Ojeda-Sanchez et al v. Bland Farms, LLC et al

Filing 331

ORDER stating that this Court enters judgment in the favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of thirteen thousand eighty dollars and eighteen cents. Defendant is liable to each individual plaintiff in the amounts listed in Doc. 330-2. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 6/16/2011. (loh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
DAVID OJEDA SANCHEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

6:08-cv-96

BLAND FARMS, LLC,
Defendant.
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are Mexican farm workers,
who are legally working in the United States
pursuant to Defendant Bland Farms’s
(“Defendant”) H-2A guest worker program.
Defendant runs a large onion planting and
harvesting operation. Plaintiffs assert
several claims against Defendant for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq, and
for breach of contract. See Doc. 119.
A bench trial was held, and the Court
makes the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See F ED. R. C IV. P.
52(a) (requiring the court to separately set
out its findings of fact and conclusions of
law).
II. FACTS
The employment relationships between
Plaintiffs and Defendant are governed by the
H-2A program requirements, and the terms
set forth in job clearance orders that
Defendant filed with the Department of
Labor (“DOL”) each season. The parties
agree that the H-2A clearance orders

constitute valid contracts between Plaintiffs
and Defendant. See, e.g., Doc. 119, ¶ 22
(“The terms and conditions in the job order
become an employment contract between
the employer and employee.”); and Doc.
137, ¶ 22 (admitting same). See also
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d
1228, 1233 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002). These
contracts provided for Plaintiffs to be paid
on a piece-rate basis that rewarded them for
planting or harvesting more onions, but in
no event could they be paid less than the
adverse effect wage rate (“AEWR”). This
rate is prescribed by the DOL to prevent the
market wage from falling below that which
a domestic employee might expect for a
certain type of work.
There are ten clearance orders at issue in
this case, all of which provide that
Defendant was to pay workers the greater of
the AEWR and the federal minimum wage.
See Doc. 319 at 2; Doc. 320 at 4-5. The
evidence established that, in each case, the
AEWR was the higher rate. See Doc. 320 at
5. In the clearance orders, Defendant also
agreed to comply with applicable federal,
state, and local employment-related laws
and regulations, including the FLSA
minimum wage provisions. See Doc. 319 at
3.
The operative complaint in this action
includes six claims for relief: (1) violation
of FLSA minimum wage provisions; (2)
breach of contract for failure to pay contract
wage; (3) breach of contract for failure to
pay travel expenses; (4) violation of FLSA
anti-retaliation provisions; (5) violation of
contract anti-retaliation provisions; and (6)
breach of contract for failure to pay federal
minimum wage. See Doc. 119.

These claims can be generally
categorized as wage claims, travel claims,
and retaliation claims. Plaintiffs argue they
are entitled to damages in connection with
both the planting and harvesting seasons in
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. See id.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s staff
accountant, Therese Bouwense
(“Bouwense”) knew some Plaintiffs traveled
for more than 2.5 days. See Doc. 319 at 19
(citing Tr. Vol. I at 124). But Bouwense’s
testimony was actually that it took Plaintiffs
a maximum of 38 hours, or 1.6 days, to
reach Bland Farms from their homes in
Mexico, unless they “stopped by and saw
somebody they knew on their way to
Monterrey, I guess.” See Tr. Vol. I at 12425.

Before the start of each planting or
harvesting season, the workers travel from
their hometowns in Mexico to Bland Farms
by way of Monterrey. Once they arrive at
Bland Farms, the Plaintiffs participate in an
orientation session, at which they are
required to report any reimbursable
expenses for their travel. See Def. Ex. Q;
Tr. Vol. I at 127; Tr. Vol. IV at 102.

In addition, Defendant built in
protections to ensure that each worker was
given the opportunity to claim all
appropriate expenses. At orientation, each
worker signed a form, that was available in
both English and Spanish, directing the
workers to submit receipts for any
unaccounted for expenses. See Tr. Vol. I at
286, 289; Tr. Vol. II at 56 (Raul MoralesMorales reading in Spanish, the following
statement from the document signed by
workers: “I expressly affirm that I have
reported all my expenses to Bland Farms
and that these are the only expenses I have
incurred to come to work at Bland Farms.”);
Tr. Vol. IV at 102-3 (Bouwense testified
that the following language was included on
reimbursement forms in Spanish and
English: “I understand that I have the right
to claim additional expenses that I can verify
with documentation in my possession.”).

First, Defendant advanced subsistence
payments to Plaintiffs at orientation,
according to the federally mandated rate,
based on two and one half (2.5) days of
travel. See Tr. Vol. I at 124.
Plaintiffs argue that they traveled for
more than 2.5 days in order to reach Bland
Farms. See Tr. Vol. I at 279-80. The
evidence was contradictory on this point.
For example, Florencio Cortez Gonzalez
testified that the trip took him a total of
approximately five days. See Tr. Vol. I at
216-17. But Esteban Martinez-Hernandez
later testified that he traveled ten hours to
Monterrey, and an additional twenty-four
hours to Bland Farms. See Tr. Vol. II at 25.
Even with an overnight stay in Monterrey,
this time would not exceed the 2.5 day
reimbursement.

Such claims were seldom made. See
e.g., Tr. Vol. I at 286, 289 (Javier Guerrero
Carrillo testified that he did not present
receipts for the additional expenses he
claims should have been reimbursed, and
acknowledged that the reimbursement
receipt that he signed includes language

No substantive evidence other than the
unreliable testimony of a few individuals
was presented to corroborate the alleged
length of each worker’s travel.

2

directing him to turn in any supplemental
receipts he has from the trip.). But
Defendant presented evidence that when
proper requests were received, additional
compensation was given. See, e.g., Tr. Vol.
II at 99 (Crescencio Hernandez-Martinez
testified that he complained about
compensation twice in 2008, and was given
further reimbursement both times).

per person, and that he never turned in
receipts).
Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to establish
that their expenses for bus fare exceeded the
amounts Defendant reimbursed. Testimony
showed that Defendant gave additional
compensation whenever employees
presented receipts, but that Plaintiffs rarely
claimed any additional bus
fare
reimbursement. See Tr. Vol. I at 119-21.

