Hoke v. Lyle et al

Filing 9

ORDER DIRECTING the United States Marshal to serve Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry with a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and this Order. Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 8/8/2016. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

STEPHEN RAY HOKE,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-45

v.
MR. LYLE; NATHAN DEAL; HOMER
BRYSON; STANLEY WILLIAMS; and
TIFFANY HENRY,
Defendants.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an inmate at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia (“GSP”), submitted a
Complaint, (doc. 1), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, et seq., contesting certain
conditions of his confinement. For the reasons which follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court
DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson. Additionally,
the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities, DISMISS his claims for compensative and punitive damages under Section
1983, and DISMISS his monetary damages claims under RLUIPA. The Court should also
DENY Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. However, Plaintiff’s allegations arguably
state colorable claims for injunctive relief and nominal damages against Defendants Lyle,
Williams, and Henry in their individual capacities. Accordingly, these claims will proceed, and
the Court DIRECTS the United States Marshal to serve Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry
with a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint and this Order.

BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff claims that Defendants instituted policies specifically “stop[ping] all Christian
Religious Mail from coming into the prison . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 8.) Plaintiff states that during the
month of September 2014, Landmark Ministries tried on multiple occasions to send Plaintiff a
study bible and bible study lessons. (Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he never received these
packages and never received notification that Defendants rejected those items. When Plaintiff
asked why he was not receiving his packages, a counselor told him that GSP had not approved
his “Package Request” form. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he submitted several package request
forms and never received a response. After filing a grievance to that effect, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Williams denied him administrative relief and described the mailing situation as
normal prison procedure.

(Id. at p. 5.)

Plaintiff contends, instead, that this policy was

specifically enacted to “isolate and inflict mental punishment on inmates,” that the policy
substantially burdens his ability to practice his religion because meetings and prayer services are
also banned, and that Defendants are specifically targeting Christians because other religious
followers have “full freedom to meet and practice any way they wish . . . includ[ing] unfretted
[sic] mail delivery of any incoming . . . material.” (Id. at pp. 7–10.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment
of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows
an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which
shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must
1

The below recited facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted as true, as they must be at
this stage.

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dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.
Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When reviewing a Complaint such as the one Plaintiff has filed, the Court is guided by
the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10
(requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of
circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard,
this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

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power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose
factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse
mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).
DISCUSSION
I.

Failure to Disclose Litigation History
Plaintiff filed a Supplement to his Complaint on July 13, 2016, to correct an “honest

mistake” regarding his litigation history. (Doc. 7.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff answered “no”
when asked if he had previously “brought any lawsuits in federal court which deal with facts
other than those involved in this action.” (Doc. 1, p. 3.) In the follow-up questions asking
Plaintiff for details regarding each lawsuit, he specifically wrote “N/A.”

However, in his

Supplement, filed almost three months after his Complaint, Plaintiff discloses to the Court that in
2010 he brought one other suit in the Northern District of Georgia. (Doc. 7.)
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld the dismissal of
cases where a pro se prisoner plaintiff has failed to disclose his previous lawsuits as required on

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the face of the Section 1983 complaint form. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F. App’x 221, 226 (11th
Cir. 2011) (pro se prisoner’s nondisclosure of prior litigation in Section 1983 complaint
amounted to abuse of judicial process resulting in sanction of dismissal); Shelton v. Rohrs, 406
F. App’x 340, 341 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Young v. Sec’y Fla. for Dep’t of Corr., 380 F. App’x
939, 941 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same). Even where the prisoner has later provided an explanation for his lack of candor, the
Court has generally rejected the proffered reason as unpersuasive. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F.
App’x at 226 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff’s
explanation for his failure to disclose the Colorado lawsuit—that he misunderstood the form—
did not excuse the misrepresentation and that dismissal was a proper sanction.”); Shelton, 406 F.
App’x at 341 (“Even if [the plaintiff] did not have access to his materials, he would have known
that he filed multiple previous lawsuits.”); Young, 380 F. App’x at 941 (finding that not having
documents concerning prior litigation and not being able to pay for copies of same did not
absolve prisoner plaintiff “of the requirement of disclosing, at a minimum, all of the information
that was known to him”); Hood, 197 F. App’x at 819 (“The objections were considered, but the
district court was correct to conclude that to allow [the plaintiff] to then acknowledge what he
should have disclosed earlier would serve to overlook his abuse of the judicial process.”).
Another district court in this Circuit explained the importance of this information as
follows:
[t]he inquiry concerning a prisoner’s prior lawsuits is not a matter of idle
curiosity, nor is it an effort to raise meaningless obstacles to a prisoner’s access to
the courts. Rather, the existence of prior litigation initiated by a prisoner is
required in order for the Court to apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the “three strikes
rule” applicable to prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis). Additionally, it has
been the Court’s experience that a significant number of prisoner filings raise
claims or issues that have already been decided adversely to the prisoner in prior
litigation. . . . Identification of prior litigation frequently enables the Court to

