Davison v. Georgia Correctional Health, LLC et al

Filing 111

ORDER denying 80 Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Kristine Patterson and 81 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/12/2018. (jlh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

CINDY DAVISON, as Administrator

*

of the Estate of Randall

*

Davison,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
•k

V.

*

CV 616-039

*

STEPHEN NICOLOU, P.A.,

*
*

Defendant.

*

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment
(doc. 81) and Plaintiff's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr.
Kristine

Patterson

(doc.

80).

The

Clerk

has

given

Plaintiff

notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment

rules,

of the

opposition,

right to file

and

the

affidavits

consequences

of

or

other

default.

materials in

Therefore,

the

notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwriqht, 772 F.2d 822, 825
(11th

Cir.

1985)

(per

curiam),

have

been

satisfied.

For

the

following reasons. Plaintiff and Defendant's respective motions
are DENIED.

I.

Randall
C'GSP").

Davison

(Def.'s

was

Answer,

BACKGROUND

an

inmate

Doc.

54,

at
SI

Georgia

13.)

In

State
early

Prison
January

2015,

Mr.

Davison

received

two

tattoos

from

(Nursing Note, Jan. 26, 2015, Doc. 79-32).

another

inmate.

One tattoo was on

Mr. Davison's neck and one was on his forearm.

(Reed Dep., Doc.

84-7, at 36.) On January 21, 2015, Mr. Davison went to the GSP
medical unit complaining of chest pain.
3,

at

48-49.)

Mr.

Davison

was

(Nicolou Dep., Doc. 83-

examined

by

Defendant

Stephen

Nicolou, a physician assistant working at the GSP medical unit.
(Id.

at

9-10.)

Defendant

prescribed

Mr.

Davison

anti-

inflammatory medication and sent him back to his dorm.

(Id. at

56-57.)

Over

the

deteriorated.

next
Due

two

to

days,

what

would

Mr.

Davison's

later

be

condition

discovered

was

an

infection caused by his tattoos, Mr. Davison's upper chest began
to turn red and his neck appeared swollen.
84-3, at 68.)
GSP

medical

On January 23, 2015, Mr. Davison returned to the

unit.

(Ball

Kozachyn,

another

inmate

provider,

claimed

that

visible

and

(Kozachyn Dep., Doc.

described

Dep.,

who
Mr.

his

neck

Doc.

was

82-1,

waiting

Davison's
as ''red

at

to

be

infection
and

swollen

four times its normal size on one side . . . ."

at 67.)

34-35.)

seen
was
to

by

a

plainly
three

or

(Kozachyn Dep.

Mr. Davison was called into the waiting room and then

told he could not be seen until the following Monday.

34.)

Paul

(Id. at

Instead of returning to his cell, Mr. Davison slipped into

Defendant's

office.

(Id.

at 36.)

Defendant

and

nurse

Calvin

Ball were in the office when Mr. Davison entered and ""demand[ed]

antibiotics."

{Ball Dep. at 32; Thrift Dep., Doc. 83-4, at 35.)

The meeting lasted a matter of seconds as Officer Stacy Thrift,
who was at the other end of the hall, removed Mr.

Davison and

placed him in a holding cell for ""being disrespectful."
Dep. at 34, 37.)
Mr. Davison.

(Thrift

Defendant provided no additional treatment to

(Nicolou Dep. at 43.)

On Monday, January 26, 2015, Mr. Davison was brought back
to the medical unit by wheel chair.
58).

Nurse

practitioner

Timothy

(Oates Dep., Doc. 79-33, at
Miller

recognized

that

Mr.

Davison was suffering from an infection and needed to go to a
hospital.

(Killer

transferred

to

Meadows

Vidalia, Georgia.
6.)

Dep.,

Doc.

83-2,

Regional

at

Medical

34.)

He

Center

was

then

(""MRMC")

in

(MRMC Physician Documentation, Doc. 79-6, at

On February 8, 2015, suffering from respiratory and renal

failure,

Mr.

Davison

was

flown

to

Atlanta

Medical

Center.

(Atlanta Med. Ctr. Discharge Summary, Feb. 15, 2015, Doc. 79-8,
at

1.)

