Alcocer v. Bulloch County Sheriff's Office et al
Filing
109
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 71 Motion to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 72 MOTION to Strike 55 Expert Witness Report, 51 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notic e of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Robert Yarbrough, 71 MOTION to Strike 57 MOTION for Summary Judgment , 51 Expert Witness Report, 56 Expert Witness Report, 65 Notice of Filing, (Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Testimony by Richard Milligan) ; denying 72 Motion to Strike. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 9/29/17. (jrb)
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
FILED
Scott L. Poff, Clerk
United States District Court
JUDITH ALCOCER,
*
By James Burrell at 4:55 pm, Sep 29, 2017
Plaintiff,
*
*
BULLOCH COUNTY
SHERIFF'S
CV
615-94
*
OFFICE et al. ,
*
Defendants.
*
ORDER
Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment
(doc.
72)
57)
and two motions to exclude expert testimony (docs. 71,
filed
by
Defendants,
Randall
Norman,
Captain
John
Plaintiff,
Sergeant
Staten,
Sheriff
Kent
Munsey,
and Captain
Judith Alcocer,
Lynn
Jason
M.
Anderson,
Jailer
Ashley
Kearney.
Deputy
Mills,
(Doc.
57.)
has sued for damages under § 1983
alleging that Defendants committed a variety of constitutional
violations.
Defendants
claim
that
they
constitutional violations and that they cannot
for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1983.
and DENIES IN PART
Defendants'
committed
no
be found liable
The Court GRANTS IN PART
motion for summary judgment and
it DENIES Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony.
I.
At
approximately
Randall
Norman
and
Sheriff's Office
east on U.S.
at
2.)
p.m.
Sergeant
Highway 80
on
Kent
January
Munsey
Plaintiff's
Information
that
the
license.
(Doc.
57-1 at
vehicle's
owner,
he
of
2.)
the
license
County
vehicle
the
road
(Doc.
plate
("GCIC"),
the
onto
Deputy
Bulloch
Georgia.
94-2
through
Deputy
had
Suspecting that
pulled
2014,
observed Plaintiff driving
Center
owner
30,
of
in Bulloch County,
running
Crime
discovered
1:30
("Sheriff's Office")
After
Georgia
BACKGROUND
a
the
Norman
suspended
Plaintiff was the
to
stop
Plaintiff.
(Id.)
Before
Deputy
Norman
could
activate
his
lights,
however,
Plaintiff pulled into a convenience store parking lot and went
inside
to
followed
store.
make
her
a
into
(Doc.
purchase.
the
(Doc.
parking
57-1 at 2.)
105
at
lot and
4.)
Deputy
confronted
Plaintiff
license,
a
arrested
transported
her
citation
her
to
Detention
driving
the
misdemeanor
Bulloch
including
GCIC,
a
He then
suspended
offense,
Detention
and
Center
(Id. )
Center
"automatically
with
County
staff
booked
Plaintiff
fingerprints into the computer system.
then
(Id. )
for
for
the
("Detention Center") .
in the
Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's
identify and that she was the vehicle's owner.
issued
her
Norman
sent
NCIC,
and
to
2
scanned
her
Plaintiff's prints were
several
federal
and
different
law
databases,
enforcement
agency
databases."
Office
(Doc.
57-1 at 4.)
received a
("I.C.E.").
(Doc.
fax
Around 2 p.m.,
the
from Immigration and Customs
97-1 at 2.)
Sheriff's
Enforcement
It stated:
I.C.E. records indicate that this subject is not legally
in the United States and appears to be subject to removal
proceedings.
. . . This is not a government detainer.
This information is for law enforcement use and is being
provided for informational purposes only.
This response
is not supported by fingerprints.
(Id.)
While
sister,
96
at
Detention
Center
Susana Hinojosa,
8-11.)
Mrs.
staff
were
booking
Plaintiff,
attempted to secure her release.
Hinojosa
asked
Detention
Center
she needed to do to get Plaintiff out of jail.
They told Mrs.
(Id. )
Mrs.
her
(Doc.
staff what
(Id.
at 10.)
Hinojosa that Plaintiff needed a $2,000 bond.
Hinojosa
walked
across
the
street
to
a
bonding
company, secured a bond for Plaintiff, returned to the Detention
Center, and awaited Plaintiff's release.
After waiting several
Mrs. Hinojosa.
(Id. at 12)
Center would not
release
hours,
(Id. at 10-12.)
the bonding company
called
It informed her that the Detention
Plaintiff because
Plaintiff was
an I.C.E.
hold.
(Id.)
Mrs.
Hinojosa once
again
Detention
Center
staff
about
Plaintiff's
release.
Detention
Center
staff
confirmed
that
they
would
Plaintiff because I.C.E. had placed a hold on her.
Naturally,
informed
Mrs.
Detention
Hinojosa protested.
Center
staff
that
(Id.
Plaintiff
under
questioned
(Id. )
not
release
(Id.)
at
was
13.)
She
a United
States
citizen
born
in
South
what documentation she
(Id.)
Detention
Hinojosa.
Carolina.
(Id.)
Center
Ultimately,
staff,
she
The next morning,
efforts.
(Id.
however,
failed to
11
a.m.
the
January 31,
at
every fifteen minutes
15-16.)
Franks,
Sheriff's
Mrs.
an I.C.E.
asked
Office
agent.
Mrs.
called
until
at
Plaintiff's
Mrs.
release
(Id. at 13-14.)
Hinojosa continued
the
11
finally
(Id.
ignored
a.m.
gave
16.)
Sheriff's
(Id. )
her
a
Office
Around
number
for
She eventually reached
(Id. at 17,
19.)
Mr.
Franks told
Hinojosa that he would contact the Sheriff's Office to see
why it was
would
She
largely
secure
2014,
from 8 a.m.
I.C.E.'s Savannah office.
Mr.
also
needed to prove Plaintiff's citizenship.
and had to return home for the evening.
her
She
holding
look into
Lastly,
he
certificate,
Plaintiff.
sending an
told
Mrs.
social
(Id.
at 20.)
order to
release
Plaintiff.
(Id. )
take
Plaintiff's
birth
Hinojosa
security card, medical
records to the Sheriff's Office.
Mrs.
Hinojosa
to
He
also
records,
said he
and
school
(Id.)
followed Mr.
Frank's instructions
and took
the suggested paperwork to the Detention Center around 12 p.m.
that day.
(Id.
at 15,
23.)
According to Mrs.
Hinojosa,
when
she tried to show the paperwork to the Detention Center staff,
"they didn't want to look at it because they told me ICE had a
hold.
look
So they were very rude.
at
that.
So
I
can't
They were like we don't need to
even
tell
you
who
paperwork to because they didn't look at it."
I
showed
(Id.
the
at 24.)
Still
unable to secure Plaintiff's
release,
Mrs.
the paperwork with her and returned to her job.
Later in the day,
her that he
release
sent
was
Mr.
