Alcocer v. Bulloch County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 109

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 71 Motion to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 72 MOTION to Strike 55 Expert Witness Report, 51 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notic e of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Robert Yarbrough, 71 MOTION to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 51 Expert Witness Report, 56 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notice of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony by Richard Milligan) ; denying 72 Motion to Strike. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 9/29/17. (jrb)

IN THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
FILED
Scott L. Poff, Clerk
United States District Court

JUDITH ALCOCER,
*

By James Burrell at 4:55 pm, Sep 29, 2017

Plaintiff,
*

*

BULLOCH COUNTY

SHERIFF'S

CV

615-94

*

OFFICE et al. ,

*

Defendants.

*

ORDER

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment
(doc.
72)

57)

and two motions to exclude expert testimony (docs. 71,

filed

by

Defendants,

Randall

Norman,

Captain

John

Plaintiff,

Sergeant

Staten,

Sheriff

Kent

Munsey,

and Captain

Judith Alcocer,

Lynn

Jason

M.

Anderson,

Jailer

Ashley

Kearney.

Deputy

Mills,

(Doc.

57.)

has sued for damages under § 1983

alleging that Defendants committed a variety of constitutional
violations.

Defendants

claim

that

they

constitutional violations and that they cannot

for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.
and DENIES IN PART

Defendants'

committed

no

be found liable

The Court GRANTS IN PART

motion for summary judgment and

it DENIES Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony.

I.

At

approximately

Randall

Norman

and

Sheriff's Office
east on U.S.

at

2.)

p.m.

Sergeant

Highway 80

on

Kent

January

Munsey

Plaintiff's

Information

that

the

license.

(Doc.

57-1 at

vehicle's

owner,

he

of

2.)

the

license

County

vehicle

the

road

(Doc.

plate

("GCIC"),

the

onto

Deputy

Bulloch

Georgia.

94-2

through

Deputy
had

Suspecting that

pulled

2014,

observed Plaintiff driving

Center

owner

30,

of

in Bulloch County,

running

Crime

discovered

1:30

("Sheriff's Office")

After

Georgia

BACKGROUND

a

the

Norman

suspended

Plaintiff was the

to

stop

Plaintiff.

(Id.)

Before

Deputy

Norman

could

activate

his

lights,

however,

Plaintiff pulled into a convenience store parking lot and went
inside

to

followed
store.

make

her

a

into

(Doc.

purchase.

the

(Doc.

parking

57-1 at 2.)

105

at

lot and

4.)

Deputy

confronted

Plaintiff

license,

a

arrested

transported

her

citation

her

to

Detention

driving

the

misdemeanor

Bulloch

including

GCIC,

a

He then
suspended

offense,

Detention

and

Center

(Id. )

Center

"automatically

with

County

staff

booked

Plaintiff

fingerprints into the computer system.
then

(Id. )

for

for

the

("Detention Center") .

in the

Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's

identify and that she was the vehicle's owner.
issued

her

Norman

sent

NCIC,

and

to

2

scanned

her

Plaintiff's prints were

several

federal

and

different

law

databases,

enforcement

agency

databases."
Office

(Doc.

57-1 at 4.)

received a

("I.C.E.").

(Doc.

fax

Around 2 p.m.,

the

from Immigration and Customs

97-1 at 2.)

Sheriff's

Enforcement

It stated:

I.C.E. records indicate that this subject is not legally
in the United States and appears to be subject to removal
proceedings.
. . . This is not a government detainer.
This information is for law enforcement use and is being
provided for informational purposes only.
This response
is not supported by fingerprints.
(Id.)

While

sister,
96

at

Detention

Center

Susana Hinojosa,
8-11.)

Mrs.

staff

were

booking

Plaintiff,

attempted to secure her release.

Hinojosa

asked

Detention

Center

she needed to do to get Plaintiff out of jail.

They told Mrs.
(Id. )

Mrs.

her

(Doc.

staff what

(Id.

at 10.)

Hinojosa that Plaintiff needed a $2,000 bond.

Hinojosa

walked

across

the

street

to

a

bonding

company, secured a bond for Plaintiff, returned to the Detention
Center, and awaited Plaintiff's release.

After waiting several

Mrs. Hinojosa.

(Id. at 12)

Center would not

release

hours,

(Id. at 10-12.)

the bonding company

called

It informed her that the Detention

Plaintiff because

Plaintiff was

an I.C.E.

hold.

(Id.)

Mrs.

Hinojosa once

again

Detention

Center

staff

about

Plaintiff's

release.

Detention

Center

staff

confirmed

that

they

would

Plaintiff because I.C.E. had placed a hold on her.

Naturally,
informed

Mrs.

Detention

Hinojosa protested.
Center

staff

that

(Id.

Plaintiff

under

questioned
(Id. )

not

release

(Id.)

at
was

13.)

She

a United

States

citizen

born

in

South

what documentation she
(Id.)

Detention

Hinojosa.

Carolina.

(Id.)

Center

Ultimately,

staff,

she

The next morning,
efforts.

(Id.

however,

failed to

11

a.m.

the

January 31,

at

every fifteen minutes

15-16.)

Franks,

Sheriff's

Mrs.

an I.C.E.

asked

Office

agent.

Mrs.

called

until

at

Plaintiff's

Mrs.

release

(Id. at 13-14.)
Hinojosa continued

the

11

finally

(Id.

ignored

a.m.

gave

16.)

Sheriff's

(Id. )

her

a

Office

Around

number

for

She eventually reached

(Id. at 17,

19.)

Mr.

Franks told

Hinojosa that he would contact the Sheriff's Office to see

why it was
would

She

largely

secure

2014,

from 8 a.m.

I.C.E.'s Savannah office.

Mr.

also

needed to prove Plaintiff's citizenship.

and had to return home for the evening.

her

She

holding

look into

Lastly,

he

certificate,

Plaintiff.

sending an

told

Mrs.

social

(Id.

at 20.)

order to

release

Plaintiff.

(Id. )

take

Plaintiff's

birth

Hinojosa

security card, medical

records to the Sheriff's Office.

Mrs.

Hinojosa

to

He

also

records,

said he

and

school

(Id.)

followed Mr.

Frank's instructions

and took

the suggested paperwork to the Detention Center around 12 p.m.

that day.

(Id.

at 15,

23.)

According to Mrs.

Hinojosa,

when

she tried to show the paperwork to the Detention Center staff,

"they didn't want to look at it because they told me ICE had a
hold.
look

So they were very rude.
at

that.

So

I

can't

They were like we don't need to
even

tell

you

who

paperwork to because they didn't look at it."

I

showed

(Id.

the

at 24.)

Still

unable to secure Plaintiff's

release,

Mrs.

the paperwork with her and returned to her job.
Later in the day,
her that he
release
sent

was

Mr.

Frank's called Mrs.

sending a fax ordering the

Plaintiff.

by

Mr.

(Id.