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dispose of successive cases without further expenditure of finite judicial
resources.
Brown v. Saintavil, No. 2:14-CV-599-FTM-29, 2014 WL 5780180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5,
2014) (emphasis omitted).
The Court has no tolerance for lack of candor in parties coming before it. However, in
light of the fact that Plaintiff’s case is still in the earliest stages, his disclosure occurred before
frivolity review, and he fully disclosed his one other lawsuit, this Court will, in an abundance of
caution, proceed with frivolity review. Plaintiff should be aware though that such behavior is
typically subject to the sanction of dismissal. Furthermore, should another such instance arise,
the Court may dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for abuse of judicial process.
II.

Dismissal of Claims Against Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson
Section 1983 liability must be based on something more than a defendant’s supervisory

position or a theory of respondeat superior. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1299 (11th Cir.
2009); Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A
supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional
violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the alleged
violations. Id. at 802. “To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege
(1) the supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the
existence of a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful
action or knowingly failed to prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the
supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed to correct.” Barr v. Gee, 437 F.
App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011).

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Plaintiff tries to overcome the supervisory liability bar for his claims against Homer
Bryson and Nathan Deal through the conclusory allegation that Defendants “are responsible
parties for the instituting of the ‘Censorship’ policy, designed to stop all Christian Religious Mail
from coming into the prison.” (Doc. 1, p. 8.) (emphasis in original). However, he provides no
further facts supporting the inference that Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson’s liability stems from
anything other than their supervisory positions. Furthermore, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), “accords judges . . . the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). Examples of “clearly
baseless” claims are those “‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Id. Plaintiff fails to
assert any facts supporting a plausible inference that Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson enacted a
state-wide prison policy specifically banning all Christian religious mail from prisons.
Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against Nathan Deal and Homer
Bryson in their entirety.
III.

Dismissal of Claims for Monetary Damages against Defendants in their Official
Capacities
Plaintiff cannot sustain his claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their

official capacities. States are immune from private suits pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment
and traditional principles of state sovereignty. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999).
Section 1983 does not abrogate the well-established immunities of a state from suit without its
consent. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). Because a lawsuit against
a state officer in his official capacity is “no different from a suit against the [s]tate itself,” such a
defendant is immune from suit under Section 1983. Id. at 71. Here, the State of Georgia would
be the real party in interest in a suit against Defendants in their official capacities as employees

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of the Georgia Department of Corrections. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes
these actors from suit in their official capacities. See Free v. Granger, 887 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1989). Consequently, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages
against Defendants in their official capacities.
IV.

Dismissal of Claims for Compensatory and Punitive Damages
“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The purpose of this statute is “to reduce the
number of frivolous cases filed by imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose and excessive
amounts of free time with which to pursue their complaints.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 531 (citing
Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976-79 (11th Cir. 2000)). “Tracking the language of [this]
statute, § 1997e(e) applies only to lawsuits involving (1) Federal civil actions (2) brought by a
prisoner (3) for mental or emotional injury (4) suffered while in custody.” Id. at 532.
In Williams v. Brown, 347 F. App’x 429, 436 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit
stated that, “compensatory damages under § 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries
caused by the defendant and cannot be presumed or based on the abstract value of the
constitutional rights that the defendant violated. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), in order to
recover for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody, a prisoner bringing a § 1983
action must demonstrate more than a de minim[i]s physical injury.” Id. (internal citations
omitted) (alterations in original). Consequently, a prisoner who has not suffered any physical
injury cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages.

Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192,

1199 (11th Cir. 2011) (“In sum, our published precedents have affirmed district court dismissals
of punitive damage claims under the PLRA because the plaintiffs failed to meet § 1997e(e)’s

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physical injury requirement.”); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiff
seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. It is clear from our case law, however, that
the latter two types of damages are precluded under the PLRA.”) abrogated on other grounds by
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011).

“In order to avoid dismissal under § 1997e(e), a

prisoner’s claims for emotional or mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical
injuries that are greater than de minimis.” Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294
F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[n]ominal damages are appropriate if a
plaintiff establishes a violation of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove
actual injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages.” Williams, 347 F. App’x at 436
(quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003)). “Thus, a prayer for nominal
damages is not precluded by § 1997e(e).” Id. (quoting Smith, 502 F.3d at 1271).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any physical injury due to
Defendants’ purported constitutional violations.

Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS

Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
However, Plaintiff’s requests for nominal damages may proceed.
V.

RLUIPA Claims
Though Plaintiff does not cite the RLUIPA directly, construing his factual allegations

liberally, he invokes that statute.

See Jones v. St. Lawrence, No. CV410-066, 2010 WL

2772440, at *2 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2010) (“While [the plaintiff] has styled this as a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim, this case actually arises under both § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act . . . .”). The RLUIPA provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of

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[Title 42], even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A plaintiff bears “the initial burden of proving” a policy or action
“implicates his religious exercise.” Holt v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (Jan. 20,
2015). The RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). A plaintiff also has the burden
of establishing the policy or action “substantially burden[s an] exercise of religion.” Holt, ___
U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 862.
Several courts have held that a defendant must have personally participated in an
RLUIPA violation in order to be subject to suit under the Act and that supervisory or vicarious
liability is not available. See, e.g., Pilgrim v. Artus, No. 9:07-CV-1001 GLSRFT, 2010 WL
3724883, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010) report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:07-CV1001 GLSGHL, 2010 WL 3724881 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2010) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor
the Second Circuit have directly addressed the issue of whether personal involvement is a
prerequisite for any valid RLUIPA claim, as it is under § 1983. However, district courts in this
Circuit and elsewhere have held that personal involvement is a necessary component of valid
RLUIPA claims.”); Greenberg v. Hill, No. CIV.A. 2:07-CV-1076, 2009 WL 890521, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 31, 2009) (“In order to establish liability under RLUIPA (and Section 1983), a
plaintiff must prove, among other things, the personal involvement of each defendant in the
alleged violation.”). Moreover, denial of a grievance alone does not appear sufficient to impose
liability under the RLUIPA. Lowery v. Edmondson, 528 F. App’x 789, 792 (10th Cir. 2013)

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(“[Plaintiff] insufficiently pleads personal involvement. First, he identifies no actions on the part
of [defendants] that infringed upon his rights. Second, we have previously held that the mere
denial of a grievance, which [defendant] allegedly did, is inadequate for personal participation.”).
However, in this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry
specifically enacted policies at GSP to prevent Christians from receiving any religious mail. See
Wilkinson v. Secy, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 622 F. App’x 805, 812 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiff’s]
claims were based not on respondeat superior, but instead on an FDOC policy or custom that
allegedly substantially burdened [Plaintiff’s] religious exercise. And the claims were advanced
not under § 1983 but under RLUIPA. Put differently, [Plaintiff’s] claims were predicated on a
theory of direct liability rather than of vicarious liability, and were formulated under RLUIPA
rather than § 1983. For these reasons, the claims are cognizable, and the district court erred in
ruling otherwise.”). Thus, at this stage, where the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally
and only dismisses those claims that are not plausible, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim against Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry.
However, Plaintiff is limited to seeking injunctive relief under the RLUIPA. While the
RLUIPA creates “a private cause of action for a prison inmate if section 3 is violated, and further
provides that the complaining party, if successful, may ‘obtain appropriate relief against a
government,’” including monetary relief, a prisoner is still subject to the terms of the PLRA, as
explained above. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1269 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a)), and abrogated on
other grounds by Sossamon, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has held that
Section 3 of the RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1) “cannot be construed as creating a private
action against individual defendants for monetary damages.” Smith, 502 F.3d at 1275.

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For these reasons, the Court should also DISMISS Plaintiff’s monetary damages claims
under the RLUIPA. However, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief under the RLUIPA against
Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry survives frivolity review.
VI.

Free Exercise Claims
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment “requires government respect for, and

noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation's people.” Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). “To establish a violation of his right to free exercise,” a
plaintiff “must first establish that a state actor imposed a “substantial burden” on his practice of
religion.” Wilkinson v. GEO Grp., Inc., 617 F. App’x 915, 917 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Church
of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993)).
To prove that his religious exercise was substantially burdened, a plaintiff “must present
evidence that he was coerced to perform conduct that his religion forbids or prevented from
performing conduct that his religion requires.” Id. The defendants can then support their
conduct on the ground that they applied a “neutral law of general applicability[.]” Emp’t Div.,
Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
Prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, including rights under the free exercise of
religion clause.

