Sanks v. Toole et al

Filing 16

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS all monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities and all claims against Defendants Toole and Chronic Care Doctor. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DEN Y Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief re 1 Complaint filed by Ronnie Sanks. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 5/30/2016). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 5/16/2016. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

RONNIE SANKS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:15-cv-146

v.
WARDEN ROBERT TOOLE; CHRONIC
CARE DR. (UNKNOWN); and DENTIST
(UNKNOWN),
Defendants.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Rogers State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, filed this
cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to contest certain conditions of his confinement
while he was housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia. For the reasons which
follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s monetary damages claims against
Defendants in their official capacities.

I also RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Toole and Chronic Care Doctor. The Court DIRECTS the
United States Marshal to serve Defendant Dentist with a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and this
Order.
In addition, the Court VACATES its March 2, 2016, Report and Recommendation, (doc.
10), concerning the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on what appeared to be Plaintiff’s
failure to follow an Order of the Court and failure to prosecute his case. The basis for the
recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint was that Plaintiff had transferred to another
penal institution and had not advised the Court of his transfer and resultant new mailing address.

(Doc. 10, p. 1–2.) However, Plaintiff later wrote letters to the Court, informing it that he is still
housed at Rogers State Prison but has not been receiving his mailings from this Court.
(Docs. 11, 12.)
Further, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 3.) As set forth
below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts he was diagnosed as HIV positive in August 2013 while he was housed at
Coastal State Prison. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends he had several rotten, infected teeth
pulled while he was housed at Coastal State Prison because the HIV doctor in Augusta informed
him these teeth could affect his immune system. At the time he was transferred to Georgia State
Prison in November 2013, Plaintiff maintains he still had two rotten, infected teeth, one of which
had an abscess, which had not been pulled. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he immediately filled out a
sick call request upon his arrival at Georgia State Prison to have those two teeth pulled. Plaintiff
states he has cancelled sick call request slips from November 2013 through January 2015, and he
did not have these teeth pulled. Plaintiff contends he wrote a letter to Defendant Toole, the
Warden, and other administrative personnel to explain his problems, yet no one responded to
him. (Id.)
Plaintiff avers he began having feelings of depression in November 2014 and told
Defendant “Chronic Care Doctor”, who had some of Plaintiff’s blood drawn. (Id. at p. 5.)
Plaintiff contends Defendant Doctor must have seen “something” in Plaintiff’s blood because
Plaintiff went to Augusta in December 2014 to see the HIV doctor. (Id.) According to Plaintiff,
the HIV doctor observed that his viral load and CD4 cell count had changed dramatically, and
Plaintiff told the doctor that he still had not gotten those two teeth pulled. Plaintiff contends the

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doctor informed him those teeth needed to be pulled as soon as possible before his immune
system worsened. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that the doctor told him that the medication he
was taking for his HIV was working so well that his HIV was not detected, but he had to stop
taking that medication because his body started to reject the medication, possibly due to the
infections in his teeth. 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment
of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows
an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which
shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must
dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.
Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is
guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
1

As an aside, Plaintiff mentions that the “administration” would not place him in protective custody after
he informed them that the “GD’s” gang had threatened him. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) Based on Plaintiff’s
requested relief, he does not seek to pursue any putative failure to protect claim in this cause of action.
This is just as well, since any failure to protect claim would be unrelated to Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim. Smith v. Owens, No. 14-14039, 2015 WL 4281241, at *4 (11th Cir. July 16, 2015)
(upholding this Court’s dismissal of unrelated claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a),
which will allow the joinder of claims if the claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.”).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . .
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set
of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that
standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350

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F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse
mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). The requisite review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint raises several doctrines of law, which the Court discusses in turn.
DISCUSSION
I.

Claims for Monetary Damages Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities
Plaintiff cannot sustain a Section 1983 claim for monetary damages against Defendants in

their official capacities.

States are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment and traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–
13 (1999). Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit
without its consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a
lawsuit against a state officer in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the
[s]tate itself,” such a defendant is immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the
State of Georgia would be the real party in interest in a suit against Defendants in their official
capacities as employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Eleventh
Amendment immunizes these actors from suit in their official capacities. See Free v. Granger,
887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Absent a waiver of that immunity, Plaintiff cannot sustain
any constitutional claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief. The
Court should DISMISS these claims.