Franks

at

21.)

states

The

3:39

2014 —

(Id. at 23.)
Hinojosa to tell

Detention Center to

time

stamp

p.m.

Plaintiff left the Detention Center at

Hinojosa took

(Doc.

5:44

p.m.

on

the

94-5

order

at

2.)

on January 31,

approximately 25 hours after her initial arrival.

(Doc.

94-1 at 2.)

Defendants,

for their part,

never explicitly deny that they

were holding Plaintiff because of the detainer.

deny

that

Hinojosa.
after

they

refused

Rather,

that

[I.C.E.]

office

arrest

the

secured a bond

—

was

....

judgment

dispute

the

bond

as

"received

previously

a

placed

by

Mrs.

notification

by

the

from

Savannah

"in

any

[ ] left

and

the

[Detention Center]

event,

Plaintiff
at

(Doc. 57-6 at 5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

is

appropriate

to any

material

only

fact

if

"there

and the

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).

secured

and

cancelled,"

II.

genuine

they

detainer

approximately 5:45 p.m."

Summary

post

they state only that on January 31 — the day

Plaintiff's

[I.C.E.]

to

Neither do they

Fed.

is

no

movant

is

R.

Civ.

P.

Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing substantive law,

and a dispute is

genuine

"if

the

evidence

is

such

that

a reasonable

return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Lobby,

Inc.,

factual
party,
U.S.
in

U.S.

disputes

in

Matsushita

574,
[the

Parcels

banc)

477

587

not

Anderson,

Court,

moving

by

motion.

Because

the

Indus.

v.

party's]
941

the

party

to

Zenith

favor."

must

view

the non-moving

Radio

United

F.2d 1428,

and

1437

citations

evidence

has

to

Corp.

standard

directed verdict,

Co.

Court

Corp.,

475

or

States

v.

(11th Cir.

omitted).

determine

Four

1991)

The

(en

Court

credibility.

at 255.

reference
Celotex

The

favorable

punctuation

weigh

(1986).

and must draw "all justifiable inferences

Prop.,

477 U.S.

The

248

Anderson v. Liberty

light most

Elec.

non-moving

(internal

should

the

(1986),

of Real

242,

jury could

the

initial

materials
v.

for

on

Catrett,

summary

burden

file,
477

the

U.S.

judgment

of

showing

basis

317,

for

323

mirrors

the

the

(1986).

that

of

the initial burden of proof required by either

party depends on who carries the burden of proof at trial.
at 323.

a

When the movant does not

Id.

carry the burden of proof at

trial, it may satisfy its initial burden in one of two ways — by

negating an essential element of the non-movant's

case or by

showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to
the

non-movant's

F.2d 604,
Kress

317).

606-08

& Co.,

case.

See

(11th Cir.

398 U.S.

The movant

144

Clark v.

1991)
(1970)

cannot meet

Coats

& Clark,

Inc.,

(explaining Adickes

v.

929

S.H.

and Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S.

its initial burden by merely

declaring
trial.

that

Clark,

If —
the

issue of

fact

non-movant

must

that

its

its

the movant

"demonstrate

precludes

the

burden

response

initial

affirmatively

cannot

meet

its

burden

at

929 F.2d at 608.

bears

tailor

carried

non-moving party

and only if —

non-movant

must

the

of

to

a

that

there

its
is

initial burden,

indeed

summary judgment."

burden.

negating

carries

proof

the

If

at

method

the

material

movant

fact,

When the

the

non-movant

which

the

presented

the

material

Id.

trial,

by

a

movant

evidence

non-movant

"must

respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion

at

trial

Fitzpatrick
1993) .

fact,

v.

on

City

the

of

material

Atlanta,

fact

2

sought

F.3d

to

1112,

be

1116

negated."

(11th

Cir.

If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material

the

non-movant must

either show that the

record contains

evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come
forward

directed

with

additional

verdict

evidence

motion

evidentiary deficiency."

at

Id.

sufficient

trial

at 1117.

based

The

to

on

withstand

the

non-movant

a

alleged

cannot

carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating

conclusory allegations contained in the complaint.
v.

Ross,

663 F.2d 1032,

1033-34

(11th Cir. 1981).

See Morris
Rather, the

non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

In this action, the Clerk of Court gave Plaintiff notice of
the motion for summary judgment and informed her of the summary

judgment rules,

the right to file affidavits or other materials

in

and

opposition,

Therefore,
772

the

F.2d 822,

the

notice
825

consequences

requirements

(11th Cir.

1985)

of

of

default.

Griffith

(Doc.

v.

(per curiam),

59.)

Wainwright,

are satisfied.

The time for filing materials in opposition has expired,

and the

motion is now ripe for consideration.

III.

In

her

seizures.

arrest

the

First,

for

Plaintiff

complaint,

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff

Plaintiff

driving

challenges

challenges

without
the

challenges

a

the

suspended

validity of her

two

separate

validity

license.

of

her

Second,

extended detention at

Detention Center.

Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983

allows citizens to sue state governments and state officials for

violations

of

Constitution.

rights

granted

them

under

the

To succeed in a § 1983 action,

make a prima facia showing of two elements:

omission deprived plaintiff of a right,

United

States

"a plaintiff must

(1) that the act or

privilege or immunity

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
(2)

and

that the act or omission was done by a person acting under

color of law."

Dist.,
1983) .

Marshal Cty.

992 F.2d 1171,

1174

Bd. of Educ.

(11th Cir.

v. Marshall Cty.

Gas

1993) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§

Plaintiff

claims

violations.
Sergeant

Plaintiff

Munsey

through

results

Captain
free

(doc.

John

from

26

Staten

seizure

Norman

right

to

ran

her

they

and

her

seizure

seized

her

(2)

108-112);

violated

when

constitutional

Deputy

Fourth Amendment

database

unreasonable

(1)

and

GCIC

11

that:

four

her

search

the

committed

alleges

violated

from unreasonable
plate

Defendants

Jailer

Ashley

Fourth

when

based

Amendment

they

(3)

Deputy

Fourteenth

targeted

Amendment's

her

profiling

Norman

for

(id.

a

SISI

probable

Anderson,

are

Sergeant

Equal

search

93-109);

Fourteenth Amendment

without

and

due

cause

Captain Staten,

Protection

and

and

process

(id^

Munsey

M

(4)

on

the

and

to

to

post

violated

based

Defendants

be
her

(id. SIS! 72-

Clause

seizure

license

right

refused

free

Mills

bond until they could verify her immigration status
76) ;

be

and

when

upon

the
they

racial

violated

her

rights when they detained her

139-158);

Captain Kearney,

and

and

(6)

Sheriff

Sergeant Munsey

subject to supervisory liability for the unconstitutional

actions of their subordinates

(id.

SI 5 8-9) .

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants make three

arguments.

First,

all

Defendants

challenge

the

legal

factual basis of the alleged constitutional violations.
Sheriff Anderson,

Captain Staten,

and Jailer Mills

and

Second,

argue they

are entitled to qualified immunity with regards to their role in

detaining Plaintiff.

Third,

Sheriff Anderson,

Captain Staten,

Captain

Kearney,

and

Sergeant

Munsey

argue

that

they

are

not

subject to supervisory liability.
Because
whether

with

first

If

Court

step

constitutional

Defendants'

claims.
the

a

the

in

a

§

violation

challenges

to

1983

action

occurred,

is

the

Plaintiff's

determining
Court

begins

constitutional

Plaintiff establishes any constitutional violations,
will

consider

Defendants'

arguments

that

they

are

entitled to qualified immunity and thus exempted from liability
under §

they
§

1983.

should

It

will

not

be

also consider Defendants'

subject

to

supervisory

arguments that

liability

under

1983.

A.

Constitutional Violations

1. Unconstitutional Stop and Seizure Claim

Plaintiff claims Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey violated

her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure when
her

at

the

they

store,

ran her license

and

when

they

plate,

arrested

when they seized
her.

The

Court

previously concluded that Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey did
not

violate

(Doc.

the

Constitution when

60 at 9-10.)

they

ran

her

the

only

plate.

It also concluded that they did not violate

the Constitution when they stopped her at the

Thus,

license

question

is

whether

Constitution when they arrested Plaintiff.

10

they

store.

violated

(Id. )

the

To

make

a

officer must
F.App'x

constitutional

arrest

establish probable cause.

523,

526

(11th

Cir.

2009).

without

a

Poulakis

v.

An

warrant,

an

Rogers,

341

officer

establishes

probable cause when he has "facts and circumstances within

knowledge
suspect

had

Gonzalez,

Ohio,

sufficient

committed

969

F.2d

379 U.S.

information

the

89,

or

was

1002

91

a

(11th

owner

that

crime."

1992)

the

U.S.
Beck

(citing

v.
v.

of

Plaintiff s

vehicle

had

a

Plaintiff has not challenged the reliability

records

vehicle,

Cir.

a

belief

Deputy Norman received reliable

upon

which

Deputy

Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's
of the

reasonable

committing

(1964)).

the

that

GCIC

warrant

999,

suspended license.
of

to

[his]

Norman

relied.

After

identity and her ownership

he had more than a reasonable belief that

was driving with a suspended license.

she

Thus, Deputy Norman and

Sergeant Munsey had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and they
did not violate the Constitution.

Because
the

Fourth

Plaintiff

Deputy Norman
Amendment

cannot

Accordingly,

the

when

succeed

Court

and Sergeant Munsey did not violate
they
on

seized and
her

GRANTS

arrested

respective

summary

§

judgment

Plaintiff,

1983

in

claim.

favor

of

Defendants with respect to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal
search

and

seizure

claim

against

Munsey.

11

Deputy

Norman

and

Sergeant

2.

Unconstitutional Detention Claim

Defendants

make

unconstitutional

may

detain

a

posted bond

detention

subject

for

up

cause hearing.
if

they

did

three

detain

claims.

arrested

to

(Doc.

arguments

48

First,

without

hours

57-6 at

before

based

Second,
her

argue

introduction

that
of

"Plaintiff

evidence

in

has

the

that

who

her

a

they

has

not

probable

they argue that,

immigration

status,

(Doc. 70 at 5.)

they had probable cause to detain her.
they

warrant

granting

on

Plaintiff's

they argue

a

10-12.)

Plaintiff

refuting

Third,

not

record

shown

that

through

she

was

held

the
after

her bond posted," nor has she shown in the record that "she was
in

fact

subject

response

from

System]

to

the

system."

a.

Defendants'

(1991).

in

hours,"

first

limits

[Automated

and

detention

Fingerprint

based

on

a

Identification

County

of

discussed

claim should fail.

relies

Riverside

claim

of

v.

that

upon the

McLaughlin

probable

was

released

cause

released

by

the
(Id.

"well

Supreme
at 11.)

12

on

500

only

within

48

U.S.

44

requires

a

hours

a

of

They then assert that

bond

after

within

Court

Supreme Court's

McLaughlin,

(Doc. 57-6 at 10-11.)

"Plaintiff

was

48-Hours

argument

determination

she

arrest

of Less Than

person's arrest.
because

AFIS

Defendants

judicial

second

(Id.)

Detentions

decision

a

in

the

approximately

permissible

McLaughlin,"

and

25

time

her

Defendants'

McClaughlin

is

argument

probable

warrant?

a

the

present

reasons.

case.

First,

The

question

how quickly must a jurisdiction provide

hearing
at

two

to

55-57.

a

suspect

arrested

without

a

The question posed in the present

how long may a jurisdiction refuse to post the bond of

suspect

not

cause

500 U.S.

case is:

for

inapplicable to the

posed in McLaughlin was:
a

fails

arrested without

same.

Thus,

a

warrant?

McLaughlin

does

These

not

two

entitle

questions

are

Defendants

to

summary judgment.

Second,

and

jurisdictions
without

a

48-hour

warrant.

that provides
48 hours

a

relatedly,

of

blank

to

U.S.

did

hold

declared

determinations

arrest will,
500

check

McLaughlin

judicial

Constitution.

McLaughlin

56

suspects

that

"a

grant

arrested

jurisdiction

of probable cause within

as a general matter,
at

not

(emphasis

comply" with the

added).

The

Court

specifically noted that a probable cause determination does not

pass "constitutional muster simply because it is provided within
48

hours.

Such

Constitution]

if the

a

hearing

may

nonetheless

violate

arrested individual can prove that

[the
his or

her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably."
at

Id.

56.

The

48-hour mark is merely a useful tool to determine the

presumptive

probable

reasonableness

cause

reasonable.

Id.

of

the

within

disputed

hours

is

A

hearing

held

at 57.

A probable cause hearing held outside
13

48

detention.

presumed

of

48

hours

contrived

is

the

presumed

48-hour

unreasonable.

mark

because

it

Id.
had

The

to.

Court

See

only

id.

at

56

("Although we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels

a specific time limit,
certainty

with

Thus,

so

that

confidence

the

it is important to provide some degree of

State

that

and

counties

may

establish

they fall within constitutional bounds.").

pertinent

question

is

not

whether

a

provided a probable cause hearing within 48-hours,

jurisdiction
reasonable

provided

amount

Because

procedures

a

probable

cause

jurisdiction

but whether a

hearing

within

a

of time.

McLaughlin

detention period,

does

not

permit

Defendants cannot

a

blanket

rely on the

released Plaintiff in only 25 hours.

Instead,

48-hour

fact that

they

they must assert

that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to prove her
detention

was

Plaintiff

has

unreasonable.

presented

As

discussed

significant

unreasonably delayed her release.

below,

evidence

Thus,

that

however,

Defendants

even if McLaughlin was

applicable to Plaintiff's case, Defendants could not prevail at
the

summary-judgment

Defendants'

claim

stage.

that

Accordingly,

McLaughlin

entitles

the

Court

them

to

DENIES
summary

judgment.

b.

Sufficiency of Evidence

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient

evidence that they held her after they posted her bond or that

they held her because of an I.C.E. hold.
14

But to establish a

Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable detention,

Plaintiff

does not have to show that Defendants held her after they posted
her

bond

or

Plaintiff
eligible

that

need
for

Defendants

only

prove

release

held

her

because

Defendants

and

lacked

probable

after she was
793

217

(1st Cir.

2015)

an

her

I.C.E.

after

cause

v.

hold.

she

was

detain

to

See Morales

eligible for release.

F.3d 208,

held

of

her

Chadbourne,

(''Because Morales was

kept in

custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release,
was

subjected to

one

that

a new seizure

must

be

for

supported

Fourth Amendment

by

a

new

she

purposes —

probable

cause

justification."); Mercado v. Dallas Cty., Texas, 229 F. Supp. 3d
501,

513

(N.D.

jurisdiction's

probable
would

that

Texas

Jan.

detention

cause

after

violate

the

17,

2017)

of a suspected

she was

Fourth

illegal

otherwise

Amendment).

(holding

that

alien

eligible

Defendants

for
do

without

release

not

claim

Plaintiff failed to produce evidence she was held without

probable cause.

The Court, therefore, must only decide whether

Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that a reasonable
could

a

find

Defendants

held

her

after

she

was

eligible

jury
for

release.

Plaintiff offers two lines of evidence that Defendants held

her after
evidence

she was
is

incarceration.

"contact

notes

eligible for release.
taken

by

Defendants

The

first

during

line of

Plaintiff's

The first entry, dated January 30, 2014, states

[I.C.E.]

in Atlanta GA for pick up before releasing."
15

(Doc.

95-1

at

3.)

The

second

states "[p]er Captain Staten,

entry,

dated

if I.C.E.

does

January
not

31,

2014,

send a hold on

subject by 02/03/2014, subject can post bond. Bond is in file." 1
(Id.

(emphasis

2014,

states

from

[I.C.E.]

(Id.)
sent

added).)

"[p]er

Captain

by Monday,

The final entry,
a

release

subject's

The

on

file.

third

Staten

entry,

if

we

do

dated
not

January
hear

31,

anything

then subject can post bond on Monday."
dated January 31,

their

Subject

detainer
was

for

2014,

states "[I.C.E.]

subject.

Paperwork

bonded by Akins

in

Bonding Company."

(Id.)

The second line of evidence is the deposition testimony of

Plaintiff's
that

after

sister,

Susana

Defendants

told

Hinojosa.
her

"that

Mrs.
the

Hinojosa

bond

was

testified

going

to

be

about 2,000 dollars," she "went across the street to talk to the

bails bond man lady to see if she could help me."
11-12.)

(Doc.

96 at

She further testified that:

I got everything took care of with the bond lady. She
told me I had to sign the bond and everything. And I said
okay. She said she would take care of it.
I walked back over to the jailhouse and I sit there and
I'm waiting for them to release her and then come about I
think it was between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock they told me
that ICE has a hold on her after I had been sitting there
for

four

hours.

They told me they're not releasing her because ICE has a
And I only found that out because the bonds
hold on it.

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff was arrested on January 30, 2014

- a Thursday.
February 3, 2014 was a Monday.
Thus, Defendants were
considering jailing Plaintiff - an ostensible American citizen - an
additional 48 hours not because of an I.C.E. hold, but merely in
anticipation of an I.C.E. hold.
16

lady

called me

and

told

me

and

then

I went

up

to

the

window and asked.

(Id. at 12
The

(emphasis added).)
Court

conclude

that

Defendants

finds
both

that

of

a

these

reasonable
lines

improperly refused to post

of

fact-finder

evidence

their

Defendants'

claim that

motion

for

Plaintiff

summary

did

not

demonstrate

Plaintiff's bond and thus

held her after she was eligible for release.
DENIES

could

Accordingly,

judgment

provide

with

Court

regards

sufficient

to

evidence

that Defendant held her after she was eligible for release.
c.

Probable

The

Cause

Court

must

now

determine

whether

Defendants

had

probable cause to continue detaining Plaintiff despite the fact
she

had

posted

nontechnical

practical
and

citations

Probable

conception

considerations

prudent

Pringle,

bond.

men,

540

not

U.S.

omitted).

circumstances

that

of

legal

366,
It

cause

deals

everyday

with

life

technicians,

370

(2005)

asks

"is
the

on

factual

act."

there

practical,

which

(internal

whether

a

reasonable

Maryland

quotations
are

and

"facts

v.

and
and

'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing

that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'"
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).

When answering this

question,

"totality

courts

circumstances"

and

must

look

at

decide

whether

the
the

facts

"viewed

of

the

from

the

standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,

17

amount

to

probable

cause."

Pringle,

540

U.S.

at

370

(internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Defendants

Plaintiff,
First,

argue

they

they

probable

had

claim

cause

illegally.

even

probable
the

to

if

cause

initial

believe

Second,

to detain persons

that

they

to

fax

did

delay

continue

sent

by

Plaintiff

releasing

detaining

I.C.E.

was

in

her.

gave

the

them

country

they claim that Georgia law allows officers

while

investigating their

immigration status.

The Court rejects both arguments.
i.

The

I.C.E.

Court

Defendants.

subject

is

Fax

begins

The

not

fax

with

stated:

legally

in

the

initial

"I.C.E.

the

fax

records

United

removal proceedings.

. . . This

detainer.

This

for

being provided

information

for

is

informational

other

relevant

The

not

Court

contain

First,

finds

enough

official I.C.E.

sent

detainer.

and

is

that

appears

to
this

to

be

not a government

enforcement

only.

(Id.)

sent

use

This

and

is

response

The fax contained no

information.

establish probable

I.C.E.

law

purposes

is not supported by fingerprints."

indicate

States

subject to

I.C.E.

that,

multiple

information

to

reasons,

support

this

fax

probable

did

cause.

detainers require the issuing officer to

cause.

specifically

Defendants

for

Morales,

793

stated that

therefore

F.3d at

it

was

should have

did not have probable cause and that,

216.

not

assumed

without

an

The

fax

official

that

I.C.E.

an independent

basis,

neither

information
country

about

of

removal.

did

they.
the

origin,
In

the

Plaintiff's

or

other

Second,

why

I.C.E.

words,

the

fax

gives

immigration
believed

fax

gave

specific

background,

she

was

her

subject

Defendants

justification for why they should continue to
Third,

no

no

to

factual

detain Plaintiff.

the fax didn't even definitively state that Plaintiff was

subject

to

removal.

It

stated

subject

to

removal"

without

only

that

she

elucidating why

"appears

she

be

subject

was

to

to

removal.

The Court
most

also

favorable

sufficient

support

to

finds

Plaintiff

information

probable

that —

to

cause

taking the

—

even

Cir.

2004)

the

establish probable

when

viewed

evidence available to officers.

(11th

if

facts

in

(holding that

officers

fax

it

totality

382

may

the

did

cause,

the

Kingsland,

in

light

contain

did

not

of

the

F.3d 1220,

not

"turn a blind

eye to exculpatory information that is available to them").
addition

to

the

fax,

Defendants

had

affirmative

Plaintiff was not only in the country legally,

most

likely

a

United

arrested,

she

had

license.

(Doc.

States

citizen.

in her possession

94-3 at 2.)

Georgia driver's

evidence

In
that

but that she was

When

a valid

1228

Plaintiff

Georgia

was

driver's

licenses are not

given to persons in the country illegally, see O.C.G.A. § 19-119.1(a)(2),
Plaintiff's

and

Defendants

license

was

do

not

fake.

her social security number.

argue

Plaintiff

(Id.)
19

that
also

they
gave

believed
Defendants

Defendants, however, did not

use this number to double check her status with I.C.E.

Finally,

Plaintiff's sister verbally attested to Plaintiff's status as

an

American citizen and brought to the Detention Center Plaintiff's
"birth

certificate,

records

from

the

her

health

from the

school

Because

Defendants

evidence,

from the

had

social

security

department

in

card,

Metter,

Board of Education."

access

to

all

her

and

her

(Doc.

of

this

96

382

that

appellees1

the

deficient

in

F.3d

at

1230

("[A]

reasonable

investigation

[of

jury

probable

papers
at

15.)

exculpatory

they did not have probable cause to detain

Kingsland,

medical

Plaintiff.

could

find

cause]

was

that the officers consciously and deliberately did

not make an effort to uncover reasonably discoverable,

material

information.").

Ultimately,

the

detaining

officer

is

responsible

ensuring that he has probable cause to detain a suspect.
v.

Evans,

officer

133

is

F.3d

required

establish probable
1521,

1525

1425,

(11th

1435

(11th

to

conduct

a

cause.");
Cir.

Cir.

1998)

reasonable

see Ortega v.

1996)

(finding

no

("An

for

Rankin

arresting

investigation

Christian,
probable

to

85 F.3d

cause

for

arrest based on a tip given by a confidential informant in part
because

the

arresting

officer

did

not

steps to investigate the informant's

take

"any

independent

tip or had any evidence

prior to arresting [the plaintiff] which would have corroborated
the

informant's

identification

of

[the

perpetrator in the commission of the crime").
20

plaintiff]

as

a

He cannot rely on

unsubstantiated allegations,
conclusory as

the

Had Defendants
most

likely

status.
not

initial

have

required

been

to

able

of

an

to

verify

and

innocence,

officer

may

obtain

and

an

investigation

easily discoverable

quotations

suffered

an

fundamental

DENIES

in

unacceptable

Defendants'

the

cause

.

.

to

.")

they

rights.

that

an

ignore

fashion

deprivation

for

probable

.

to

immigration

arrest.

information

. . . [n]or may the officer

Because

motion

claim

established

1525.

theoretically

making

choose

biased

facts

omitted).

constitutional

Defendants'

at

police officer is

every

before

not

a

("[A]

eliminate

that has been offered to him or her
conduct

See id.

Plaintiff's

382 F.3d at 1229

explore

claim

Nevertheless,

fax sent by I.C.E.

conducted any amount of investigation they would

See Kingsland,

plausible

especially allegations as vague and

of

or

elect

(internal

did

most

Accordingly,

summary
initial

detain

judgment
fax

with
sent

Plaintiff

to

citations

not,

her

not

Plaintiff
basic
the

and

Court

respect
by

after

to

I.C.E.

she

was

otherwise eligible for release.
ii.

In

addition

Georgia

to

the

I.C.E.

fax,

Defendants

law allowed them to detain Plaintiff.

O.C.G.A.

(b)

Georgia Law

§

also

claim that

They point to

17-5-100(b)-(c):

. . . during any investigation of a criminal suspect

by a peace officer, when such officer has probable cause
to believe that
a suspect has committed a criminal
violation, the officer shall be authorized to seek to

21

verify such suspect's immigration status when the suspect
is unable to provide one of the following:
(2) A valid Georgia driver's license

(6) Other information as to the suspect's identity
that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to
independently identify the suspect.
(c) When attempting to determine the immigration status of
a suspect ... a peace officer shall be authorized to use
any
reasonable
means
available
to
determine
the
immigration status of the suspect, including:

(1)

Use of any federal identification database;

(4)

Contacting an appropriate federal agency.

Defendants claim that § 17-5-100(b)-(c)

to

detain

Plaintiff

for

gave them probable cause

purposes

of

investigating

her

immigration status.

Defendants,

Section

have misinterpreted § 17-5-100(b)-(c).

17-5-100(b)-(c)

persons

solely

illegally.

It

immigration
First,

however,

the

does

because

they

only

not

allows

status
officer

if
must

he

suspect

cause

violation.
sufficient

to

meets

have

believe

they

officers

the

to

three

already

suspect for a criminal violation.
probable

allow

officers

are

in

verify

the

a

specific

been

to

detain

country

suspect's

conditions.

investigating

the

Second, the officer must have
suspect

committed

a

criminal

Third, the suspect must have been unable to provide
identification

to

22

confirm

her

identity

and

immigration

status.

Section

17-5-100(b),

therefore,

does

not

stand for the proposition asserted by Defendants.
But,

detain

even

a

if

§

suspect

solely

immigration

status,

opportunity

to

Plaintiff

for

17-5-100 (b) - (c)

do

it

for

would

so

driving with

have

When

a

allow

purposes

not

here.

did

of

license

is

specifically

suspended license,

identification
detention

under

Plaintiff

investigation

of

listed

§

suspended

Defendants'

investigation,

Plaintiff's

bond

§

17-5-100(b)

Plaintiff

or

while

did

not

the

motion

respect

with

100(b)-(c)

grant

Court

to

an

occur

hear

Defendants

probable
DENIES

their

cause

Plaintiff

during

it

gave

form

the

refused

that

the

post
Thus,

to

her

after

to

I.C.E.

ability

for

of

Defendants'

occurred

from

Defendants'

assertion

confronted

Additionally,

Defendants
to

the

accepted

license;

when

waiting

establish

Accordingly,

did not

Defendants

A Georgia driver's

17-5-100(b)(2).

challenges

her

as

her

Norman

the Deputy a valid Georgia Driver's license.

to

verifying

allowed

Deputy

Defendants

detain

detention.

summary

judgment

O.C.G.A.

§

17-5-

gave them probable cause to detain Plaintiff.

3. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff

Protection

claims

Clause

investigation.

by

that

using

Defendants

racial

violated

profiling

to

target

Equal

her

for

"The Equal Protection Clause requires government

entities to treat similarly situated people alike."

Rainbow City,

the

Ala.,

434

F.3d 1306,
23

1313

(11th Cir.

Campbell v.

2006).

To

succeed

on

an

enforcement,

a

differently
that

equal

protection

plaintiff

from

other

[the defendant]

must

claim

show

similarly

that

"(1)

that

situated

unequally applied a

evidence

claim

that

demonstrating

(Doc.

she

at

(Doc.

breakdown
60%

of

105

57-6 at

21.)

has

on

Bulloch County is

60%

Id.

not

the

17.)

She

was]

treated

individuals,

[her]."

discrimination

[Sheriff's Office]."

has.

Plaintiff

[she

selective

and

facially neutral

for the purpose of discriminating against
Defendants

alleges

[law]

at 1314.

provided

part

"any

of

the

Plaintiff asserts that

claims

white

that

and

"[t]he

40%

racial

non-white but

of the traffic citations are issued to the non-white group,

of which

[Plaintiff]

are

comparators

the

asserts

that

is a member,

to

The

therefore,

[Plaintiff]."

Court

finds

the white motorists

(Id.)

"Defendants hold road blocks

white neighborhoods."

Plaintiff

the

Court

does

assertion because

(Doc.

91.)

selective

best,

(Id.)
that

not

Plaintiff

accept

Plaintiff

Second,

has

not

it

does

Plaintiff's
includes

Plaintiff's

enforcement.

and

also

in predominately non-

shown

that

she

treated differently than similarly situated individuals.

The

nothing

no

statistical
citation

evidence

statistical

to

show

does

to

not

disparity

that

race

disparity

the

record.

demonstrate
is

was

is

true

for

the

alleged

road blocks

in

mild,

the

non-white

Based upon the evidence presented by Plaintiff,
24

was

First,

at

factor

responsible for the disparity of traffic citations issued.
same

(2)

The

areas.

no reasonable

jury could conclude that
which violated the

Defendants'

Defendants

engaged in racial profiling

Fourteenth Amendment.

motion

for

summary

Thus,

judgment

the Court GRANTS

with

regards

to

Plaintiff's equal protection claim.
4.

Substantive Due

Plaintiff

due process
[her]
her

also

makes

personal

claims

process

autonomy
of

that

and Procedural

under

Due

the

Process

Fourteenth

Amendment's

Plaintiff claims that Defendants

due

actions

claims

two

clause.

substantive

arbitrary

Process

rights

the

have

from

preserved

to

the

Defendants."

"Defendants

(Doc.

violated

her

"violated

dignity,

unnecessary
1

26

procedural

Plaintiff's

is

repetitive

constitutional

provision,

hold."

substantive due process

of

her

claim

due

such

as

the

Amendment

covered

by

Fourth

or

a

She

process

on an

(Doc. 105 at 22.)

claim fails because it

Fourth

is

and

142.)

when she was illegally held in jail after obtaining bond,
erroneous Immigration Customs (I.C.E.)

and

claim.

specific

Eighth

xx[I]f

a

constitutional

Amendment,

the

claim

must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific

provision,
Cty.

Of

not

under

Sacramento

Graham v. Connor,

the

v.

rubric

Lewis,

490 U.S.

of

523

386,

395

substantive
U.S.

833,

(1989)

due

843

process."

(1998);

see

("Because the Fourth

Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection

against

governmental conduct,
notion

of

this

sort

of

that Amendment,

'substantive

due

process,'
25

physically

intrusive

not the more generalized
must

be

the

guide

for

analyzing these
search

and

"dignity,

claims.").

seizure

and her

The

Fourth Amendment's

provision

personal

already

autonomy

.

unreasonable

protects
. from the

.

Plaintiff's
unnecessary

and arbitrary actions of the Defendants."

See Mendoza v. United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

849 F.3d 408,

(8th

attempt

Cir.

2017).

substantive

Thus,

due

illegal search,

process
seizure,

Plaintiff's
claim

also

Defendants

Plaintiff

violation

because

for

Amendment

cause

already

Thus,

Plaintiff's

process

similar

Cir.

requires

any

reasons.

arrest

See

it

government

under

be

allegedly

due

process

Plaintiff

also

Thus,
is

to

claims

establish probable

Gerstein,

concerning

the

at
of

Amendment's

of

Plaintiff's

Milewski,

327

F.3d 564,

passes

muster

under

that

satisfy

the

requirements

if this court upholds

reviewed

420 U.S.

legitimacy

the

Fourteenth

duplicative

Case v.

seizure

should

when

plaintiff]

would

("[A]

process clause.

the

determination

claim.

2003)

Amendment

a

The Fourth Amendment,

extended detention.

detention

clause

Amendment

assert

violated her right to procedural due process because

prior to any

114.

her

procedural

they detained her without probable cause.
however,

of

to

or detention.

Fourteenth

fails

cannot

420-21

under

Fourth

Fourth

568

the

of

due

(7th

Fourth

the

due

[the plaintiff's]

Amendment

rules,

[the

will not succeed by recasting his challenge in the

language of due process."); see Lawson v. City of Coatesville,
42

F.

Supp.

3d 664,

676-77

(E.D.
26

Pa.

2014);

Crouse v.

South

Lebanon Tp.,
that

the

criminal
for

668

F.

Fourth

justice

seizures

Supp.

Amendment

system"

of

2d

664,
is

and

persons

or

674

(M.D.

"explicitly

governs

"the

property").

Pa.

2009)

(noting

tailored

process

for

that

Plaintiff,

the

is

due

therefore,

must challenge the legitimacy of her detention under the Fourth
Amendment,

not

the

Case,

327

F.3d

at

1120,

1129

(D.

Fourteenth

568;

Colo.

Amendment's

Shimomura

2014)

v.

due

process

Carlson,

("Considering

that

17

F.

his

clause.

Supp.

due

3d

process

claim effectively mirrors his allegation of illegal arrest under
the

Fourth

claim

Amendment,

under

the

[the

Fifth

plaintiff]

and

has

Fourteenth

failed

Amendments

to

state

upon

a

which

relief can be granted."); Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345,
365-66

(M.D.

Pa.

2013)

Fourteenth Amendment,

any

unlawful

("[I]t is the

Fourth Amendment,

which is the proper vehicle for addressing

pretrial

deprivations

of

liberty

criminal proceedings."); Sayan-Resto v. Berrios,
252,

265

(D.

P.R.

not the

2013)

incidental

to

933 F. Supp. 2d

(holding that a plaintiff must

pursue

her illegal detention claim under the Fourth, not the Fourteenth
Amendment);

Crouse,

668

F.

Supp.

2d

at

674

("[A]

pretrial

deprivation of liberty that is related to a criminal proceeding
is addressed not through procedural due process, but the Fourth
Amendment.").

Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motion

for summary judgment with regards to Plaintiff's substantive and
procedural due process claims.

27

B.

