Grange Mutual Insurance Company v. Dasher et al

Filing 39

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 30 Motion to Dismiss; denying 30 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 1/7/13. (bcw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
6:12-cv-63

V.

SHAD DASHER, individually; KARIN
DASHER, individually; VIDALIA
ORGANICS, INC. a/k/a SHAD and
KARIN DASHER dlb/a GLENN VILLE
PRODUCE CO.; MARIA SERRANO; J.
ENEDINO FAJARDOCEBALLOS;
KATHLEEN WAGNER, CHARLES
WAGNER, JOSEPH BLAKE;
METROPOLITAN GROUP PROPERTY
& CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are Defendants Kathleen
Wagner, Charles Wagner, and Joshua Blake's
("Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Or, in the
Alternative, Motion to Stay. ECF No. 30.
Defendants request dismissal of this
declaratory judgment action because ongoing
state court proceedings allegedly constitute a
more appropriate forum for resolution of this
dispute. See ECF No. 31 at 10-11. The Court
cannot completely agree and for the following
reasons GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants' motion.
The Court exercises jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28
U.S.C. § 2201. Defendants do not contest
venue or jurisdiction and the Court finds
allegations sufficient to support both.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dasher/Gleunville Produce
Policy With Grange
From December 1, 2009 to December 1,
2010, Grange Mutual Casualty Company
("Grange") provided farm insurance to "Shad
& Karin Dasher DBA Glennville Produce."
ECF Nos. 15 at 4; 1-1 at 3. The policy
"provides liability coverage for . . . those
sums that the 'insured' becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of
'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which
this insurance applies." ECF No. 15 at 8-9.
The policy defined "insured" as:
a. "Insured" means you, and if you
are:
(1) An individual, "insured" also
means the following members
of your household:
(a) Your relatives;
(b) Any other person under the
age of 21 who is in the care
of any person specified
above.
(2) A partnership or Joint venture,
"insured" also means your
members and your partners and
their spouses, but only with
respect to the conduct of your
"farming" operations;
(3) An organization other than a
partnership or joint venture,
"insured" also means:
(a) Your executive officers and
directors, but only with
respect to their duties as
your officers and directors;
and

LI

(b) Your stockholders, but only
with respect to their
liability as stockholders.
No person or organization is an
"insured" with respect to the conduct
of any current or past partnership or
joint venture that is not shown as a
Named Insured in the Declarations.
b. "Insured" also means any of your
employees (other than executive
officers), but only for acts that
(1) Cause "bodily injury" or
"personal injury" to someone
other than you or a coemployee; and
(2) Are within the scope of the
employee's employment by
The providing of
you.
professional health care
services or the failure to
provide them will not be
considered to be within the
scope of any employee's
employment by you.
ECF 15 at 9-10. Not until May of 2010 did
the policy's coverage of bodily injury and
property damage become an issue for either
Grange or the Dashers and their onion farm.
B. Underlying Incident

At about 9:30 pm on May 12, 2010, J.
Enedino Fajardoceballos ("Faj ardoceballos")
drove east along State Road 196 in Tattnall
County, Georgia, in a 2006 SkyTrak Forklift.
ECF Nos. 31 at 1; 15 at 5. A Chevy
Uplander, driven by Kathleen Wagner and
containing Charles Wagner and Joseph Blake,
approached from the rear. ECF Nos. 15 at 5;
15-8 at 4. The Uplander struck the rear of the
forklift, injuring its occupants. ECF Nos. 15-

8 at 4; 15 at 6. That accident spawned three
lawsuits: one in Tattnall County State Court,
one in Gwinnett County State Court, and the
instant declaratory judgment action. See ECF
No. 15 at 5.
C. The State Court Lawsuits

On April 29, 2011, in Tattnall County,
Georgia, the Wagners and Blake ("Wagner
Plaintiffs") brought suit against Shad Dasher
("Dasher"), Vidalia Organics, Inc., Maria
Serrano, and Fajardoceballos. ECF No. 15-8
at 2. The Wagner Plaintiffs alleged that
Vidalia Organics—a company owned and
operated by Dasher that runs his farm—rented
the forklift involved in the accident to use in
its farming operation. ECF No. 15-8 at 4.
They also alleged that Fajardoceballos was
an employee of Vidalia Organics, Dasher, and
Maria Serrano. Id Dasher, on the other
hand, contends Fajardoceballos constituted an
independent contractor, not an employee, of
Dasher, Glennville Produce, and Vidalia
Organics ("Dasher entities"), at the time of
the accident. ECF No. 15 at 10.
The Wagner Plaintiffs claimed the forklift
driven by Fajardoceballos lacked "lights,
signage, or escorts that would make it visible
at night." ECF No. 15-8 at 5. They further
alleged that Dasher and Vidalia Organics
knew or should have known the forklift "was
not designed for safe operation on [Georgia]
roadways." ECF No. 15 at 6. Despite that
knowledge, Vidalia Organics and Dasher
allegedly "entrusted Fajardoceballos with the
forklift and instructed him to operate [it] at
night on State Road 196." Id. at 6.
The Wagner Plaintiffs brought claims of
negligence and negligence per se against
Fajardoceballos, and claims of respondeat
superior liability, negligent hiring and