In addition to the subsistence payments,
Plaintiffs sought to prove entitlement to
reimbursement for a hotel stay in Monterrey,
Mexico. Bouwense testified that Defendant
reimburses hotel costs for workers who stay
overnight in Monterrey during their trip to
Bland Farms. See Tr. Vol. I at 126. Before
2007, the immigration processing in
Monterrey did not require an overnight stay.
See id. at 125. When the process changed,
requiring two days in Monterrey, the
workers began turning in receipts for hotel
expenses. See id. at 127. Workers were also
given the opportunity, as with subsistence
pay, to request supplemental hotel
reimbursement. See id.

Aside from the expenses reported at the
orientation, Plaintiffs are entitled to payment
for the time spent at the orientation session
itself. As a rule, Defendant credited
Plaintiffs with one hour’s pay for orientation
each season. See Tr. Vol. IV at 122. But
testimony showed that Plaintiffs were
required to be present for far longer. See Tr.
Vol. I at 196; Tr. Vol. II at 8, 79. At these
sessions, Plaintiffs were required to watch
instructional videos, listen to a presentation
by the field supervisor, and complete
paperwork. See Tr. Vol. IV at 122-23.
Plaintiffs testified they had to wait long
periods of time before they were able to
discuss their paperwork with Defendant’s
staff. See Tr. Vol. I at 196; Tr. Vol. II at 8,
79. The Court finds that Plaintiffs were
required to report to orientation for an
average of two and one half (2.5) hours each
season.

Plaintiffs failed to present any receipts
establishing the fact and cost of the hotel
stays. Compare Tr. Vol. I at 237 (Florencio
Cortez Gonzalez testified, but presented no
documentation, that the hotel cost varied
depending on the number of people in the
room, but fell within the range of 120 to 150
pesos per worker), with Tr. Vol. II at 14, 1920 (Esteban Martinez-Hernandez testified
that hotel costs totaled between 70 and 100
pesos per worker depending on the hotel,
and admitted that he never turned in receipts
for the years addressed in this lawsuit), and
id. at 41, 55 (Raul Morales-Morales testified
to hotel costs of between 160 and 180 pesos

During Plaintiffs’ time at Bland Farms,
Defendant provided housing in several
barracks-style dormitories and manufactured
homes. See Tr. Vol. IV at 38-39. Defendant
is entitled to a credit taken against Plaintiffs’
compensation for housing, but the parties
dispute the value of the housing, and
therefore, the amount of the credit.
3

Defendant called Jack Eugene Gibson
(“Gibson”), a certified real property
appraiser, to testify as to the rental value of
these accommodations. See id. at 36-59.
After assessing a number of comparable
properties, Gibson appraised the fair rental
value of Defendant’s housing at fifty dollars
($50) per week. See id. at 46. The primary
basis for his valuation was that Defendant’s
facilities were superior, in quality and
location, to a similar barracks-style unit that
charged migrant workers thirty five dollars
($35) per week. See id. at 41.

of that. I want [the] record to be clear on
that.”).
The evidence at trial showed that
Defendant’s field supervisors, Nahum
Ornelas (“Ornelas”) and Jose Lopez Gomez
(“Lopez”), did not begin counting Plaintiffs’
work time upon arrival at the fields, but
instead waited until Plaintiffs actually began
planting or harvesting onions. See Pl. Ex.
46 at 21 (Lopez Dep. Designations); Tr. Vol.
I at 177; Tr. Vol. V at 46. Many mornings,
Plaintiffs began the day sitting on the buses
at the fields awaiting word that the fields
were dry enough to begin work. See Pl. Ex.
46 at 21-22.

Plaintiffs argued that Gibson’s estimate
was excessive, but did not present a rebuttal
expert. Rather, Plaintiffs relied on thin
evidence, such as a newspaper ad for rental
property, see id. at 54-55, and a contract
valuing farm worker housing at ten dollars
($10) per worker without specifying any
covered time period, see id. at 53.

In calculating Plaintiffs’ pay, Defendant
also excluded the time that Plaintiffs spent
waiting for the buses to take them home, or
for the field supervisor to tally each group’s
production. See Pl. Ex. 46 at 37-39; Tr. Vol.
V at 43. And, Ornelas and Lopez arbitrarily
altered stop times at the end of the day to
compensate for unrecorded breaks they
thought Plaintiffs took throughout the day.
See Pl. Ex. 46 at 25-26; Tr. Vol. V at 35.

Plaintiffs’ central claim is that
Defendant’s pay records are inaccurate and
grossly under-represent their true
compensable time. See Tr. Vol. III at 19
(Plaintiffs argue that there is an average
deficiency in recorded hours of
approximately 2.4 hours per day, per
worker). Plaintiffs showed that indeed
Defendant’s time records are inaccurate.
Initially, Plaintiffs sought to establish that
Defendant deliberately forged pay records in
order to systematically underpay piece-rate
workers. See Tr. Vol. II at 137 (Testimony
of Plaintiffs’ expert George Rivero). But
Plaintiffs then abandoned this tactic and
rescinded their deliberate hours-fixing
allegations. See Tr. Vol. IV at 78 (“We are
saying that the hours are inaccurate. We are
not alleging that there is an intentional doing

Plaintiffs argued that the Court should
use the field working hours recorded for bus
drivers who also served as field walkers as a
proxy for the hours Plaintiffs actually
worked. Field walkers are intermediate
supervisors who assist the field supervisors
in monitoring Plaintiffs and setting up the
fields for work each day. See Tr. Vol. V at
7-18. Bus drivers transport Plaintiffs to and
from the fields each day. See id. at 18-25.
Some workers served as both bus drivers
and field walkers. See id. at 26. These
individuals were separately compensated for
their bus driving time.
4

Plaintiffs argued that because these field
walkers brought Plaintiffs to the fields in the
morning, watched them plant or harvest
onions during the day, and then took them
back to the barracks at the end of the day,
their hours recorded for working the fields
represented the hours for which Plaintiffs
should have been compensated. If this were
true, Plaintiffs would be correct. But all
field walkers had duties above and beyond
supervising Plaintiffs that required them to
work longer hours. See Doc. 320 at 13.

