Jackson et al v. Catanzariti et al

Filing 188

ORDER denying 132 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 134 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/27/2017. (thb)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT

OF

COURT

FOR THE

GEORGIA

STATESBORO DIVISION

MIGUEL JACKSON and KELVIN

STEVENSON,

*
*

Plaintiffs,

*

CIVIL ACTION NO.
CV

612-113

v.
ir

JOSEPH CATANZARITI,

et al. ,

it
i:

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiffs Miguel Jackson and Kelvin Stevenson filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983 on December 10, 2012.

The

case arises out of an alleged unlawful beating that Plaintiffs
received at
December

31,

January 25,

Smith State
2010.

2013.

Prison in; Glennville,

Plaintiffs

Georgia,

on

amended their complaint

on

The amended coiyiplaint is the operative

complaint in the case.

(Doc. 24.)

Plaintiffs have named 3 9

individuals from Smith State Prison ks Defendants.
two of the defendants,

Eason,

have

contending

Defendants Eerius Attical and Joshua

filed

motions

that

Plaintiffs

for

judgment

have

administrative remedies against them.
for consideration.

Presently,

on

failed

the

to

pleadings

exhaust

The motions are ripe

I.

LEGAL

STANDARD

The legal standards applicable to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings and Rule
12(b) (6)

motions

to

dismiss

are

the

same.

Roma v.

Outdoor

Creations, Inc. v. City of Cumming, Ga. , 558 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
1284 (N.D. Ga. 2008)

("A motion for judgment on the pleadings

is subject to the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss.")

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a

motion to dismiss,

does not test whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail on the merits of

the case.

tests

complaint.

the

Rhodes,

legal

416 U.S.

sufficiency of
232,

236

the

(1974).

Therefore,

Rather,

it

Scheur v.

the court must

accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and construe
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.

See Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey,

(11th Cir.

2002) .

The court, however,

312 F.3d 1222,

1225

need not accept the

i

complaint's
facts.

legal

conclusions

as

true,

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662,

only

its

well-pled

677-79 (2009).

A complaint also must "contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted

as

true,

xto

plausible on its face.'"
v.

Twomblv,

550

U.S.

state

a

claim

to

relief

that

Id. at 61% (citing Bell Atl.

544,

570

(2007)).

required to plead *factual content

that

The
allows

is

Corp.

plaintiff

is

the

to

court

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the

misconduct

probability

beyond

.

Twombly,
Broudo,

.
550

544

alleged."

requirement

.

mere

U.S.
U.S.

Id.

at

the

pleading

possibility

at
336,

556-57
347

j Although

.

.

.

stage,

must

(citing Durma

(2005))

When,

basis of a dispositive issue of law,

there

is

no

"something

be

alleged."

Pharm.,

Inc.

v.

on

the

however,

no construction of the

factual allegations of the complaint will support the cause of

action,

dismissal

of

the

complaint

is

appropriate,

See

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty. , 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th
Cir.

1991).

II.

On

December

31,

BACKGROUND

2010,

performed a nshake down"
Plaintiffs.

Smith

of

State

th^

Prison

officials

dormitory that housed

(Am. Compl., Doc. 24, t 13.)

During that time,

Defendant Joseph Catanzariti struck Plaintiff Jackson after

the two exchanged words, and then Defendant Catanzariti lifted
Plaintiff Jackson up, with the help of other defendants, as if

he were going to throw him over the second floor rail.

H 16.)

(Id.

After placing him in handcuffs, Defendant Catanzariti

repeatedly struck Plaintiff Jackson in the face with an object

(the back end of a flash light or hammer).
beating is allegedly on video.
strike

Plaintiff

Jackson

while

(Id. )
he

dormitory and to the medical unit

(Id. f 19.)

This

Defendants continued to

was

escorted

(Id. H 21.)

outside

the

Defendant

Catanzariti repeatedly hit Plaintiff Jackson in the face with
a hammer,

and another defendant beat him with a night stick.

(Id. H 22.)

While in the medical unit, Defendant Catanzariti

threatened Plaintiff Jackson if he mentioned the beating and
hit him a few more times.

(Id. f 27.)

Plaintiff Jackson

suffered head injury, a broken nose, fractured teeth, multiple
lacerations to the face, contusions, swelling to his eyes and

trauma to his

ear canal.

(Id.

U 29.)

Plaintiff

Jackson

continues to suffer effects from tjhe injuries sustained on
that day.

