Id.

her,

when

visibly rolling their eyes, and

they

saw

her.

(Id.)

Defendants

displaying
failed

to

produce responsive documents to her open records request to try
to

hide their overt acts of race

(Id. at 26.)

discrimination

and

retaliation.

Thus, as outlined above. Plaintiff sued the School

District for violations of the Georgia Open Records Act.
Defendants

12(b)(6)
45.)

to

move

under

dismiss the

Federal

Complaint

Rule

under

of

res

Civil

(Id.)

Procedure

judicata.

(Doc.

Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 48), Defendants filed a

reply brief (Doc. 52), Plaintiff filed a sur-reply (Doc. 53-2)^,
and

Defendants filed a sur-reply (Doc. 55).

Thus, the motion

has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

Scheuer v.

^ Plaintiff filed a motion for leave/notice of intent to file her sur-reply.
(Doc. 53.)

The Court considers Plaintiff's sur-reply (Doc. 53-2); thus, her

motion for leave to file (Doc. 53) is GRANTED.
8

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Davis V. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" to give the defendant fair notice of both
the

claim

and

the

supporting

grounds.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
allegations"
unadorned,

are

not

required.

Bell

Atl.

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

v.

Although ^'detailed factual

Rule

8 ''demands

more

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

Ashcroft V.

Corp.

662, 678

than

an

accusation."

(2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555).

A

plaintiff s

labels

and

pleading

conclusions,

obligation

and

a

"requires

formulaic

recitation

elements of a cause of action will not do."
at

555.

"Nor

assertions'

does

devoid

a

of

complaint

'further

suffice

factual

more

than

of

the

Twombly, 550 U.S.

if it

tenders

enhancement.'"

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

'naked

Iqbal,

The Court

need not accept the pleading's legal conclusions as true, only
its well-pleaded facts.

Id. at 677-79.

Furthermore, "the court

may dismiss a complaint pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)] when, on the
basis

of

a

dispositive

issue

of

law,

no

construction

factual allegations will support the cause of action."

of

the

Marshall

Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171,

1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Exec. 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty./
922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991)).
''Under the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738, federal courts give preclusive effect to a state-court
judgment

whenever

the

courts

of

the

judgment emerged would do the same."

state

from

Lawsuit

applies.

was

resolved

by

the

Richardson v. Miller, 101

F.3d 665, 668 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).

First

which

Georgia

courts,

Because the

Georgia

law

"In Georgia, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the

re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated,
or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties
or

their

privies

First Guar.

in

Mortg.

identical

Corp.,

CV

causes
419-055,

of

action."

2019

WL

Shuman

5198470,

v.

at *3

(quoting Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins., 629 S.E. 2d 260, 262
(Ga. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

party trying

to

invoke

judgment must establish

three

parties,

of

(2)

identity

res

judicata

based

on

a

prior

prerequisites: "(1) identity of

the

causes

of

action,

and

(3)

adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction

in which the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the relevant issues."

Id. (quoting Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d

1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1993)).

10

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint based on

res judicata.

(Doc. 45, at 2.)

They argue Plaintiff put at

issue the same facts in

her Superior Court action against the

School

four

District

nearly

years

ago.

(Id.)

Although

Plaintiff only brought a claim under the Open Records Act in the
Superior Court, they argue she cannot now be heard on additional
claims
(Id.)
her
same

that

arise

from

the

same

nucleus

of

operative

facts.

As such. Defendants argue Plaintiff was required to plead

discrimination
facts

in

and

retaliation

Superior

Court

and

claims

arising

cannot

do

so

out

of

now.

the

(Id.)

Plaintiff argues her suit is not barred by res judicata.

(Doc.

48.)

As outlined above, ''[r]es judicata prevents plaintiffs from

bringing

claims

related

to

prior

decisions

when

^the

prior

decision (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies;
and (4) involved the same causes of action.'"

Rodemaker v. City

of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., No. 22-13300, 2024 WL 3643133, at *4

(11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024) (quoting TVPX ARS, Inc. v. Genworth
Life

&

Annuity

Ins.,

959

F.3d

1318,

1325

(11th

Cir.

2020)).

''The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of showing
that the later-filed suit is barred."

quotation

marks

omitted

and

Id. at *6 (citation and

alteration
11

adopted).