However, “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying
our penal system.” Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App’x 771, 774 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting O’Lone
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, (1987)). “In the prison context, the state actor can
defend the action if it is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Wilkinson, 617
F. App’x at 917 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Put succinctly, “[i]n a prison
setting, to demonstrate a free exercise violation, a plaintiff must show that prison officials

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administered or implemented a policy or regulation, not reasonably related to any legitimate
penological interest or security measure, which substantially burdens and significantly interferes
with the practice of his religion or restricts his free exercise of a sincerely held religious belief.”
Hosey-Bey v. Williams, No. 2:12-CV-959-WHA, 2015 WL 4988388, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 19,
2015).
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry refused to provide him
with a study bible and his bible study lessons sets forth plausible free exercise claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim brought pursuant to Section 1983 for injunctive relief
and nominal damages shall proceed.
VII.

Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff’s claims also implicate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. To state a valid Equal Protection claim, a prisoner must show: (1) that he has been
treated differently from other “similarly situated” inmates, and (2) that this discriminatory
treatment is based upon a constitutionally impermissible basis, such as religion. Jones v. Ray,
279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Additionally, a prisoner must demonstrate
that the defendants were motivated by a discriminatory intent or purpose. See Parks v. City of
Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1995) (requiring “proof of discriminatory intent or
purpose” to show an Equal Protection Clause violation); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of
Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
challenged action was motivated by an intent to discriminate in order to establish an equal
protection violation). Potential indicators of discriminatory intent include “a clear pattern of
disparate impact, unexplainable on grounds other than [religion]; the historical background of the
challenged decision or the specific events leading up to the decision; procedural or substantive

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departures from the norm; and the legislative or administrative history of the challenged statute.”
Parks, 43 F.3d at 617 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim that Defendants
Lyle, Williams, and Henry intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of religion.
Plaintiff states that these Defendants allow inmates of other religions, including Muslim inmates,
to receive religious materials, but refuse to allow the same for Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 9–10.)
See St. Lawrence, 2010 WL 2772440, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] alleges that Muslims have been treated
differently from Christian and Jewish inmates . . . . That is all that is required to survive § 1915A
screening here.”).

Plaintiff also contends that other religious groups are allowed to hold

meetings and lead prayer services, but Christians are denied the same “freedom of worship.”
(Doc. 1, p. 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show intentional disparate
treatment on the basis of his religion and, as a result, these claims may proceed.
VIII. Plaintiff’s Mail Claims
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his rights when they sent back his mail without
notifying him.

“In the First Amendment context . . . a prison inmate retains those First

Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.” Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509 (11th
Cir. 1996). A federal prisoner does not surrender his constitutional rights at the prison gates.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433
U.S. 119, 129 (1977). “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). These retained First Amendment rights
include the right to send and receive mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). “‘Conversely, prison officials have a duty to maintain security

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within the prison, and this may include reading inmates’ incoming and outgoing mail, with the
exception of legal mail.’” Stovall v. Duncan, No. CV413-025, 2014 WL 1818152, at *3 (S.D.
Ga. May 7, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV413-025, 2014 WL 3110030
(S.D. Ga. July 7, 2014) (quoting Cotner v. Knight, 61 F.3d 915, ___ (10th Cir. 1995)).
At the frivolity review stage, it cannot be determined whether Defendants had a
legitimate penological purpose in returning Plaintiff’s religious mail. Thus, Plaintiff’s mail
claims against Lyle, Williams, and Henry survives frivolity review.
IX.

Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks an “immediate injunction” from the Court to order Defendants to “stop the

Religious Mail Ban policies in all Georgia Prisons.” (Doc. 1, p. 11) (emphasis in original). To
be entitled to a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, the movant must show:
(1) a substantial likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) an injunction or protective order
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm the
injunction or protective order would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the injunction or
protective order would not be adverse to the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005).

In this Circuit, an “injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the
‘burden of persuasion’ as to the four requisites.” Horton v. City of Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318,
1326 (11th Cir. 2001).
If a plaintiff succeeds in making such a showing, then “the court may grant injunctive
relief, but the relief must be no broader than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation.”
Newman v. Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1982).

Accordingly, where there is a

constitutional violation in the prison context, courts traditionally are reluctant to interfere with

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prison administration and discipline, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad
hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration [because] . . . courts are ill equipped
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”), overruled
on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In such cases, “[d]eference to
prison authorities is especially appropriate.” Newman, 683 F.2d at 1320–21 (reversing district
court’s injunction requiring release of prisoners on probation because it “involved the court in
the operation of the State’s system of criminal justice to a greater extent than necessary” and less
intrusive equitable remedy was available).
Plaintiff has not shown that he has satisfied the prerequisites in order to be entitled to a
preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiff has not shown the likelihood of success on the
merits of his claims. This is not to say that Plaintiff will not be able to ultimately obtain some
form of injunctive relief in this case. However, he has not made the requisite showing at this
time to obtain the extraordinary relief he currently seeks. Therefore, the Court should DENY his
request for a preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
claims against Governor Nathan Deal and Homer Bryson in their entirety. The Court should also
DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities,
DISMISS his claims for compensatory and punitive damages under Section 1983, and DISMISS
his monetary damages claims under RLUIPA. The Court should also DENY Plaintiff’s request
for a preliminary injunction.