(Id.)

During

this

same

event,

Defendant

Catanzariti

also

repeatedly struck Plaintiff Stevenson with a hammer while he
was handcuffed,

on the ground,

sitting on him.

(Id. t 17.)

Plaintiff

Stevenson at

the

and with a 300-pound officer

Other defendants beat and kicked
same time.

beating is allegedly on video.

(Id.)

(Id.

f 18.)

This

Plaintiff Stevenson was

taken to the medical unit, but while there, Defendants punched

him

in

the

Stevenson

face

with handcuffs.

suffered head

injury,

(Id.

K

26.)

concussion,

a

Plaintiff
broken

jaw,

multiple lacerations, a broken nose; swelling to the eyes and

trauma to his ear canal.

(Id.

K 28.)

Plaintiff Stevenson

continues to suffer effects from the injuries sustained on
that day.

In

(Id. )

their

§

1983

amended

complaint,

Plaintiffs

have

brought

a

claim

(Count

I)

for

violation

of

their

Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants either participated in

the beatings or failed to take reasonable steps to immediately
stop the

illegal beatings,

or both.

Plaintiffs

have also

brought a claim (Count II) for supervisory liability against
Defendants Catanzariti,

Eason and Andrew McFarlane.

The case was stayed for over three years because of the

state criminal charges brought against Plaintiffs for their

conduct in the prison disturbance that occurred on that day.
(See Doc. 81, 118.)

Now, discovery in the case is ongoing and
i

being

actively

Judge.

monitored

by

the

United

States

Magistrate

A Joint Status Report submitted to the Court on March

7, 2017 shows that the parties are discussing the dismissal of
several defendants;
those listed.

however,

(See Doc.

the movants here are not among

174.)

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Section 1983 creates a federal remedy for the deprivation

of federal rights.
Inc.,

826 F.2d 1030,

1983

claim

Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp.,

requires

1032

(11th Cir.

proof

of

a

1987).

An actionable §

deprivation

of

rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States and that the deprivation was by a person

or persons acting under color of law.1
claim that Defendants

punishment

in

Id.

subjected them to

the

Eighth

and unusual

made

applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

See

(stating

of

cruel

Amendment

Campbell v.

violation

Here, Plaintiffs

Sikesf

169 F.3d 1353,

the

Eighth Amendment's

that

1374

(11th Cir.

1999)

proscription against

cruel and unusual punishment governs the amount of force that

prison officials are entitled to use against inmates); Bennett

v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11^ Cir. 1990) ("The eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
triggered when a prisoner is subject to a [n]
wanton infliction of pain.'"

'unnecessary and

(quoted source omitted)).

In order to seek relief, however, a prisoner must first
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal

!
court.

Porter v.

Nussle,

534

U.S.

516,

524

(2002) .

More

specifically, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") ,
action

" [n]o

shall

be

brought

conditions under section 1983
Federal

law

.

.

. until

of

with
this

respect
title,

such administrative

available are exhausted."

Through their motions

42 U.S.C.

to

prison

or any other

remedies

as

are

§ 1997e(a).

for judgment on the pleadings,

Defendants Eason and Attical contend that Plaintiffs did not

1 There is no dispute that
of

state

law.

Defendants

acted under color

exhaust

against

them because

their prison grievances do not identify them.

In Jones v.

Bock,

their administrative

549 U.S.

199,

Court explained that

218

remedies

(2007),

the United States

Supreme

u[t]he level bf detail necessary in a

grievance to comply with the grieva.nce procedures will vary

from

system

prison's

to

system and claim

requirements,

and not

to

the

boundaries of proper exhaustion."

claim,
PLRA,

but

is

the

define

that

it

the

Thus, this Court must look

to the Smith State Prison's requirements to determine whether

Plaintiffs complied with its grievance procedure.
The Standard Operating Procedure for prisons operated by
the Georgia Department of Corrections requires a prisoner to
use its grievance form to grieve his complaints.

In turn, the

Grievance Form informs the prisoner as follows:

must be

completed in blue or black ink.

dates,

You must include

t

specific

information

names

concerning your

of persons

involved,

"This form

grievance

and

to

witnesses.

include

n2

(Def.

j

Eason's Br.

in Supp.

of Mot.

for J. on the Pleadings,

132, Exs. 1 & 2 (emphasis added) .)

Doc.