Thus,

Defendants

bear

the

burden

here.

The

Court

addresses

each

element below.

A. Court: of Compe'tent: Jurisdic-tion and Final Judgment

Defendants assert ^'[i]t cannot be disputed that the final

judgment in the [Superior Court] action . . . is an adjudication
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction."
at

23

(citing

Doc.

40-1).)

Plaintiff

does

not

(Doc. 45,

dispute

the

Superior Court is a court of competent jurisdiction or that it
issued a final judgment.
the

cause

of

actions

addresses below.

(Doc. 48, at 15.)

and

(Id.)

parties

Plaintiff disputes

matching,

which

the

Court

As such, the Court finds the Superior

Court is a court of competent jurisdiction and issued a final
judgment.
B. Cause of Acbion

To

action

determine

for

substance,

res
and

Rodemaker, 2024

whether

judicata
not

F.3d

marks

"'We

same

cases

purposes,
form,

involve

the
of

the

two

same

cause

concerns

of

""the

proceedings."

Trustmark Ins, v.

1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002)) (quotation
ask

whether

the

nucleus of operative facts, or

factual predicate."

the

inquiry

WL 3643133, at *9 (quoting

ESLU, Inc., 299
omitted).

the

two

claims

are

"arise

based

out of the

upon

the

same

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted

and alterations adopted).

"When a court enters judgment on the

merits, the effect of the judgment extends to the litigation of
12

all

issues

whether

relevant

or

not

to

raised

the

same

claim

at trial."

between

Simplis

v.

the

JP

parties,

Morgan

Chase

Bank, No. CV 417-183, 2018 WL 11217094, at *2 {S.D. Ga. May 22,

2018) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng^g & Mach.,
Inc.,

575

F.2d

530,

535

(5th

Cir.

1978))

marks omitted and alteration adopted).

(internal

quotation

''Causes of action share

a nucleus of operative fact if 'the same facts are involved in
both

cases,

so

that

the

present

claim

effectively litigated with the prior one.'"
3643133,
F.3d

at

882,

*9

(quoting

893 (11th

Cir.

Lobo

v.

Celebrity

2013)); see

also

could

have

been

Rodemaker, 2024 WL
Cruises,

Inc.,

N.A.A.C.P.

v.

704

Hunt,

891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Res judicata applies not

only to the precise legal theory presented in the prior case,
but to all legal theories and
nucleus

claims arising out of the same

of operative fact." (citation

omitted)).

But if full

relief was unavailable in the prior case, res judicata will not
bar the second.

Plaintiff

Id. (citation omitted).

only

brought

an

Open

Records

Act

claim

in

Superior Court, yet Defendants argue she pled and attempted to
place at issue the facts she contends demonstrate discrimination

and

retaliation.

(Doc.

45,

at

15.)

Defendants

argue

a

comparison of the pleadings here and the Superior Court action
demonstrate the facts were identically pled in both cases.

at 15-17.)

(Id.

They argue "Plaintiff placed at issue almost every
13

one

of those facts at the [Superior Court trial] in

final judgment was rendered."

(Id. at 17.)

which

a

Defendants assert

Plaintiff cannot now plead claims she could have asserted, but
chose not to, in the Superior Court action arising out of the
same facts.

(Id. at 18.)

In response. Plaintiff argues none of the rights and issues
in the two cases are identical, so Defendants failed to show her

claims

are

barred

by

res

many

of

the

acknowledges

judicata.

(Doc.

allegations

in

48,

the

at

two

11.)

She

suits

are

similar but argues the causes of actions are based on different
allegations of misconduct.

the

misconduct

in

the

(Id. at 11-12.)

Superior

Court

Plaintiff asserts

action

was

the

School

District's failure to respond to the Open Records Act request,

but here, it is Defendants' failure to grant her professional
advancement

opportunities

similarly

situated

argument

is

constitute
Pleming

v.

that

separate

white

and

employment

privileges

counterparts.

'Ms]eparate
causes

of

Universal-Rundle

(Id.)

allegations

action."

Corp.,

142

F.3d

her

Plaintiff's

of

(Id.

like

at

1354

misconduct
12

(citing

(11th

Cir.

