Clark v. Owens et al

Filing 24

ORDER denying as moot 3 Motion for TRO; Motion for Preliminary Injunction; 9 Motion for TRO; Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 4/30/2015. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
JUSTIN CLARK,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV614-122

v.
BRIAN OWENS, Commissioner, Individually
and in his Official Capacity; STANLEY
WILLIAMS, Warden, Smith State Prison,
Individually and in his Official Capacity; C/O
DEAL, Smith State Prison, Individually and in
his Official Capacity; C/O ERIC SMOKES,
Smith State Prison, Individually and in his
Official Capacity; LT. COLEMAN,
Individually and in his Official Capacity;
DENNIS BROWN, Warden, Hancock State
Prison, Individually and in his Official
Capacity; ERIC SELLARS, Hancock State
Prison, Individually and in his Official
Capacity; C/O GEORGE IVEY, Hancock State
Prison, Individually and in his Official
Capacity; C/O JARVIS PRIMUS, Hancock
State Prison, Individually and in his Official
Capacity; C/O MICHAEL RANSOM,
Hancock State Prison, Individually and in his
Official Capacity; DR. LIFT, Medical
Director, Hancock State Prison, Individually
and in his Official Capacity; C/O KENNETH
BURNETTE, Hancock State Prison,
Individually and in his Official Capacity;
GREGORY MCLAUGHLIN, Warden, Macon
State Prison, Individually and in his Official
Capacity; DON BLAKELY, Deputy Warden,
Macon State Prison, Individually and in his
Official Capacity; and C/O TRACY
MCINTYRE, Macon State Prison, Individually
and in his Official Capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Macon State Prison in Oglethorpe, Georgia,
filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his
confinement while housed at Macon State Prison and, previously, at Smith State Prison in
Glenville, Georgia, and Hancock State Prison in Sparta, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) The undersigned has
conducted an initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Pursuant to that review, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and state-law claims against Williams, Deal,
Smokes, Coleman, and Commissioner Owens arising out of the alleged events at Smith State
Prison be SEVERED into a separate lawsuit from his claims against Defendants Brown, Sellers,
Ivey, Primus, Ransom, Lift, Burnette, McLaughlin, Blakely, McIntyre, and Commissioner
Owens relating to Hancock State Prison and Macon State Prison. The undersigned further
recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Williams, Deal, Smokes, Coleman, and
Commissioner Owens concerning Smith State Prison be DISMISSED. In addition, Plaintiff’s
suit against Brown, Sellers, Ivey, Primus, Ransom, Lift, Burnette, McLaughlin, Blakely,
McIntyre, and Commissioner Owens should be TRANSFERRED to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Consistent with those recommendations, Plaintiff’s
Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motions for Preliminary Injunction are
DENIED as moot. (Docs. 3–4, 9–10.)
The Court provides additional instructions to Plaintiff pertaining to his right to file
objections to this Report and Recommendation, which he is urged to read.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In any civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity, Section 1915A requires a district court to screen the

2

prisoner’s complaint for cognizable claims before, or as soon as possible after, docketing. 28
U.S.C § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages
from a defendant who is immune. Id. § 1915A(b). Similarly, Section 1915, which governs a
prisoner’s payment of filing fees, states that a court must dismiss an action that “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In conducting this review, the Court must ensure that the prisoner plaintiff has complied
with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A. However, in
determining compliance, the undersigned is guided by the longstanding principle that pro se
pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);
Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
In addition, the Court is guided by the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the language in Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. Noting that
this language closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
(“Rule 12(b)(6)”), the court held that the same standards for deciding whether to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to the initial review of prisoner
complaints under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Id.

While the court in Mitchell interpreted

Section 1915, its interpretation guides this Court in applying the nearly identical language of the
screening provisions in Section 1915A. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (dismissal
pursuant to Section 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim governed by same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)).