Frank's called Mrs.
sending a fax ordering the
Plaintiff.
by
Mr.
(Id.
Franks
at
21.)
states
The
3:39
2014 —
(Id. at 23.)
Hinojosa to tell
Detention Center to
time
stamp
p.m.
Plaintiff left the Detention Center at
Hinojosa took
(Doc.
5:44
p.m.
on
the
94-5
order
at
2.)
on January 31,
approximately 25 hours after her initial arrival.
(Doc.
94-1 at 2.)
Defendants,
for their part,
never explicitly deny that they
were holding Plaintiff because of the detainer.
deny
that
Hinojosa.
after
they
refused
Rather,
that
[I.C.E.]
office
arrest
the
secured a bond
—
was
....
judgment
dispute
the
bond
as
"received
previously
a
placed
by
Mrs.
notification
by
the
from
Savannah
"in
any
[ ] left
and
the
[Detention Center]
event,
Plaintiff
at
(Doc. 57-6 at 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
is
appropriate
to any
material
only
fact
if
"there
and the
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
56(a).
secured
and
cancelled,"
II.
genuine
they
detainer
approximately 5:45 p.m."
Summary
post
they state only that on January 31 — the day
Plaintiff's
[I.C.E.]
to
Neither do they
Fed.
is
no
movant
is
R.
Civ.
P.
Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing substantive law,
and a dispute is
genuine
"if
the
evidence
is
such
that
a reasonable
return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Lobby,
Inc.,
factual
party,
U.S.
in
U.S.
disputes
in
Matsushita
574,
[the
Parcels
banc)
477
587
not
Anderson,
Court,
moving
by
motion.
Because
the
Indus.
v.
party's]
941
the
party
to
Zenith
favor."
must
view
the non-moving
Radio
United
F.2d 1428,
and
1437
citations
evidence
has
to
Corp.
standard
directed verdict,
Co.
Court
Corp.,
475
or
States
v.
(11th Cir.
omitted).
determine
Four
1991)
The
(en
Court
credibility.
at 255.
reference
Celotex
The
favorable
punctuation
weigh
(1986).
and must draw "all justifiable inferences
Prop.,
477 U.S.
The
248
Anderson v. Liberty
light most
Elec.
non-moving
(internal
should
the
(1986),
of Real
242,
jury could
the
initial
materials
v.
for
on
Catrett,
summary
burden
file,
477
the
U.S.
judgment
of
showing
basis
317,
for
323
mirrors
the
the
(1986).
that
of
the initial burden of proof required by either
party depends on who carries the burden of proof at trial.
at 323.
a
When the movant does not
Id.
carry the burden of proof at
trial, it may satisfy its initial burden in one of two ways — by
negating an essential element of the non-movant's
case or by
showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to
the
non-movant's
F.2d 604,
Kress
317).
606-08
& Co.,
case.
See
(11th Cir.
398 U.S.
The movant
144
Clark v.
1991)
(1970)
cannot meet
Coats
& Clark,
Inc.,
(explaining Adickes
v.
929
S.H.
and Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S.
its initial burden by merely
declaring
trial.
that
Clark,
If —
the
issue of
fact
non-movant
must
that
its
its
the movant
"demonstrate
precludes
the
burden
response
initial
affirmatively
cannot
meet
its
burden
at
929 F.2d at 608.
bears
tailor
carried
non-moving party
and only if —
non-movant
must
the
of
to
a
that
there
its
is
initial burden,
indeed
summary judgment."
burden.
negating
carries
proof
the
If
at
method
the
material
movant
fact,
When the
the
non-movant
which
the
presented
the
material
Id.
trial,
by
a
movant
evidence
non-movant
"must
respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict
motion
at
trial
Fitzpatrick
1993) .
fact,
v.
on
City
the
of
material
Atlanta,
fact
2
sought
F.3d
to
1112,
be
1116
negated."
(11th
Cir.
If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material
the
non-movant must
either show that the
record contains
evidence that was "overlooked or ignored" by the movant or "come
forward
directed
with
additional
verdict
evidence
motion
evidentiary deficiency."
at
Id.
sufficient
trial
at 1117.
based
The
to
on
withstand
the
non-movant
a
alleged
cannot
carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating
conclusory allegations contained in the complaint.
v.
Ross,
663 F.2d 1032,
1033-34
(11th Cir. 1981).
See Morris
Rather, the
non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In this action, the Clerk of Court gave Plaintiff notice of
the motion for summary judgment and informed her of the summary
judgment rules,
the right to file affidavits or other materials
in
and
opposition,
Therefore,
772
the
F.2d 822,
the
notice
825
consequences
requirements
(11th Cir.
1985)
of
of
default.
Griffith
(Doc.
v.
(per curiam),
59.)
Wainwright,
are satisfied.
The time for filing materials in opposition has expired,
and the
motion is now ripe for consideration.
III.
In
her
seizures.
arrest
the
First,
for
Plaintiff
complaint,
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
driving
challenges
challenges
without
the
challenges
a
the
suspended
validity of her
two
separate
validity
license.
of
her
Second,
extended detention at
Detention Center.
Plaintiff brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983
allows citizens to sue state governments and state officials for
violations
of
Constitution.
rights
granted
them
under
the
To succeed in a § 1983 action,
make a prima facia showing of two elements:
omission deprived plaintiff of a right,
United
States
"a plaintiff must
(1) that the act or
privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
(2)
and
that the act or omission was done by a person acting under
color of law."
Dist.,
1983) .
Marshal Cty.
992 F.2d 1171,
1174
Bd. of Educ.
(11th Cir.
v. Marshall Cty.
Gas
1993) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§
Plaintiff
claims
violations.
Sergeant
Plaintiff
Munsey
through
results
Captain
free
(doc.
John
from
26
Staten
seizure
Norman
right
to
ran
her
they
and
her
seizure
seized
her
(2)
108-112);
violated
when
constitutional
Deputy
Fourth Amendment
database
unreasonable
(1)
and
GCIC
11
that:
four
her
search
the
committed
alleges
violated
from unreasonable
plate
Defendants
Jailer
Ashley
Fourth
when
based
Amendment
they
(3)
Deputy
Fourteenth
targeted
Amendment's
her
profiling
Norman
for
(id.
a
SISI
probable
Anderson,
are
Sergeant
Equal
search
93-109);
Fourteenth Amendment
without
and
due
cause
Captain Staten,
Protection
and
and
process
(id^
Munsey
M
(4)
on
the
and
to
to
post
violated
based
Defendants
be
her
(id. SIS! 72-
Clause
seizure
license
right
refused
free
Mills
bond until they could verify her immigration status
76) ;
be
and
when
upon
the
they
racial
violated
her
rights when they detained her
139-158);
Captain Kearney,
and
and
(6)
Sheriff
Sergeant Munsey
subject to supervisory liability for the unconstitutional
actions of their subordinates
(id.
SI 5 8-9) .
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants make three
arguments.