1998)).)
The

Court

must

determine

whether

this

^^case

arises

out

of

the same nucleus of operative facts, or is based up on the same
factual predicate, as [the] former action."

TVPX ARS, Inc., 959

F.3d at 1325 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

14

The Court

finds the claims in both the Superior Court action and here grow

out of the same nucleus of operative facts - the alleged racial
discrimination

Plaintiff

faced

at

the

District and those involved with it.

hands

of

the

School

While the Superior Court

action involved a violation of the Open Records Act, it involved
records

Plaintiff

retaliation

The

claims.

Complaint and

both

recap

sought
Those

the

to

support

are

the

exact

complaint in

Plaintiff's

career

her

and

claims

asserted

the Superior
the

history of unlawful discrimination.

discrimination

School

and
here.

Court action

District's

long

(Doc. 40; Doc. 45-1.)

The

Superior Court complaint rehashes the same events that serve as
the basis of this Complaint - including Plaintiff's desire to be
hired as Superintendent, not being considered for the job, and
submitting a complaint of discrimination to the BOE after they
failed to interview her and hired someone else.

7-10.)

(Doc. 45-1, at

While the Superior Court action dealt with the School

District's

failure

to

produce

responsive

documents

to

Plaintiff's Open Records requests, she alleged they did so ^'in
an

effort

to

hide

their

overt

retaliation

against

[Plaintiff]."

(Id. at 12.)

same

of

nucleus

acts

African

operative

of

race

American

discrimination

employees

and

like

In this case. Plaintiff asserts the

facts,

outlining

her

throughout her long tenure with the School District.

treatment
(Doc. 40.)

The biggest difference between the allegations in this Complaint
15

and

the

Superior

Superior
Court

Court

findings

complaint
and

is

that

evidence

as

she

includes

support

allegations of discrimination and retaliation here.
27-30.)

for

the
her

(Doc 40, at

Beyond these additions, the Complaint contains almost

identical allegations of Plaintiff's treatment.

''"Res judicata

applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the
prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of
the

same

3643133,

nucleus
at

*9

of

operative

(citation

and

fact."

Rodemaker,

quotation

marks

2024

omitted).

WL
The

claims here arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact as
the Superior Court action, thus making them the same cause of
action for res judicata purposes.
Plaintiff

tries

to

argue

she

could

not

have

raised

her

present claims in her prior suit because she did not yet have

evidence

of race

suspicions,
Superior
racial

and

Court

discrimination
she

did

compelled

discrimination.

Furthermore,

she

argues

not

and

retaliation, she

possess

defendants
(Doc.

48,

she

the

to
at

had

evidence

turn
4;

not

over

Doc

yet

only had
until

evidence

53-2,

at

exhausted

the
of

5-6.)

her

administrative remedies because her EEOC charge was and is still
pending.

(Doc. 48, at 4; Doc. 53-2, at 6.)

Defendants argue

these assertions are irrelevant to the disposition of the res
judicata arguments.

(Doc. 55, at 5-6.)

16

The

not

Court is

having

Superior

the

by Plaintiff s argument about

relevant evidence

Court

Plaintiffs

not persuaded

case.

Complaint

(See Doc. 45-1.)

As

until the

outlined

matches

her

conclusion

above,

the

Superior

of the

majority

Court

of

complaint.

The extra allegations in this Complaint citing

the Superior Court Judge's ruling do not change the nature of
the

allegations.

suit,

would

evidence
arguments

Discovery,

have

given

necessary
are

to

conducted

Plaintiff
prove

insufficient

her

the

after
avenue

claims.

justification

the
to

initiating
uncover

Thus,
for

why

the

Plaintiffs
she

did

not

bring these claims in Superior Court.
As to the EEOC charge, the Eleventh Circuit has ^^held that
the fact a plaintiff did not have when [s]he filed [her] first

lawsuit a right to sue letter that was necessary for the claim
[s]he raised in [her] second lawsuit does not prevent it from
being barred by res judicata."
*10

(citing

Jang

v.

(11th Cir. 2000)).
not

have

brought

her

United

Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at

Techs.

Corp., 206

F.3d

1147,

1149

Thus, Plaintiffs argument that she could
discrimination

and

retaliation

claims

in

Superior Court because she did not yet have her EEOC right to
sue letter is irrelevant to the Court's analysis.