3

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff must assert “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not”
suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Because “[p]ro se pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys,” they are liberally construed.
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff asserts a broad spectrum of contentions in his Complaint against numerous
Defendants. His allegations pertain to his imprisonment at Smith State Prison, Hancock State
Prison, and Macon State Prison. (Doc. 1, pp. 4–14.)
Plaintiff contends that while he was housed at Smith State Prison on September 26, 2013,
he received a disciplinary report for allegedly possessing drugs in his cell and, subsequently, was
moved to housing in administrative segregation. (Id. at pp. 4–5.) Plaintiff asserts that his
placement in administrative segregation violated prison policy regarding the qualifications for
administrative segregation and the requirement of a disciplinary hearing within ninety-six hours
after placement therein. (Id. at pp. 5–6.) According to Plaintiff, his disciplinary hearing did not
occur until October 10, 2013, at which time Lieutenant Coleman (“Coleman”) found Plaintiff
guilty of the charge of possession of drugs, based solely on the allegations in the disciplinary
report and without producing any drug-testing results. (Id. at p. 6.) Plaintiff avers that he filed
administrative appeals with Warden Stanley Williams (“Williams”) but that Williams never
responded within the allotted time period. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) Plaintiff further represents that
Correctional Officer Deal (“Deal”) is responsible for approving all housing assignments on

4

behalf of Williams and that Correctional Officer Eric Smokes (“Smokes”) supervises
administrative segregation at this facility. (Id. at p. 2.)
Plaintiff states that on November 14, 2013, he was transferred to Hancock State Prison,
where he was assigned immediately to the administrative segregation program supervised by
Correctional Officer Michael Ransom (“Ransom”). (Id. at p. 8.) Plaintiff submits that his
housing assignment at this facility violated prison policy, because it was determined based on his
previous placement at Smith State Prison rather than on a disciplinary hearing upon transfer.
(Id.) Plaintiff maintains that he appealed his assignment to Warden Dennis Brown (“Brown”)
and never received a response. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that on July 25, 2014,
Correctional Officers George Ivey (“Ivey”) and Jarvis Primus (“Primus”) confiscated Plaintiff’s
property, including his asthma pump, and Correctional Officer Kenneth Burnette (“Burnette”)
informed Plaintiff that his belongings would not be returned until the following week. (Id. at
p. 9.) According to Plaintiff, he filed a grievance against Ivey and Primus, and, in retaliation, Dr.
Lift (“Lift”), the Medical Director of the facility, discontinued his respiratory treatment. (Id. at
p. 11.) Plaintiff also avers that Ivey, Primus, and Burnette fabricated disciplinary reports against
him and that Warden Eric Sellers (“Sellers”) threatened him on one occasion. (Id. at pp. 10,
12-13.)
Plaintiff further alleges that he was transferred to Macon State Prison on September 26,
2014, where he again was placed in administrative segregation immediately and without a
hearing. (Id. at p. 13.) Plaintiff submits that he also was not given a form to appeal his
assignment to administrative segregation, as required by prison policy. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains
that Warden Gregory McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”) is responsible for the operation of Macon
State Prison, Deputy Warden Don Blakely (“Blakely”) approves all housing assignments on

5

behalf of McLaughlin, and Correctional Officer Tracy McIntyre (“McIntyre”) oversees the
administrative segregation program at this facility. (Id. at p. 4.)
On November 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint arguing that the alleged
events at Smith State Prison, Hancock State Prison, and Macon State Prison violated his
constitutional and state-law rights. (Id. at pp. 1, 15–16.) As Defendants, Plaintiff names the
officials from these facilities, as well as Brian Owens, the Commissioner of the Georgia
Department of Corrections (“Commissioner Owens”), individually and in their official
capacities. (Id. at pp. 2–4.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Smith State Prison officials
Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman; Hancock State Prison officials Brown, Ivey, Ransom,
and Sellers; and Macon State Prison officials McLaughlin, Blakely, and McIntyre violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection by failing to follow prison
policy in assigning him to administrative segregation at their respective facilities. (Id. at p. 15.)
In addition, Plaintiff claims that the actions of Hancock State Prison officials Sellers, Ivey,
Primus, Burnette, and Lift with regard to his respiratory treatment constituted deliberate
indifference to his medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and negligence under
Georgia law.

(Id. at pp. 15–16.)