D. Grange's Declaratory Judgment
Action

and
entrustment,
negligent
retention,
negligent supervision against Dasher and
Vidalia Organics. ECF No. 15-8 at 5-8.
"Grange [Mutual Insurance Company] is
providing a defense to Vidalia Organics, Inc.
and Shad Dasher, both d/b/a Glennville
Produce Co., Maria Serrano, and Mr.
Fajardoceballos in the Wagner Action under
reservations of rights." ECF No. 15 at 7
(emphasis added).

Approximately sixteen months after the
Wagner Plaintiffs (in this action, the
Defendants) initiated the Tattnall County suit,
Grange filed this declaratory judgment action.
Compare ECF No. 1 (filed August 14, 2012),
with ECF No. 15-8 (showing filing date for
Tattnall County suit as April 29, 2011).
Grange requests this Court "declare that
[under the terms of the policy] there is no
coverage in connection with the loss(es)
arising out of the" forklift accident. ECF No.
15 at 12. Grange also requests a declaration
that it is "not obligated to defend, indemnify
or expend any sums on behalf of Maria
Serrano or Mr. Fajardoceballos." Id. More
specifically, Grange argues that
Fajardoceballos and Maria Serrano were not
employees of any of the Dasher entities and so
were not "insureds" under the policy. Id. at
10; ECF No. 34 at 6.

The Tattnall County suit "has been
actively litigated since" its filing, ECF No. 31
at 2, and currently sits on the trial calendar for
the state court's December trial term.' Id.
In Gwinnett County, Metropolitan Group
Property and Casualty Insurance a/sb
Kathleen Wagner filed a "subrogation action
to collect from Fajardoceballos and RSC
Equipment Rental, Inc. ("RSC") for the
property damages Kathleen Wagner"
sustained in the accident. ECF No. 15 at 7.
RSC then filed a third-party complaint against
"Shad Dasher d/b/a Glennville Produce Co.,
and Vidalia Organics, Inc. d/b/a Glennville
Produce Co.," alleging that Glennville rented
the forklift from RSC and agreed to
indemnify RSC against any personal injury or
property damage claims arising out of the use
of the forklift. Id Both the Gwinnett and
Tattnall cases remain ongoing at present.
Plaintiff Grange, however, is associated only
with—and even then only as a provider of a
defense under reservation of rights—the
Tatthall County action.

Defendants responded by moving to
dismiss, or in the alternative stay, this case.
ECF No. 30. They argue that the issue of
Faj ardocebal los's employment status with the
Dasher entities "will be determined by a jury
in Tattnall County," and thus this Court
should defer to the state court action. ECF
No. 31 at 2-4. If this Court elects not to defer,
the Wagner Defendants fear inconsistent
results in two separate forums on the
employment status issue. Id. at 4.
Defendants further contend that "Grange is
not asking this Court to interpret the terms of
the insurance policy in question and rule on
what the terms mean." Id at 3. Instead,
Defendants claim "Grange has brought this
action" to ask this Court "to make a factual
determination as to whether . .

Grange disputes this trial timetable. Grange claims
"that the State Court of Tattnall County will not be
holding a calendar call for civil jury trials until March
1.3." ECF No. 34 at 7 (emphasis in original).

3

No. 15 at 12. Second, Grange seeks a
declaration that it has no duty to defend
Fajardoceballos or Serrano. Id. These two
issues, however, no matter that they may
share some factual underpinnings, are not two
sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, an
actual controversy exists as to each.