First,
all
Defendants
challenge
the
legal
factual basis of the alleged constitutional violations.
Sheriff Anderson,
Captain Staten,
and Jailer Mills
and
Second,
argue they
are entitled to qualified immunity with regards to their role in
detaining Plaintiff.
Third,
Sheriff Anderson,
Captain Staten,
Captain
Kearney,
and
Sergeant
Munsey
argue
that
they
are
not
subject to supervisory liability.
Because
whether
with
first
If
Court
step
constitutional
Defendants'
claims.
the
a
the
in
a
§
violation
challenges
to
1983
action
occurred,
is
the
Plaintiff's
determining
Court
begins
constitutional
Plaintiff establishes any constitutional violations,
will
consider
Defendants'
arguments
that
they
are
entitled to qualified immunity and thus exempted from liability
under §
they
§
1983.
should
It
will
not
be
also consider Defendants'
subject
to
supervisory
arguments that
liability
under
1983.
A.
Constitutional Violations
1. Unconstitutional Stop and Seizure Claim
Plaintiff claims Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey violated
her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure when
her
at
the
they
store,
ran her license
and
when
they
plate,
arrested
when they seized
her.
The
Court
previously concluded that Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey did
not
violate
(Doc.
the
Constitution when
60 at 9-10.)
they
ran
her
the
only
plate.
It also concluded that they did not violate
the Constitution when they stopped her at the
Thus,
license
question
is
whether
Constitution when they arrested Plaintiff.
10
they
store.
violated
(Id. )
the
To
make
a
officer must
F.App'x
constitutional
arrest
establish probable cause.
523,
526
(11th
Cir.
2009).
without
a
Poulakis
v.
An
warrant,
an
Rogers,
341
officer
establishes
probable cause when he has "facts and circumstances within
knowledge
suspect
had
Gonzalez,
Ohio,
sufficient
committed
969
F.2d
379 U.S.
information
the
89,
or
was
1002
91
a
(11th
owner
that
crime."
1992)
the
U.S.
Beck
(citing
v.
v.
of
Plaintiff s
vehicle
had
a
Plaintiff has not challenged the reliability
records
vehicle,
Cir.
a
belief
Deputy Norman received reliable
upon
which
Deputy
Deputy Norman confirmed Plaintiff's
of the
reasonable
committing
(1964)).
the
that
GCIC
warrant
999,
suspended license.
of
to
[his]
Norman
relied.
After
identity and her ownership
he had more than a reasonable belief that
was driving with a suspended license.
she
Thus, Deputy Norman and
Sergeant Munsey had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and they
did not violate the Constitution.
Because
the
Fourth
Plaintiff
Deputy Norman
Amendment
cannot
Accordingly,
the
when
succeed
Court
and Sergeant Munsey did not violate
they
on
seized and
her
GRANTS
arrested
respective
summary
§
judgment
Plaintiff,
1983
in
claim.
favor
of
Defendants with respect to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment illegal
search
and
seizure
claim
against
Munsey.
11
Deputy
Norman
and
Sergeant
2.
Unconstitutional Detention Claim
Defendants
make
unconstitutional
may
detain
a
posted bond
detention
subject
for
up
cause hearing.
if
they
did
three
detain
claims.
arrested
to
(Doc.
arguments
48
First,
without
hours
57-6 at
before
based
Second,
her
argue
introduction
that
of
"Plaintiff
evidence
in
has
the
that
who
her
a
they
has
not
probable
they argue that,
immigration
status,
(Doc. 70 at 5.)
they had probable cause to detain her.
they
warrant
granting
on
Plaintiff's
they argue
a
10-12.)
Plaintiff
refuting
Third,
not
record
shown
that
through
she
was
held
the
after
her bond posted," nor has she shown in the record that "she was
in
fact
subject
response
from
System]
to
the
system."
a.
Defendants'
(1991).
in
hours,"
first
limits
[Automated
and
detention
Fingerprint
based
on
a
Identification
County
of
discussed
claim should fail.
relies
Riverside
claim
of
v.
that
upon the
McLaughlin
probable
was
released
cause
released
by
the
(Id.
"well
Supreme
at 11.)
12
on
500
only
within
48
U.S.
44
requires
a
hours
a
of
They then assert that
bond
after
within
Court
Supreme Court's
McLaughlin,
(Doc. 57-6 at 10-11.)
"Plaintiff
was
48-Hours
argument
determination
she
arrest
of Less Than
person's arrest.
because
AFIS
Defendants
judicial
second
(Id.)
Detentions
decision
a
in
the
approximately
permissible
McLaughlin,"
and
25
time
her
Defendants'
McClaughlin
is
argument
probable
warrant?
a
the
present
reasons.
case.
First,
The
question
how quickly must a jurisdiction provide
hearing
at
two
to
55-57.
a
suspect
arrested
without
a
The question posed in the present
how long may a jurisdiction refuse to post the bond of
suspect
not
cause
500 U.S.
case is:
for
inapplicable to the
posed in McLaughlin was:
a
fails
arrested without
same.
Thus,
a
warrant?
McLaughlin
does
These
not
two
entitle
questions
are
Defendants
to
summary judgment.
Second,
and
jurisdictions
without
a
48-hour
warrant.
that provides
48 hours
a
relatedly,
of
blank
to
U.S.
did
hold
declared
determinations
arrest will,
500
check
McLaughlin
judicial
Constitution.
McLaughlin
56
suspects
that
"a
grant
arrested
jurisdiction
of probable cause within
as a general matter,
at
not
(emphasis
comply" with the
added).
The
Court
specifically noted that a probable cause determination does not
pass "constitutional muster simply because it is provided within
48
hours.
Such
Constitution]
if the
a
hearing
may
nonetheless
violate
arrested individual can prove that
[the
his or
her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably."
at
Id.
56.
The
48-hour mark is merely a useful tool to determine the
presumptive
probable
reasonableness
cause
reasonable.
Id.
of
the
within
disputed
hours
is
A
hearing
held
at 57.
A probable cause hearing held outside
13
48
detention.
presumed
of
48
hours
contrived
is
the
presumed
48-hour
unreasonable.
mark
because
it
Id.
had
The
to.
Court
See
only
id.
at
56
("Although we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels
a specific time limit,
certainty
with
Thus,
so
that
confidence
the
it is important to provide some degree of
State
that
and
counties
may
establish
they fall within constitutional bounds.").
pertinent
question
is
not
whether
a
provided a probable cause hearing within 48-hours,
jurisdiction
reasonable
provided
amount
Because
procedures
a
probable
cause
jurisdiction
but whether a
hearing
within
a
of time.
McLaughlin
detention period,
does
not
permit
Defendants cannot
a
blanket
rely on the
released Plaintiff in only 25 hours.