Plaintiff also sets forth conspiracy claims against

Commissioner Owens; Smith State Prison officials Williams and Deal; and Hancock State Prison
officials Brown, Ivey, and Sellers, on the basis that their failure to investigate his administrative
appeals demonstrated a conspiracy to violate his rights. (Id. at p. 16.) Furthermore, it appears
that Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia
tort law against all of the named Defendants. (See id. at p. 1 (“Plaintiff also alleges the tort[ ] of
[i]ntentional [i]nfliction of mental or emotional distress.”); id. at pp. 17–18 (seeking

6

compensatory damages for “emotional injury” resulting from his placement in administrative
segregation as well as the discontinuation of his respiratory treatment)).
As relief, Plaintiff requests a declaration that the officials violated his constitutional and
state-law rights, in addition to compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at pp. 16–18.) Plaintiff
also asks that the Court expunge his disciplinary reports at these facilities and issue preliminary
injunctions ordering Owens and McLaughlin to release him from administrative segregation and
arrange for him to undergo a medical examination. (Id. at pp. 16–17.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s allegations implicate numerous theories of liability, and the undersigned
addresses each of these in turn. This analysis applies the Standard of Review set forth above and
accepts Plaintiff’s nonconclusory factual allegations as true, as the Court must do at this stage.
I.

Improper Joinder
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the several Defendants jointly in this

action. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) (“Rule 20(a)(2)”), a plaintiff may
not join various defendants in one action unless two prongs are satisfied: (1) “any right to relief
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”; and (2) “any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In
determining whether to allow joinder, a district court “is guided by the underlying purpose of
joinder, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite the resolution of disputes, thereby
eliminating unnecessary lawsuits.” Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)).

7

Under the first prong, the term “transaction” is flexible and comprises “all logically related
events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another.” Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1323
(internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that allegations of a “pattern or practice” of
discrimination would describe such logically related events so as to meet the transaction
requirement). The second prong “does not require that all questions of law and fact raised by the
dispute be common, but only that some question of law or fact be common to all parties.” Id.
at 1324.
Even accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, Plaintiff fails to show that the first
prong of Rule 20(a)(2) is satisfied.

Plaintiff asserts no single right to relief against all

Defendants jointly, severally, or in the alternative. Plaintiff cites Section 1983 and his rights to
due process and equal protection as grounds for relief against ten of the fifteen Defendants,
jointly and severally: Smith State Prison officials Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman;
Hancock State Prison officials Brown, Sellers, Ivey, and Ransom; and Macon State Prison
officials McLaughlin, Blakely, and McIntyre. (Doc. 1, p. 17.) 1 However, Plaintiff’s asserted
rights to relief arise out of several isolated instances, in which Plaintiff believes different
officials at separate facilities failed to follow prison policy concerning placement in
administrative segregation. (See id. at pp. 6, 8, 13, 15, 17.) Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations
against Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman concern his initial placement in administrative
segregation at Smith State Prison on September 26, 2013; his claims against Brown, Sellers,
Ivey, and Ransom relate to his placement in administrative segregation upon transfer to Hancock
State Prison on November 14, 2013; and his claims against McLaughlin, Blakely, and McIntyre

1

As discussed supra, it seems that Plaintiff also may intend to state claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Georgia tort law. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert such claims against
these ten Defendants, those claims likewise fail under the first prong of Rule 20(a)(2), for the reasons
discussed here.

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arise out of his placement in administrative segregation upon transfer to Macon State Prison on
September 26, 2014. (Id. at pp. 4–5, 8, 13, 17.) While Plaintiff maintains that he was denied a
disciplinary hearing on each of these occasions, Plaintiff offers no facts demonstrating that this
alleged deprivation at the initial placement stage bore any logical relation to those allegedly
occurring upon transfer to the other facilities. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to establish any
plausible basis for holding Smith State Prison officials Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman
jointly and severally liable for the independent decisions of the officials at Hancock State Prison
and Macon State Prison. 2
Plaintiff’s contention that Smith State Prison officials Williams and Deal conspired with
the officials from the other facilities does not change this result. (Id. at pp. 14, 16.) Without any
facts suggesting that Williams and Deal reached some agreement with the other officials to
violate Plaintiff’s rights, such a conclusory allegation of conspiracy fails to plausibly establish
any logical connection between the actions of these officials, as required under Rule 20(a)(2).
See Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To establish a
prima facie case of section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the
defendants reached an understanding to violate his rights.” (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988),
overruled in part on other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1996))). Plaintiff also represents that the Hancock State Prison officials assigned Plaintiff to
administrative segregation upon transfer based on his previous placement at Smith State Prison;

2

For the reasons discussed with regard to venue infra Part II, the undersigned declines to consider
whether the alleged events at Hancock State Prison are part of the same transaction as those at Macon
State Prison, such that Plaintiff could proceed against the officials from those facilities jointly under
Rule 20(a)(2). Rather, for the purposes here, it is sufficient to find that the alleged incidents at Smith
State Prison were unrelated to those occurring elsewhere and that, as a result, the Smith State Prison
officials may not be joined with the remaining officials as Defendants in this action.