Therefore,

the Court finds the cause of actions the same for res judicata
purposes and turns to the parties' similarity.

17

C. Parties

For res judicata to apply, both lawsuits must involve the
same parties or ones in privity with them.
3643133,

at

*7.

District are

Defendants

parties to both

argue

school

board

Plaintiff

actions, so the

same for res judicata purposes.
individual

Rodemaker, 2024 WL
and

the

parties are

(Doc. 45, at 19.)

members

and

School

the

the

As to the

superintendent,

Defendants argue they are in privity with the School District,
the

named

defendant

in

Superior

Court.

(Id.

at

20.)

In

response. Plaintiff asserts the individual Defendants could not

have

been

were

not

included

responsible

responsive records.

The

in

Eleventh

the

under

Superior

the

Court

Open

action

Records

because

Act

to

they

produce

(Doc. 48, at 14.)

Circuit

has

defined

privity

^'somewhat

circularly . . . as the relationship between one who is a party
of

record

and

a

nonparty

that

is

sufficiently

close

so

a

judgment for or against the party should bind or protect the
nonparty."

Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (quoting Hunt, 891

F.2d at 1560) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme

Court has a non-exhaustive list of factors that favor a finding
of privity:

(1) the nonparty agreed to be bound by the litigation
of others; (2) a substantive legal relationship
existed between the person to be bound and a party to
the
judgment;
(3)
the
nonparty
was
adequately
represented by someone who was a party to the suit;
18

(4) the nonparty assumed control over the litigation
in

which

the

judgment

was

issued;

(5)

a

party

attempted to relitigate issues through a proxy; or (6)
a statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by
nonlitigants.
Id. {citations omitted).

The Superior Court action was filed by Plaintiff against
Charlton

County

Schools

Defendant here.

(Doc.

School District are the

Defendants
Lairsey,
Matthew

here

that

—

the

45-1,
same

were

at 2.)

in

named

as

Plaintiff and

a

the

But there are additional

the

Curtis

District

Thus,

Parties.

not

the Superintendent;

School

Superior

Nixon,

P. Sands, member of BOE; John

Court

member

of

action:
BOE;

Dr.

Canaday, member of BOE;

Lucille Hannans, member of BOE; and Pender Lloyd, member of BOE.
(Doc.

40,

at

4-6.)

Defendants

argue

the

superintendent

and

individual BOE members are in privity with the School District,
thus

satisfying the

Defendants

argue

superintendent

color

of

and

law" as

School District.

res

judicata

Plaintiff's

allegations

individual

agents,

element.

BOE

members

employees,

(Id. at 21.)

In

or

(Doc.

45, at 20.)

against
were

board

response.

both

taken

members

the

''under

of

the

Plaintiff again

argues that the individual Defendants could not have been part
of the Open Record claim because they had no duty to produce
responsive records.

(Doc. 48, at 14.)

She asserts that because

the conduct at issue is different, the individual Defendants are

not in privity with the School District.

19

(Id.)

While the' Court agrees with Plaintiff that the individual
Defendants were not parties in the Superior Court action because
they were not liable under the Open Records Act, that does not
mean

she

could

not

have

included

them

as

defendants

if

she

brought discrimination and retaliation claims.

Thus, the Court

finds

to

this

individual

argument

without

Defendants

are

merit

in

and

privity

turns

with

the

whether

School

the

District

for res judicata purposes.
Plaintiff

lists

the

individual

Defendants

in

their

individual and official capacities, but then brings each claim

against them in their individual capacities only.
1,

30,

33,

alleged

their

to

36,
be

38.)

Defendants

operating

individual

as

argue

agents

capacities

as

and

that
under

agents,

(Doc. 40, at

since
color

^'they

were

of law

employees,

in

[and]

representatives of the School District, they are in privity with

the School District."

(Doc. 45, at 21 (citing Echeverria

v.

Bank of Am., N.A., 632 F. App'x 1006, 1008 (11th Cir. 2015)).)

Defendants assert the School District represented the interests
of

the

individual

Defendants

in

Superior

Court

because

it

objected and resisted the introduction of all evidence Plaintiff

claimed
They

demonstrated

argue

privity

discrimination
exists

because

and
the

retaliation.
individual

(Id.)