Plaintiffs also offered personal time
recordings from two workers as substitutes
for Defendant’s inadequate records. See Tr.
Vol. II at 33-34; Pl. Ex. 47. But these
recordings were inconsistent, self-serving,
and anecdotal. See id. They do not provide
a sound basis for calculating Plaintiffs’
compensable time.
Although the Court does not accept the
field walker/bus driver hours as an adequate
proxy for Plaintiffs’ hours, the Court finds
that Defendant’s records undercounted
Plaintiffs compensable time by thirty (30)
minutes of work time per day.

The field walkers’ field walking time
consisted of more than merely supervising
Plaintiffs. See Tr. Vol. V at 23-25. The
field walkers/bus drivers had to prepare the
buses for the day, call Plaintiffs to tell them
when they would arrive, drive Plaintiffs to
and from the fields, as well make stops at
convenience stores en route. See id.

Additionally, Defendant’s field
supervisors automatically deducted one hour
for a lunch break each day regardless of how
long the employee actually stopped working.
See Pl. Ex. 46 at 26-27; Tr. Vol. IV at 7; Tr.
Vol. V at 48 (Nahum Ornelas testified that
he did not record the beginning of the lunch
period, the end of the lunch period, or the
actual time that was taken for lunch.).
Plaintiffs presented convincing evidence that
the workers often continued planting or
harvesting for a substantial part of the lunch
hour in order to increase their piece-rate pay.
See Tr. Vol. I at 200-01; Tr. Vol. II at 9-10.
The Court finds that the workers took an
average of fifteen minutes for lunch. See
e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 33 (Raul Morales-Morales
testified that he kept a pocket watch to keep
time for his lunch break, and that the
workers typically took a 10 to 15 minute
break). Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to
compensation for an additional forty-five
minutes each day.

Those field workers who did not drive
buses, but whose hours closely resembled
those who did, also had additional duties
beyond the time Plaintiffs were in the fields.
See Tr. Vol. V at 7-12. In the planting
season, they had to measure the rows to be
planted, retrieve unplanted plants from the
day before, and distribute new plants. See
id. In the harvest season, they had to set up
bins into which the onions were loaded. See
id. In both seasons, they had to fill water
coolers, deliver them throughout the fields,
assess field conditions, report those
conditions back to the field supervisor, and
clean trash out of the fields. See id.
Plaintiffs were not present while these duties
took place and thus did not work the same
number of hours as either type of field
walkers. See id. at 7.

The Court further concludes that the
inaccuracies in Defendant’s records exist
5

despite a good faith effort on Defendant’s
part to record hours properly. Plaintiffs
argued that Defendant failed to train its
timekeepers on the FLSA’s requirements.
See Tr. Vol. IV at 80.

them. See Jones v. Ala. Power Co., 282 F.
App’x 780, 785 (11th Cir. 2008).
III. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
As an initial matter, the Court finds that
a six-year statute of limitations applies to all
contract claims, and a two-year statute of
limitations applies to all FLSA claims.

Bouwense testified to the detailed
accounting system Defendant set up to
maintain workers’ hours. See Tr. Vol. IV at
67. The field supervisors made records of
Plaintiffs’ hours worked on a daily basis.
See id. Bouwense reviewed these records
and input them into Defendant’s payroll
records soon thereafter. See id. Bouwense
then provided each employee with a weekly
tabulation of their hours and requested that
they review the document for correctness.
See id. at 69-70. Employees objected to
their recorded hours on at least two
occasions and Bouwense promptly corrected
the errors and reimbursed them. See id. at
105-09; see also Tr. Vol. II at 99
(Crescencio Hernandez-Martinez testified
that he complained twice about his pay and
was reimbursed both times). Defendant had
a subjective, good faith belief that it had
systems in place to abide by its FLSA
requirements and any violations were
negligent at worst.

A. Contract Claims
As this Court has previously held, a sixyear statute of limitations applies to the
contract claims in this case. See Doc. 264 at
17. See also Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon
Produce Farms, Inc., 2006 WL 140590, at
*3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2006) (holding that a
six-year statute of limitations governs
alleged breach of an H-2A contract between
employer and employee).
B. FLSA Claims
Generally, FLSA claims are subject to a
two-year statute of limitations. See 29
U.S.C. § 255(a). That period is extended to
three years if a cause of action arises out of a
willful violation of the FLSA. See id.
To establish willfulness, Plaintiffs must
show that an employer “either knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the
statute.” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,
486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988). If an employer
acts unreasonably but not recklessly in
determining its legal obligation under the
FLSA, then its actions should not be
considered willful, and the two-year statute
of limitations should be applied. Lockaby v.
Top Source Oil Analysis, Inc., 998 F. Supp.
1469, 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1998). Plaintiffs have
failed to establish the requisite knowledge or
recklessness.

Finally, Plaintiffs Raul MoralesMorales, Arturo Morales-Morales, and
Oscar Antonio Morales-Ramirez claim that
they were barred from returning to
Defendant’s farm in retaliation for filing this
suit. The evidence showed that they failed
to even apply for work in the 2007 and 2008
planting seasons. See Tr. Vol. II at 52, 70;
Doc. 320 at 36 (citing Arturo MoralesMorales Dep. at 42). Thus, the Court finds
that Defendant did not retaliate against

6

Initially, Plaintiffs sought to establish
that Defendant deliberately forged pay
records in order to systematically underpay
piece-rate workers. See Tr. Vol. II at 137
(Testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert George
Rivero). But Plaintiffs then abandoned this
tactic and rescinded their deliberate hoursfixing allegations. See Tr. Vol. IV at 78
(“We are saying that the hours are
inaccurate. We are not alleging that there is
an intentional doing of that. I want [the]
record to be clear on that.”).