9

however, even accepting this fact as true, nothing suggests that the Hancock State Prison
officials’ decision not to provide a disciplinary hearing at that time—the action underlying
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims—were connected to the events allegedly transpiring at
Smith State Prison. (See Doc. 1, p. 8.)
Nor do Plaintiff’s remaining claims for relief satisfy the first prong of Rule 20(a)(2).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims alleging Eighth Amendment violations, as well as his negligence
claims under Georgia law, pertain only to Hancock State Prison officials Sellers, Ivey, Primus,
Burnette, and Lift, based on their alleged confiscation and discontinuation of Plaintiff’s
respiratory treatment. (Id. at pp. 15–16.) Relevant here is that Plaintiff does not seek relief from
any Smith State Prison official on these grounds. As a result, Plaintiff fails to state any right to
relief permitting him to proceed against the Smith State Prison officials and the remaining
officials jointly as Defendants under the first prong of Rule 20(a)(2). Furthermore, joinder under
these circumstances would be contrary to the purposes of Rule 20(a)(2), in that entertaining the
unrelated claims against the numerous officials would neither expedite their resolution nor
promote trial convenience. See Swan, 293 F.3d at 1253.
Despite Plaintiff’s improper joinder of these officials as Defendants here, “[m]isjoinder
of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Rather, a court “may at
any time, on just terms, add or drop a party” and “may also sever any claim against a party.” Id.
Consistent with these principles, and this Court’s obligation to construe Plaintiff’s pleadings in
his favor, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and state-law claims against
Smith State Prison officials Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman be SEVERED into a separate
lawsuit from his claims against the Hancock State Prison and Macon State Prison officials.
Because Plaintiff seeks to hold Commissioner Owens liable for the alleged events at each of

10

these facilities (see Doc. 1, p. 2), the undersigned further recommends that Commissioner Owens
remain a named Defendant in both actions and that Plaintiff’s claims against him be SEVERED
accordingly. 3
II.

Claims Concerning Hancock State Prison and Macon State Prison
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Section 1983 and Georgia law from Hancock State

Prison officials Brown, Sellers, Ivey, Primus, Ransom, Lift, and Burnette; Macon State Prison
officials McLaughlin, Blakely, and McIntyre; and Commissioner Owens, based on alleged
constitutional or state-law violations occurring at various times during his incarceration at those
facilities. (Id. at pp. 8–16.) 4
This Court is not the proper venue to hear Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b) sets forth the applicable venue provisions:
A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of
the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise
be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant
is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Assuming the facts alleged by Plaintiff to be true, it appears that these Defendants are
located at Hancock State Prison in Hancock County, Georgia; Macon State Prison in Macon
County, Georgia; and the Georgia Department of Corrections in Fulton County, Georgia. (See
Doc. 1, pp. 2–4.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants stem from events

3

Joinder of Commissioner Owens as a Defendant in each of these actions is consistent with
Rule 20(a)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

4

As noted above, this Report and Recommendation does not address whether Plaintiff should be allowed
to proceed against all of these Defendants jointly. That decision should be made by a court of proper
venue as to these Defendants.

11

allegedly taking place only in these locations. (See id. at pp. 8–14, 15–16.) Hancock County
and Macon County are in the Middle District of Georgia, while Fulton County is in the Northern
District of Georgia. See 28 U.S.C. § 90(a)–(b) (defining the federal judicial districts in Georgia).
Thus, it appears that venue lies in those judicial districts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Because Plaintiff could have filed his claims against these Defendants in either the Middle
District or Northern District of Georgia, and because a substantial part of the underlying events
occurred in the Middle District of Georgia, the undersigned recommends that these claims be
TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for
disposition. See id. § 1406(a) (stating that where venue is improper, a court must “dismiss, or if
it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought”).
Because Plaintiff’s Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motions for
Preliminary Injunction relate only to his current conditions of confinement at Macon State
Prison, these Motions are DENIED as moot. (Docs. 3–4, 9–10.) Plaintiff may request such
relief by filing the appropriate motions in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia. 5
III.