Here, Defendants Eason and

2 Plaintiffs argue in part thlat they were not required
to provide the names of persons involved because such
requirement appears on the Grievance Form as opposed to in the

Standard

Operating

Procedures

Department of Corrections.

("SOP")

of

the

Georgia

(Doc. 135, at 13-14; Doc. 142, at

13-14.) This argument is without merit; the Grievance Form is
explicitly identified within and appended to the SOP. Its use
is a required step in the exhaustion process and is therefore
an integral part of the grievance procedure.

Attical complain that Plaintiffs'

grievances fail to mention

them by name or any description of

events

or conduct

that

could reasonably identify them.
Plaintiff Jackson's grievance form reads as follows:

On 12/31/10 after regaining control of a disturbance
in D-2 Dorm,

Smith State Prison.

and subdued with mace.

Sgt.

While han[d]cuffed

Joseph Catanzai

(sic)

and escort off. repeatedly beat! me in the head, face,
and body with a hammer and blackjack all the way to
the medical door.
Inside medical waiting room
officers continued to punch and kick me.
(Id. , Ex.

1.)

Plaintiff Jackson requests "criminal charges

brought upon all officers that participated!"

(Id.)

Plaintiff Stevenson's grievance form reads as follows:
12-31-10 at D2 Dormitory, Petit ioner was assaulted by
Lt. McFarland (sic) and Sgt
Cantarzati (sic) 2nd
shift along with numerous other officers, while
handcuffed in restraints.

numerous

which

times

were

with

used

as

a

Said officers assaulted me

metal

brass

hammer

knuckles

and

handcuffs

....

Said

incident was witnessed by Micheal (sic) Briscoe and
numerous persons of Smith S.P. (Grady Williams).

(Id. , Ex.

2.)

Plaintiff Stevenson requests * [c]riminal and

civil charges to be brought against said officers . . . ."
(IdJ
The Eleventh Circuit addressed

a similar question to the

one presented here in Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir
2000) .

The question before the Brown court was "whether the

§ 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement always prohibits a prisoner

from

suing

any

defendant

other

than

those

administrative grievance the prisoner filed."
8

named

in

the

Id. at 1207

The

Eleventh Circuit unequivocally held that

it

does

not.

I

Rather,

the

prisoner

need

only

provide

"all

the

relevant

information he has, including the identity of any officials he

thinks have wronged him and any witnesses."

Id. at 1208.

The

court reasoned that a prisoner cannot identify those whose
identities are unknown to him and that the PLRA did not intend

to "shut[] the courthouse door to a prisoner who, at the time

he filed his grievance,

did not know and could not readily

ascertain the identity of the individuals responsible for the
alleged

injury

or

deprivation."

The

Id.

United

States

Supreme Court did not change this analysis in Jones v. Bock,

54 9 U.S. 199, but rather supported the Brown rationale when it
held that nothing in the PLRA "imposes a 'name all defendants'
i

requirement"

upon

Importantly,

the

a

prison

Jones

grievance

Court

form.

concluded

Id.

that

the

at

217.

level

of

detail required in a prison grievance would vary not only from

system to system but from "claim to claim" as well.
218;

see

also

id.

at

219

(n [E] xhaustion

is

not

Id. at
per

se

inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not

named in the grievances.

We leave it to the court below in

the first instance to determine |the sufficiency of the
exhaustion in these cases.").

In reviewing Plaintiffs'

Court

is

mindful

of

the

grievances in this case,

purposes

behind

the

the

exhaustion

requirement.

The

exhaustion

requirement

"eliminate[s]

unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration

of

prisons"

and

allows

"'corrections

officials

time

and

opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing
initiation of a federal case.'"

93 (2006)

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

(quoted source omitted); see also Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. at 204 ("Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an
opportunity to resolve disputes

their

responsibilities

before

concerning the exercise of

being

haled

into

court.");

Toennings v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 600 F. App'x 645, 649 (11th
Cir. 2 015) ("The critical function of the grievance process is
that it provides the institution with notice of a problem such
i

that

they

have

internally.")
10,

an

opportunity

to

address

(citing with approval Brown,

the

problem

212 F.3d at 1209-

for the proposition that "[e]xhaustion of the grievance

procedure does

not

require

that

every single defendant be

identified by name").
The

Court has

also considered the

cases

cited by the

parties to include Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., 627 F.3d

1215

(11th

Cir.

2010) .

In

Parzyck,

the

Eleventh

Circuit

concluded that a prison grievance form that did not list the
name of the doctor defendant was not insufficient for a claim

involving the ongoing denial of medical attention.

