Waters v. Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice

Filing 18

ORDER denying 10 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge B. Avant Edenfield on 7/30/14. (bcw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
JOHNNY DARNELL WATERS,
Plaintiff,
V

6:14-cv-1O

.

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JEFFREY W.
ALLICOOD, and TIMOTHY L.
STRICKLAND,
Defendants.
1]

1 I) D

I. INTRODUCTION
Johnny Darnell Waters brings this action
against the Georgia Department of Juvenile
Justice ("DJJ") and employees Jeffrey
Alligood and Timothy L. Strickland for
deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights
and violation of the Georgia Whistleblower
Act. ECF Nos. 1; 6. Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss in lieu of answer. ECF
No. 10. The Court determines that Waters
has stated an adequate claim upon which
relief may be granted and DENIES the
motion. However, Defendants' argument
that Waters failed to pursue available State
remedies is not frivolous, and if warranted,
the Defendants may raise it again in the
Summary Judgment phase.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Facts from the Complaints
The Court accepts the relevant facts
from the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and the
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 6, as true for
the purpose of evaluating the Motion to

Dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Waters worked for the DJJ
from 2007 to February 7, 2012. ECF No. 6
at 3, 5. The DJJ suspended Waters in
December but terminated him by letter on
February 7. Id. at 4-5. The DJJ issued a
press release regarding the allegations
surrounding Waters's dismissal which was
published in newspapers and online. Id. at
6. Waters never received notice of
opportunity to clear his name. Id. at 5.
B. Standard of Review
Defendants move for dismissal pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. 570 (2007)).
C. Analysis
In relevant part, Alligood and Strickland
argue that Waters cannot prevail on a
procedural due process claim because the
State did not "refl.ise[] to provide a process
sufficient to remedy the procedural
deprivation." ECF No. 10-1 at 7 (quoting
Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330
(11th Cir. 2000)). Waters distinguishes
Cotton from this case because the
Defendants did not notify him of his right to
request a hearing. ECF No. 13 at 8.
In Cotton, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the availability of mandamus
relief precluded recovery under a due
process claim. Cotton, 216 F.3d at 1333.
"[T]he state procedure need not provide all
the relief available under section 1983." Id
at 1331. The "inquiry concerns whether

III. CONCLUSION

adequate procedures were available to
Plaintiff to protect his right not to be
deprived of his liberty interest in his
reputation by state action without the
opportunity for a name-clearing hearing."
Id.

The Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, is
The litigation shall move
DENIED.
forward in this Court for all parties.

This

As the Complaint reads, the State did not
provide an adequate remedy for Waters.
Even if the mandamus process was available
to Waters as suggested by Cotton, the case
does not address whether the issuance of the
press release violated due process rights.
Here, Waters faced a long suspension before
termination by letter. If the press release
occurred immediately after termination—or
even before—the DJJ would have done
irreversible harm before Waters ever had the
opportunity for a name-clearing hearing or
mandamus review. Cotton is distinguishable
here, and does not serve as a basis for
dismissal.

day of July 2014.

B. AVANT EDENFIELD, JUflGE /
UNITED STATES DISTRJC41'COIJ5RT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OI'A3EORGIA

All parties should note that Cotton
challenged the availability of a state remedy
at the summary judgment stage. This
defense may still prove tenable, and the
Court will entertain it given the proper set of
discoverable facts.
As the Court refuses to dismiss the due
process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Court maintains supplemental
jurisdiction over the Georgia Whistleblower
Act claims. Likewise, the DJJ must answer
to those allegations in spite of the fact that
both parties agree the entity is not subject to
suit pursuant to § 1983. ECF Nos. 10-1 at34; 13 at 4-5.

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