Claims Concerning Smith State Prison
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Williams, Deal, Smokes, Coleman, and

Commissioner Owens allege conspiracy as well as due process and equal protection violations
occurring while Plaintiff was housed at Smith State Prison in Tattnall County, Georgia. (Doc. 1,

5

The Court makes no representation as to the efficacy of such a pursuit.

12

pp. 4–8, 15–16.) 6 It also appears that Plaintiff seeks relief from these Defendants on the basis of
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law. (See id. at pp. 1, 15.)
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements. First,
he must allege that an act or omission deprived him “of some right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d
1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).

Second, Plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was

committed by “a person acting under color of state law.” Id.
At the outset, Plaintiff cannot sustain Section 1983 claims against Williams, Deal,
Smokes, Coleman, and Commissioner Owens in their official capacities. States are immune
from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and traditional principles of state
sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999). Section 1983 does not abrogate the
well-established immunities of a state from suit without its consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a lawsuit against a state officer in his official capacity is
“no different from a suit against the [s]tate itself,” such defendant is immune from suit under
Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit
against Williams, Deal, Smokes, Coleman, and Commissioner Owens in their official capacities,
and, accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes these actors from suit. See Free v.
Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity, Plaintiff
cannot sustain any constitutional claims against these Defendants in their official capacities, and
these claims should be DISMISSED.
As to Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants individually, Plaintiff fails to state any
claim for relief against Commissioner Owens. In Section 1983 actions, liability must be based
6

Tattnall County, Georgia, is in within the Southern District of Georgia; therefore, there is no venue
issue with regard to these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 90(c)(6).

13

on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299
(11th Cir. 2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th
Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only “when the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 802 (quoting Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). Thus, to state a claim for relief against a
supervisory defendant, a plaintiff must allege
(1) the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional
rights, (2) the existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate
indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an
inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to
prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of
an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.
Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321,
1328–29 (11th Cir. 2007)).
It appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Commissioner Owens liable for the alleged actions
of the Smith State Prison officials, based solely on his supervisory position as Commissioner of
the Georgia Department of Corrections. (See Doc. 1, p. 2.) Plaintiff submits that Commissioner
Owens “is the Commissioner of the Stat[e] of Georgia [D]epartment of Corrections. He is
legally responsible for the overall operation of the department and each institution under its
jurisdiction.” (Id.) However, nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that Defendant Owens
had any involvement in, or any custom or history resulting in, Plaintiff’s placement in
administrative segregation at Smith State Prison. In fact, Plaintiff’s due process claims are based
on the Smith State Prison officials’ alleged actions in contravention of—rather than pursuant
to—the prison policies maintained by the Georgia Department of Corrections.

(See id. at

pp. 5-6.) Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly suggest that Commissioner Owens could be held

14

liable for any potential constitutional violation arising out of the actions of the Smith State Prison
officials, Plaintiff’s claims to this effect should be DISMISSED. 7
Plaintiff’s allegation of conspiracy against Williams and Deal is insufficient to support
his Section 1983 claims against them individually. It is true that “[c]onspiring to violate another
person’s constitutional rights violates section 1983.” Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283. Even so, “[t]o
establish a prima facie case of section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other
things, that the defendants reached an understanding to violate [his] rights.”

Id. (second

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strength, 854 F.2d at 425).
Plaintiff alleges that Williams and Deal failed to investigate his administrative appeals and, on
this basis alone, concludes that these officials must have conspired to violate his rights. (Doc. 1,
pp. 4–8, 16.) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that these officials overtly reached such an agreement,
and, therefore, his conspiracy claims should be DISMISSED.
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot sustain his Section 1983 claims against Williams, Deal, and
Smokes on the basis of alleged equal protection violations. Equal protection principles under the
Fourteenth Amendment require generally that government officials behave in a way such “that
all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate
that (1) he is similarly situated with other prisoners who received more favorable treatment;
and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based on some constitutionally protected interest.”

7

It is unclear whether Deal and Smokes had any direct involvement in Plaintiff’s assignment to
administrative segregation at Smith State Prison or whether Plaintiff names these Defendants based on
their respective roles in approving housing assignments and supervising the administrative segregation
program at this facility. (See Doc. 1, p. 2.) Construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff arguably could
intend to allege that these Defendants acted in their respective capacities in placing Plaintiff in
administrative segregation on the date in question. However, the undersigned need not inquire into this
issue any further, because, as discussed infra, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants
individually are due to be dismissed in any event.