Any breach by Defendant was not
willful. The FLSA’s two-year statute of
limitations governs Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.
IV. FLSA WAGE CLAIMS

“The protections of the minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA indisputably apply”
to Plaintiffs. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms,
LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b) (2002)
(“During the period for which the temporary
alien agricultural labor certification is
granted, the employer shall comply with
applicable federal, State, and local
employment-related laws and regulations
. . .”).

Plaintiffs now maintain that Defendant
was “on notice of their FLSA obligations
because they have defended themselves
against at least six lawsuits or claims over
the last sixteen years brought on behalf of
migrant farm workers in Defendant’s
employ, including one lawsuit brought by
the DOL.” See Doc. 157 at 20. Defendant,
meanwhile, points out that “of the serial
claims that Georgia Legal Services have
[sic] brought against them, . . . there has not
been a single finding of an FLSA violation.”
Doc. 192 at 14. Defendant urges that “[t]he
mere fact that an unsuccessful claim is
brought against a company does not
establish knowledge or a reckless disregard
for the matter of whether the company’s
practices violate the FLSA,” and “[t]he
correct question is whether Defendants
knew or exhibited a reckless disregard for
the matter of whether they violated the
FLSA.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ wage claims include four subissues: (1) whether Defendant properly
recorded the start and end of work each day;
(2) whether Defendant properly accounted
for Plaintiffs’ lunch time; (3) whether
Defendant compensated Plaintiffs for the
correct amount of time spent in orientation
at the beginning of each season; and (4) the
amount of the housing credit to which
Defendant is due in the final calculation of
compensation.
This section examines whether
Defendant properly recorded all of
Plaintiffs’ compensable time. The FLSA
requires Defendant to pay Plaintiffs the
minimum wage times those hours (minus
any wage credits). Section IX examines
whether Defendant breached this
requirement and what, if any, damages it
owes Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have failed to show any
reckless disregard. Bouwense detailed
Defendant’s accounting system and the
employees’
opportunity
correct
to
Defendant’s records. See Tr. Vol. IV at 6770.

“Compensable hours worked within the
meaning of the FLSA include . . . time
during which employees are required to be
present at the work site but must wait to
7

work or must wait to satisfy the procedures
imposed by the employer (e.g., inspection of
groves).” Wales v. Jack M. Berry, Inc., 192
F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 1999);
see also Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970
F.2d 802, 807 (11th Cir. 1992) (waiting time
is compensable where “the time is spent
predominately for the employer’s benefit”)
Compensable time also includes periodic
short breaks.

negative the reasonableness of the
inference to be drawn from the
employee’s evidence. If the employer
fails to produce such evidence, the
court may then award damages to the
employee, even though the result be
only approximate.

Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328
U.S. 680, 687-688 (1946), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in IBP,
Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 41 (2005).

Rest periods of short duration,
running from 5 minutes to about 20
minutes, are common in industry.
They promote the efficiency of the
employee and are customarily paid
for as working time. They must be
counted as hours worked.
Compensable time of rest periods
may not be offset against other
working time such as compensable
waiting time or on-call time.

A. Inaccurate Records

The FLSA obligates every employer to
“make, keep, and preserve such records of
the persons employed by him and of the
wages, hours, and other conditions and
practices of employment maintained by
him....” 29 U.S.C. § 211(c).
H-2A regulations have a comparable
requirement:

29 C.F.R. § 785.18.

The employer must keep accurate
and adequate records with respect
to the workers’ earnings, including
but not limited to field tally
records, supporting summary
payroll records, and records
showing the nature and amount of
the work performed; the number of
hours of work offered each day by
the employer; . . . the hours actually
worked each day by the worker; the
time the worker began and ended
each workday; the rate of pay (both
piece rate and hourly, if
applicable); the worker’s earnings
per pay period; . . . and the amount
of and reasons for any and all
deductions taken from the worker’s
wages.

In determining the proper compensable
time, the Supreme Court has held that:
Where the employer’s records are
inaccurate or inadequate and the
employee cannot offer convincing
substitutes . . . an employee has
carried out his burden if he proves
that he has in fact performed work for
which he was improperly
compensated and if he produces
sufficient evidence to show the
amount and extent of that work as a
matter of just and reasonable
inference. The burden then shifts to
the employer to come forward with
evidence of the precise amount of
work performed or with evidence to
8

exactness and precision of
measurement that would be possible
had he kept records in accordance
with the requirements of § 11(c) of
the Act. And even where the lack of
accurate records grows out of a bona
fide mistake as to whether certain
activities or non-activities constitute
work, the employer, having received
the benefits of such work, cannot
object to the payment for the work
on the most accurate basis possible
under the circumstances. Nor is such
a result to be condemned by the rule
that precludes the recovery of
uncertain and speculative damages.
That rule applies only to situations
where the fact of damage is itself
uncertain. But here we are assuming
that the employee has proved that he
has performed work and has not been
paid in accordance with the statute.
The damage is therefore certain. The
uncertainty lies only in the amount of
damages arising from the statutory
violation by the employer. In such a
case “it would be a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice to
deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his
acts.” It is enough under these
circumstances if there is a basis for a
reasonable inference as to the extent
of the damages.

20 C.F.R. § 655.122(j)(1).
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
Defendant’s records are inaccurate.
Defendant’s field supervisors, Ornelas and
Gomez, admitted to numerous shortcuts,
omissions, and estimates in their records.
See Pl. Ex. 46 at 21; Doc. 320 at 26-27.
Defendant’s time records cannot serve as the
basis for deciding Plaintiffs’ compensable
time.
B. Convincing Substitutes
Plaintiffs argued that the Court should
use the field working hours recorded for bus
drivers who also served as field walkers as a
proxy for the hours Plaintiffs actually
worked. But these field walkers had duties
above and beyond supervising Plaintiffs that
required them to work longer hours. See
Doc. 320 at 13. Their hours are not a
convincing substitute for accurate records of
Plaintiffs’ compensable time.
Plaintiffs also offered personal time
recordings from two workers. See Doc. 318
at 3. But these exhibits also failed to
provide a sound basis for calculating
Plaintiffs’ compensable time.
Plaintiffs failed to establish a convincing
substitute for records showing the actual
hours they worked.
C. Just and Reasonable Inference
of Additional Compensation
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have provided
evidence to support a just and reasonable
inference of their right to some additional
compensable time.

Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688 (quoting
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931)).

The employer cannot be heard to
complain that the damages lack the
9

not simply ignore ten to fifteen minutes of
work it required of Plaintiffs each day.

1. Daily Hours
Plaintiffs are entitled to an additional
thirty (30) minutes of compensable field
working time per week for time they worked
either before Defendant began recording
time or after Defendant stopped recording.
As discussed above, Defendant admitted that
it did not begin counting the Plaintiffs’ time
when they arrived at the fields, see Pl. Ex.
46 at 21, stopped counting before Plaintiffs
left, see Doc. 320 at 26-27, and arbitrarily
deducted time for unrecorded breaks they
thought Plaintiffs took throughout the day,
see Doc. 319 at 6. Many of these breaks
were likely fully compensable. See 29
C.F.R. § 785.18.

While the exact amount of time
Plaintiffs were shorted is impossible to
precisely measure, this was through no fault
of their own. Plaintiffs performed work for
which Defendant did not pay them.
Plaintiffs have provided a basis for the
reasonable inference that they merit thirty
(30) extra minutes of compensable time for
each week they worked for Defendant.
2. Lunch
The Court finds that although Defendant
had an internal policy of required one hour
lunch breaks, Plaintiffs rarely, if ever, took
such a break. Plaintiffs showed, by a just
and reasonable inference, that they only took
an average of fifteen minutes for lunch. See
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687-688. Plaintiffs
are entitled to an additional forty-five (45)
minutes per day of compensable time for the
deducted time they actually worked.

Defendant contends that the time it
shorted Plaintiffs was de minimis. See Doc.
320 at 27 (arguing that even 10-15 minutes
per day is de minimis). But the de minimis
rule applies only where there are
uncertain and indefinite periods of
time involved of a few seconds or
minutes duration, and where the
failure to count such time is due to
considerations justified by industrial
realities. An employer may not
arbitrarily fail to count as hours
worked any part, however small, of
the employee’s fixed or regular
working time or practically
ascertainable period of time he is
regularly required to spend on duties
assigned to him.

Defendant did not present any evidence
that a set lunch hour was called at any time,
but only that Plaintiffs were required to take
one hour off at some point during the day.
Defendant argues that it should be able to
deduct one hour from Plaintiffs’ work hours
for this lunch hour, regardless of whether
they took the break. Plaintiffs argue that
they should be paid for all time spent
actually working.
Periods during which an employee is
completely relieved from duty and
which are long enough to enable him
to use the time effectively for his
own purposes are not hours worked.
He is not completely relieved from
duty and cannot use the time

29 C.F.R. § 785.47. Defendant has not
shown that any administrative impracticality
prevented it from counting this time. See
id.; Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d
1407, 1414 (5th Cir. 1990). Defendant may
10

effectively for his own purposes
unless he is definitely told in
advance that he may leave the job
and that he will not have to
commence work until a definitely
specified hour has arrived.

These regulations appear to point in
opposite directions. Defendant had reason
to know Plaintiffs were working during their
lunch hour because it happened in front of
the field walkers. But Defendant points the
Court to section 785.19’s use of the word
“required.” Because Plaintiffs were not
required to work during lunch, Defendant
argues the time is not compensable.
Plaintiffs point to sections 785.11 and
785.13’s focus on whether employees are
actually working.

29 C.F.R. § 785.16.
“Bona fide meal periods are not
worktime.” See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19. “In
order to be considered a bona fide meal
period, however, the regulations require
complete relief from duty: ‘The employee is
not relieved if he is required to perform any
duties, whether active or inactive, while
eating.’” See Kohlheim v. Glynn Cnty., 915
F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (1990)).

Thirty-seven years ago, the Northern
District of Georgia applied these regulations
to a similar fact pattern. See Clark v.
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886
(N.D. Ga. 1973). An Atlanta Journal
employee brought suit for his employer’s
failure to include lunch periods in overtime
computations. See id. at 891. Employees
were free to leave and were relieved of all
duties for one hour each day. See id. at 89192. Nonetheless the employee ate his lunch
at his desk while answering phones and
doing miscellaneous work. See id. at 891.
The court held that this lunch time was not
compensable work time because he had been
relieved of his duties. See id. at 892. It
dismissed 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 as
inapplicable because the cases the regulation
cited involved situations in which
employees were required to remain on duty
during break periods. See id. The court
then dismissed 29 C.F.R. § 785.13 because
it cited no decisional authority and the court
interpreted it to apply only to the same
situations where § 785.11 applied. See id.

“Work not requested but suffered or
permitted is work time. . . . The reason is
immaterial. The employer knows or has
reason to believe that he is continuing to
work and the time is work time.” See 29
C.F.R. § 785.11.
[I]t is the duty of management to
exercise its control and see that the
work is not performed if it does not
want it to be performed. It cannot sit
back and accept the benefits without
compensating for them. The mere
promulgation of a rule against such
work is not enough. Management
has the power to enforce the rule and
must make every effort to do so.
29 C.F.R. § 785.13; see also Reich v. Dep’t
of Conservation and Natural Res., 28 F.3d
1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 1994) (Employer
could not rest on policy statements that
overtime was prohibited).

Clark was decided before Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Post11

Chevron, courts are not free to so easily

advance that he may leave the job.” See id.;
Tr. Vol. V at 46-48.

dismiss the clear language of an agency’s
construction of a statute. See id. at 843.
Where Congress has not directly spoken to
the precise question at issue, the court must
follow the agency’s interpretation unless it is
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute. See id. at 843-44.