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II.

Claims Against Defendant Toole
Section 1983 liability must be based on something more than a defendant’s supervisory

position or a theory of respondeat superior. 2 Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir.
2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A
supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged
violations. Id. at 802. “To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege
(1) the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the
existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful
action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the
supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.” Barr v. Gee, 437 F.
App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011).
It appears Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Toole liable based solely on his position as
Warden at Georgia State Prison. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Toole
personally participated in any alleged constitutional violations.

In fact, the only assertion

Plaintiff makes against Defendant Toole is that he wrote him a letter telling him about Plaintiff’s
dental issues, and Defendant Toole did nothing to help him. This is an insufficient basis for
liability under Section 1983. See Allen v. Brown, No. CV 112-052, 2013 WL 1333175, at * 5
n.9 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting that, even assuming a prisoner-plaintiff alleged the filing of a
grievance with supervisory officials put the officials on notice of alleged constitutional
violations, he still could not proceed against the supervisors on this basis because plaintiff did
2

The principle that respondeat superior is not a cognizable theory of liability under Section 1983 holds
true regardless of whether the entity sued is a state, municipality, or private corporation. Harvey v.
Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129–30 (11th Cir. 1992).

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not state the supervisors personally participated in the violations or that there was a causal
connection between the alleged violations and the supervisors’ actions) (citing Asad v. Crosby,
158 F. App’x 166, 170–72 (11th Cir. 2005), and Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999)); see also Weems v. St. Lawrence, No. CV 409-065, 2009 WL 2422795, at * 4 n.7 (S.D.
Ga. Aug. 6, 2009) (finding that plaintiff’s assertion that he sent grievances and letters to ranking
officers was not enough to establish any direct participation in alleged constitutional violations
on the part of those ranking officials). The Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Toole.
III.

Deliberate Indifference Claims
The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials including the duty to take

reasonable measures to ensure the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828
(1994). This right to safety is violated when a defendant shows a deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). In order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish
the following: (1) there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him; (2) defendant showed a
deliberate indifference to this risk; and (3) there is a causal connection between the defendant’s
acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.
In the medical care context, the standard for cruel and unusual punishment, embodied in
the principles expressed in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), is whether a prison
official exhibits a deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 828. However, “not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical
treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505
(11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105). Rather, “an inmate must allege acts or

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omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Hill v. DeKalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994).
In order to prove a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must overcome three
obstacles. The prisoner must: (1) “satisfy the objective component by showing that [he] had a
serious medical need”; (2) “satisfy the subjective component by showing that the prison official
acted with deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical need”; and (3) “show that the injury
was caused by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326
(11th Cir. 2007). A medical need is serious if it “‘has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or [is] one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187). As for the subjective
component, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently required that “a defendant know of and
disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety.” Haney v. City of Cumming, 69
F.3d 1098, 1102 (11th Cir. 1995). Under the subjective prong, an inmate “must prove three
things: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.
“The meaning of ‘more than gross negligence’ is not self-evident[.]” Goebert, 510 F.3d
at 1327.

“When the claim turns on the quality of the treatment provided, there is no

constitutional violation as long as the medical care provided to the inmate is ‘minimally
adequate.’” Blanchard v. White Cty. Det. Ctr. Staff, 262 F. App’x 959, 964 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harris, 941 F.2d at 1504). “Deliberate indifference is not established where an inmate
received care but desired different modes of treatment.” Id.

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A.

Claims Against Defendant Chronic Care Doctor

Plaintiff fails to set forth a viable deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Chronic
Care Doctor. The only allegation Plaintiff levies against this Defendant is that he informed the
Chronic Care Doctor of his feelings of depression. In response, the Chronic Care Doctor had
Plaintiff’s blood drawn, and whatever the Chronic Care Doctor saw on any tests he may have run
resulted in Plaintiff being sent to the HIV doctor in Augusta the next month. Plaintiff does not
set forth sufficient facts for a deliberate difference claim against Defendant Chronic Care Doctor.
Thus, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant.
B.

