Eason v. Evans County Board of Commissioners et al

Filing 22

ORDER granting 10 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 10/17/2013. (loh)

I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
CONNIE EASON,
Plaintiff,
V

6:13-cv-41

.

EVANS COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; IRENE BURNEY;
JACK PINCKARD; NEIL HAMMOCK;
and SHEILA HOLLAND,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss. ECF No. 10. Defendants
primarily argue that Connie Eason fails to
state a claim for gender discrimination. Id
at 4-5. Eason, of course, disagrees. ECF
No. 16. The four corners of Eason's
complaint, however, belie her disagreement.
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants'
motion.
II.

BACKGROUND

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the
Court accepts as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See
Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302
(11th Cir. 2011).
Between October, 2006 and June 6,
2012, Eason "was an experienced and fully
trained Code Enforcement Officer for
[Evans] County." ECF No. 1 at 4. "Eason
underwent surgery on February 20, 2012."
Id.
Upon her return to work, Eason

requested light duty work pursuant to her
treating physician's recommendation. Id.
Evans County ("County") did not
accommodate her request. Id. "On June 6,
2012 . . . Eason was terminat, unlike her
male counterparts whose lig1J dutyvork
restrictions and .da1es wei% c
accommodated. Id.

-_, -

Eason appealed the terminn. 4t her: :
appeal hearing, Eason
rindeci all.:
.Defendants that they roui4ely iuiade
accommodations for simi1arl. ivated male
employees." Id. at 5. Sh&ls4 reminded
them "that a male county employee with
worse disabilities and more crippling
limitations than [Eason] was currently on the
payroll." Id.
All the reminders mattered not.
"Defendants upheld their decision to
terminate.. . Eason," and replaced her with
"a male whose duties are tailored for the
light duty work restrictions that would have
accommodated [Eason's] light duty work
restrictions." Id
Eason then filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. ECF No. 1-1.
The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on
January 17, 2013, ECF No. 1-2, and Eason
filed this suit almost four months later. ECF
No. 1. Defendants answered and filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
ECF Nos. 9; 10; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
requires complaints to contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." "While a

Title VII and § 1983 claims, then her § 1981
claim.

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations," it must contain "more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A. Title VII and § 1983
Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating in the workplace on the basis
of, among other things, an individual's
gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Disparate
treatment, like that Eason alleges, "can
constitute illegal discrimination when 'an
employer has treated a particular person less
favorably than others because of a protected
trait." Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 482 F.
App'x 394, 396 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577
(2009)).

Courts must "take all of the factual
allegations in [a] complaint as true," but
those allegations must raise "more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added). Indeed,
"[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability," it falls short of stating a claim for
relief. Id (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557). With that review lens established, the
Court turns to the complaint's claims.

To state a claim for disparate treatment,
however, "a Title VII complaint need not
allege facts sufficient to make out a classic
McDonnell Douglas2 prima facie case" of
discrimination. Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir.
2008). A plaintiff must instead provide
enough factual allegations, taken as true, to
suggest intentional discrimination based on
a protected trait. See Id. The elements of a
prima facie case nevertheless remain

IV. DISCUSSION
Eason's complaint alleges violations of
Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983,
all centered on Defendants' alleged
disparate treatment of Eason based on her
gender.' The Court addresses first Eason's
Eason also seeks punitive damages, purportedly
against Irene Burney, Jack Pinckard, Neil Hammock,
and Sheila Holland in their individual capacities.
ECF No. 16 at 5. Eason, however, misunderstands
the difference between individual and official
capacity claims. She asserts that "[a]s supervisors
and agents of the County, each defendant is
individually culpable." Id. That simply is an
incorrect statement of law. In fact, "[t]he relief
granted under Title VII is against the employer, not
individual employees." Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga.
Bd of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000)
(emphasis added). Supervisory employees, like the
defendants here, are only proper defendants in a Title
VII action insofar as they are agents of their
employer. Id Defendants are not liable in their
individual capacities and Eason's request for punitive
damages against them therefore must fail. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (prohibiting the recovery of

punitive damages against "a government,
governmental agency or political subdivision," like
the County).
2
The McDonnell Douglas framework gives courts an
evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement, by
which to evaluate Title VII claims supported by
circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510
(2002). At the motion to dismiss stage then, where
no evidence yet exists, plaintiffs are not required to
"make a showing of each prong of the prima facie
test" outlined in McDonnell Douglas. See Raj v. La.
State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
Swierkiewicz's discussion of the McDonnell Douglas
test).
"To establish a prima fade case, a plaintiff must
show that (1) [s]he is a member of a protected class;
PA

