Gaskin v. Astrue

Filing 28

ORDER granting 27 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 2/5/14. (bcw)

U

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
BUD GASKIN,
Plaintiff,
V

6:1 1-cv-28

.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Court considers Plaintiff Bud
Gaskin's Application for Attorneys' Fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA"). He seeks both legal fees and
expenses incurred during his successful
Social Security benefits challenge. Because
Plaintiff is statutorily entitled to these fees,
the Court GRANTS his motion. The Court
calculates his legal fees at a rate of $165.00
per hour and awards him $6,621.60.
II.

PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND'

In March, 2011, Plaintiff sought this
Court's review of the Social Security
Commissioner's decision to deny him
disability benefits. ECF No. 1 at 1. The
Magistrate Judge considered Plaintiff's
arguments and recommended that the Court
affirm the denial, which it did. ECF Nos.
12; 16. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
ECF No. 18. On August 14, 2013, the

For the substantive facts underlying Plaintiffs
claims, see ECF No. 23 at

2-3.

Eleventh Circuit vacated this Court's
judgment and remanded to this Court with
instructions to send the case back to the
Administrative Law Judge ("AU") for
reconsideration. ECF No. 23 at 5-6.
Gaskin timely moved for fees and
expenses under the EAJA. ECF No. 27. He
requests $6,662.50 in legal fees and
$1,259.10 in expenses.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Application of Equal Access to
Justice Act
The EAJA provides legal fees to civil
litigants who win suits against the United
States, unless the United States proves that it
was substantially justified in its maintenance
of the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Such fees may cover work directly related to
investigation of and framing of a civil
action, see McGuire v. Sullivan, 723 F.
Supp. 1506, 1508-10 (N.D. Ga. 1989), work
done in the federal courts or the
administrative context, Shalala v. Schaefer,
509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993), and for work
preparing the EAJA motions themselves,
Comm'r, INS. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 16162 (1990).
To award EAJA damages, the Court
must find three things: (1) that the plaintiff
prevailed in his suit against the government;
(2) that the government's position was not
substantially justified; and (3) that there are
no circumstances that make an award
against the government unjust. Jean v.
Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 765 (11th Cir. 1988).
Here, the Plaintiff was the prevailing
party. A party who secures remand under
"sentence four" of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
"prevails" for EAJA purposes. S/ia/ala, 509

U.S. at 296-97. When the Eleventh Circuit
directed this Court to remand Plaintiff's case
to the ALJ and this Court complied, he
became a prevailing party under EAJA.
Plaintiff also argues that the position of
the United States was not substantially
justified Although the United States bears
the burden of showing that its arguments
had 'reasonable basis in law and fact,"
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 n.2
(1988), Plaintiff advances several
affirmative arguments that they did not. He
notes that the ALJ did not "clearly articulate
the reasons for giving less weight" to a
treating physician's opinion. ECF No. 27 at
7 (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d
1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). He further
highlights the Eleventh Circuit's
requirement that when a vocational expert
testifies in the form of a hypothetical, she
must include all of the claimant's limitations
in that hypothetical. ECF No. 27 at 7
(quoting Ingram v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir.
2007)).

was not substantially justified. Cf. United
States v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1425 (11th
Cir. 1997) (finding no substantial
justification when government ignored
established pleading requirement to show
discriminatory action in voting rights
context).

.2

Here, the ALJ disregarded these
established principles of law. See ECF No.
23 at 4-6. And the AL's actions are a part
of the "position of the United States." 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). The United States
bears the burden of explaining why these
actions were substantially justified and has
not. Further, the Court is satisfied that when
the United States dismissed established
precedents during the initial administrative
proceedings and defended its position as the
case proceeded to the Eleventh Circuit, it
2

The United States did not reply or respond to the
Application for Attorneys' Fees.

Finally, the Court is unaware of
circumstances that would render this EAJA
award unjust. Courts have found such
circumstances where, for example, the
plaintiffs own negligence resulted in an
unnecessarily prolonged legal process. See
Webb v. Astrue, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1329,
1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 2007). Because the
record reflects no wrongdoing or
gamesmanship on the part of Plaintiff, the
third factor will not disqualify his recovery.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to fees and
expenses under EAJA.
B. Fee Calculations
Plaintiff has requested both legal fees
and expenses. He seeks recompense for
32.5 hours of legal work and has attached
both his attorney's affidavit, ECF No. 27-1
at 1-2, and a detailed breakdown of his
attorney's billed hours, all of which
represent work compensable under the
EAJA. Id. at 3. The Court therefore finds
32.5 hours to be a proper and reasonable
time figure for calculating EAJA damages.
Plaintiff requests that the Court
compensate this billed time at a rate of
$205.00 per hour. Id. at 8-9. While the
EAJA generally awards attorneys' fees at a
rate of $125.00 per hour, § 2412(d)(2)(A)
permits the Court to set a higher rate
because of an "increase in the cost of living.
." Plaintiff argues that because the CPI

T

See, e.g., Rutledge v. Sullivan, 745 F. Supp.
715, 717 (S.D. Ga. 1990). But it also finds
$165.00 per hour is a more reasonable rate
and is more in line with the standards of the
Savannah market. The Court has discretion
in this matter because the "court is itself an
expert on the question [of a reasonable
hourly rate] and may consider its own
knowledge and experience. . . ." Brungardt
v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 234 F. App'x 889,
891 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations
omitted). An award of $165.00 per hour
adequately compensates Mr. Gaskin under
EAJA.

for urban southern areas has risen from
152.4, when the EAJA rate was most
recently amended, to 227.837, when this
Court entered its opinion, the functional
EAJA rate should be $208.61 per hour. He
requests a rate very near that figure.
First, the Court disagrees with Mr.
Gaskin's calculations. 3 But more
fundamentally, CPI figures alone do not
dictate EAJA analysis.
The first step in the analysis. . . is to
determine the market rate for
"similar services [provided] by
lawyers of reasonably comparable
skills, experience, and reputation."
The second step, which is needed
only if the market rate is greater than
$[125] per hour, is to determine
whether the court should adjust the
hourly fee upward from $[125] to
take into account an increase in the
cost of living, or a special factor.

IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Gaskin has demonstrated his
entitlement to $5,362.50 in legal fees and
$1,259.10 in expenses. See ECF No. 27-1 at
4. The Court GRANTS his Application for
Attorneys' Fees in the amount of $6,621.60.

Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033-34
(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and page
numbers omitted).

This,,.. day of February 2014.

Here, the Court does find that it is
appropriate to deviate upward from EAJA's
$125.00 per hour base rate to account for an
increase in the cost of living since 1996.

B. AVANT EDENFIELD, JflDGE/
UNITED STATES DISTRJT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICTtF GEORGIA

When Congress established the EAJA's
$125.00 per hour base rate in March 1996, the CPI
stood at 152.4. ECF No. 27-3. By August 2013, that
Id. Plaintiff
figure had increased to 227.837.
contends that the second figure represents a 68.89%
increase in the CPI. ECF No. 27 at 9. The Court,
however, calculates that percent increase to be
49.5%. Therefore, the CPI-adjusted EAJA rate
would be $186.86 per hour.

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