Clark v. Owens et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 18 Motion as to Rule 56(f); denying 20 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Should it become apparent later on in the proceedings that counsel should be appointed; the Court will entertain this motion again at the appropriate time. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 3/23/2015. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
JUSTIN CLARK,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
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v.
:
:
:
BRIAN OWNES, STANLEY WILLIAMS,
:
CO DEAL, ERIC SMOKES, LT. COLEMAN, :
DENNIS BROWN, ERIC SELLERS, GEORGE :
IVEY, JARVIS PRIMUS, MICHAEL RANSOM, :
DR. LIFT, KENNETH BURNETTE, GREGORY :
McLAUGHLIN, DON BLAKELY, and
:
TRACY McINTYRE,
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Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV614-122

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Letter Motion filed on February 25, 2015 and
Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 18 & Doc. 20.) After careful consideration, and
for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED.
I.

Plaintiff’s Letter Motion
In his Letter Motion (Doc. 18.), Plaintiff asserts that Macon State Prison has denied him

access to the materials that he needs at the prison’s law library and has denied receipt of a legal
manual by mail. Plaintiff requests that the Court direct Macon State Prison to provide him access
to the requested legal materials.
This Motion implicates Plaintiff’s constitutional right of access to the courts. Barbour v.
Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977))
(“It is now clearly established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.”)
In Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to

the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful
legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from
persons trained in the law.” 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S. Ct. at 1498.
However, prisoners’ right to access legal materials is not unlimited. See, Wanninger v.
Davenport, 697 F.2d 992, 993 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that prison does not have to provide
prisoner with free, unlimited access to photocopies of legal documents). Moreover, courts must
accord “wide-ranging and substantial deference to prisoner administrators in their execution of
policies and practices that they consider necessary to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security. Such deference is justified because of the complexity of prison
management, the fact that responsibility therefor is necessarily vested in prison officials, and the
fact that courts are ill-equipped to deal with such problems.” Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317,
1328 (11th Cir. 2008).
At this early stage of this proceeding, the Court will not interfere with the library access
policy and procedure at Macon State Prison. This action has not yet been subjected to frivolity
review and has not been served on any defendants. Therefore, at this stage, the Court is unable to
fully assess whether Plaintiff’s right to access legal materials has been impermissibly impinged.
For this reason, Plaintiff’s Letter Motion is DENIED. However, should it become evident later in
this action, through a renewed motion of Plaintiff or otherwise, that Plaintiff is not being provided
adequate access to legal materials, the Court will address the issue at that time.
II.

Plaintiff’s Motion To Appoint Counsel
Additionally, Plaintiff again requests that the Court appoint counsel to assist him in this

matter. (Doc. 20.) As the Court pointed out in its prior order denying Plaintiff’s first Motion to
Appoint Counsel, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case such as this

one, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, in the absence of the showing of an
exceptional circumstance. the Court is not inclined to appoint counsel to assist Plaintiff. Wahl vs.
McIver, 773 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1985). The Court does not ascertain that circumstances have
changed since its Order denying Plaintiff’s first Motion to Appoint Counsel in any manner that
would warrant the Court revisiting that decision.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for the

appointment of counsel is DENIED. Should it become apparent later on in the proceedings that
counsel should be appointed, the Court will entertain this motion again at the appropriate time.
SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of March, 2015.

___________________________________
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA