Brumfield v. Toole et al

Filing 35

ORDER denying Defendants' 27 Motion for More Definite Statement; dismissing as moot their 17 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 11/21/2016. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

KEVIN DARNELL BRUMFIELD,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-1

v.
ROBERT TOOLE, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement and
their Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’
Motion for a More Definite Statement, (doc. 27), and DISMISSES as moot Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, (doc. 17).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on January 6, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting
conditions of his confinement at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) In the
Report and Recommendation dated April 12, 2016, I recommended that the Court dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims, except his First Amendment claims against Defendants Bobbit and Smith.
(Id.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on April 25, 2016, (doc. 11),
which the Court sustained in part and overruled in part, (doc. 19). 1 Specifically, the Court
determined that Plaintiff had also stated a viable First Amendment claim against Defendant

1

Prior to the Court’s partial adoption of the Report and Recommendation, Defendants Bobbit and Smith
filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 17.)

Toole and concluded that claim should proceed, in addition to his First Amendment claims
against Defendants Bobbit and Smith. (Doc 19, p. 1.)
Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint, which the Court granted in part.
(Doc. 21.) Specifically, the Court allowed Plaintiff to add a substantive due process claim to his
original Complaint. (Id. at p. 1.) Plaintiff then filed an Objection to the Court’s Order partially
granting his Motion to Amend, which the Court overruled. Following the Court’s rulings on
these matters, Defendants filed a Motion for More Definite Statement. (Doc. 27.) In their
Motion, Defendants seek clarification as to which claims remain in this case, contending that
“the identity of the pleading to which Defendants must file a responsive pleading is so vague and
ambiguous that Defendants cannot reasonably prepare a response.” (Id. at p. 1.)
DISCUSSION
I.

Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement
Defendants maintain that, following the Court’s partial adoption of the Report and

Recommendation, (doc. 19), and partial grant of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, (doc. 21), they are
“uncertain as to which pleading they are required to respond.” (Doc. 27, p. 3.) Defendants
inquire whether “the operative pleading in this case consists of (i) [Plaintiff]’s Proposed
Amended Complaint only; (ii) the original complaint as supplemented by the Proposed Amended
Complaint and/or the factual assertions concerning defendant Toole contained in Brumfield’s
objection; or (iii) the original complaint only, unless and until [Plaintiff] files an amended
pleading.” (Id.) Defendants request that the Court order Plaintiff to file one document framing
the remaining claims in this case. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for a
More Definite Statement contending that he “do[es] not understand what a more definite

2

statement is,” has “absolutely no idea what a memorandum of law is . . . or how to write one,”
and is unable to conduct the legal research at this time to do so. (Doc. 28.)
Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to order a party to
recast a pleading that is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot reasonably
prepare a response. The basis for granting a Rule 12(e) motion is unintelligibility. 5C Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1376, 1377 (3d ed. 2004).
Courts generally disfavor motions for a more definite statement. Id. at 1377. In addition, while
pro se litigants are bound by the same rules of procedure and practice applicable to all litigants,
the courts afford great lenience to complaints drafted by individuals who are unable to obtain the
services of legal counsel. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Here, Defendants’ source of confusion does not appear to be with the substance of
Plaintiff’s pleadings or the manner in which he has drafted them. Instead, Defendants are
uncertain as to which specific pleadings contain the claims that remain in this case. In the
interest of expeditiously adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims and because Plaintiff’s pleadings are not
“unintelligible,” the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for More Definite Statement. 2
However, to provide clarity to the pleadings to date, the Court advises the parties as
follows. Two groups of claims remain viable in this case: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claims against Defendants Bobbit, Smith, and Toole 3; and (2) Plaintiff’s substantive

2

Additionally, directing Plaintiff to recast his claims at this point could be seen as giving him leave to
once again add to the claims that he is asserting. Given Plaintiff’s pro se status and the efforts that the
Court has already made to sift through Plaintiff’s meritorious and non-meritorious claims, the Court find
that such leave would only further delay and confuse the litigation of this case.

3

As discussed above, in its Order dated June 3, 2016, the Court affirmed the finding that Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Bobbit and Smith should proceed. (Doc. 19, p. 3
(“Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Defendants Bobbit, Smith, and Toole remain pending”).).
In that Order, the Court further explained that, “in light of Plaintiff’s new allegations in his Objections, he
no longer seeks to hold Defendant Toole liable based solely on his supervisory position.” (Id. at p. 4.)
3

due process claims against Defendants Bobbit, Smith, Toole, and Chambers. 4 Furthermore,
Defendants are advised that the operative pleadings in this case are Plaintiff’s original
Complaint, as supplemented by (1) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (doc. 16-1), and (2)
Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Toole, as stated in Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report
and Recommendation, (doc. 11, p. 1). 5
II.

Motion to Dismiss
As evidenced by their Motion for a More Definite Statement, (doc. 27), Defendants were

uncertain as to which claims remain in the case and seek guidance regarding the claims to which
they must respond. Moreover, the amendments to Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed after Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, could directly impact the questions underlying the Motion to Dismiss, (doc.
17), particularly because “an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes
the operative pleading in the case.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir.
2007). Consequently, Plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint moots Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. Perkins v. Kushla Water Dist., No. CIV.A. 13-00286-KD-B, 2013 WL 4511329, at *1
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2013) (“Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint is now the operative
pleading in this action; Defendants’ motion [to dismiss] is moot.”) (citing Pintando v. Miami–

The Court proceeded to explain that, instead, Plaintiff’s Objections “state[] a plausible claim that
Defendant Toole personally participated in . . . the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights.” (Id. at p. 4.) The Court did not, as Defendants contend in their Motion for More Definite
Statement, permit Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendant Toole to proceed. (Doc. 27,
p. 2.)
4

Plaintiff states in his Motion to Amend that “the [D]eputy [W]arden of [S]ecurity (Mr. Bobbit) and Unit
Mananger Smith . . . took all my property and had me placed in the [T]ier II program.” (Doc. 16-1, p. 6.)
He also states that “both Mr. Chambers and Warden Toole had to sign off on my placement into the
program.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend alleges that Defendants Bobbit, Smith,
Chambers, and Toole were personally involved in or otherwise causally connected to his confinement in
the Tier II Unit and, therefore, alleges substantive due process claims against each of these Defendants.
5

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Toole violated his First Amendment right is contained, in its
entirety, under the section labeled “(1)” in Plaintiff’s Objections, (doc. 11).
4

Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007); De Sisto College v. Line, 888
F.2d 755, 757 (11th Cir. 1983); Meterlogic, Inc. v. Copier Solutions, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1292,
1297 (S.D. Fla. 2002)).
Thus, the Court DISMISSES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. Defendants
may reassert their Motion to Dismiss within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. 6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for More
Definite Statement, (doc. 27), and DISMISSES as MOOT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
(doc. 17), in light of the additional claims now proceeding in this case. Defendants may reassert
their Motion to Dismiss after accounting for Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Plaintiff’s
newly asserted First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Toole contained in
Plaintiff’s Objections, (doc. 11).
SO ORDERED, this 21st day of November, 2016.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

6

Local Rule 7.5 states, “Unless . . . the assigned judge prescribes otherwise, each party opposing a
motion shall serve and file a response within fourteen (14) days of service of the motion, except that in
cases of motions for summary judgment the time shall be twenty-one (21) days after service of the
motion.”
5