He

never

February 15, 2015.

recovered

from

his

infection

and

died

on

(Id.)

On April 4, 2016, Cindy

Davison--Randall

Davison's sister

and the administrator of his estate--brought the present action
against Georgia
and

Defendant

Correctional
for

violating

Health,
Mr.

Sergeant

Davison's

Dedrick
Eighth

Anthony,
Amendment

rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^

(Doc. 1.)

Defendant

now moves for summary judgment and argues that he is entitled to
qualified immunity.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment will be granted if there is
no disputed material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Facts are material if

they could affect the results of the case.
Lobby,

Inc., 477

U.S.

242,

248

(1986).

The

facts in the light most favorable to the
draw all inferences in its favor.
Ltd.

V.

Zenith

Radio

Corp.,

475

Anderson v. Liberty
court

must

view

non-moving party and

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
U.S.

574,

587

(1986).

The

movant initially bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate
the

absence

of

a

disputed

material

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Celotex

Corp.

v.

The movant must also show no

reasonable jury could find for the
the essential elements.

fact.

non-moving

party on any of

Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

If the movant carries its burden, the non-moving party must
come forward with significant, probative evidence showing there
is a material fact in

dispute.

Id. at 1116.

The

non-movant

must respond with affidavits or other forms of evidence provided

^

Plaintiff subsequently dropped

Health and Mr. Anthony.

her claims against

(Docs. 22, 78.)

Georgia

Correctional

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
non-movant

cannot

survive

summary

judgment

pleadings or conclusory statements.
1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981).

Id. at 1116 n.3.
by

relying

The

on

its

Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d

After the non-movant has met

this burden, summary judgment is granted only if "the combined

body of evidence is still such that the movant would be entitled
to

a

directed

verdict

at

trial

-

that

is,

reasonable jury could find for the non-movant."

such

that

no

Fitzpatrick, 2

F.3d at 1116.

III.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant
because
immunity

he

claims

is

that

entitled

protects

summary

judgment

to

qualified

government

officials

is

appropriate

immunity.

Qualified

from

suit

so

long

their conduct does not violate clearly established law.

as

Morris

V. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.15 (11th Cir. 2014).

The

defendant

must

first

discretionary authority.

show

he

was

the

plaintiff

appropriate.

Lee

v.

within

his

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004).

and

acting

must

show

Ferraro,

284

The burden then shifts,

qualified
F.3d

immunity

1188,

1194

is

not

(11th

Cir.

2002).

To

survive

summary

judgment,

the

plaintiff must

show

the

officer's conduct (1) violated a constitutional right that (2)

was

clearly

Clearly

United

established

established

States

when

rights

Supreme

are

Court,

Georgia Supreme Court.

the

violation

those

the

set

by

Eleventh

occurred.
precedent

Id.
the

and

Circuit,

of

the

Snider v. Jefferson State Cmty. Coll.,

344 F.Sd 1325, 1328 (llth Cir. 2003).

The case does not need to

be directly on point and only needs to give the defendant fair
notice

that

his

conduct

was

unconstitutional.

Mitello

v.

Sherriff of the Broward Sheriff^s Office, 684 F. App'x 809, 813
(llth Cir. 2017).

acting

in

his

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant was

discretionary

authority.

Therefore,

Plaintiff

must show that Defendant violated Mr. Davison's Eighth Amendment
rights and that those rights were clearly established.

A. Constitutional Violation

There

is

constitutional

evidence

2007).

the

violation.

prisoner's serious
Amendment.

in

record

to

Deliberate

medical need

is

a

support

finding

indifference

violation

to

of the

a
a

Eighth

Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (llth Cir.

To

succeed

plaintiff

must

defendant

was

show:

on

a

(1)

deliberately

deliberate

a

serious

indifferent

indifference

medical
to

that

that indifference caused the plaintiff's injury.

claim,

need;
need;
Id.

the

(2)

the

and

(3)

1.
The

serious
need

first

element

medical

''''is

one

Serious Medical Need
of

a

need—asks
that

has

deliberate

the

indifference

to

plaintiff

been

claim—

medical

diagnosed

show

by

a

her

physician

as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person

would

easily

recognize

the

necessity

for

a

doctor's

attention.
'" Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Hill v.