Fajardoceballos" is an employee "of any of
According to
the Dasher entities." id.
Defendants, this case is simple: If
Fajardoceballos was an employee, coverage
under the Grange policy obtains. If not, no
coverage. Id. Simple or not, the Court turns
now to evaluating the merits of the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A controversy exists as to Grange's duty
to indemnify or provide coverage. Grange
disclaims that obligation and Defendants
assert Grange is so obligated. See id.; ECF
No. 31 at 2-3. Even absent a judgment as to
the liability of Defendants, the dispute over
Grange's duty to indemnify constitutes an
actual controversy for purposes of declaratory
relief. See Md. Gas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court first sets forth the legal
framework for deciding declaratory judgment
actions. The Court then evaluates Grange's
request for a declaration as to its duty to
indemnify or provide coverage. Lastly, the
Court evaluates Grange's request for a
declaration as to its duty to defend.
A. Declaratory Judgment Actions

"[A] controversy exists regarding the duty
to defend when the insured seeks a defense
from an insurance company, but the insurance
company denies that it is obligated." State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Myrick, No. 2:06cv-359, 2007 WL 3120262, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Oct. 23, 2007) (citing Am. Fid. & Gas. Co. v.
Pa. Threshermen & Farmers' Mu!. Gas. Co.,
280 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 1960)). Grange
denies that very obligation. See ECF No. 15
at 12. That Grange currently provides a
defense to Defendants and Fajardoceballos
does not eliminate the controversy because
Grange only does so under reservation of
rights. Id. at 7; see World Harvest Church,
Inc. v. GuideOne Mu!. Ins. Co., 287 Ga. 149,
152 (2010) (holding that an insurer can avoid
being estopped from denying a defense by

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides
that, "[i]n a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. 2201(a)
(emphasis added). Because the Constitution
limits the federal judicial power to concrete
cases or controversies, the threshold question
in a declaratory judgment action is whether an
actual controversy exists. See Atlanta Gas
Light Co. v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d
409, 414 (11th Cir. 1995).
This case has two issues that may present
actual controversies. First, Grange asks this
Court to declare that it has no duty to
indemnify Fajardoceballos or Cerrano. 2 ECF

about coverage are subsumed within the indemnity
issue and the Court treats them together.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding
precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down
before October 1, 1981.
See Banner v. Ci/y of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).

2

Grange also asks the Court to declare that the policy
provides no coverage for any losses arising out of the
forklift accident. See ECF No. 15 at 12. Questions

4

No parallel state court action exists here.
Grange is not a party to either the Tattnall or
Gwinnett County actions. But state court
proceedings, though not parallel, do exist and
may warrant deference. Although concerns
for comity therefore do not dictate abstention,
the Court nevertheless retains a limited form
of discretion should a particular issue "better
be settled in the proceeding pending in the
state court." Brilihart, 316 U.S. at 495. The
Court turns now to an evaluation of Grange's
duty to indemnify.

that,
insured
'the
"inform[ing]
notwithstanding [the insurer's] defense of the
action, it disclaims liability and does not
waive the defenses available to it against the
insured.").
Because actual controversies exist here,
the Court has jurisdiction to award the
requested relief. The Declaratory Judgment
Act, however, is "an enabling Act, which
confers a discretion on the courts rather than
an absolute right upon the litigant." Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995)
(citations and quotations omitted).

B. Duty to Indemnify
In cases, like this one, involving insurance
coverage, the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify are distinct and analyzed
separately. See City of Atlanta v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 206,
208 (1998) ("An insurer's duty to defend and
its duty to indemnify are separate and
independent obligations."). 5 And the duty to
indemnify "is triggered only when the insured
is determined to be liable for damages within
the policy's coverage." Erie Indem. Co. v,
Acuity Mu!. Ins. Co., No. 1:06-cv-0174, 2006
WL 2048310, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2006).

To determine the propriety of abstaining
from the exercise of jurisdiction, courts must
ask "whether the questions in controversy
between the parties to the federal suit, and
which are not foreclosed under applicable
substantive law, can better be settled in the
proceeding pending in the state court."
Brilihart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S.
491, 495 (1942). "[W]here another suit is
pending in a state court presenting the same
issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties," "it would be uneconomical
as well as vexatious for a federal court to
proceed in a declaratory judgment suit." Id
At the other end of the spectrum, "[i]t is an
abuse of discretion . . . to dismiss a
declaratory judgment action in favor of a state
court proceeding that does not exist." Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d
1236, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000).

In fact, the Eleventh Circuit—in
distinguishing between the actual controversy
requirement and the "discretion of federal
courts exercising jurisdiction over declaratory
from hearing the request for declaratory relief in favor
of the state forum, the district court therefore
necessarily abused its discretion. Id But it did not do
so because of a lack of a parallel state proceeding.
This Court must apply Georgia's choice of law rule in
this case. See World Holdings, LLC v. Fed Republic
qfGer.,__F.3d_,20l2WL55l2377, at*9(llthCir.
Nov. 15, 2012) (holding that federal courts must apply
the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit).
And that rule dictates that Georgia law governs the
interpretation of an insurance contract issued to a
Georgia insured. See Fed Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Distrib.
Co., 203 Ga. App. 763, 765 (1992).