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Any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation is ORDERED to file
specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
REMAINING CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff’s allegations arguably state colorable claims for injunctive relief under Section
1983 and the RLUIPA against Defendants Lyle, Williams, and Henry. Plaintiff also states
colorable claims for nominal damages under Section 1983 against Defendants Lyle, Williams,
and Henry in their individual capacities. Consequently, a copy of Plaintiff’s Complaint (doc. 1),

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Supplement to Complaint (doc. 7), and a copy of this Order shall be served upon these
Defendants by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost.
The Court also provides the following instructions to the parties that will apply to the
remainder of this action and which the Court urges the parties to read and follow.
INSTRUCTIONS TO DEFENDANTS
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned directs that service be
effected by the United States Marshal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will
first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendant by first-class mail and request that the
Defendant waive formal service of summons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.7. Individual
and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and
any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of
personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer
the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are hereby granted leave of court to take
the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Defendants are
further advised that the Court’s standard 140 day discovery period will commence upon the
filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Defendants shall ensure that all discovery, including
the Plaintiff’s deposition and any other depositions in the case, is completed within that
discovery period.
In the event that Defendants take the deposition of any other person, Defendants are
ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30. As the Plaintiff

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will likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, Defendants shall notify Plaintiff of the
deposition and advise him that he may serve on Defendants, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10)
days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the
witness, if any. Defendants shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the
deposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if
appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorneys, a copy of every further pleading or
other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original
paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct
copy of any document was mailed to Defendants or their counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. “Every
pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and]
the file number.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
Plaintiff is charged with the responsibility of immediately informing this Court and
defense counsel of any change of address during the pendency of this action. Local Rule 11.1.
Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in his address may result in dismissal of this
case.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to
obtain facts and information about the case from Defendants, Plaintiff must initiate discovery.
See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq. The discovery period in this case will expire 140 days
after the filing of the last answer. Local Rule 26.1. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the
Court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within
this time period. Local Rule 26.1. Discovery materials should not be filed routinely with the

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Clerk of Court; exceptions include: when the Court directs filing; when a party needs such
materials in connection with a motion or response, and then only to the extent necessary; and
when needed for use at trial. Local Rule 26.4.
Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes
of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or
organizations who are not named as Defendants. Interrogatories are not to contain more than
twenty-five (25) questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than
twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the Court. If
Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he
should first contact the attorneys for Defendants and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff
proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has
contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2)(A); Local Rule 26.7.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff
loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard
cost of fifty cents ($.50) per page. If Plaintiff seeks copies, he should request them directly
from the Clerk of Court and is advised that the Court will authorize and require the
collection of fees from his prison trust fund account to pay the cost of the copies at the
aforementioned rate of fifty cents ($.50) per page.
If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of
prosecution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41; Local Rule 41.1.

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It is Plaintiff’s duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by
Defendants. Upon no less than five (5) days’ notice of the scheduled deposition date, the
Plaintiff shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or
solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete
responses to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions,
including dismissal of this case.
As the case progresses, Plaintiff may receive a notice addressed to “counsel of record”
directing the parties to prepare and submit a Joint Status Report and a Proposed Pretrial Order.
A plaintiff proceeding without counsel may prepare and file a unilateral Status Report and is
required to prepare and file his own version of the Proposed Pretrial Order. A plaintiff who is
incarcerated shall not be required or entitled to attend any status or pretrial conference which
may be scheduled by the Court.
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF REGARDING
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under this Court’s Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve
his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. “Failure to respond shall
indicate that there is no opposition to a motion.” Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if Plaintiff fails to
respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that he does not oppose the Defendants’
motion. Plaintiff’s case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution if Plaintiff fails to respond to a
motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff’s response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twenty-one
(21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a
motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact

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set forth in the Defendants’ statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless
specifically controverted by an opposition statement. Should Defendants file a motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff is advised that he will have the burden of establishing the existence
of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by
reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, Plaintiff must file counter-affidavits if
he desires to contest the Defendants’ statement of the facts. Should Plaintiff fail to file opposing
affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, any factual
assertions made in Defendants’ affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment may
be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 8th day of August,
2016.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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