Daker v. Head et al

Filing 410

ORDER Overruling 380 Objections to Order filed by Waseem Daker. The Magistrate Judge's 354 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct remains the Order of this Court. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 3/31/2022. (pts)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:14-cv-47

v.
BRIAN OWENS, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s January
3, 2022 Order. (Doc. 380.) For the reasons below, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s Order. The Magistrate Judge’s Order remains the Order of the Court.
Plaintiff moved to amend or supplement his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 339.) Plaintiff
sought to add more than 100 new defendants and add a number of unrelated claims, including
claims which the Court has already dismissed. (Doc. 354, pp. 4, 6.) The Magistrate Judge denied
Plaintiff’s Motion because his proposed supplementation violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8 and 20, he unduly delayed filing his Motion, and allowing an amendment now would prejudice
Defendants and create a completely unmanageable case for the Court. (See generally id.) Plaintiff
now challenges those rulings by the Magistrate Judge.
A district judge must consider a party’s objections to a magistrate judge’s order on a pretrial
matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). However, the district judge may
modify or set aside that order, and reconsider the pretrial matter, only “where it has been shown

that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge erred in finding his proposed Complaint violated
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Doc. 380, pp. 4–6.) Plaintiff contends he sufficiently
connected defendants to allegations. (Id., p. 4.) Plaintiff’s argument on this point is conclusory
and upon reviewing Plaintiff’s filings, the Court cannot say the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion is
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Moreover, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded

Plaintiff’s policy or custom claims were improperly pled. Plaintiff brought policy or custom
claims against dozens of Defendants for each purported unconstitutional policy or custom.
(Doc. 392-1, pp. 21, 30, 33, 38, 70, 75, 83.) If Plaintiff is asserting “these defendants had a policy
that was enforced throughout the prison, he must provide facts that show they could implement
such a policy.” Smith v. Farcas, No. 1:07-cv-58, 2008 WL 2557535, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 17,
2008); Lawrence v. W. Publ’g Corp., No. 1:15-CV-3341, 2016 WL 4257741, at *10 (N.D. Ga.
June 17, 2016) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff fails to identify a county policy or custom through the repeated
acts of a final policy maker that caused her injuries, she fails to state a claim for relief.”). Put
simply, Plaintiff’s proposed pleading violates Rule 8 because he does not identify which
Defendants are responsible for implementing the purportedly unconstitutional policy.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES this portion of Plaintiff’s Objections, as the Court cannot
conclude the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint violates Rule 8 is
clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s proposed
Complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. (Doc. 380, pp. 6–8.) Plaintiff contends
his amendments containing allegations from 2016 and 2017 should be permitted because they are

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related to his 2014 Tier II procedural due process claim. Specifically, Plaintiff states he can use
the allegations from 2016 and 2017 to show in 2014 the Tier II conditions impose an atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, which is required under
Sandin. (Id., pp. 6–7.) Thus, Defendants from 2016 and 2017 are properly joined under Rule 20.
The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how conditions years later
would show whether Tier II conditions in 2014 impose an atypical and significant hardship, as
required by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995). Plaintiff offers nothing more than
conclusory assertions on this point. Moreover, allowing Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would
result in a totally unmanageable case, which counsels against allowing such an amendment.
(Doc. 354, p. 4 (citing Dickerson v. Donald, 252 F. App’x 277, 279 (11th Cir. 2007).)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Objections to this portion of the Order related to Rule 20 are
OVERRULED.
Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge denying his Motion because the amendment
was unduly delayed, in bad faith, and would prejudice Defendants. (Doc. 380, pp. 8–13.) The
Magistrate Judge concluded the relevant period for measuring undue delay was from the date of
Plaintiff’s original complaint—May 11, 2014. (Doc. 354, p. 6.) Plaintiff contends the Court is
required to use some later date, such as adoption of the order denying his initial motion to amend
or the order overruling his objections on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 380, p. 8.) Plaintiff
offers no support for this position, and there is no indication the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on
this date was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. To the extent Plaintiff argues his inability to
access his legal materials should excuse any undue delay, the Court disagrees. (Id., pp. 10–11.)
During the time Plaintiff’s access has been purportedly limited, he has submitted more than 50
filing to the Court. (Docs. 273, 280–88, 292, 295, 296, 298, 300, 301, 303, 305, 309, 310, 312,

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313–16, 319, 321, 322, 324, 330, 334, 335, 336, 338–40, 344, 347, 351–53, 357–59, 360, 362,
364–67.) Any restrictions on Plaintiff’s access to his legal materials or the law library have not
impeded Plaintiff from availing himself of the Court.
Similarly, the fact Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of already dismissed claims is
immaterial. (Doc. 380, pp. 11–13.) The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded Plaintiff attempted
to assert claims that were already dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff filing a motion for reconsideration on that ruling does not open the door to allow him to
re-assert these claims in a subsequent pleading. To hold otherwise would allow a litigant to
continually re-assert an already disposed of claim based on simply filing a motion for
reconsideration and forcing a defendant to defend against that claim indefinitely. Indeed, the fact
a motion for reconsideration was filed underscores the lack of need to amend to bring the claim.
If the motion for reconsideration had been granted, the claim would simply remain in the case.
(See Docs. 385, 393 (denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration).)

Finally, Plaintiff’s

arguments that Defendants would not be prejudiced by the proposed Amended Complaint is
conclusory and without merit.

Accordingly, the Court also OVERRULES this portion of

Plaintiff’s Objections. The Magistrate Judge’s January 3, 2022 Order is not clearly erroneous or
contrary to law; thus, it remains the Order of the Court.
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of March, 2022.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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