Even if both regulations did apply, 29
C.F.R. §§ 785.11 and 785.13 would carry
the day. Those regulations anticipate
possible conflicts between work rules
barring compensable activity and factual
scenarios where employees nonetheless
worked to their employer’s benefit. The
DOL has ruled that where such a conflict
exists, the employer “cannot sit back and
accept the benefits without compensating for
them.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.13; see also Reich,
28 F.3d at 1083. This ruling is neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor manifestly contrary
to the FLSA. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344.

The FLSA does not speak directly to the
issue of whether time spent working through
a designated lunch hour is compensable.
See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 785.13 does
directly address this case. Defendant had an
unenforced policy that required workers to
take a full hour off to eat lunch. But the
facts showed that Plaintiffs actually worked
an average of forty-five minutes of this hour.
Defendant “cannot sit back and accept
[these] benefits without compensating for
them.” See id. If it did not want to pay for
work performed during this lunch hour,
Defendant had a duty to see that work was
not performed. See id.

Defendant points to several other cases
finding that an employee’s lunch period is
not compensable time. See Doc. 320 at 2125. But these cases involve employees who
take a certain lunch period away from their
work stations, but must remain on call and
may be occasionally interrupted to deal with
some emergency. See, e.g., Bridges v.
Amoco Polymers, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1379 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (employees sued for
unpaid meal break where they were subject
to recall for emergencies); see also Myracle
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 55, at *5 (6th Cir.
1994) (mechanics sued for unpaid lunch
period where their breaks were occasionally
interrupted by emergencies).

Defendant argues that sections 785.16
and 785.19 also directly address this case
and make one hour a day not compensable
because Plaintiffs were officially relieved of
their duties and not required to work.
First, Defendant failed to prove 29
C.F.R. § 785.16 applies to this case.
Plaintiffs are not “relieved from duty . . .
unless [they are] definitely told in advance
that [they] may leave the job and that [they]
will not have to commence work until a
definitely specified hour has arrived.” See
id. Defendant admitted that there was no
specific lunch hour and it failed to prove that
each Plaintiff was “definitely told in

This case is different. Plaintiffs did not
suffer occasional interruptions to their lunch
break. They simply did not take a one hour
lunch.
In Kohlheim v. Glynn Cnty., 915 F.2d
1473 (11th Cir. 1990), the court held that the
12

plaintiff firefighters’ meal periods were
compensable because they were on call
during that time to respond to emergencies.
This case was different from Defendant’s on
call cases because a firefighter’s entire job is
to be on call to respond to emergencies. See
id. at 1477. Like the firefighters in
Kohlheim, Plaintiffs continued their ordinary
duties through their designated meal period
and should be compensated.

Therefore, they are entitled to an
additional one and one half (1.5) hours of
compensable time each season.
D. Defendant’s Burden
Where the employee “produces
sufficient evidence to show the amount and
extent of [their] work as a matter of just and
reasonable inference[, t]he burden then
shifts to the employer to come forward with
evidence of the precise amount of work
performed or with evidence to negative the
reasonableness of the inference to be drawn
from the employee’s evidence.” See
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688.

“[T]he essential consideration in
determining whether a meal period is a bona
fide meal period or a compensable rest
period is whether the employees are in fact
relieved from work for the purpose of eating
a regularly scheduled meal. . . . [W]hat
matters in meal period cases is whether the
employees are subject to real limitations on
their personal freedom which inure to the
benefit of their employer.” Kohlheim, 915
F.2d at 1477, 1477 n.19. Plaintiffs were not
in fact relieved from work during forty-five
minutes of their lunch hour. Plaintiffs spent
this time harvesting or planting onions
which inured entirely to the benefit of their
employer.

Defendant failed to produce any
evidence, apart from its inaccurate tally
sheets, that could prove the precise amount
of Plaintiffs’ work or negate their inference.
Because Defendant failed to produce such
evidence, the Court will award damages
where the wages Defendant paid fell below
the minimum pay required for the hours
worked established by Plaintiffs. See id.
E. Good Faith
Employees who prevail in a minimum
wage action are ordinarily entitled to recover
their unpaid wages as well as an equal
amount in liquidated damages. See 29
U.S.C. § 216(b). But if the employer shows
that it acted in good faith and “had
reasonable grounds for believing that [its]
act or omission was not a violation of the
[FLSA] . . . the court may, in its sound
discretion, award no liquidated damages.”
See 29 U.S.C. § 260; see also Spires v. Ben
Hill Cnty., 980 F.2d 683, 689 (11th Cir.
1993); Barcellona v. Tiffany English Pub,
Inc., 597 F.2d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1979). The
employer must prove that it had: (1) a

Forty-five minutes of Plaintiffs’ lunch
hour is compensable. The remaining fifteen
minutes were bona fide meal periods under
29 C.F.R. § 785.19.
3. Orientation
Defendant credited Plaintiffs with one
hour’s pay for orientation each season. But
testimony showed that Plaintiffs were
required to be present for an average of two
and one half (2.5) hours. See Tr. Vol. I at
196; Tr. Vol. II at 8, 79.

13

subjectively honest intention to ascertain
what the FLSA requires and to act in
accordance with it; and (2) objectively
reasonable grounds for believing that its
conduct comported with the FLSA. See
Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep ’t of Corrs., 942
F.2d 1562, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1991).

V. CONTRACT WAGE CLAIMS

Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant
breached the operative employment contract
for each season by failing to pay the proper
wages. In order to prove breach of the
employment contract, Plaintiffs must prove:
(1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach
of the contract, and (3) damages resulting
from the breach. See Bartholomew v. AGL
Resources, Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1338-1339
(11th Cir. 2004) (“The elements of a right to
recover for a breach of contract under
Georgia law are simply ‘the breach and the
resultant damages to the party who has the
right to complain about the contract being
broken.’”) (citing Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v.
Webb, 220 Ga. App. 278 (1996)).

