Taplin v. Hester et al

Filing 12

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against the Georgia Department of Corrections and against Defendant Hester in his official capacity re 1 Complaint filed by Randy Taplin. The Court O RDERS that any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 3/4/2016). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 2/19/2016. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

RANDY TAPLIN,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:15-cv-128

v.
OFC. HESTER; and GEORGIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia,
submitted a Complaint in the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.)
The Court has conducted the requisite frivolity review of the Complaint. For the reasons which
follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against the Georgia
Department of Corrections and any official capacity claims against Officer Hester. However,
Plaintiff arguably sets forth a plausible claim that Defendant Hester used an excessive amount of
force against him. Accordingly, this claim will proceed, and the Court DIRECTS the United
States Marshal to serve Defendant Hester with a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and this Order.
Additionally, the Court provides instructions regarding the future litigation of this case, which
the parties are urged to read and follow.
Further, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Entry of Default, (doc. 8), and a Motion to
Appoint Counsel, (doc. 9).
DENIED, respectively.

As set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motions are DISMISSED and

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action contesting certain conditions of his confinement at Georgia State
Prison. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts he had his right hand on the outside of the bottom of the
tray flap during shift change on September 2, 2015, when Defendant Hester approached the cell
door and began cussing at Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends Defendant Hester suddenly
began slamming the tray flap with his hands and kicking the tray slider, which caused the metal
slider to shut across Plaintiff’s hand, ripping his “skin and flesh.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff,
Defendant Hester immediately left the dormitory. Plaintiff maintains he was in excruciating pain
and bleeding profusely, and the officer who witnessed this entire incident immediately called the
officer in charge. The officer in charge called two other officers, who arrived an hour after this
incident, and they examined Plaintiff’s hand and left. Plaintiff then states two other officers later
came to look at Plaintiff’s hand, which was still bleeding severely. These officers took Plaintiff
to the medical unit, at which time the nurse told him he needed to go to the hospital to receive
stitches. However, Plaintiff contends he was not taken to the hospital until two days later, and he
received seven stitches and was prescribed pain and antibiotic medications. Plaintiff contends he
has experienced “constant, continuous pain and numbness in his” hand, and he is “in the process
of receiving further medical attention for[ ]” his injuries. (Id. at p. 6.)
In addition to Defendant Hester, Plaintiff names the Georgia Department of Corrections
as a Defendant.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for Defendant Hester’s intentional and

malicious actions. (Id. at p. 7.)

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment
of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows
an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which
shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must
dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.
Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is
guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . .
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set
of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that

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standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse
mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).
DISCUSSION
I.

Claims against Georgia Department of Corrections and Defendant Hester in his
Official Capacity
In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must satisfy two elements.

First, he must allege that an act or omission deprived him “of some right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579,

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1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, Plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by
“a person acting under color of state law.” Id.
While local governments qualify as “persons” under Section 1983, state agencies and
penal institutions are generally not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Grech v. Clayton
Cty. Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). “A state and its agencies (such as the Georgia
Department of Corrections) are not ‘persons’ who may be sued under § 1983.” Darrough v.
Allen, No. 1:13-CV-57 WLS, 2013 WL 5902792, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2013); see also
Williams v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV612-050, 2012 WL 3911232, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 6,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV612-050, 2012 WL 3910834 (S.D. Ga. Sept.
6, 2012) (“Because the Georgia Department of Corrections is a state agency, it is not a ‘person’
subject to suit under § 1983.”)
In addition, Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Hester in his
official capacity. States are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and
traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999).
Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit without its
consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a lawsuit against
a state agency or a state officer in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the
[s]tate itself,” such defendants are immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the
State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit against the Georgia Department of
Corrections, as well as against Defendant Hester in his official capacity as an employee of the
Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the Georgia
Department of Corrections from suit, as well as Defendant Hester in his official capacity. See
Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity,

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Plaintiff cannot sustain any constitutional claims for monetary relief against the Georgia
Department of Corrections or Defendant Hester in his official capacity.
For all of these reasons, the Court should DISMISS all claims against the Georgia
Department of Corrections and Defendant Hester in his official capacity.
II.

Excessive Force Claim
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment governs the

amount of force that prison officials are entitled to use against inmates. Campbell v. Sikes, 169
F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). An excessive force claim has two requisite parts: an objective
and a subjective component. Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 (11th Cir. 1994). In order to
satisfy the objective component, the inmate must show that the prison official’s conduct was
“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The subjective component requires a showing that the force used
was “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” rather than “a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). In
order to determine whether the force was used for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing
harm or whether the force was applied in good faith, courts consider the following factors: the
need for the exercise of force, the relationship between the need for force and the force applied,
the extent of injury that the inmate suffered, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
other inmates, and any efforts taken to temper the severity of a forceful response. Skelly v.
Okaloosa Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 456 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fennell v.
Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009)).