Claims Against Defendant Dentist

To prove a delay in providing medical treatment caused harm, a plaintiff must present
evidence of: “‘(1) the seriousness of the medical need; (2) whether the delay worsened the
medical condition; and (3) the reason for the delay.’” Keele v. Glynn Cty., Ga., 938 F. Supp. 2d
1270, 1292 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327).

However, “‘accidental

inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, [and] medical malpractice’” are insufficient to
sustain a claim of deliberate indifference. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nimmons v.
Aviles, 409 F. App’x 295, 297 (11th Cir. 2011)). In addition, a plaintiff who asserts that a delay
in obtaining medical treatment amounts to a constitutional violation is required to submit
verifying medical evidence into the record “to establish the detrimental effect of [any] delay in
medical treatment to succeed.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 458–59 (11th Cir. 2010)
(internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff contends that he has two teeth which are infected, and if these teeth are not
pulled, he could suffer deleterious effects to his immune system since he is HIV positive.
Plaintiff also contends he has made numerous sick call requests to have these teeth removed, yet

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he still has not received this treatment. Plaintiff arguably sets forth a claim that he has a serious
medical need, and the delay in receiving treatment for that need could cause an exacerbation of
his already existing condition.

Accordingly, Plaintiff sets forth a plausible deliberate

indifference claim against Defendant Dentist.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

(Doc. 1, p. 11.)

To be entitled to a preliminary

injunction or a temporary restraining order, the movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of
ultimate success on the merits; (2) an injunction or protective order is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction or protective order
would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the injunction or protective order would not be adverse
to the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir.
2005). In this Circuit, an “injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted
unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.”
Horton v. City of Augustine, Fla., 272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
If a plaintiff succeeds in making such a showing, then “the court may grant injunctive
relief, but the relief must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.”
Newman v. Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, where there is a

constitutional violation in the prison context, courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere with
prison administration and discipline, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad
hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”), overruled
on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In such cases, “[d]eference to

10

prison authorities is especially appropriate.” Newman, 683 F.2d at 1320–21 (reversing district
court’s injunction requiring release of prisoners on probation because it “involved the court in
the operation of the State’s system of criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary” and less
intrusive equitable remedy was available).
Plaintiff has not shown that he has satisfied the prerequisites in order to be entitled to a
preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiff has not shown the likelihood of success on the
merits of his claims. This is not to say that Plaintiff will not be able to ultimately obtain some
form of injunctive relief in this case. However, he has not made the requisite showing at this
time to obtain the extraordinary relief he currently seeks. Therefore, the Court should DENY his
request for a preliminary injunction.
V.

Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3)
Plaintiff seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him in this case. In this civil case,

Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Wright v. Langford, 562 F.
App’x 769, 777 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)).
“Although a court may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), appoint counsel for an indigent
plaintiff, it has broad discretion in making this decision, and should appoint counsel only in
exceptional circumstances.” Id. (citing Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320). Appointment of counsel in a
civil case is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the
facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained
practitioner.” Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Poole v. Lambert,
819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987), and Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir.
1985)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “the key” to assessing whether counsel should
be appointed “is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or

11

her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need
such help.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 457 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kilgo v. Ricks,
983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)).
The Court has reviewed the record and pleadings in this case and finds no “exceptional
circumstances” warranting the appointment of counsel.

While the Court understands that

Plaintiff is incarcerated, this Court has repeatedly found that “prisoners do not receive special
consideration notwithstanding the challenges of litigating a case while incarcerated.” Hampton
v. Peeples, No. CV 614-104, 2015 WL 4112435, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2015). “Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld district courts’ decisions to refuse appointment of
counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions similar to this case for want of exceptional circumstances.”
Id. (citing Smith v. Warden, Hardee Corr. Inst., 597 F. App’x 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 2015);
Wright, 562 F. App’x at 777; Faulkner v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 702
(11th Cir. 2013); McDaniels, 405 F. App’x at 457; Sims v. Nguyen, 403 F. App’x 410, 414 (11th
Cir. 2010); Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1091, 1096; Wahl, 773 F.2d at 1174). This case is not so
complex legally or factually to prevent Plaintiff from presenting “the essential merits of his
position” to the Court. Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the numerous reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS all
monetary damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities and all claims against
Defendants Toole and Chronic Care Doctor. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DENY
Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for
Appointment of Counsel.