Dekalb

Reg'1

1994),

Youth

Pet.

Ctr.^

40

F.3d

1176,

1187

(11th

Cir.

overruled in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730,

739

n.9

(2002));

Brown

v.

Johnson,

387

F.3d

1344,

1351

(11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he medical need must be one that, if left

unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.").
Defendant
medical

need

argues that Mr.
because

his

Davison

infection

was

physician before he met with Defendant.
based

upon

standard.

a

misunderstanding

Deciding

whether

a

of

did

not

have

a serious

diagnosed

by

a

Defendant's position is

the

prisoner

not

serious
had

a

medical

serious

need

medical

need is an objective inquiry that focuses on the ailment itself.
Mr.

Davison

suffered

from

shortly before his death.
Report, Doc. 80-9, at 11.)

suffered

from

frequently

(Heard Rep. at 3.)

an

infection,

which

was

diagnosed

(Heard Dep., Doc. 84-4, at 24; Heard
The bacterial infection Mr. Davison

causes

death

if

it

is

not

treated.

Thus, Plaintiff has shown there is evidence

in

the

record

to

support

a

finding

that

Mr.

Davison

had

a

serious medical need.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Defendant
demonstrating
Davison's

also
he

acted

serious

indifference,

a

disputes
with

medical

plaintiff

whether

there

deliberate

any

evidence

indifference

need.

must

is

To

demonstrate:

show

(a)

to

Mr.

deliberate

the

defendant

was subjectively aware of the risk of harm; and (b) disregarded
that risk (c) by engaging in conduct that was more than grossly
negligent.

Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.

be aware of facts from

''The official must both

which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the

inference."

Farmer

v.

Brennan,

511

U.S.

825,

837 (1994).

The defendant will not be held responsible for failing to take
action if "he should have perceived the risk but did not . . .
."

Id.,

inferred

prison

at
when

838.
the

official

Nevertheless,
risk

had

was

the

subjective

obvious.

requisite

Id.

at

knowledge

knowledge
842.

of

a

can

"Whether

be
a

substantial

risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual

ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence."^

Id.

^ Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived his opportunity to challenge whether
he knew about Mr. Davison's serious medical need by not raising that issue in
his motion for summary judgment.
Certainly, arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief may be deemed waived.
Herring v. Sec'y, Dep't of
Corr., 379 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005); Milwood-Jones v. Holder, 2016 WL

1189494, at *8 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 22,

2016).

Nonetheless, this argument

a. Subjective Knowledge
Plaintiff points to evidence in the record that shows the

symptoms of Mr. Davison's infection were obvious before he met
Defendant

on

January

23,

2015.

Shadaya

Latimore,

who

was

a

guard in Mr. Davison's dormitory, noticed Mr. Davison's "swollen
red neck" on January 23, 2015, at 5:10 PM, several hours after

his meeting with Defendant.
Paul

Kozachyn

dormitory,

and

Tavis

claimed

that

(Latimore Dep., Doc. 84-8, at 37.)
Gates,

the

inmates

infection

was

moments before^ Mr. Davison met Defendant.
67;

Gates

Dep.,

Doc.

84-2,

at

27.)

in

Mr.

Davison's

plainly

visible

(Kozachyn Dep., at

Defendant

argues

that

because Mr. Kozachyn and Mr. Gates do not identify a specific
date

and

Gfficer

Latimore

did

not

see

Mr.

Davison's

symptoms

until after his meeting with Defendant, Plaintiff has not shown
subjective knowledge.

However, from the consistent description

by Mr. Kozachyn, Mr. Gates, and Gfficer Latimore, a jury could
reasonably

conclude

before

his

concerns

an

meeting

essential

that

with

Mr.

Davison's

Defendant

on

symptoms

January

element of Plaintiff's case;

23,

were

visible

2015.

Plaintiff could

not

The
have

been surprised by Defendant's challenge.
Moreover, Plaintiff had a fair
opportunity to respond, as she did in her sur-reply.
Accordingly, Plaintiff
was not prejudiced by Defendant's late challenge.

^ Defendant claims that a disagreement between two of Plaintiff's witnesses
essentially negates their evidentiary value.
Unlike Mr. Kozachyn, Jerry
Reed, who helped walk Mr. Davison to medical on January 23, claims that the

infection on Mr. Davison's neck did not appear until January 25.
(Reed Dep.
at 31.) Plaintiff has presented two different witnesses who do not agree o.n
a material fact.
Granting summary judgment because of such a dispute would
require weighing evidence, which is impermissible at this stage.
See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Indeed, a jury
could find Mr. Kozachyn's testimony more believable than Mr. Reed's.

obviousness

of

Mr.

Davison's

medical

need

could

support

a

finding of subjective knowledge.
Defendant

with

Mr.

also

Davison

subjectively

aware

Defendant

without

that

precludes

of

Mr.

that

explains

condition

maintains

he

the

finding

Davison's
could

performing

brevity

a

that

of

his

meeting

Defendant

serious

not

medical

diagnose

Mr.

medical

evaluation

was

need.

Davison's

and

diagnosis was a prerequisite to subjective knowledge.

such

a

Defendant

asserts that Plaintiff's expert, Henry Heard, P.A., supports the

necessity

of

sub-element

a
of

diagnosis.
a

However,

deliberate

the

subjective

indifference

claim

knowledge

is

not

so

narrowly defined as to require a medical diagnosis.

Moreover,

while

be

to

Mr. Heard confirmed that a full evaluation

accurately

diagnose

Mr.

Davison,

Mr.

Heard

would

went

on

needed

to

say

that ''any reasonable individual can tell an infection by looking
at it" and that such a conclusion can be made without performing
an exam.
both

of

(Heard Dep. at 40, 52.)
Mr.

Heard's

statements

and

A reasonable jury could hear
conclude

that

while

a

full

evaluation would be ideal before a provider begins treatment, a
physician assistant would know Mr. Davison was suffering from an
infection just by looking at him.
b.
Defendant

also

Deliberate Disregard

argues

that

there

is

disregarded Mr. Davison's serious medical need.
10

no

evidence

he

To satisfy the

second

sub-element

of

deliberate

indifference—deliberate

disregard—a plaintiff must show the defendant failed to take
reasonable measures to avoid the harm.

Farmer^

511 U.S. at 847.

Even if the defendant knew about the risk, he will not be held

liable if he acted reasonably, even if the harm was not avoided.
Pourmoqhani-Esfahani
2010).

v.

Nevertheless,

Glee,

625

disregard

single episode of misconduct.

F.3d

can

be

1313,

1317

(11th

established

Cir.

through

a

As with the other sub-elements,

[d]isregard of the risk is . . . a question of fact that can be

shown by standard methods."
Defendant

claims

Thrift prevented

Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.

because

him from

the

record

shows

providing treatment to

Plaintiff cannot show deliberate disregard.

that

Mr.

Officer

Davison,

Plaintiff responds

that Georgia Department of Corrections (""GDOC") Policy VHOl-0002
(Oct.

1,

2012),

which

the

Court

takes

notice

of

pursuant

to

Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1), gave Defendant authority to

ensure that ""security considerations do not compromise decisions
and

actions

regarding

inmate/prisoner."
removed

Mr.

necessary

(Doc. 95-1, at 2.)'^

Davison

from

the

health

care

for

any

Although Officer Thrift

clinic.

Defendant

retained

Defendant argues that this evidence should not be considered because
Plaintiff failed to disclose the policy during discovery.
While Federal Rule
Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) demands disclosure of documents in the party's
possession,
is well established that discovery need not be required of
documents of public record which are equally accessible to all parties.'"
Thomas v. City of Jacksonville, 2014 WL 12708970, at *1 (M.D.