15

Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932–33 (11th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff sets
forth no facts indicating that the Smith State Prison officials treated him differently than
similarly situated prisoners based on a discriminatory intent. Plaintiff simply alleges that the
officials’ failure to provide him a disciplinary hearing deprived him equal protection of the law.
(Doc. 1, p. 15.) Such a conclusory allegation falls short of plausibly suggesting that any
constitutional violation occurred. Plaintiff’s equal protection claims should, consequently, be
DISMISSED.
As for Plaintiff’s due process claims against Williams, Deal, Smokes, and Coleman
individually, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects against
deprivations of ‘life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’” Kirby v. Siegelman, 195
F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

The United States

Supreme Court has identified two situations in which a prisoner can be deprived of liberty such
that the protection of due process is required: (1) there is a change in the prisoner’s conditions of
confinement so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court; and (2) the
State has consistently given a benefit to prisoners, usually through a statute or administrative
policy, and the deprivation of that benefit “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 1290–91 (quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
Plaintiff’s allegations of being denied certain benefits guaranteed pursuant to prison
policy arguably state procedural due process violations; however, Plaintiff cannot obtain the
relief he is seeking on this basis. As laid out below, even if Plaintiff were to prove a procedural
due process violation at Smith State Prison, he cannot obtain a declaratory judgment,

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compensatory damages, punitive damages, or injunctive relief on his procedural due process
claims against the Smith State Prison Defendants.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court “[i]n a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. §
2201(a) (stating that such a declaration has “the force and effect of a final judgment or decree”
and is reviewable as such). Even so, the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent
source of jurisdiction[.]” Mata v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 426 F. App’x 698, 699 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir. 1989)). A party seeking
to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction “must show: ‘(1) that [he] personally [has] suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury
fairly can be traced to the challenged action; and (3) that it is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.’” Am. Ins. Co. v. Evercare Co., 430 F. App’x 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting U.S. Fire Ins. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus, 931 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir. 1991)).
“[T]he question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Id. (quoting GTE
Directories Publ’g Corp. v. Trimen Am., 67 F.3d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff requests
a declaration that the actions of these Defendants violated his constitutional and state-law rights.
(Doc. 1, p. 16.) Plaintiff contends that he suffered emotional injury as a result of the alleged
violations, but Plaintiff fails to show that his alleged injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision in an action for a declaratory judgment. Because Plaintiff’s claims concern

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past actions of the Smith State Prison Defendants, and because Plaintiff is no longer housed at
that facility, this case does not present the type of immediate dispute over legal interests that a
declaratory judgment is intended to resolve.
As to Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages, a denial of procedural due process is
actionable under Section 1983 only for nominal, rather than compensatory, damages, absent
proof of actual injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (reversing the appellate court’s
holding that the plaintiffs should be granted compensatory damages for a procedural due process
violation causing no actual injury). “Although mental and emotional distress caused by the
denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under [Section] 1983, . . . neither the
likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding
compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.” Id. at 264. Plaintiff
makes a conclusory allegation that the alleged procedural due process violations caused him
“emotional injury,” because he could not participate in certain programs and activities while in
administrative segregation at Smith State Prison. (Doc. 1, p. 17.) However, the Court cannot
presume that the alleged deprivations were certain to cause emotional distress, and Plaintiff
offers no facts demonstrating any actual distressing effect on him. Carey, 435 U.S. at 263
(requiring a showing of the distressing effect on the plaintiff, which may be evidenced by his
conduct or the observations of others). Plaintiff complains of “respiratory impairment” only as a
physical injury stemming from the discontinuation of his respiratory treatment at Hancock State
Prison, not as any sort of physical manifestation of the emotional injury allegedly caused by the
Smith State Prison officials. (Doc. 1, pp. 17–18.) Because the Complaint contains only a
conclusory allegation of emotional injury without any factual support, Plaintiff’s ability to prove