Instead,
48-hour
fact that
they
they must assert
that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to prove her
detention
was
Plaintiff
has
unreasonable.
presented
As
discussed
significant
unreasonably delayed her release.
below,
evidence
Thus,
that
however,
Defendants
even if McLaughlin was
applicable to Plaintiff's case, Defendants could not prevail at
the
summary-judgment
Defendants'
claim
stage.
that
Accordingly,
McLaughlin
entitles
the
Court
them
to
DENIES
summary
judgment.
b.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient
evidence that they held her after they posted her bond or that
they held her because of an I.C.E. hold.
14
But to establish a
Fourth Amendment violation for unreasonable detention,
Plaintiff
does not have to show that Defendants held her after they posted
her
bond
or
Plaintiff
eligible
that
need
for
Defendants
only
prove
release
held
her
because
Defendants
and
lacked
probable
after she was
793
217
(1st Cir.
2015)
an
her
I.C.E.
after
cause
v.
hold.
she
was
detain
to
See Morales
eligible for release.
F.3d 208,
held
of
her
Chadbourne,
(''Because Morales was
kept in
custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release,
was
subjected to
one
that
a new seizure
must
be
for
supported
Fourth Amendment
by
a
new
she
purposes —
probable
cause
justification."); Mercado v. Dallas Cty., Texas, 229 F. Supp. 3d
501,
513
(N.D.
jurisdiction's
probable
would
that
Texas
Jan.
detention
cause
after
violate
the
17,
2017)
of a suspected
she was
Fourth
illegal
otherwise
Amendment).
(holding
that
alien
eligible
Defendants
for
do
without
release
not
claim
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence she was held without
probable cause.
The Court, therefore, must only decide whether
Plaintiff provided sufficient evidence that a reasonable
could
a
find
Defendants
held
her
after
she
was
eligible
jury
for
release.
Plaintiff offers two lines of evidence that Defendants held
her after
evidence
she was
is
incarceration.
"contact
notes
eligible for release.
taken
by
Defendants
The
first
during
line of
Plaintiff's
The first entry, dated January 30, 2014, states
[I.C.E.]
in Atlanta GA for pick up before releasing."
15
(Doc.
95-1
at
3.)
The
second
states "[p]er Captain Staten,
entry,
dated
if I.C.E.
does
January
not
31,
2014,
send a hold on
subject by 02/03/2014, subject can post bond. Bond is in file." 1
(Id.
(emphasis
2014,
states
from
[I.C.E.]
(Id.)
sent
added).)
"[p]er
Captain
by Monday,
The final entry,
a
release
subject's
The
on
file.
third
Staten
entry,
if
we
do
dated
not
January
hear
31,
anything
then subject can post bond on Monday."
dated January 31,
their
Subject
detainer
was
for
2014,
states "[I.C.E.]
subject.
Paperwork
bonded by Akins
in
Bonding Company."
(Id.)
The second line of evidence is the deposition testimony of
Plaintiff's
that
after
sister,
Susana
Defendants
told
Hinojosa.
her
"that
Mrs.
the
Hinojosa
bond
was
testified
going
to
be
about 2,000 dollars," she "went across the street to talk to the
bails bond man lady to see if she could help me."
11-12.)
(Doc.
96 at
She further testified that:
I got everything took care of with the bond lady. She
told me I had to sign the bond and everything. And I said
okay. She said she would take care of it.
I walked back over to the jailhouse and I sit there and
I'm waiting for them to release her and then come about I
think it was between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock they told me
that ICE has a hold on her after I had been sitting there
for
four
hours.
They told me they're not releasing her because ICE has a
And I only found that out because the bonds
hold on it.
1 The Court notes that Plaintiff was arrested on January 30, 2014
- a Thursday.
February 3, 2014 was a Monday.
Thus, Defendants were
considering jailing Plaintiff - an ostensible American citizen - an
additional 48 hours not because of an I.C.E. hold, but merely in
anticipation of an I.C.E. hold.
16
lady
called me
and
told
me
and
then
I went
up
to
the
window and asked.
(Id. at 12
The
(emphasis added).)
Court
conclude
that
Defendants
finds
both
that
of
a
these
reasonable
lines
improperly refused to post
of
fact-finder
evidence
their
Defendants'
claim that
motion
for
Plaintiff
summary
did
not
demonstrate
Plaintiff's bond and thus
held her after she was eligible for release.
DENIES
could
Accordingly,
judgment
provide
with
Court
regards
sufficient
to
evidence
that Defendant held her after she was eligible for release.
c.
Probable
The
Cause
Court
must
now
determine
whether
Defendants
had
probable cause to continue detaining Plaintiff despite the fact
she
had
posted
nontechnical
practical
and
citations
Probable
conception
considerations
prudent
Pringle,
bond.
men,
540
not
U.S.
omitted).
circumstances
that
of
legal
366,
It
cause
deals
everyday
with
life
technicians,
370
(2005)
asks
"is
the
on
factual
act."
there
practical,
which
(internal
whether
a
reasonable
Maryland
quotations
are
and
"facts
v.
and
and
'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'"
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
When answering this
question,
"totality
courts
circumstances"
and
must
look
at
decide
whether
the
the
facts
"viewed
of
the
from
the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
17
amount
to
probable
cause."
Pringle,
540
U.S.
at
370
(internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Defendants
Plaintiff,
First,
argue
they
they
probable
had
claim
cause
illegally.
even
probable
the
to
if
cause
initial
believe
Second,
to detain persons
that
they
to
fax
did
delay
continue
sent
by
Plaintiff
releasing
detaining
I.C.E.
was
in
her.
gave
the
them
country
they claim that Georgia law allows officers
while
investigating their
immigration status.
The Court rejects both arguments.
i.
The
I.C.E.
Court
Defendants.
subject
is
Fax
begins
The
not
fax
with
stated:
legally
in
the
initial
"I.C.E.
the
fax
records
United
removal proceedings.
. . . This
detainer.
This
for
being provided
information
for
is
informational
other
relevant
The
not
Court
contain
First,
finds
enough
official I.C.E.
sent
detainer.
and
is
that
appears
to
this
to
be
not a government
enforcement
only.
(Id.)
sent
use
This
and
is
response
The fax contained no
information.
establish probable
I.C.E.
law
purposes
is not supported by fingerprints."
indicate
States
subject to
I.C.E.
that,
multiple
information
to
reasons,
support
this
fax
probable
did
cause.
detainers require the issuing officer to
cause.
specifically
Defendants
for
Morales,
793
stated that
therefore
F.3d at
it
was
should have
did not have probable cause and that,
216.
not
assumed
without
an
The
fax
official
that
I.C.E.
an independent
basis,
neither
information
country
about
of
removal.
did
they.
the
origin,
In
the
Plaintiff's
or
other
Second,
why
I.C.E.
words,
the
fax
gives
immigration
believed
fax
gave
specific
background,
she
was
her
subject
Defendants
justification for why they should continue to
Third,
no
no
to
factual
detain Plaintiff.
the fax didn't even definitively state that Plaintiff was
subject
to
removal.
It
stated
subject
to
removal"
without
only
that
she
elucidating why
"appears
she
be
subject
was
to
to
removal.