relevant and may be used as a point of
reference in evaluating disparate treatment
claims. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 551;
Harney v. McCatur, Inc., No. CV-11-S4103-NE, 2012 WL 2479630, at *4 (N.D.
Ala. 2012).
Regardless, Eason provides insufficient
factual allegations suggesting that
Defendants intentionally discriminated
against her on the basis of gender. After
refusing to accommodate her light duty
work request, Eason complains that the
County (1) terminated her; (2)
accommodated male employees, and (3)
replaced her with a disabled man whose
"disabilities and more crippling limitations"
the County accommodated. ECF No. 1 at 5.
The allegation that the County
accommodated disabled males is nothing
more than a bare assertion that amounts to a
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a
constitutional discrimination claim,"
namely, that Defendants treated males
similarly situated to Eason differently than
her. Iqbai, 556 U.S. at 681. "As such, the
allegation [is] conclusory and not entitled to
be assumed true." Id
Eason's statement that Defendants
replaced her with a man who required light
duty work restrictions, although factual, also
does not save her complaint. While that
statement is "consistent with [the County's]
(2) [s]he was qualified for his job; (3) [s]he was
subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4)
h[er] employer treated similarly-situated employees
outside his class more favorably or replaced him with
someone outside his class." MackMuhammad v.
Cagle's Inc., 379 F. App'x 801, 804 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs.
Of Fla. Dep't of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2003)).

liability," it is insufficient to push Eason's
claims over the possible-plausible divide.
Id. at 678.
The plaintiffs complaint in Twombly is
illustrative. There, plaintiffs alleged a
violation of the Sherman Act, which
"enjoins only anticompetitive conduct
'effected by a contract, combination, or
conspiracy." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.
Plaintiffs then "flatly pleaded . . . that the
defendants' 'parallel course of conduct.
to prevent competition' and inflate prices
was indicative of the unlawful agreement
alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551). The Court held
that the factual allegation of parallel conduct
"was consistent with an unlawful
agreement" but "did not plausibly suggest an
illicit accord" sufficient to state a claim to
relief.
So too here. Defendants' replacement of
Eason with a disabled man certainly
supports an inference of gender
discrimination. But like the parallel course
of conduct by two competitors in Twombly
that did not make an unlawful,
anticompetitive agreement a more likely
explanation, hiring a man after terminating a
woman does not, absent more, make
discrimination a more likely explanation.
Eason's failure to allege sufficient facts
supporting her Title VII claim is also fatal to
her § 1983 equal protection claim because
"there is no difference between the scope of
Title VII and the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause concerning intentional
discrimination in the form of disparate
treatment in the public workplace." Snider
v. Jefferson State Cmty. Coil., 344 F.3d

'[T]he
1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003).
elements of a claim under each are
identical" and so a failure of one is a failure
of the other. Id The Court accordingly
DISMISSES both Eason's Title VII and §
1983 claims.

This/pay of October 2013

B. Section 1981
I3.'A7ANDENFIELD, JI,DGE
UNITED STATES DISTRT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

By its text, § 1981 provides the same
rights to contract to "[a]ll persons" as those
enjoyed by "white citizens." The statute's
plain language thus speaks only in terms of
race and citizenship status. So while § 1981
protects against race and alienage
discrimination, it does not extend to
discrimination based on national origin and
it certainly does not extend to gender
discrimination. See Tippie v. Spacelabs
Med., Inc., 180 F. App'x 51, 56 (11th Cir.
2006) ("[S]ection 1981 applies to claims of
discrimination based on race, not national
origin.").
Even if § 1981 did apply, which it does
not, Eason's claim would fail because like §
1983, the legal elements of a § 1981 claim
are identical to those of a Title VII claim
when a plaintiff predicates liability on
disparate treatment. Underwood v. Perry
CnIy. Comm 'ii, 431 F.3d 788, 793 (11th Cir.
2005). In any case, Eason's § 1981 claim
necessarily fails as a matter of law and so it
is DISMISSED.
V. CONCLUSION
All of Eason's claims—under Title VII
and §§ 1981 and 1983—fail because
Eason's complaint lacks sufficient plausible
factual allegations that Defendants treated
disabled males differently. Defendants'
motion to dismiss therefore is GRANTED
and this case is DISMISSED.
ILI