Qualified Immunity and Supervisory Liability

Because

Plaintiff

successfully

established

that

Defendants

violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure when they refused to release her on bond,
now

consider

the

doctrine

consider

whether

of

Defendants'

qualified

Plaintiff's

Kearney,

and

immunity.

claim

Captain

liability

that

Staten

is

The

Sheriff

should

be

the Court must
extinguished

Court

must

Anderson,

subject

to

by

also

Captain

supervisory

liability.
1. Qualified Immunity

Sheriff

Anderson,

Captain

immunity

Qualified

immunity

government

officials by allowing them to

their

Anderson

conduct

v.

their

aims

may

omitted).

performing

discretionary

violate
of

civil

clearly

which

a

Fitzgerald,

limit

rise

to

U.S.

provides

functions

damages

liability

646

their

established statutory or

reasonable

person

would

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)

28

Plaintiff.

liability

for

(1987)

"government

generally
as

assert

of

"reasonably anticipate

that

insofar

Mills

detaining

635,

It

Jailer

personal

483

Creighton,

for

in

give

quotations

liability

to

role

and

qualified

when

for

Staten,

have

are

damages."

(internal

officials

shielded

conduct

does

constitutional
known."

from

rights

Harlow

(citations omitted).

not

v.

Establishing

First,

the

qualified

official

must

immunity

"prove

is

that

a

he

two-step

was

acting

process.

within

the

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful
acts

occurred."

Cir.

2002)

Cir.

2002)).

within

(quoting

his

If

to

Id.

prove

"the

show

v.

that

311

violated

1346

(11th

F.3d

1188,

1194

(11th

the

is

plaintiff

that

he

burden

immunity

immunity

the

1340,

establishes

authority,

a

F.3d

284

Ferraro,

qualified

stage,

actions

Wilson,

defendant

qualified

summary-judgment
officer's

Lee

discretionary

plaintiff
To

Vineyard v.

is

not

must

shifts

not

appropriate

prove

Constitution,

(1)

and

of

the

probable

alleged

cause,

constitutional

however,

immunity standard.

courts

violation

use

Under this standard,

a

acting
to

the

appropriate."
at

the

that

the

that

the

(2)

constitutional right violated was clearly established.

When

was

See id.

concerns

special

a

lack

qualified

"[o]fficers who make an

arrest without probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity
if there was

arguable probable cause for the

v.

Miami,

City

Arguable
same

of

probable

arrest

could

F.3d

1220,

1232

(11th

and

have

Plaintiff

.

possessing
believed

.

.

the

that

."

Id.

same

Cir.

2004).

officers

cause exists if "reasonable

circumstances

Defendants

382

arrest." Kingsland

in the

knowledge

probable

cause

(internal

as

existed

quotations

the
to
and

citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were
their

discretionary

authority.

Thus,
29

the

burden

acting in
shifts

to

Plaintiff
cause

to

to

prove

detain

that

her.

Defendants

If

she makes

lacked

this

arguable

showing,

probable

she must

also

prove that the right violated was clearly established.

The

Court

favorable

to

arguable

probable

from

that,

Plaintiff,

detained her,

fax

finds

taking

she

cause.

has

the

established

According

a United States citizen,

I.C.E.

stating,

without

facts

any

to

in

the

light

Defendants

Plaintiff,

most

lacked

Defendants

for 25 hours based upon a

supporting

that

Furthermore,

Plaintiff appeared to be subject to removal.

evidence,

they

detained her in spite of the fact that she had in her possession

a

valid

which
the

Georgia

is

not

United

driver's

knowingly

States

—

and

license

given
in

to

spite

procured and proffered a copy of
security card,

and school records.

—

a

form

persons
of

the

of

identification

unlawfully
fact

that

present

in

her

sister

her birth certificate,

social

No reasonable officer in the

same circumstances could have believed probable cause existed to

detain Plaintiff for being in the country illegally.
382

F.3d at

1233

disregarded
cause

or

officers

knowledge

("If the defendants

certain
arguable

in

as

the

the

pieces

of

same

fabricated or unreasonably

evidence
cause,

as

circumstances

and

probable

defendants

could

Kingsland,

not

to

establish
alleged,

possessing

have

probable

reasonable
the

same

believed

that

probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.").

The only remaining question is whether Defendants violated
a clearly established right.

The right to be free from arrest
30

or

extended

detention

See Gerstein v.

is

the

and

Pugh,

standard

officers

threshold
Kingsland,

before
382

in

on

ample

at

103,

notice

an

cause

textbook

law.

(1975).

Probable cause

all

arrests

or

that

they

individual

1232.

is

114

justifying

detaining

F.3d

probable

420 U.S.

used

are

absent

Thus,

the

detentions,

must

clear

without
Court

a

warrant.

finds

right to be free from arrest absent probable cause is

that

that

the

a clearly

established constitutional right.
Because
that

Plaintiff

Defendants

has

detained

produced

her

sufficient

without

arguable

evidence
probable

violation of a clearly established constitutional right,
are

not

Court

entitled to

DENIES

qualified immunity at

Defendants'

summary

this

judgment

show

cause

in

Defendants

time.

motion

to

Thus,

for

the

qualified

immunity as it relates to Plaintiff's unconstitutional detention.
2. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory defendants may not be held liable under § 1983
for the unconstitutional

acts

of

or

respondeat

Jenne,

326

superior

F.3d 1352,

1360

of their

subordinates

vicarious
(11th Cir.

on the basis

liability.
2003).

Cottone

v.

They may only be

held liable under § 1983 "if they personally participated in the

allegedly
connection

unconstitutional
between

conduct

[their]

actions

constitutional deprivation.'"
1328

(11th Cir.

2007)

or

if
.

West v.

(quoting Cottone,

establish a causal connection,

.

there
.

and

Tillman,
326

is

^a

the

causal
alleged

496 F.3d 1321,

F.3d at 1360).

a Plaintiff must show either
31

To
(1)

"a

history

of

supervisor

a

act

the

and

to

inference

of

need

or

policy

puts

to

that

the

rights"

or

deliberate

supporting

the

subordinates

326

F.3d

by

event,

subordinates

to

Cottone,

any

the

in

unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so."

In

that

so";

act

1360.

knew

alleged

facts

(3)

directed

the

fails to do

results

supervisor

responsible

would

at

or

the

correct

[that]

constitutional

unlawfully

[that]

[that the alleged supervisor]

"custom

indifference
"an

abuse

notice

on

deprivation,
(2)

widespread

"[t]he

standard

which

a

supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for actions
of a subordinate is extremely rigorous."

Sheriff Anderson,

that

they

Anderson

are
and

not

Captain Kearney,

subject

Captain

to

Staten

they

Captain

are

not

Kearney,

assert

and

causally

and Captain Staten argue

supervisory

participate in detaining Plaintiff.
Anderson,

Id.

they

did

not

Sheriff
personally

(Doc. 57-6 at 15.)

Captain

connected

liability.

Staten

to

Sheriff

further

Plaintiff's

assert

alleged

unconstitutional detention because "[p]laintiff has not produced

any evidence that Sheriff Anderson, Captain Kearney,
Staten

were

violations

aware

of

^obvious,

of constitutional

rights,

resulted in deliberate indifference,

jailers to act unlawfully."
have

asserted

a

lack

of

flagrant,

rampant'

implemented a policy that
or directed the deputies or

(Id^ at 16.)

evidence,

[or]

or Captain

the

Because Defendants
Court

must

determine

whether Plaintiff's reply briefs point to evidence demonstrating
32

that

any

Defendant

personally

participated

in

or

was

causally

connected to the constitutional deprivation.

Plaintiff

not

affirmatively

personally

involved

however,

contains

involved

in

Captain

Staten,

02/03/2014,
Captain

if

if

Plaintiff.

then

subject

can

Thus,

while

claims

does

(See

not

do

Sheriff Anderson was

Plaintiff.

Captain

Staten
Doc.

send

can post bond.

we

that

detaining
that

I.C.E.

subject

Staten

in

evidence

detaining

concedes

a

Bond is

not

of

anything

bond

post

hear

on

personal

against Sheriff Anderson,

was

95-1

hold

in

Monday.")

The

personally
at

on

3

by

. . . Per

ICE

by Monday,

(emphasis

participation

("Per

subject

file.

from

record,

added)).

cannot

proceed

the Court finds sufficient evidence to

support a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Captain
Staten personally participated in Plaintiff's detention.
The

Court,

produced
Kearney

sufficient
were

(1)

must

evidence

causally

deprivation.
that:

however,

also

that

connected

examine

Sheriff
to

the

Anderson

alleged

The best the Court can discern,
"Anderson

[Plaintiff's

and

detention],

Staten's

or

failure

reprimand

whether

or

Plaintiff

or

Captain

constitutional

Plaintiff asserts
to

investigate

discipline

Mills

constituted a policy, practice or custom of deliberate indifference
to Mill's misconduct toward Plaintiff";

(2)

"[Jailer]

Mills denied

receiving much training on I.C.E. holds and I.C.E. detainers"; and
(3) "The Defendants have no written policy or procedures having to
do with I.C.E.

holds and I.C.E. detainers or anything having to do
33

with I.C.E.
annual

yet,

Defendant Anderson claims that his staff receives

training about

15, 17).

I.C.E.

and immigration

Plaintiff also argues that:

to effectuate all detainers,

(1)

and

(2)

"Sheriff's

policy or practice,

officials,

Plaintiff
could

find

Anderson
to

did
a

or

Captain

establish

it.

provided
evidence

evidence

provide

causal

a

evidence that
fix

not

Plaintiff's

connection

Kearney

causal

Defendants

were

326

no

evidence.

of

such
other

F.3d

at

delayed

Court

of

For

the

finds

that

jury

actions

must

Sheriff

First,

provide

some

a problem and failed to

example,

releases

of

detention.

Plaintiff,

to

Sheriff's

reasonable

a

Plaintiff

1360.

complaints made

other

the

Plaintiff's

aware

the

(Doc. 106 at 15).

between

and

I.C.E. had-or

without asking either

such that

connection,

Cottone,

of

following

briefs,

evidence

at

[sic] cause to support the

re-imprisoned [Plaintiff]

examining

105

"the Sheriff's policy was

her or I.C.E. any additional questions."

After

(Doc.

regardless whether [sic]

[sic] even claimed to have had-probable
request";

laws"

however,

she

the police

caused

has

provides

no

department,

no

by

a

suspect's

uncertain immigration status, and no evidence that the training

given to deputies
Second,

Defendants'

and jailers falls below accepted

alleged failure to investigate or reprimand

Jailer Mills does not constitute a policy or practice.
Plaintiff's

claim

standards.

that

Sheriff

Anderson

had

a

Finally,
policy

of

detaining all suspects that triggered a detainer by I.C.E. was

34

not

supported

by

any

citation

to

the

record.

will not consider this factual assertion.

Additionally,

Plaintiff

has

Thus,

(Doc.

provided

no

the

Court

91.)

case

law

explaining

why the scant evidence she has provided is sufficient to establish

supervisory liability.

She

has

the burden of

demonstrating what

evidence exists to show a causal connection and why that evidence
is sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Just as this Court will

not scour the record to find evidence which supports her claims,
will

not

supports

scour

her

Westlaw

or

Lexis

claims.

In

Nexis

our

responsibility belongs to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff
demonstrates

a

has

failed

causal

to

find

case

adversarial

law

which

system,

that

evidence

that

not the Court.

provide

connection

to

it

sufficient

between

the

actions

of

Sheriff

Anderson or Captain Kearney and the constitutional deprivation.

She

has also conceded that Sheriff Anderson did not personally participate
in

Plaintiff's detention.

Thus,

the Court GRANTS Defendants'

motion

for summary judgment with regards to the supervisory liability claims
against
provides

Sheriff Anderson
sufficient

participated

in

and

Captain

evidence

detaining

that

Plaintiff

Kearney.
Captain

after

she

Because
Staten

was

the

record

personally

eligible

for

release, however, that claim shall proceed to trial as well.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants'

for summary judgment.

(Doc.

57.)

35

motion

It GRANTS summary judgment in

favor

of

claim

Defendants'

against

violating

motion

Deputy

the

and DISMISSES

Norman

Fourth

and

Sergeant

Amendment's

searches and seizures;

(2)

against Sergeant Munsey,

(1)

Plaintiff's

Munsey

prohibition

for

on

§

1983

allegedly

unreasonable

Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim

Sheriff Anderson,

and Captain Kearney for

Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey's alleged violation of the Fourth
Amendment's

prohibition on unreasonable

Plaintiff's

supervisory

and

Captain

Kearney

detaining her;
to
and

the

alleged

(5)

(4)

liability

for

their

claims

alleged

substantive

Plaintiff's

and

allows

and seizures;

against

role

in

Sheriff

(3)

Anderson

unconstitutionally

Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants related
and procedural

claims

against

alleged equal protection violations.

motion

searches

the

following

all

due

process

Defendants

violations;

related

to

the

The Court DENIES Defendants'

claims

to

proceed

to

trial:

(1)

Plaintiff s claim that Jailer Mills and Captain Staten detained her
in

violation

of

the

Fourth

Amendment;

and

(2)

Plaintiff's

supervisory liability claims against Captain Staten.
The

Court

also

DENIES

as

untimely

exclude Plaintiff's expert testimony.

ORDER
September,

ENTERED

at

Augusta,

Defendants'

motions

(Docs. 71, 72.)

Georgia,

this

J( *?

day

2017.

CHlkE^JUJDGE A. RANDAL HALL
UNITEKSTATES

DISTRICT

COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

36

to

of