The Court
most
also
favorable
sufficient
support
to
finds
Plaintiff
information
probable
that —
to
cause
taking the
—
even
Cir.
2004)
the
establish probable
when
viewed
evidence available to officers.
(11th
if
facts
in
(holding that
officers
fax
it
totality
382
may
the
did
cause,
the
Kingsland,
in
light
contain
did
not
of
the
F.3d 1220,
not
"turn a blind
eye to exculpatory information that is available to them").
addition
to
the
fax,
Defendants
had
affirmative
Plaintiff was not only in the country legally,
most
likely
a
United
arrested,
she
had
license.
(Doc.
States
citizen.
in her possession
94-3 at 2.)
Georgia driver's
evidence
In
that
but that she was
When
a valid
1228
Plaintiff
Georgia
was
driver's
licenses are not
given to persons in the country illegally, see O.C.G.A. § 19-119.1(a)(2),
Plaintiff's
and
Defendants
license
was
do
not
fake.
her social security number.
argue
Plaintiff
(Id.)
19
that
also
they
gave
believed
Defendants
Defendants, however, did not
use this number to double check her status with I.C.E.
Finally,
Plaintiff's sister verbally attested to Plaintiff's status as
an
American citizen and brought to the Detention Center Plaintiff's
"birth
certificate,
records
from
the
her
health
from the
school
Because
Defendants
evidence,
from the
had
social
security
department
in
card,
Metter,
Board of Education."
access
to
all
her
and
her
(Doc.
of
this
96
382
that
appellees1
the
deficient
in
F.3d
at
1230
("[A]
reasonable
investigation
[of
jury
probable
papers
at
15.)
exculpatory
they did not have probable cause to detain
Kingsland,
medical
Plaintiff.
could
find
cause]
was
that the officers consciously and deliberately did
not make an effort to uncover reasonably discoverable,
material
information.").
Ultimately,
the
detaining
officer
is
responsible
ensuring that he has probable cause to detain a suspect.
v.
Evans,
officer
133
is
F.3d
required
establish probable
1521,
1525
1425,
(11th
1435
(11th
to
conduct
a
cause.");
Cir.
Cir.
1998)
reasonable
see Ortega v.
1996)
(finding
no
("An
for
Rankin
arresting
investigation
Christian,
probable
to
85 F.3d
cause
for
arrest based on a tip given by a confidential informant in part
because
the
arresting
officer
did
not
steps to investigate the informant's
take
"any
independent
tip or had any evidence
prior to arresting [the plaintiff] which would have corroborated
the
informant's
identification
of
[the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime").
20
plaintiff]
as
a
He cannot rely on
unsubstantiated allegations,
conclusory as
the
Had Defendants
most
likely
status.
not
initial
have
required
been
to
able
of
an
to
verify
and
innocence,
officer
may
obtain
and
an
investigation
easily discoverable
quotations
suffered
an
fundamental
DENIES
in
unacceptable
Defendants'
the
cause
.
.
to
.")
they
rights.
that
an
ignore
fashion
deprivation
for
probable
.
to
immigration
arrest.
information
. . . [n]or may the officer
Because
motion
claim
established
1525.
theoretically
making
choose
biased
facts
omitted).
constitutional
Defendants'
at
police officer is
every
before
not
a
("[A]
eliminate
that has been offered to him or her
conduct
See id.
Plaintiff's
382 F.3d at 1229
explore
claim
Nevertheless,
fax sent by I.C.E.
conducted any amount of investigation they would
See Kingsland,
plausible
especially allegations as vague and
of
or
elect
(internal
did
most
Accordingly,
summary
initial
detain
judgment
fax
with
sent
Plaintiff
to
citations
not,
her
not
Plaintiff
basic
the
and
Court
respect
by
after
to
I.C.E.
she
was
otherwise eligible for release.
ii.
In
addition
Georgia
to
the
I.C.E.
fax,
Defendants
law allowed them to detain Plaintiff.
O.C.G.A.
(b)
Georgia Law
§
also
claim that
They point to
17-5-100(b)-(c):
. . . during any investigation of a criminal suspect
by a peace officer, when such officer has probable cause
to believe that
a suspect has committed a criminal
violation, the officer shall be authorized to seek to
21
verify such suspect's immigration status when the suspect
is unable to provide one of the following:
(2) A valid Georgia driver's license
(6) Other information as to the suspect's identity
that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to
independently identify the suspect.
(c) When attempting to determine the immigration status of
a suspect ... a peace officer shall be authorized to use
any
reasonable
means
available
to
determine
the
immigration status of the suspect, including:
(1)
Use of any federal identification database;
(4)
Contacting an appropriate federal agency.
Defendants claim that § 17-5-100(b)-(c)
to
detain
Plaintiff
for
gave them probable cause
purposes
of
investigating
her
immigration status.
Defendants,
Section
have misinterpreted § 17-5-100(b)-(c).
17-5-100(b)-(c)
persons
solely
illegally.
It
immigration
First,
however,
the
does
because
they
only
not
allows
status
officer
if
must
he
suspect
cause
violation.
sufficient
to
meets
have
believe
they
officers
the
to
three
already
suspect for a criminal violation.
probable
allow
officers
are
in
verify
the
a
specific
been
to
detain
country
suspect's
conditions.
investigating
the
Second, the officer must have
suspect
committed
a
criminal
Third, the suspect must have been unable to provide
identification
to
22
confirm
her
identity
and
immigration
status.
Section
17-5-100(b),
therefore,
does
not
stand for the proposition asserted by Defendants.
But,
detain
even
a
if
§
suspect
solely
immigration
status,
opportunity
to
Plaintiff
for
17-5-100 (b) - (c)
do
it
for
would
so
driving with
have
When
a
allow
purposes
not
here.
did
of
license
is
specifically
suspended license,
identification
detention
under
Plaintiff
investigation
of
listed
§
suspended
Defendants'
investigation,
Plaintiff's
bond
§
17-5-100(b)
Plaintiff
or
while
did
not
the
motion
respect
with
100(b)-(c)
grant
Court
to
an
occur
hear
Defendants
probable
DENIES
their
cause
Plaintiff
during
it
gave
form
the
refused
that
the
post
Thus,
to
her
after
to
I.C.E.
ability
for
of
Defendants'
occurred
from
Defendants'
assertion
confronted
Additionally,
Defendants
to
the
accepted
license;
when
waiting
establish
Accordingly,
did not
Defendants
A Georgia driver's
17-5-100(b)(2).
challenges
her
as
her
Norman
the Deputy a valid Georgia Driver's license.
to
verifying
allowed
Deputy
Defendants
detain
detention.
summary
judgment
O.C.G.A.
§
17-5-
gave them probable cause to detain Plaintiff.
3. Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff
Protection
claims
Clause
investigation.
by
that
using
Defendants
racial
violated
profiling
to
target
Equal
her
for
"The Equal Protection Clause requires government
entities to treat similarly situated people alike."
