Preston v. Williams

Filing 10

ORDER ADOPTING 7 Report and Recommendations dismissing the case. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 1/30/13. (wwp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

VANLEN PRESTON,
Plaintiff,
:

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV612-100

STANLY WILLIAMS, Warden,
Defendant.

ORDER
After an independent and de novo review of the entire record, the undersigned
concurs with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, to which Objections
have been filed. In his Objections, Plaintiff states that Defendant Williams and Brian
Owens, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, were "aware of
the high incidents of violence [at] Smith [State Prison] yet did not [e]nforce the
[necessary] action to [alleviate] the problem." (Doc. No. 9, p. 1). To the extent Plaintiff
wishes to assert a widespread abuse claim against Defendant Williams and
Commissioner Owens, he cannot do so for two (2) reasons. First, Plaintiffs allegations
in this regard are conclusory, which is an insufficient basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. "A complaint must state a facially plausible claim for relief, and '[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft

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v. lpbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" does not suffice. Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 678. Secondly, Plaintiff notes one (1) example of a violent incident; one alleged
instance of violence does not make a widespread abuse claim.
Plaintiff also attempts to name Sergeant Catanzariti and Officer Farrell, the two
(2) officers who escorted Plaintiff out of the recreation yard, as defendants. The Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a
constitutional duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of prison inmates. "To show a violation of [his] Eighth Amendment rights, [a
p]laintiff must produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2)
the defendant['s] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation." Smith v. Req'l
Dir. of Fla. Dep't of Corr., 368 F. App'x 9, 14 (11th Cii. 2010) (quoting Purcell ex rel.
Estate of MorQan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005)). "To be
deliberately indifferent a prison official must know of and disregard 'an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference." Id .. (quoting Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20). Whether a substantial risk of
.

serious harm exists so that the Eighth Amendment might be violated involves a legal
rule that takes form through its application to facts. However, "simple negligence is not
actionable under § 1983, and a plaintiff must allege a conscious or callous indifference
to a prisoner's rights." Smith, 368 F. App'x at 14. In other words, "to find deliberate
indifference on the part of a prison official, a plaintiff inmate must show: (1) subjective

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knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is
more than gross negligence." Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010).
Like any deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
and a subjective inquiry. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2004).
Under the objective component, a plaintiff must prove the condition he complains of is
sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
8 (1992). As for the subjective component, "the prisoner must prove that the prison
official acted with 'deliberate indifference." Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1260-61
(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). To prove
deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that prison officials "acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind" with regard to the serious prison condition at issue.
Id. (quoting Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289-90).
There is no assertion before the Court which supports a plausible finding that
sergeant Catanzariti and Officer Farrell were aware of a risk to Plaintiff's safety and that
they disregarded that risk. Even assuming that officials should have known that Plaintiff
faced a risk to his safety, there is no allegation before the Court that these officials did
know of this risk. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that "a state
official acts with deliberate indifference when he disregards a risk of harm of which he is
actually aware."

Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in

original) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against
Sergeant Catanzariti or Officer Farrell.
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, as supplemented herein,
is adopted as the opinion of the Court. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED based on his

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failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Clerk of Court is directed
to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal.
SO ORDERED, this

dayof

,2013.

B. AVANT EDENFIELD, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT/COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 1GEORGIA

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