Mapp v. Jarriel et al

Filing 53

ORDER denying 44 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 2/26/14. (bcw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
AL RICO MAPP,
Plaintiff,
V

.

6: 12-cv-103

JAVAKA JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER

Plaintiff Al Rico Mapp has filed a
Motion in Limine seeking to exclude 1)
evidence of prior criminal convictions and
2) references to K building at Georgia State
Prison being the "special management" unit.
ECF No. 44. Defendants filed a response
opposing most of the motion, but concede
that they will not present evidence of Mr.
Mapp's misdemeanor criminal convictions
or drug convictions that occurred more than
ten years before trial, ECF No. 50 at 5.
Mr. Mapp is currently serving a life
sentence for an armed robbery conviction
that occurred on July 21, 2004. ECF No. 44
at 1. Both parties recognize that Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(b) generally excludes
evidence of felony convictions greater than
ten years old for the purpose of impeaching
a witness. And both parties argue that Rule
403, which permits the Court to exclude
"relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of...
unfair prejudice," apply in their favor. ECF
Nos. 44 at 7; 50 at 6-7.
Mapp's armed robbery conviction
occurred just under ten years ago. And

introduction of evidence of Mapp's armed
robbery conviction will not unfairly
prejudice him. The jury, simply by virtue of
the nature of the case, will know that Mapp
is a prisoner. Providing evidence of the
conviction underlying his incarceration will
not add substantially to the prejudice
inherent in Mapp's status as a prisoner.
Particularly given "[t]he implicit assumption
of Rule 609 . . . that prior felony convictions
have probative value," United States v.
Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir.
1998), Mapp's motion to exclude evidence
of his armed robbery conviction is
DENIED.
The incident in question occurred in K
building of Georgia State Prison, which the
Defendants identify as the "special
management" unit. ECF No. 44 at 1. Mapp
argues that identifying the unit as "special
management" will unduly prejudice him
because inmates are housed in K building
for a variety of reasons, some being
innocuous. Id at 1-2, 8-9. Defendants
respond that the parties stipulated to the fact
that Mapp was assigned to the K building,
which "houses special management
inmates." ECF No. 50 at 9 (citing ECF No.
35 at 21). Moreover, the Defendants
contend that Mapp's status as a "special
management" inmate is probative of
appropriate response to his behavior. Id. at
9-10.
The Court agrees with Defendants on
both arguments, but analyzes only the
substantive argument. Rule 403 only
excludes evidence if danger of confusion or
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
probative value. If Mapp was not in the
"special management" unit due to any

malfeasances as his attorney contends, ECF
No. 44 at 2, he may testify to that, and
Mapp's attorney may present evidence to
establish all of the reasons why an inmate
may be placed in the "special management"
unit. Because Mapp will have ample
opportunity to explain his position, the
Court cannot say that any reference to
"special management" will substantially
outweigh probative value; in fact, given the
opportunity to explain himself, reference to
"special management" may not pose any
danger to Mapp's case. The Court DENIES
the motion and the Defendants may refer to
K building as the "special management"
unit.
In summary, the Court DENIES Mapp's
Motion in Limine in whole.

ThiJay of February 2014.

L AV1Q(17 BUENFIELD, JJDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT (iF GEORGIA