Rainbow City,
the
Ala.,
434
F.3d 1306,
23
1313
(11th Cir.
Campbell v.
2006).
To
succeed
on
an
enforcement,
a
differently
that
equal
protection
plaintiff
from
other
[the defendant]
must
claim
show
similarly
that
"(1)
that
situated
unequally applied a
evidence
claim
that
demonstrating
(Doc.
she
at
(Doc.
breakdown
60%
of
105
57-6 at
21.)
has
on
Bulloch County is
60%
Id.
not
the
17.)
She
was]
treated
individuals,
[her]."
discrimination
[Sheriff's Office]."
has.
Plaintiff
[she
selective
and
facially neutral
for the purpose of discriminating against
Defendants
alleges
[law]
at 1314.
provided
part
"any
of
the
Plaintiff asserts that
claims
white
that
and
"[t]he
40%
racial
non-white but
of the traffic citations are issued to the non-white group,
of which
[Plaintiff]
are
comparators
the
asserts
that
is a member,
to
The
therefore,
[Plaintiff]."
Court
finds
the white motorists
(Id.)
"Defendants hold road blocks
white neighborhoods."
Plaintiff
the
Court
does
assertion because
(Doc.
91.)
selective
best,
(Id.)
that
not
Plaintiff
accept
Plaintiff
Second,
has
not
it
does
Plaintiff's
includes
Plaintiff's
enforcement.
and
also
in predominately non-
shown
that
she
treated differently than similarly situated individuals.
The
nothing
no
statistical
citation
evidence
statistical
to
show
does
to
not
disparity
that
race
disparity
the
record.
demonstrate
is
was
is
true
for
the
alleged
road blocks
in
mild,
the
non-white
Based upon the evidence presented by Plaintiff,
24
was
First,
at
factor
responsible for the disparity of traffic citations issued.
same
(2)
The
areas.
no reasonable
jury could conclude that
which violated the
Defendants'
Defendants
engaged in racial profiling
Fourteenth Amendment.
motion
for
summary
Thus,
judgment
the Court GRANTS
with
regards
to
Plaintiff's equal protection claim.
4.
Substantive Due
Plaintiff
due process
[her]
her
also
makes
personal
claims
process
autonomy
of
that
and Procedural
under
Due
the
Process
Fourteenth
Amendment's
Plaintiff claims that Defendants
due
actions
claims
two
clause.
substantive
arbitrary
Process
rights
the
have
from
preserved
to
the
Defendants."
"Defendants
(Doc.
violated
her
"violated
dignity,
unnecessary
1
26
procedural
Plaintiff's
is
repetitive
constitutional
provision,
hold."
substantive due process
of
her
claim
due
such
as
the
Amendment
covered
by
Fourth
or
a
She
process
on an
(Doc. 105 at 22.)
claim fails because it
Fourth
is
and
142.)
when she was illegally held in jail after obtaining bond,
erroneous Immigration Customs (I.C.E.)
and
claim.
specific
Eighth
xx[I]f
a
constitutional
Amendment,
the
claim
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific
provision,
Cty.
Of
not
under
Sacramento
Graham v. Connor,
the
v.
rubric
Lewis,
490 U.S.
of
523
386,
395
substantive
U.S.
833,
(1989)
due
843
process."
(1998);
see
("Because the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection
against
governmental conduct,
notion
of
this
sort
of
that Amendment,
'substantive
due
process,'
25
physically
intrusive
not the more generalized
must
be
the
guide
for
analyzing these
search
and
"dignity,
claims.").
seizure
and her
The
Fourth Amendment's
provision
personal
already
autonomy
.
unreasonable
protects
. from the
.
Plaintiff's
unnecessary
and arbitrary actions of the Defendants."
See Mendoza v. United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
849 F.3d 408,
(8th
attempt
Cir.
2017).
substantive
Thus,
due
illegal search,
process
seizure,
Plaintiff's
claim
also
Defendants
Plaintiff
violation
because
for
Amendment
cause
already
Thus,
Plaintiff's
process
similar
Cir.
requires
any
reasons.
arrest
See
it
government
under
be
allegedly
due
process
Plaintiff
also
Thus,
is
to
claims
establish probable
Gerstein,
concerning
the
at
of
Amendment's
of
Plaintiff's
Milewski,
327
F.3d 564,
passes
muster
under
that
satisfy
the
requirements
if this court upholds
reviewed
420 U.S.
legitimacy
the
Fourteenth
duplicative
Case v.
seizure
should
when
plaintiff]
would
("[A]
process clause.
the
determination
claim.
2003)
Amendment
a
The Fourth Amendment,
extended detention.
detention
clause
Amendment
assert
violated her right to procedural due process because
prior to any
114.
her
procedural
they detained her without probable cause.
however,
of
to
or detention.
Fourteenth
fails
cannot
420-21
under
Fourth
Fourth
568
the
of
due
(7th
Fourth
the
due
[the plaintiff's]
Amendment
rules,
[the
will not succeed by recasting his challenge in the
language of due process."); see Lawson v. City of Coatesville,
42
F.
Supp.
3d 664,
676-77
(E.D.
26
Pa.
2014);
Crouse v.
South
Lebanon Tp.,
that
the
criminal
for
668
F.
Fourth
justice
seizures
Supp.
Amendment
system"
of
2d
664,
is
and
persons
or
674
(M.D.
"explicitly
governs
"the
property").
Pa.
2009)
(noting
tailored
process
for
that
Plaintiff,
the
is
due
therefore,
must challenge the legitimacy of her detention under the Fourth
Amendment,
not
the
Case,
327
F.3d
at
1120,
1129
(D.
Fourteenth
568;
Colo.
Amendment's
Shimomura
2014)
v.
due
process
Carlson,
("Considering
that
17
F.
his
clause.
Supp.
due
3d
process
claim effectively mirrors his allegation of illegal arrest under
the
Fourth
claim
Amendment,
under
the
[the
Fifth
plaintiff]
and
has
Fourteenth
failed
Amendments
to
state
upon
a
which
relief can be granted."); Meketa v. Kamoie, 955 F. Supp. 2d 345,
365-66
(M.D.
Pa.
2013)
Fourteenth Amendment,
any
unlawful
("[I]t is the
Fourth Amendment,
which is the proper vehicle for addressing
pretrial
deprivations
of
liberty
criminal proceedings."); Sayan-Resto v. Berrios,
252,
265
(D.
P.R.
not the
2013)
incidental
to
933 F. Supp. 2d
(holding that a plaintiff must
pursue
her illegal detention claim under the Fourth, not the Fourteenth
Amendment);
Crouse,
668
F.
Supp.
2d
at
674
("[A]
pretrial
deprivation of liberty that is related to a criminal proceeding
is addressed not through procedural due process, but the Fourth
Amendment.").
Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Defendants'
motion
for summary judgment with regards to Plaintiff's substantive and
procedural due process claims.
27
B.