Defendant acted in good faith. As
discussed above, Defendant’s field
supervisors made records of Plaintiffs’ hours
worked on a daily basis. See Tr. Vol. IV at
67. Bouwense reviewed these records and
input them into Defendant’s payroll records
soon thereafter. See id. She then consulted
the employees to check whether the
recorded hours were proper and corrected
any errors brought to her attention. See id.
at 105-09.

The parties’ H-2A clearance orders
constitute valid contracts between Plaintiffs
and Defendant. See Doc. 119, ¶ 22; Doc.
137, ¶ 22. There are ten clearance orders at
issue in this case, all of which provide that
Defendant was to pay workers the greater of
the AEWR and the federal minimum wage.
See Doc. 319 at 2; Doc. 320 at 4. The
evidence established that, in each case, the
AEWR was the higher rate. See Doc. 320 at
5. In the clearance orders, Defendant also
agreed to comply with applicable federal,
state, and local employment-related laws
and regulations. See Doc. 319 at 3.

The Court’s holding that these records
undercounted Plaintiffs’ hours in certain
respects does not preclude finding that
Defendant attempted to meet its obligations
in good faith. Defendant knew its
operations were governed by the FLSA and
subjectively believed it was abiding by the
law’s requirements. The safeguards it set up
provided Defendant an objectively
reasonable basis for this belief. As to its
automatic lunch deduction, Defendant was
relying on an analogous Northern District of
Georgia case. See Clark v. Atlanta
Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886 (N.D.
Ga. 1973). Defendant acted in good faith.

In order to determine whether Defendant
breached its contractual obligations, the
Court must decide whether the actual pay
received by each Plaintiff matched or
exceeded the appropriate number of hours,
multiplied by the AEWR. As previously
discussed, the Court has found that
Defendant under-represented Plaintiffs’

The Court elects to use its discretion to
withhold liquidated damages under these
circumstances, in the event Plaintiffs could
show an FLSA violation.

14

hours worked. The Court’s adjusted
calculation with regard to the FLSA claims
applies equally under the contract claims,
and Plaintiffs should be credited
accordingly. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(j)(1)
(requiring H-2A employers to keep the same
type of accurate time records as required by
the FLSA); Avery v. City of Talladega, 24
F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir. 1994) (“If a
violation of the FLSA has occurred, then a
violation of the contract, which incorporates
the FLSA, will have occurred as well.”).

entitled to a fifty dollar per week, per
worker housing credit.
VII. TRAVEL EXPENSES
If an expense incurred by an H-2A
worker is determined to be “primarily for
the benefit of the employer,” the employer
must reimburse the employee during the first
workweek in which the expense arose up to
the amount needed to comply with the
federal minimum wage laws. Arriaga v.
Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237
(11th Cir. 2002).

VI. HOUSING CREDIT

To determine whether costs were for the
benefit of the employer, the Court must
consider whether the employment related
cost is a personal expense that would arise
as a normal living expense, and whether the
cost is “incident of and necessary to the
employment.” Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 124143. If the cost is not a normal living
expense and was necessary for employment,
then the cost is incurred for the employer’s
benefit and should be reimbursed if wages
are brought below the FLSA minimum. See
id. at 1244.

As the Court has previously discussed at
length, Defendant is entitled to a reasonable
credit for the cost of housing provided to
Plaintiffs and other H-2A workers. See Doc.
264 at 18-20. “The only question that
remains is the amount of the § 203(m) wage
credit that Bland Farms may claim.” See id.
at 20.
At trial, Defendant proved, by way of
expert testimony, that the housing provided
to Plaintiffs should be valued at fifty dollars
($50) per week. See Tr. Vol. IV at 46.
Plaintiffs argued that fifty dollars per
week was an excessive credit for the type
and condition of the housing Defendant
provided. Plaintiffs did not present their
own expert testimony to rebut Gibson’s
opinion, and the thin evidence presented was
otherwise inadequate to demonstrate what a
preferable figure might be. See, e.g., id. at
53 (discussing a contract valuing farm
worker housing at $10 per worker without
specifying any covered time period).

The Court has already held that
transportation, lodging, and immigration
expenses (not including passport expenses)
are “Arriaga expenses” and should have
been reimbursed. See Doc. 264 at 9-10.
The only remaining factual issues are: (1)
whether Plaintiffs are entitled to additional
subsistence compensation, and (2) whether
Plaintiffs are entitled to additional
compensation for hotel costs.

The Court finds that, based on the
evidence presented at trial, Defendant is

Employers are required to pay H-2A
workers a subsistence amount equal to the

A. Subsistence Pay

15

cost of three meals for each day of travel to
the work site. See 20 CFR § 655.102(b)(5)
(2008); 73 Fed. Reg. 10289; see also, e.g.,
Doc. 108-2 at 17 (2004 H-2A Clearance
Order). Defendant advanced these payments
to Plaintiffs at orientation in amounts based
on two and one half (2.5) days of travel. See
Tr. Vol. I at 124.

admitted that he never turned in receipts),
and id. at 41, 55 (Raul Morales-Morales
testified to hotel costs of between 160 and
180 pesos per person, and that he never
turned in receipts).
The Court finds that the lack of receipts,
together with the inconsistent testimony,
fails to establish Plaintiffs’ claims for
additional lodging reimbursement.

Plaintiffs failed to establish how much
additional subsistence pay, if any, each
worker should have been given, and because
Defendant demonstrated that it has a
workable procedure for making
supplemental payments should employees
show it takes them longer than 2.5 days to
reach Bland Farms, Plaintiffs are not entitled
to recover any additional subsistence pay.

VIII. RETALIATION

“The FLSA protects persons against
retaliation for asserting their rights under the
statute. See Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200
F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs
were further protected from retaliation by
the
H-2A
contracts’
anti-retaliation
provisions. Plaintiffs Raul MoralesMorales, Arturo Morales-Morales, and
Oscar Antonio Morales-Ramirez (“the
Retaliation Plaintiffs”) alleged that they
were not rehired in the 2007 and 2008
planting seasons because of their FLSA
claims against Defendant. To prove an
FLSA retaliation claim, they must show:
“(1) [they] engaged in activity protected
under the act; (2) [they] subsequently
suffered adverse action by the employer; and
(3) a causal connection existed between the
employee’s activity and the adverse action.”