Plaintiffs

cite Paryzyck in a conclusive way for the proposition that

10

" [a]

prisoner need not name any particular defendant

grievance in order to properly exhaust his claim."
1218-19.
because

Defendants
it

distinct

This

involved

occurrence,

Court

uses

complain
a

that

continuous

and

Paryzck

because

as

an

Paryzyck
failure

it

is

to

involved

example

of

in a

Id.

at

inapposite
act,

not

Florida

analyzing

a

law.

the

exhaustion requirement on a case by case basis in accordance
with the policy reasons behind it,

Id.

at

1219

("Section

1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement is designed 'to alert prison
officials to a problem,

not to provide personal notice to a

particular official that he may be sued

. . . .'"

(quoted

sources omitted)).

Defendants also cite Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App'x 769

(11th Cir.

2 014),

in which the Eleventh Circuit found that a

grievance

form which omitted the defendant's

name did not

properly exhaust the prisoner's administrative remedies.
subject grievance form,

stated in relevant part:

however,

The

was sparse in that it only

"My hand is fractured your officer

handcuffed me behind my back."

Id.

at 772.

At the summary

judgment stage, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's
excessive force claim for failure to exhaust upon finding that

the grievance was untimely and failed to include not only the
officer's name, which was known to the plaintiff at the time

of filing the grievance, but also that the officer "handcuffed

11

him too tightly or jerked him up on the handcuffs."

776.

Id. at

By contrast, Plaintiffs' grievances in this case provide

greater detail.

Finally,

the

parties

decision in Toenniges,
court

recognized

discuss

the

Eleventh

600 F. App'x 645.

that

"[t] he

Circuit's

In Toenniges,
function

critical

the
the

of

grievance process is that it provides the institution with

notice of
address

a problem such that they have an opportunity to

the

problem

internally."

Id.

at

649.

The

court

concluded that the Georgia prisoner's failure to name a doctor
defendant on his grievance form was fatal to his claim because

the

grievance,

filed

and

prior

grieved

to

the

doctor's

treatment, did not serve the purpose of putting the prison on
notice of an ongoing problem with the prisoner's treatment or
give the prison an opportunity to address the medical issue.
i

Id.

Again,

the

court's

focus

was

on whether

the

subject

grievance served the purposes of the exhaustion requirement.
In the case at bar,

distinct incident

Plaintiffs'

grievances describe a

(identified by date and place)

of alleged

unlawful beatings of Plaintiffs in the dormitory,

in transit

to

the

medical

unit,

and while

in

the

medical

unit.

The

grievances provide a few names along with the allegation that
"numerous" unidentified officers participated in the beatings.

It is clear from both grievances that Plaintiffs believed more

12

than the named officers were involved.

There can be no doubt

that if the allegations are true, it would be very difficult
for

an

aggressively

beaten

inmate

in

such

tumultuous

circumstances to remember or be aware of every officer who was

present and participated in the abuse.

It is also noteworthy

that the allegations arise out of a prison disturbance that
had

to

be

well-known

and

thoroughly

prison.

Indeed,

Plaintiffs

short,

this

Court

chargejs

will

not

were

hold

brought

by

the

for their involvement.

In

criminal

investigated

these

against

particular

prisoners under the circumstances of this case to a strict
"'name all defendants'

requirement!'

at

the pleadings stage

because of the instructions on the grievance form.

v. Bock,

54 9 U.S.

at 217.

Certainly,

See Jones

the grievances put the

prison on notice of potential claims, particularly given the
heinous

nature

of

the

allegations.

Finally,

the

Court

observes that the parties are diligently conducting discovery

and represent that they are carefully considering which of the
named Defendants

should remain

in

the

case

(Joint

Status

Report, Doc. 174 (listing 15 Defendants that Plaintiffs are
prepared to dismiss and stating that "[t]he parties will
continue

to

discuss

whether

additional

Defendants

can

be

dismissed from the case before motions for summary judgment
are due to be filed").)

13

IV.

Upon the foregoing,

CONCLUSION

the Court concludes that Plaintiffs

did not fail to exhaust their administrative remedies against
Defendants

Accordingly,

Eason

and

Attical

under

the

circumstances.

the Court DENIES Defendants Eason and Attical's

motions for judgment on the pleadings.

(Docs. 132 & 134.)

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this ^r_7^aky of June,
2017.

jL,

CHIEF JUDGE

UNitED States district court
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

14