Fla. Jul. 16,

2014) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Samuel H. Sloan & Co., 369 F. Supp.
994, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
Because the GDOC policy is public record,
exclusion is not appropriate.
11

authority to provide treatment and therefore could be found to
have disregarded the risk that faced Mr. Davison.

c. Greater than Grossly Negligent Conduct
The

final

sub-element

of

deliberate

indifference

involves

demonstrating that the defendant's conduct amounted to more than

gross negligence.

To rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

violation, the care must be ''so grossly incompetent, inadequate,
or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to

fundamental

fairness."

(llth Cir. 1986).
effective

Rogers

v.

Evans,

792

F.2d

1052,

1058

This includes providing an easier but less

treatment,

providing

treatment

that

is

grossly

inadequate, or providing such minimal care that it amounts to no
treatment

at

all.

McElligott

v.

Foley,

182

F.3d

1248,

1255

{llth Cir. 1999).

Defendant's position that there is no evidence to support

finding disregard by more than gross negligence rests entirely
on

distinguishing

gross

negligence

the
was

facts
found.

indifference so narrowly.

here

from

Courts

do

cases
not

where
define

more

than

deliberate

Although the facts in Marsh v. Butler

Cnty., 238 F.3d 1014 (llth Cir. 2001), are distinguishable from

this case. Marsh established that doing nothing in response to a
serious

medical

negligent.

need

Marsh,

is

238

conduct
F.3d

at

12

that
1029.

is

more
The

than

grossly

evidence

shows

Defendant

did

not

provide

removed from his office.

treatment

after

Mr.

(Nicolou Dep. at 43.)

Davison

was

If a jury found

Defendant knew Mr. Davison was suffering from an infection, it
could conclude that his decision to provide no further treatment
was more than gross negligence.

Plaintiff
Davison

has

appeared

suffering

from

provided
in

an

evidence

Defendant's

infection

showing

office,

that

when

Mr.

Davison

Mr.

was

Defendant

notwithstanding the brevity of their meeting.
68; Heard Dep. at 52).

that

recognized

(Kozachyn Dep. at

Despite his knowledge. Defendant failed

to provide treatment, which could constitute disregard by more

than

gross

support

negligence.

the

Accordingly,

second

element

of

there

is

evidence

Plaintiff's

to

deliberate

indifference claim.

3. Causation

As

the

last

element

of

a

deliberate

indifference

claim,

"[a] plaintiff must also show that the constitutional violation
caused his injuries."
shown

by

the

Marsh, 268

defendant's

constitutional violation.

does

not

record

dispute

contains

summary judgment.

F.3d at 1028.

personal

This can

participation

Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327.

causation,
sufficient

and

the

evidence

Court
of

is

in

the

Defendant

satisfied

causation

be

to

that

survive

As previously established, although Defendant

13

did not remove Mr. Davison from his office, he

Theft's

conduct.

Defendant's

acquiescence

knew of Officer

to

removal may establish personal participation.

Mr.

Davison's

See Carswell v.

Bay Cty, 854 F.2d 454, 457 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988); Camps v. City

of Warner Robins, 822 F. Supp. 724, 735 (M.D. Ga. 1993).

the precipitous nature of an

Given

untreated bacterial infection, a

jury could find Defendant's delay or refusal to provide adequate
treatment caused Mr. Davison's suffering and death.

(See Heard

Dep. at 33.)
Plaintiff

has

identified

evidence

in

the

record

support a deliberate indifference cause of action.

that

would

A bacterial

infection, like the one Mr. Davison succumbed to, is deadly if
left untreated and constitutes a serious medical need.

evidence

to

support

an

symptoms were obvious.
medical

could

need.

find

If

that

a

inference

Defendant
factfinder

Defendant's

that

because

knew of Mr.
confirmed

failure

to

Mr.

There is

Davison's

Davison's serious

these

elements,

provide

it

immediate

treatment led to Mr. Davison's death.

B.

Clearly Established Right

Plaintiff

argues

that

Defendant

is

not

entitled

to

qualified immunity because there is evidence in the record that
Defendant

knew

of

Mr.

Davison's

serious

medical

need.

The

law

is clearly established "that knowledge of the need for medical
care and an intentional refusal to provide that care constitutes
14

deliberate indifference."

(11th

Cir.

Amendment

1995).