B. Hotel Costs

Plaintiffs also sought to prove
entitlement to reimbursement for a hotel stay
in Monterrey, Mexico. Bouwense testified
that Defendant reimburses hotel costs for
workers who stay overnight in Monterrey
during their trip to Bland Farms. See Tr.
Vol. I at 126. As with subsistence pay,
workers were given the opportunity, to
present receipts and request supplemental
reimbursement. See id.
Plaintiffs failed to present any receipts
establishing the fact and cost of the hotel
stays. Compare Tr. Vol. I at 237 (Florencio
Cortez Gonzalez testified, but presented no
documentation, that the hotel cost varied
depending on the number of people in the
room, but fell within the range of 120 to 150
pesos per worker), with Tr. Vol. II at 14, 19
(Esteban Martinez-Hernandez testified that
hotel costs totaled between 70 and 100 pesos
per worker depending on the hotel, and

See id.
The evidence showed that the
Retaliation Plaintiffs failed to apply for
work in the 2007 and 2008 planting seasons
because they feared they would not be
rehired. Defendant’s failure to hire workers
who did not apply for work is not an adverse
employment action. See Jones v. Ala.
Power Co., 282 F. App’x 780, 785 (11th
Cir. 2008). The Retaliation Plaintiffs failed
16

to establish a prima facie case of FLSA
retaliation.

(5) Plaintiffs are entitled to an additional
thirty (30) minutes of compensable
field working time per week for time
they worked either before Defendant
began their recorded time or after
Defendant stopped their recorded
time;

To prove a violation of their contractual
freedom from retaliation, the plaintiffs must
prove a “breach and the resultant damages to
the party who has the right to complain
about the contract being broken.” See Odem
v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 648, 654
(1998). Where the Retaliation Plaintiffs
cannot show that they even attempted reemployment, they did not prove a breach of
contract.

(6) Plaintiffs for whom Defendant
automatically deducted one hour for
lunch are entitled to an additional
forty-five (45) minutes per day of
compensable time;
(7) Defendant is entitled to take a fifty
dollar ($50) per week per plaintiff
housing credit for the housing it
provided Plaintiffs; and

IX. DAMAGES

The Court ordered the parties to submit
damages calculations based on a set of
preliminary findings. See Docs. 325, 328.
The Court also attached a set of forms to be
used for submitting damages calculations.
See id. at 4. The Court’s findings were that:

(8) Defendant proved it acted in good
faith such that liquidated damages
will not be assessed.

See Docs. 325, 328.

(1) Plaintiffs failed to prove their
entitlement to any additional amount
in damages for any hotel stay in
Monterrey, Mexico;

Based on those findings, Plaintiffs filed
calculations showing that Defendant
breached its contractual obligations in the
amount of $13,196.66. Plaintiffs
represented that the Court’s preliminary
findings preclude a finding of any FLSA
violation and elected not to submit any
damages calculations based on FLSA
violations. See Doc. 326.

(2) Plaintiffs failed to prove their
entitlement to any additional amount
in subsistence payments for their
trips from their homes in Mexico to
Defendant’s farm;
(3) Plaintiffs failed to prove Defendant
willfully violated the FLSA;

Plaintiffs also noted that the Court’s
damages forms omitted any consideration of
subsistence payments in the first week’s
damages calculations. See Doc. 326 at 1-2.
This amount is required by the H-2A
contracts to be paid halfway through the
season to those employees who remain
employed. See, e.g., Doc. 108-2 at 17.
Therefore, it is inappropriate to include it

(4) Plaintiffs are entitled to an additional
one and one half (1.5) hours of
compensable time in each season in
which they worked for Defendant for
the total time spent in orientation
sessions;

17

within either Defendant’s first week
obligations or its first week payments
toward satisfaction of those obligations.
Further both parties agree that Defendant
paid for 2.5 days of subsistence and the
Court has held that Plaintiffs failed to prove
any additional entitlement.

erases their paltry first week shortage
claims.
The Court adopts Defendant’s damages
forms, see Docs. 330-1, 330-2, and finds
that Defendant violated their contractual
duties to Plaintiffs in the amount of thirteen
thousand eighty dollars and eighteen cents
(13,080.18). See id.

Defendant largely stipulated to
Plaintiffs’ calculations, but objected to
Plaintiffs’ listed amount of bus fare owed in
2004 and 2005. See Doc. 330. Defendant
represents that it agreed “to use the amounts
indicated on Plaintiffs’ signed travel
reimbursement forms” for bus fare and that
this amount is $12 less than Plaintiffs’ listed
in their damages charts. See id. Plaintiffs
failed to carry their burden on these travel
expenses and thus the Court will adopt those
costs stipulated by the Defendant. Thus, the
Court will use the bus fare numbers from
Defendant’s charts. See Doc. 330-1 at 1-2.

X. CONCLUSION

THE COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS IN THE
AMOUNT OF THIRTEEN THOUSAND
EIGHTY DOLLARS AND EIGHTEEN
CENTS (13,080.18). Defendant is liable to
each individual Plaintiff in the amounts
listed in Doc. 330-2.

This 16th day of June 2011.

4AVANTaw
h PDENFIELØ,RIDGE
B
•)

Defendant also argues that the FLSA’s
two-year statute of limitations precludes
compensation of Plaintiffs’ 2004 and 2005
first week damages claims. See Doc. 330.
This argument fails to appreciate the nexus
between Plaintiffs’ contract and FLSA
claims. Although Plaintiffs cannot claim
first week damages through the FLSA for
those years, Defendant separately agreed by
contract to abide by the FLSA’s terms. Any
breach carries a six-year statute of
limitations and allows Plaintiffs to collect
for 2004 and 2005 violations.

.•]..•ff

7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

But Plaintiffs do not claim that their first
week’s pay was shorted more than four
dollars ($4). The twelve dollar ($12)
reduction in bus fare owed to Plaintiffs

18