Grange cites Thomas for the proposition that a district
court abuses its discretion "if it dismisses the
[declaratory judgment action] where no parallel state
court action exists." ECF No. 34 at 3. Thomas stands
for no such thing. The federal bank party there had a
statutory right to a federal forum for any dispute
involving it. See 220 F.3d at 1245. Quite simply, there
was no state forum to defer to after the bank properly
removed the state action at issue. Id. In abstaining

11

judgment actions"—"has cautioned against
the exercise of jurisdiction in suits for
declaratory judgment when the question of..
insurance coverage may never arise due to
the lack of a judgment establishing the
liability of the insured." Edwards v. Sharkey,
747 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing
Pennsylvania Threshermen, 280 F.2d at 461).
Many district courts have heeded that
cautionary advice and declined to decide
questions of insurance coverage "when the
underlying [liability] action is pending."
Myrick, 2006 WL 3120262, at *2 (refusing to
answer indemnification question, and granting
the insured's motion to dismiss on that issue
because the state court had yet to make a
decision on the insured's liability); see also
Emp 'rs Mut. Gas. Co. v. All Seasons Window
& Door Mfg., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1205,
1211-1212 (S.D. Ala. 2005) ("It is simply
inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction over an
action seeking a declaration of the plaintiff's
indemnity obligations absent a determination
of the insured's liability. . . ."); Allstate
Indem. Co. v. Lewis, 985 F. Supp. 1341,
1349-50 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (declining to reach
indemnity issue as an exercise of discretion
under Declaratory Judgment Act while still
reaching issue of insurer's duty to defend);
Great N Paper Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
46 F.R.D. 67, 70 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (refusing to
decide "questions of insurance coverage and
liability for indemnification" when the
insured's liability "may never occur.").
Courts in other circuits also have declined
to reach questions of coverage when a state
court action deciding liability remains
pending. See Lear Corp. v. Johnson Elec.
Holdings Ltd, 353 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir.
2003) ("We regularly say that decisions about
indemnity should be postponed until the

underlying liability has been established.");
Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 693
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding duty to indemnify
issue not ripe for adjudication until the
insured is held liable in the underlying suit);
Am. Slates Ins. Co. v. Component Techs. Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 2d 373, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
("As a general rule, a court entertaining a
declaratory judgment action in an insurance
coverage case should refrain from
determining the insurer's duty to indemnify
until the insured is found liable for damages
in the underlying action.").
This Court too chooses to follow the
Eleventh Circuit's warning. No liability has
been established yet in the Tattnall County
action. Should the defendants in that case
prevail, any decision by this Court on the
issue of coverage would be moot and a waste
of judicial resources. And wasteful this Court
will not be. The Court therefore DECLINES
to exercise jurisdiction over questions of
indemnity and coverage involving Grange's
policy with the Dasher entities. Defendants'
motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART
and Grange's request for declaratory relief as
to its coverage and indemnity obligations is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
C. Duty to Defend

The same rationale that applies to
declining decision on questions of coverage
does not, however, apply equally to questions
surrounding the duty to defend. If the Court
decides Grange's defense obligations under
the policy, it does not risk issuing an opinion
that the state court action later moots, as it
would if it decided Grange's indemnity
obligation. See Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co.,
291 Ga. 402, 407-08 (2012) (holding that an
insurer's duty to defend is determined by

acting in the course and scope of his
employment. See Broadnax v. Daniel Custom
Cons!, LLC, 315 Ga. App. 291, 296 (2012).
Negligent hiring, supervision, and retention
claims require, in addition to Fajardoceballos
being an employee, that the Dasher entities
knew or should have known Fajardoceballos
posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
people in the Defendants' situation. See
Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App.
545, 548 (2010). And the negligent
entrustment claim does not turn at all on
See
Fajardoceballos's employment status.
Ga. Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Bradley, 302 Ga.
App. 247, 250 (2010) ("Under the doctrine of
negligent entrustment, a party is liable if he
entrusts someone with an instrumentality,
with actual knowledge that the person to
whom he has entrusted the instrumentality is
incompetent by reason of his age or
inexperience, or his physical or mental
condition, or his known habit of
recklessness."). While the issue of Grange's
duty to defend may—but very likely does
not—share one factual element with the
claims Defendants assert in Tattnall County,
they remain sufficiently distinct to warrant
this Court's exercise of discretion to decide
the former.