Defendants,

non-parties, were adequately represented by the School District,

a

party

to

the

suit.

(Doc.
20

52,

at

14

(citing

Taylor

v.

Sturqell, 553 U.S. 880, 894-95 (2008)).)

They also argue the

BOE members are responsible for and control litigation involving
the

School

District,

thus

on

that

privity with the School District.

basis

alone,

they

are

in

(Id. at 15.)

Claims against individuals in their official capacities are
generally

treated

as

a

claim

against the

entity.

Rodemaker,

2024 WL 3643133, at *7 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165-66

(1985)).

Although

Plaintiff

names

the

individual

Defendants in both their official and individual capacities in
the Complaint's caption, she brings the claims against them only
in their individual capacities.
38.)

(Doc. 40,

at

1,

30, 33,

36,

Thus, there is not automatic privity from suing them in

their official capacity.

See Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8.

Nevertheless,

finds

Defendants

the

and

Court

the

School

privity

District

between
because

the
the

individual
allegations

against the individual Defendants all pertain to actions taken
through their involvement with the School District and the BOE.
(Doc. 40, at 30-40.)

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, 'Mw]hen one party's
actions are legally another party's actions, those two parties
have the kind of substantive legal relationship that establishes
privity."
and

Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citation omitted

emphasis in original).

The

individual

Defendants are

School District's Superintendent and members of the BOE.

21

the

(Doc.

40, at 4-6.)
School

Plaintiff alleges the BOE made decisions for the

District,

including

hiring

KC&A

to

assist

in

the

Superintendent search, deciding who to interview, and ultimately
voting on the new

Superintendent.

also alleges the "School
including

against

She

District, by and through its agents,

Superintendent,

discriminated

(Id. at 19, 21, 24.)

and

her.

each

(Id.

at

member

30.)

of

Thus,

its

by

[BOE],"

her

own

allegations, the individual Defendants were agents of the School
District.

Although

Plaintiff

identifies

the

individual

Defendants in their individual capacities, she seeks liability
for actions they took on behalf of the BOE, and ultimately the
School District.

Plaintiff's allegations refer to actions the

individual Defendants took in their capacity as board members,
and only the BOE and School District, as entities, could take

those actions.

Based on these findings, the Court finds privity

exists because the individual Defendants' relationship with the
School District is so close as to border on "near identity."
Rodemaker, 2024 WL 3643133, at *8 (citing Harmon Indus., Inc. v.
Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999)).
D. Conclusion

Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

Court

finds

Defendants

met

their burden of showing this suit is barred by res judicata.
They showed the prior decision issued by the Superior Court was
rendered

by

a

court

of

competent
22

jurisdiction,

was

final,

involved
same

the

causes

(quoting

same
of

TVPX

parties

or

action.

ARS,

their

privies,

Rodemaker,

Inc.,

959

2024

F.3d

and

WL

at

involved

3643133,

1325).

the

at

As

*4

such.

Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 45) is
GRANTED.

E. Collateral Estoppel

In

argues

response

Defendants

whether

15.)

to

evidence

Defendants'

are
of

Defendants

motion

collaterally

race

argue

to

estopped

discrimination

the

dismiss.

Court

from

exists.

should

Plaintiff

relitigating
(Doc.

not

48,

consider

at

this

assertion because it is asserted without legal grounds and was
inappropriately raised in a response brief.

(Doc. 52, at 16-

17.)

Collateral

estoppel

prevents

parties

from

relitigating

issues which were actually litigated and decided in a previous
adjudication.

Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264-

65 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Because the Court finds

Plaintiff's claims barred by res judicata, it does not address
Plaintiff's collateral estoppel arguments.

IV. CONCLUSION

For

the

Defendants'

complaint

foregoing
motion

under

the

to

reasons,
dismiss

doctrine

of
23

IT

IS

HEREBY

Plaintiff's

res

judicata

ORDERED

second

(Doc.

that

amended

45)

is

GRANTED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all pending motions

and deadlines and CLOSE this case.

ORDER

ENTERED

at

Augusta,

Georgia,

this

September, 2024.

HONOp^BLE J.ORAND^ flALL
UNITmc&tTES DISTRICT JUDGE

SOUTHeS district of GEORGIA

24

day

of