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actual emotional injury and ultimately recover compensatory damages is merely conceivable
rather than plausible.
Punitive damages are available in a Section 1983 action “when the defendant’s conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from Williams, Deal, and Smokes “for their willful and
malicious conduct in confining the Plaintiff to segregation without a hearing before or after his
placement” therein. (Doc. 1, p. 18.) Plaintiff also requests punitive damages from Coleman but
does not provide any justification for doing so. (See id.) Plaintiff does not state sufficient
factual matter to establish that the Smith State Prison Defendants were motivated by evil motive
or intent or that they acted with reckless or callous disregard to his federally protected rights.
Given the conclusory or wholly unsubstantiated nature of his requests for relief, Plaintiff fails to
plausibly demonstrate that he would be entitled to punitive damages on account of his due
process claims.
By contrast, equitable relief is often available to remedy procedural due process
violations. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (“In procedural due
process cases, . . . the primary relief sought is equitable.”). Nevertheless, the limitations on
equitable relief in the prison context traditionally have included a reluctance to interfere with
prison administration and discipline, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad
hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”), overruled
on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Newman v. State of Ala., 683

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F.2d 1312, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Deference to prison authorities is especially appropriate
when state penal facilities are involved.”) (reversing a district court’s injunction requiring a
release of prisoners on probation because it “involved the court in the operation of the State’s
system of criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary” and a less intrusive equitable
remedy was available). Plaintiff asks that the Court “[e]xpunge the disciplinary convictions
described in [his] Complaint from [his] institutional record, as well as any disciplinary reports
while [he was] confined in [administrative segregation].” (Doc. 1, p. 17.) Because such relief
involves the recordkeeping at Smith State Prison—a matter squarely within the realm of prison
administration—the Court cannot grant Plaintiff this form of equitable relief. Moreover, because
Plaintiff is no longer at Smith State Prison, any requests for relief from the conditions at Smith
State Prison and against the Smith State Prison Defendants are now moot. For example, even if
the Court were to find that Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation at Smith State
Prison violated his rights to procedural due process, the Court could not remedy that violation by
ordering that the Smith State Prison Defendants remove him from administrative segregation,
because he is no longer housed at that facility.
In sum, even if Plaintiff were to succeed in proving that procedural due process violations
occurred at Smith State Prison, this Court ultimately could not grant the declaratory, monetary,
and equitable relief he is seeking through this civil rights action. Accordingly, the undersigned
finds no reason to allow Plaintiff to proceed with his Section 1983 claims on procedural due
process grounds. For these reasons, these claims should be DISMISSED.
Finally, assuming that Plaintiff intends to do so, Plaintiff cannot pursue his state-law
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Plaintiff cannot proceed on his
asserted federal claims, and because these Defendants reside in Georgia, this Court has no

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jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s state-law claims standing alone. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32
(explaining that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases involving a federal question or
diversity). Furthermore, even if this Court were to find that Plaintiff states some viable federal
claim sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, any supplemental claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress would fail. To state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Georgia law, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that “(1) the defendant’s conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (3) the defendant’s
conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.”
Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc., 60 F.3d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1995). Such conduct must be
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Yarbrough v. SAS Sys., Inc., 419 S.E.2d 507, 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Any failure to follow
prison policy on the part of the Smith State Prison officials—while perhaps unfair—is not
sufficiently atrocious or utterly intolerable so as to amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims against these Defendants should be DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IV.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Plaintiff

has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in
the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not
take in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or
after the notice of appeal is filed, that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective
standard. Busch v. Cnty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not
proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears that
the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir.
1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in
good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d
528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009
WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis, any appeal taken in this case would be based on
indisputably meritless legal theories or baseless factual allegations.

Because there are no

nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal, an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, in
forma pauperis status on appeal should be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Section 1983
and state-law claims against Williams, Deal, Smokes, Coleman, and Commissioner Owens
arising out of the alleged events at Smith State Prison be SEVERED into a separate lawsuit from
his claims against the other Defendants relating to Hancock State Prison and Macon State Prison.
The undersigned further recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Williams, Deal, Smokes,
Coleman, and Commissioner Owens concerning Smith State Prison be DISMISSED.

In

addition, Plaintiff’s suit against Brown, Sellers, Ivey, Primus, Ransom, Lift, Burnette,
McLaughlin, Blakely, McIntyre, and Commissioner Owens should be TRANSFERRED to the

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United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Consistent with the preceding
recommendation, Plaintiff’s Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order and Motions for
Preliminary Injunction are DENIED as moot. (Docs. 3–4, 9–10.)
Any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation is ORDERED to file
specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the undersigned failed to address any
contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions herein.

See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served
upon all other parties to the action.
Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein. Objections not meeting the
specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order and Report and Recommendation upon
Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 30th day of April,
2015.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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