Williams v. Byson
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS this action without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk to CLOSE this case re 1 Complaint filed by Ronnie Eugene Williams. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis status on appeal. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 5/30/2016). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 5/16/2016. (ca)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
RONNIE EUGENE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-36
v.
HOMER BYSON,
Defendant.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, filed this
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed in
Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. For the reasons which
follow, I RECOMMEND this Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, DIRECT the Clerk of
Court to CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was convicted in Chatham County Superior Court. (Doc. 1, p. 9.) In his
Complaint, he contends Defendant has been keeping him in confinement beyond his release date,
which is in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. (Id. at p. 5.) Plaintiff
maintains he is suffering from emotional distress and mental anguish as a result of his improper
confinement. He seeks monetary damages, as well as the restoration of credit against his
sentence to which he claims entitlement. (Id. at p. 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In any civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity, Section 1915A requires the Court to screen the complaint
for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the
complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
In conducting this initial review, the Court must ensure that a prisoner plaintiff has
complied with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A.
However, in determining compliance, the Court shall be guided by the longstanding principle
that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
In addition, the Court is guided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to
that contained in the screening provisions at Section 1915A(b).
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
closely
tracks
the
language
of
As the language of
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to the initial review of prisoner
complaints under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in
Mitchell interpreted Section 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identical
language of Section 1915A. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) (dismissal pursuant to
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Section 1915A (b)(1) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standards as dismissals
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff must assert “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not”
suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Because “[p]ro se pleadings are
held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys[,]” they are liberally
construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
I.
Whether Plaintiff can Proceed Pursuant to Section 1983
Plaintiff’s Complaint centers on his prior conviction in Chatham County Superior Court.
However, the Complaint indicates that his conviction has not been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, called into question by a federal court’s issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, or
otherwise overturned. (Doc. 1.) Consequently, this Court is precluded from reviewing his
claims by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and
investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The United
States Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff’s claim to a common-law cause of action for
malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal
proceeding was terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court
reasoned:
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983
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damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of
his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for
malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote omitted), a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 486–87 (emphasis added).
Under Heck, a plaintiff who is attempting “to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” must make a showing that his
conviction, sentence, or other criminal judgment was reversed, expunged, declared invalid by an
appropriate state tribunal, or called into question in a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Id. If a plaintiff fails to make this showing, then he cannot bring an action under
Section 1983. Id. at 489. Furthermore, to the extent a plaintiff contends that a favorable ruling
on his claims would not invalidate his conviction, sentence, confinement, or other criminal
judgment, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove this contention in order for his claims to
proceed. Id. at 487. Although Heck involved a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money
damages, Heck’s holding has been extended to claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief as
well as money damages. 1 See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005); Abella v.
1
In addition to seeking his release, Plaintiff requests monetary damages in the amount of $1,200,000.
(Doc. 1, p. 6.)
4
Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973) (“[W]e hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.”).
“Under this standard, it is not unusual for a § 1983 claim to be dismissed for failure to
satisfy Heck’s favorable termination requirement.” Desravines v. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs.,
No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2292180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted by No. 6:11-CV-235-ORL-22, 2011 WL 2222170 (M.D. Fla. June 8,
2011) (citing Gray v. Kinsey, No. 3:09–cv–324/LC/MD, 2009 WL 2634205, at *9 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 25, 2009) (finding plaintiff’s claims barred by Heck’s favorable termination requirement
where plaintiff sought invalidation of his traffic conviction but failed to appeal the conviction in
state court)); Domotor v. Wennet, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“allowing the
plaintiff to circumvent applicable state procedures and collaterally attack her convictions in
federal court is the precise situation that Heck seeks to preclude” because the plaintiff entered
into a plea agreement with knowledge of substantially all of the allegations that now form the
basis of a Section 1983 action for damages); St. Germain v. Isenhower, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1366,
1372 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding plaintiff’s convictions for the lesser-included offenses of false
imprisonment and misdemeanor battery did not constitute a favorable termination and thus
plaintiff’s § 1983 action was precluded by Heck ); see also Cooper v. Georgia, No. CV413-091,
2013 WL 2253214, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by No.
CV413-091, 2013 WL 2660046 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2013); Brown v. Renfroe, No. CV210-003,
2011 WL 902197, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2011), report and recommendation adopted by No.
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CV210-003, 2011 WL 892359 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2011), aff’d sub nom., Brown v. Coleman, 439
F. App’x 794 (11th Cir. 2011).
In this case, Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction or sentence has been favorably
terminated. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s chief complaint is that he is still being detained due to his
conviction obtained in the Chatham County Superior Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are
unquestionably precluded by the Heck decision.