Qualified Immunity and Supervisory Liability
Because
Plaintiff
successfully
established
that
Defendants
violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure when they refused to release her on bond,
now
consider
the
doctrine
consider
whether
of
Defendants'
qualified
Plaintiff's
Kearney,
and
immunity.
claim
Captain
liability
that
Staten
is
The
Sheriff
should
be
the Court must
extinguished
Court
must
Anderson,
subject
to
by
also
Captain
supervisory
liability.
1. Qualified Immunity
Sheriff
Anderson,
Captain
immunity
Qualified
immunity
government
officials by allowing them to
their
Anderson
conduct
v.
their
aims
may
omitted).
performing
discretionary
violate
of
civil
clearly
which
a
Fitzgerald,
limit
rise
to
U.S.
provides
functions
damages
liability
646
their
established statutory or
reasonable
person
would
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
28
Plaintiff.
liability
for
(1987)
"government
generally
as
assert
of
"reasonably anticipate
that
insofar
Mills
detaining
635,
It
Jailer
personal
483
Creighton,
for
in
give
quotations
liability
to
role
and
qualified
when
for
Staten,
have
are
damages."
(internal
officials
shielded
conduct
does
constitutional
known."
from
rights
Harlow
(citations omitted).
not
v.
Establishing
First,
the
qualified
official
must
immunity
"prove
is
that
a
he
two-step
was
acting
process.
within
the
scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful
acts
occurred."
Cir.
2002)
Cir.
2002)).
within
(quoting
his
If
to
Id.
prove
"the
show
v.
that
311
violated
1346
(11th
F.3d
1188,
1194
(11th
the
is
plaintiff
that
he
burden
immunity
immunity
the
1340,
establishes
authority,
a
F.3d
284
Ferraro,
qualified
stage,
actions
Wilson,
defendant
qualified
summary-judgment
officer's
Lee
discretionary
plaintiff
To
Vineyard v.
is
not
must
shifts
not
appropriate
prove
Constitution,
(1)
and
of
the
probable
alleged
cause,
constitutional
however,
immunity standard.
courts
violation
use
Under this standard,
a
acting
to
the
appropriate."
at
the
that
the
that
the
(2)
constitutional right violated was clearly established.
When
was
See id.
concerns
special
a
lack
qualified
"[o]fficers who make an
arrest without probable cause are entitled to qualified immunity
if there was
arguable probable cause for the
v.
Miami,
City
Arguable
same
of
probable
arrest
could
F.3d
1220,
1232
(11th
and
have
Plaintiff
.
possessing
believed
.
.
the
that
."
Id.
same
Cir.
2004).
officers
cause exists if "reasonable
circumstances
Defendants
382
arrest." Kingsland
in the
knowledge
probable
cause
(internal
as
existed
quotations
the
to
and
citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were
their
discretionary
authority.
Thus,
29
the
burden
acting in
shifts
to
Plaintiff
cause
to
to
prove
detain
that
her.
Defendants
If
she makes
lacked
this
arguable
showing,
probable
she must
also
prove that the right violated was clearly established.
The
Court
favorable
to
arguable
probable
from
that,
Plaintiff,
detained her,
fax
finds
taking
she
cause.
has
the
established
According
a United States citizen,
I.C.E.
stating,
without
facts
any
to
in
the
light
Defendants
Plaintiff,
most
lacked
Defendants
for 25 hours based upon a
supporting
that
Furthermore,
Plaintiff appeared to be subject to removal.
evidence,
they
detained her in spite of the fact that she had in her possession
a
valid
which
the
Georgia
is
not
United
driver's
knowingly
States
—
and
license
given
in
to
spite
procured and proffered a copy of
security card,
and school records.
—
a
form
persons
of
the
of
identification
unlawfully
fact
that
present
in
her
sister
her birth certificate,
social
No reasonable officer in the
same circumstances could have believed probable cause existed to
detain Plaintiff for being in the country illegally.
382
F.3d at
1233
disregarded
cause
or
officers
knowledge
("If the defendants
certain
arguable
in
as
the
the
pieces
of
same
fabricated or unreasonably
evidence
cause,
as
circumstances
and
probable
defendants
could
Kingsland,
not
to
establish
alleged,
possessing
have
probable
reasonable
the
same
believed
that
probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.").
The only remaining question is whether Defendants violated
a clearly established right.
The right to be free from arrest
30
or
extended
detention
See Gerstein v.
is
the
and
Pugh,
standard
officers
threshold
Kingsland,
before
382
in
on
ample
at
103,
notice
an
cause
textbook
law.
(1975).
Probable cause
all
arrests
or
that
they
individual
1232.
is
114
justifying
detaining
F.3d
probable
420 U.S.
used
are
absent
Thus,
the
detentions,
must
clear
without
Court
a
warrant.
finds
right to be free from arrest absent probable cause is
that
that
the
a clearly
established constitutional right.
Because
that
Plaintiff
Defendants
has
detained
produced
her
sufficient
without
arguable
evidence
probable
violation of a clearly established constitutional right,
are
not
Court
entitled to
DENIES
qualified immunity at
Defendants'
summary
this
judgment
show
cause
in
Defendants
time.
motion
to
Thus,
for
the
qualified
immunity as it relates to Plaintiff's unconstitutional detention.
2. Supervisory Liability
Supervisory defendants may not be held liable under § 1983
for the unconstitutional
acts
of
or
respondeat
Jenne,
326
superior
F.3d 1352,
1360
of their
subordinates
vicarious
(11th Cir.
on the basis
liability.
2003).
Cottone
v.
They may only be
held liable under § 1983 "if they personally participated in the
allegedly
connection
unconstitutional
between
conduct
[their]
actions
constitutional deprivation.'"
1328
(11th Cir.
2007)
or
if
.
West v.
(quoting Cottone,
establish a causal connection,
.
there
.
and
Tillman,
326
is
^a
the
causal
alleged
496 F.3d 1321,
F.3d at 1360).
a Plaintiff must show either
31
To
(1)
"a
history
of
supervisor
a
act
the
and
to
inference
of
need
or
policy
puts
to
that
the
rights"
or
deliberate
supporting
the
subordinates
326
F.3d
by
event,
subordinates
to
Cottone,
any
the
in
unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so."
In
that
so";
act
1360.
knew
alleged
facts
(3)
directed
the
fails to do
results
supervisor
responsible
would
at
or
the
correct
[that]
constitutional
unlawfully
[that]
[that the alleged supervisor]
"custom
indifference
"an
abuse
notice
on
deprivation,
(2)
widespread
"[t]he
standard
which
a
supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for actions
of a subordinate is extremely rigorous."
Sheriff Anderson,
that
they
Anderson
are
and
not
Captain Kearney,
subject
Captain
to
Staten
they
Captain
are
not
Kearney,
assert
and
causally
and Captain Staten argue
supervisory
participate in detaining Plaintiff.
Anderson,
Id.
they
did
not
Sheriff
personally
(Doc. 57-6 at 15.)