Adams v. Poag^

Moreover,

jurisprudence

"[a]

. . .

is

61 F.3d 1537, 1543-44

core

that

principle

prison

of

Eighth

officials

with

knowledge of the need for care may not, by failing to provide
care, delaying care, or providing grossly inadequate care, cause

a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain resulting from his or
her illness."

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1257.

Thus, Defendant's

entitlement to qualified immunity depends on whether he knew of
Mr. Davison's serious medical need and intentionally refused to

provide treatment.

Because there is evidence in the record to

support such a finding. Defendant's motion for summary judgment
is DENIED.

IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE DR. KRISTINE PATTERSON'S

TESTIMONY

Plaintiff

moves

to

exclude

the

testimony

of

Kristine

Patterson, M.D., who will testify as to when Mr. Davison began
showing symptoms of an infection.
opines that

Mr.

Davison

did

not

Specifically, Dr. Patterson
begin

showing

symptoms

of

an

infection until after January 21, 2015.

(Patterson Report, Doc.

80-8,

Evidence

courts

at

5.)

act

testimony.

as

Under

Federal

""gatekeepers"

Daubert

v.

U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).

Rule

to

Merrell

of

ensure
Dow

the

702,

quality

Pharmaceuticals,

district

of

expert

Inc.,

509

While performing this function, courts

must confirm ""(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently
15

regarding

the

methodology

by

sufficiently

matters

which

he

intends

the

reliable

expert

as

to

address;

reaches

determined

by

his

the

(2)

the

conclusions

sort

of

is

inquiry

mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of

fact,

through

the

application

specialized

expertise,

determine

fact

Chems.,

a

Inc.,

158

in

to

scientific,

understand

issue."

F.3d

of

548,

City
562

the

of

technical,

evidence

Tuscaloosa

(11th

Cir.

or

v.

or
to

Harcros

1998).

A

court

performing this function must keep in mind that the goal is not
to determine the persuasiveness of the evidence. Quiet Tech. DC8, Inc. V. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.

2003).

Some weaknesses in expert testimony are better handled

through cross-examination rather than exclusion.
Plaintiff

claims

that

because

Dr.

Id.

Patterson

failed

to

include evidence that contradicted her conclusions, she has not

reliably

applied

her

differential

Plaintiff explains that because there

diagnosis

methodology.

are "more than

a

dozen"

pieces of evidence that suggest Mr. Davison's arm was infected
before

he

was

admitted

to

MRMC,

Dr.

Patterson

should

not

be

allowed to claim there was no such infection.

However, none of

the

contradicts

evidence

Patterson's

Plaintiff

findings.

"INFECTED ARM" as
Summary,

source

of

Doc.

his

18,

Mr.
at

illness

cites
For

inherently

example,

the

MRMC

file

Davison's "Stated Complaint."
8.)

could

What

be

16

Mr.

Davison

reasonably

Dr.
lists

(MRMC ED

claimed

disregarded

was

the

by

Dr.

Patterson
whole.

why,

after
Dr.

303

Patterson

despite

(Patterson

F.

considering

this

Plaintiff s

also

gave

evidence,

a

her

medical

reasonable

conclusions

records

explanation

remained

Dep., Doc. 84-9, at 51.) See also Wilson

App'x

708,

714

(11th

Cir.

2008).

as

The

a

for

viable.

v.

Taser,

fact that

Dr.

Patterson gave greater weight to certain pieces of evidence than
others

See

does

Jones

not

v.

demonstrate

Otis

Elevator

that

Co.,

her

861

methods

F.2d

655,

are

unreliable.

662

(11th

Cir.

1988) (while an expert's testimony must be supported by facts,
"'absolute
would

be

exclusion.

certainty
better

is

not

required").

addressed

Accordingly,

Plaintiff's

through

cross-examination

Plaintiff's

motion

to

concerns
than

exclude

Dr.

Patterson's testimony is DENIED.

V.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(doc. 81) and Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr.
Kristine Patterson's (doc. 80) are DENIED.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this /^3^^ay of March,
2018 .

;f judge

UNITED' STATES DISTRICT COURT
[ERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

17