comparing policy language with a complaint's
allegations). "[T]he issue [of the duty to
defend] is not whether the insured is actually
liable to the plaintiffs in the underlying
action; the issue is whether a claim has been
asserted which falls within the policy
coverage and which the insurer has a duty to
defend." HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v.
Morrison Homes, --- F.3d ---, No. 10-14637,
2012 WL 5834882, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 19,
2012) (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. N. Ins.
Co. of N. Y, 249 Ga. App. 532, 533 (2001))
(emphasis in original). So whether the
Defendants and Fajardoceballos are
ultimately liable for the forklift accident or
not, Grange's defense obligations remain the
same.
Even if adjudicating Grange's duty to
defend requires this Court to examine
Fajardoceballos's employment status 6—an
issue the jury in the Tattnall County case may
also decide—the overarching issues in this
case and the Tattnall County action remain
different. Here, the Court is being asked to
declare whether Grange has an obligation to
defend the Dasher entities, Maria Serrano,
and Fajardoceballos in the Tattnall County
action. See ECF No. 15 at 12. In that case,
by contrast, the state court has before it claims
of respondeat superior liability, negligent
hiring and retention, negligent entrustment,
and negligent supervision. ECF No. 15-8 at
5-8.

Defendants also point to nine factors laid
out by the Eleventh Circuit in Ameritas
Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d
1328 (11th Cir. 2005), and argue they support
deferring to the Tattnall County action. 7 See

Although the Dasher entities' liability on
the respondeat superior claim turns in one part
on Fajardoceballos's employment status, it
also requires that Fajardoceballos have been

Those factors are:
(I) the strength of the state's interest in
having the issues raised in the federal
declaratory action decided in the state
courts;
(2) whether the judgment in the federal
declaratory action would settle the
controversy;

6

As discussed infra at 8, a final decision on Grange's
duty to defend very likely will not require a factual
finding on the issue of Fajardoceballos's employment
status.

7

The question of Grange's duty to defend
would not "better be settled in the proceeding
pending in the state court." Bnillhart, 316 U.S.
at 495. The Court therefore DENIES
Defendants' motion to dismiss insofar as it
asks this Court to refrain from deciding that
issue.

But the Amen/as factors
ECF No. 31 7-9.
were designed to address when courts should
decline to hear declaratory judgment actions
in favor of parallel state court actions.
Ainenilas, 411 F.3d at 1330-3 1. This case and
the Tattnall County case do not involve the
same parties or all the same issues and as a
result many of the Amer/las factors do not
apply. See Erie Indemnity, 2006 WL
2048310, at *3 The ones that do apply do
not decisively counsel in favor of deference to
the Tattnall County action. 8

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to
dismiss. The Court RETAINS jurisdiction to
decide whether Grange has an obligation to
defend the Dasher entities and
Faj ardoceballos. The Court, however,
DECLINES to declare whether Grange's
policy with the Dasher entities provides
coverage for any losses associated with the
forklift accident at the center of the Tattnall
County case. Accordingly, the portion of
Grange's complaint requesting declaratory
relief as to its coverage and indemnity
obligations is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Defendants' motion to stay is
DENIED.

whether the federal declaratory action
would serve a useful purpose in clarifying
the legal relations at issue;
(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being
used merely for the purpose of
"procedural fencing" —that is, to provide
an arena for a race for res judicata or to
achieve a federal hearing in a case
otherwise not removable;
(5) whether the use of a declaratory action
would increase the friction between our
federal and state courts and improperly
encroach on state jurisdiction;
(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that
is better or more effective;
(7) whether the underlying factual issues are
important to an informed resolution of the
case;
(8) whether the state trial court is in a better
position to evaluate those factual issues
than is the federal court; and
(9) whether there is a close nexus between the
underlying factual and legal issues and
state law and/or public policy, or whether
federal common or statutory law dictates a
resolution of the declaratory judgment
action.
411 F.3dat 1331.
The Eleventh Circuit never intended for the Verizas
factors to be an exclusive list of things to consider in
deciding whether to hear a declaratory relief action.
See Id. ("Our list is neither absolute nor is any one
factor controlling; these are merely guideposts in
furtherance of the Supreme Court's admonitions in
Brilihart and Wilton."). Helpful guides though they
may be in some actions, the Veriras factors do not
persuade the Court to abstain in this case from deciding
whether Grange has a duty to defend.
(3)

This

day of January 2013.

S. AVANT EDENF1ELD,)UGE
UNITED STATES DIST)(IQt COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRlGA OF GEORGIA

' The Court also DENIES Defendants' request for a
stay of this action. The issue of Grange's duty to
defend will not arise in either the Tattnall or Gwinnett
County actions. Staying this action would not further
the goal of comity orjudicial economy.

8