Captain
connected
liability.
Staten
to
Sheriff
further
Plaintiff's
assert
alleged
unconstitutional detention because "[p]laintiff has not produced
any evidence that Sheriff Anderson, Captain Kearney,
Staten
were
violations
aware
of
^obvious,
of constitutional
rights,
resulted in deliberate indifference,
jailers to act unlawfully."
have
asserted
a
lack
of
flagrant,
rampant'
implemented a policy that
or directed the deputies or
(Id^ at 16.)
evidence,
[or]
or Captain
the
Because Defendants
Court
must
determine
whether Plaintiff's reply briefs point to evidence demonstrating
32
that
any
Defendant
personally
participated
in
or
was
causally
connected to the constitutional deprivation.
Plaintiff
not
affirmatively
personally
involved
however,
contains
involved
in
Captain
Staten,
02/03/2014,
Captain
if
if
Plaintiff.
then
subject
can
Thus,
while
claims
does
(See
not
do
Sheriff Anderson was
Plaintiff.
Captain
Staten
Doc.
send
can post bond.
we
that
detaining
that
I.C.E.
subject
Staten
in
evidence
detaining
concedes
a
Bond is
not
of
anything
bond
post
hear
on
personal
against Sheriff Anderson,
was
95-1
hold
in
Monday.")
The
personally
at
on
3
by
. . . Per
ICE
by Monday,
(emphasis
participation
("Per
subject
file.
from
record,
added)).
cannot
proceed
the Court finds sufficient evidence to
support a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Captain
Staten personally participated in Plaintiff's detention.
The
Court,
produced
Kearney
sufficient
were
(1)
must
evidence
causally
deprivation.
that:
however,
also
that
connected
examine
Sheriff
to
the
Anderson
alleged
The best the Court can discern,
"Anderson
[Plaintiff's
and
detention],
Staten's
or
failure
reprimand
whether
or
Plaintiff
or
Captain
constitutional
Plaintiff asserts
to
investigate
discipline
Mills
constituted a policy, practice or custom of deliberate indifference
to Mill's misconduct toward Plaintiff";
(2)
"[Jailer]
Mills denied
receiving much training on I.C.E. holds and I.C.E. detainers"; and
(3) "The Defendants have no written policy or procedures having to
do with I.C.E.
holds and I.C.E. detainers or anything having to do
33
with I.C.E.
annual
yet,
Defendant Anderson claims that his staff receives
training about
15, 17).
I.C.E.
and immigration
Plaintiff also argues that:
to effectuate all detainers,
(1)
and
(2)
"Sheriff's
policy or practice,
officials,
Plaintiff
could
find
Anderson
to
did
a
or
Captain
establish
it.
provided
evidence
evidence
provide
causal
a
evidence that
fix
not
Plaintiff's
connection
Kearney
causal
Defendants
were
326
no
evidence.
of
such
other
F.3d
at
delayed
Court
of
For
the
finds
that
jury
actions
must
Sheriff
First,
provide
some
a problem and failed to
example,
releases
of
detention.
Plaintiff,
to
Sheriff's
reasonable
a
Plaintiff
1360.
complaints made
other
the
Plaintiff's
aware
the
(Doc. 106 at 15).
between
and
I.C.E. had-or
without asking either
such that
connection,
Cottone,
of
following
briefs,
evidence
at
[sic] cause to support the
re-imprisoned [Plaintiff]
examining
105
"the Sheriff's policy was
her or I.C.E. any additional questions."
After
(Doc.
regardless whether [sic]
[sic] even claimed to have had-probable
request";
laws"
however,
she
the police
caused
has
provides
no
department,
no
by
a
suspect's
uncertain immigration status, and no evidence that the training
given to deputies
Second,
Defendants'
and jailers falls below accepted
alleged failure to investigate or reprimand
Jailer Mills does not constitute a policy or practice.
Plaintiff's
claim
standards.
that
Sheriff
Anderson
had
a
Finally,
policy
of
detaining all suspects that triggered a detainer by I.C.E. was
34
not
supported
by
any
citation
to
the
record.
will not consider this factual assertion.
Additionally,
Plaintiff
has
Thus,
(Doc.
provided
no
the
Court
91.)
case
law
explaining
why the scant evidence she has provided is sufficient to establish
supervisory liability.
She
has
the burden of
demonstrating what
evidence exists to show a causal connection and why that evidence
is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Just as this Court will
not scour the record to find evidence which supports her claims,
will
not
supports
scour
her
Westlaw
or
Lexis
claims.
In
Nexis
our
responsibility belongs to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff
demonstrates
a
has
failed
causal
to
find
case
adversarial
law
which
system,
that
evidence
that
not the Court.
provide
connection
to
it
sufficient
between
the
actions
of
Sheriff
Anderson or Captain Kearney and the constitutional deprivation.
She
has also conceded that Sheriff Anderson did not personally participate
in
Plaintiff's detention.
Thus,
the Court GRANTS Defendants'
motion
for summary judgment with regards to the supervisory liability claims
against
provides
Sheriff Anderson
sufficient
participated
in
and
Captain
evidence
detaining
that
Plaintiff
Kearney.
Captain
after
she
Because
Staten
was
the
record
personally
eligible
for
release, however, that claim shall proceed to trial as well.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants'
for summary judgment.
(Doc.
57.)
35
motion
It GRANTS summary judgment in
favor
of
claim
Defendants'
against
violating
motion
Deputy
the
and DISMISSES
Norman
Fourth
and
Sergeant
Amendment's
searches and seizures;
(2)
against Sergeant Munsey,
(1)
Plaintiff's
Munsey
prohibition
for
on
§
1983
allegedly
unreasonable
Plaintiff's supervisory liability claim
Sheriff Anderson,
and Captain Kearney for
Deputy Norman and Sergeant Munsey's alleged violation of the Fourth
Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable
Plaintiff's
supervisory
and
Captain
Kearney
detaining her;
to
and
the
alleged
(5)
(4)
liability
for
their
claims
alleged
substantive
Plaintiff's
and
allows
and seizures;
against
role
in
Sheriff
(3)
Anderson
unconstitutionally
Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants related
and procedural
claims
against
alleged equal protection violations.
motion
searches
the
following
all
due
process
Defendants
violations;
related
to
the
The Court DENIES Defendants'
claims
to
proceed
to
trial:
(1)
Plaintiff s claim that Jailer Mills and Captain Staten detained her
in
violation
of
the
Fourth
Amendment;
and
(2)
Plaintiff's
supervisory liability claims against Captain Staten.
The
Court
also
DENIES
as
untimely
exclude Plaintiff's expert testimony.
ORDER
September,
ENTERED
at
Augusta,
Defendants'
motions
(Docs. 71, 72.)
Georgia,
this
J( *?
day
2017.
CHlkE^JUJDGE A. RANDAL HALL
UNITEKSTATES
DISTRICT
COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
36
to
of
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