Additional grounds support dismissal of Plaintiff’s putative Section 1983 claims.
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
claims, which essentially seek review of a state-court criminal conviction against him. “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923),
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and provides that,
as a general matter, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision.”
McCorvey v. Weaver, 620 F. App’x 881, 882 (11th Cir. 2015). Nor under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine may a federal court “decide federal issues that are raised in state proceedings and
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.” See Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252,
253 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Staley v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988)).
“Rooker-Feldman applies because, among the federal courts, Congress authorized only the
Supreme Court to reverse or modify a state court decision.” Helton v. Ramsay, 566 F. App’x
876, 877 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005)). Because Plaintiff, through this Section 1983 action, essentially asks this Court to
invalidate his conviction by the Chatham County Superior Court or to otherwise alter his
sentence, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims. 2
2
Even if this Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, venue would lie in this Court’s Savannah
Division, as Plaintiff is attacking his conviction obtained in Chatham County. 28 U.S.C. § 90(c)(3).
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For these reasons, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.
II.
Whether Williams can Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Federal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a
motion and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category.” Retic
v. United States, 215 F. App’x 962, 964 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540
U.S. 375, 381 (2003)). This Court may “recharacterize a pro se litigant’s motion to create a
better correspondence between the substance of the motion and its underlying legal basis.”
Rameses v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F. App’x 691, 694 (11th Cir. 2013). Federal courts
“may do so in order to avoid an unnecessary dismissal, to avoid inappropriately stringent
application of formal labeling requirements, or to create a better correspondence between the
substance of a pro se motion’s claim and its underlying legal basis.” Id. (quoting Castro, 540
U.S. at 381–82).
This ability to re-characterize is limited, particularly when a court recharacterizes a
pleading filed by a pro se litigant as a Section 2254 petition. Prior to such re-characterization,
the court:
must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to recharacterize the pleading, warn
the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent § 225[4] motion
will be subject to the restrictions on ‘second or successive’ motions, and provide
the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the motion or amend it so that it contains
all the § 225[4] claims he believed he has.
Castro, 540 U.S. at 383.
After reviewing Plaintiff’s pleading, (doc. 1), it appears his claims are more appropriately
deemed as being brought pursuant to Section 2254 and not Section 1983. He apparently seeks to
attack his state conviction and sentence, not the conditions of his confinement, and “a state
prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one remedy: an application
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for a writ of habeas corpus.” Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003).
However, Plaintiff is advised that any future Section 2254 motions he may file will be subject to
certain procedural restrictions 3 applicable to Section 2254 motions. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s
claims, it would be more appropriate for him to bring an action that fully sets out any claims he
makes for habeas relief rather than recharacterizing his Complaint. Thus, the Court should
DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, which was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for these
reasons, as well.
III.
Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 4
Though
Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. R. 24(a)(1)(A) (“A party who was
permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in the district-court action, . . ., may proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis without further authorization, unless the district court—before or after the notice
of appeal is filed—certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith[.]”) (italics supplied). An
appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies, either before or after the
notice of appeal is filed, that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Good
faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189
3
“A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the
appropriate court of appeals to contain-- (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), which notes that an
applicant must move the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider
an application for habeas relief before a second or successive application will be allowed.
4
A certificate of appealability (“COA”) is not required to file an appeal in a Section 1983 action. See
Fed. R. App. P. 3 & 4; Morefield v. Smith, No. 607CV010, 2007 WL 1893677, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 2,
2007) (citing Mathis v. Smith, No. 05-13123-A (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005) (unpublished)).
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F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to
advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly
baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327
(1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma
pauperis action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit
either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v.
United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of the claims Plaintiff sets forth in his Complaint, the Court
should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal, as there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and any appeal would not be taken in good faith.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, it is my RECOMMENDATION that the Court DISMISS
this action without prejudice, and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case. I further
RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
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Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 16th day of May,
2016.
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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