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The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.

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REMAINING CLAIM AND DEFENDANT
Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint arguably state a colorable claim for relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Dentist.
Consequently, a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and a copy of this Order shall be served upon
Defendant Dentist by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. The Court also
provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the remainder of this action
and which the Court urges the parties to read and follow.
The Court notes that Plaintiff identifies Defendant Dentist as being in service at Georgia
State Prison from 2013 to 2015, indicating that this Defendant is no longer employed at Georgia
State Prison. The Court ORDERS the United States Marshal to make reasonable efforts to
locate this Defendant Dentist so that he may be served with a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint. This
is not to say Plaintiff is relieved from his obligation to prosecute his cause of action. Rather, this
Order only speaks to the inherent constraints placed on prisoner-plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff here,
in attempting to garner personal information regarding named defendants who are or were
employed by the Georgia Department of Corrections. Plaintiff is advised he, too, should also
make reasonable efforts to locate Defendant Dentist so that this Defendant may be served with a
copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff is forewarned that the lack of service upon Defendant
Dentist—even through no fault of his own—may result in the dismissal of his claims against this
Defendant.
INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANT
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs that the United
States Marshal effect service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a
copy of the complaint to the Defendant by first-class mail and request that the Defendant waive

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formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.7. Individual and corporate
defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any such
defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service
unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint
until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(d)(3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is hereby granted leave of court to take
the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Defendant is further
advised that the Court’s standard 140 day discovery period will commence upon the filing of the
last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Defendant shall ensure that all discovery, including the Plaintiff’s
deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that discovery period.
In the event that Defendant takes the deposition of any other person, Defendant is ordered
to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As the Plaintiff will
likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, Defendant shall notify Plaintiff of the
deposition and advise him that he may serve on Defendant, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10)
days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the
witness, if any. Defendant shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the
deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c).

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INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant or, if
appearance has been entered by counsel, upon his attorney, a copy of every further pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original
paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct
copy of any document was mailed to Defendant or his counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. “Every
pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and]
the file number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this Court and
defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1.
Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this
case.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to
obtain facts and information about the case from Defendant, Plaintiff must initiate discovery.
See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq. The discovery period in this case will expire 140 days
after the filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the
Court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within
this time period. Local Rule 26.1. Discovery materials should not be filed routinely with the
Clerk of Court; exceptions include: when the Court directs filing; when a party needs such
materials in connection with a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary; and
when needed for use at trial. Local Rule 26.4.
Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes

16

of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or
organizations who are not named as Defendant. Interrogatories are not to contain more than
twenty-five (25) questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than
twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the Court. If
Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he
should first contact the attorney for Defendant and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff
proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has
contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2)(A); Local Rule 26.7.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff
loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard
cost of fifty cents ($.50) per page. If Plaintiff seeks copies, he should request them directly
from the Clerk of Court and is advised that the Court will authorize and require the
collection of fees from his prison trust fund account to pay the cost of the copies at the
aforementioned rate of fifty cents ($.50) per page.
If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of
prosecution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Local Rule 41.1.
It is Plaintiff’s duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by
Defendant. Upon no less than five (5) days’ notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff
shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn
affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses

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to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including
dismissal of this case.
As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to “counsel of record”
directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order.
A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is
required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is
incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which
may be scheduled by the Court.
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under this Court’s Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve
his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. “Failure to respond shall
indicate that there is no opposition to a motion.” Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to
respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that he does not oppose the Defendant’s
motion. Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution if Plaintiff fails to respond to a
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twentyone (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a
motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact
set forth in the Defendant’s statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless
specifically controverted by an opposition statement.

Should Defendant file a motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff is advised that he will have the burden of establishing the existence
of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by
reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendant’s

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motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, Plaintiff must file counter-affidavits if
he desires to contest the Defendant’s statement of the facts. Should Plaintiff fail to file opposing
affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, any factual
assertions made in Defendant’s affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment may
be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of May,
2016.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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