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Hester caused the tray flap to close on his hand by
slamming and kicking the tray flap, leading to Plaintiff sustaining injuries and having continuing
problems, arguably state a claim for relief.
III.

Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. 8)
Plaintiff moves the Court to issue an Order directing Defendants to show cause and

respond to his Complaint. As the Court has now conducted the requisite frivolity review of
Plaintiff’s Complaint and directed service of Plaintiff’s Complaint upon Defendant Hester,
Plaintiff’s Motion is DISMISSED. The parties’ future conduct is set forth in the body of this
Order. Defendants were under no obligation to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint simply because
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court that had not yet been served on Defendants.
IV.

Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 9)
Plaintiff seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him in this case. In this civil case,

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford, 562 F.
App’x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)).
“Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent
plaintiff, it has broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel only in
exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a
civil case is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the
facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained
practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert,
819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.
1985)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “the key” to assessing whether counsel should
be appointed “is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or

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her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need
such help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks,
983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).
The Court has reviewed the record and pleadings in this case and finds no “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel.

While the Court understands that

Plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found that “prisoners do not receive special
consideration notwithstanding the challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated.” Hampton
v. Peeples, No. CV 614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). “Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts’ decisions to refuse appointment of
counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this case for want of exceptional circumstances.”
Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015);
Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 702
(11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App’x at 457; Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 414 (11th
Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096; Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). This case is not so
complex legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting “the essential merits of his
position” to the Court. Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims
against the Georgia Department of Corrections and against Defendant Hester in his official
capacity.
The Court ORDERS that any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address

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any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
REMAINING CLAIM AND DEFENDANT
Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint arguably state a colorable claim that Defendant
Hester used an excessive amount of force against Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Eighth Amendment. Consequently, the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of Plaintiff’s
Complaint and a copy of this Order upon Defendant Hester without prepayment of cost. The
Court also provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the remainder of
this action and which the Court urges the parties to read and follow.

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INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANT
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs that service be
effected by the United States Marshal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will
first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendant by first-class mail and request that the
Defendant waive formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.7. Individual
and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and
any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of
personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer
the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is hereby granted leave of court to take
the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Defendant is further
advised that the Court’s standard 140 day discovery period will commence upon the filing of the
last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Defendant shall ensure that all discovery, including the Plaintiff’s
deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that discovery period.
In the event that Defendant takes the deposition of any other person, Defendant is ordered
to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As the Plaintiff will
likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, Defendant shall notify Plaintiff of the
deposition and advise him that he may serve on Defendant, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10)
days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the
witness, if any. Defendant shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the
deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c).

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INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant or, if
appearance has been entered by counsel, upon his attorneys, a copy of every further pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original
paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct
copy of any document was mailed to Defendant or his counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. “Every
pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and]
the file number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this Court and
defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1.
Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this
case.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to
obtain facts and information about the case from Defendant, Plaintiff must initiate discovery.
See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq. The discovery period in this case will expire 140 days
after the filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the
Court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within
this time period. Local Rule 26.1. Discovery materials should not be filed routinely with the
Clerk of Court; exceptions include: when the Court directs filing; when a party needs such
materials in connection with a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary; and
when needed for use at trial. Local Rule 26.4.
Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes

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of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or
organizations who are not named as a Defendant. Interrogatories are not to contain more than
twenty-five (25) questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than
twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the Court. If
Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he
should first contact the attorneys for Defendant and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff
proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has
contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2)(A); Local Rule 26.7.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff
loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard
cost of fifty cents ($.50) per page. If Plaintiff seeks copies, he should request them directly
from the Clerk of Court and is advised that the Court will authorize and require the
collection of fees from his prison trust fund account to pay the cost of the copies at the
aforementioned rate of fifty cents ($.50) per page.
If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of
prosecution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Local Rule 41.1.
It is Plaintiff’s duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by
Defendant. Upon no less than five (5) days’ notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff
shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn
affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses

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to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including
dismissal of this case.
As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to “counsel of record”
directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order.
A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is
required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is
incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which
may be scheduled by the Court.
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under this Court’s Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve
his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. “Failure to respond shall
indicate that there is no opposition to a motion.” Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to
respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that he does not oppose the Defendant’s
motion. Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution if Plaintiff fails to respond to a
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twentyone (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a
motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact
set forth in the Defendants’ statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless
specifically controverted by an opposition statement.

Should Defendant file a motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff is advised that he will have the burden of establishing the existence
of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by

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reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, Plaintiff must file counter-affidavits if
he desires to contest the Defendant’s statement of the facts. Should Plaintiff fail to file opposing
affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, any factual
assertions made in Defendant’s affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment may
be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 19th day of February,
2016.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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