Reddick v. Lienhard
Filing
22
ORDER granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment. This case stands CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 06/27/2017. (pts)
IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
ADDISON REDDICK,
*
*
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO,
*
v.
CV
616-051
BENJAMIN LIENHARD,
*
*
Defendant.
0
R
D
E
R
Before the Court in the captioned matter is a motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendant;against Plaintiff's sole
claim in the
1983.
case,
a
false
arrest
claim under 42
U.S.C.
§
Upon consideration of the record evidence, the parties'
briefs, and the relevant law, the motion for summary judgment
(doc.
10)
is GRANTED.
I.
On
July
4,
FACTUAL
2014,
BACKGROUND
Defendant
Benjamin
Lienhard,
an
Investigator with the Bulloch County Sheriff's Department, and
other members of the county crime suppression team met with an
informant who stated that he could |have Arizona Zeb Connell
i
i
deliver
Defendant
heroin
to
planned
the
officers |in
a sting
to pose as a heroin
buyer.
operation.
(Dep.
of
Benjamin Lienhard, Doc. 9-1, at 13-14, 17-19.)
contacted Mr.
Connell
and told him what
The informant
kind of
buyer (Defendant) would be in for their meeting.
Mr.
vehicle
the
(Id. at 14.)
Connell changed the meeting place on that day two times
before settling upon Parker's convenience store.
Defendant
space.
drove
to
Parker's
and
parked
(Id.)
in
a
parking
Thereafter, Mr. Connell and Plaintiff Addison Reddick
pulled up in a white Honda Civic and parked a couple of spaces
down from Defendant.
(Id. at 14-15.)
Although Mr.
was driving the Civic, Plaintiff ownbd the vehicle.
Addison Reddick, Doc. 13-1, at 23-24.)
in,
Defendant
did
not
(Lienhard Dep. at 14.)
know
the
Connell
(Dep. of
When the Civic pulled
occupants'
identities.
Once Mr. Connell exited the vehicle,
the other observing members of the crime suppression unit
identified him.1
The officers followed Mr.
store and confronted him.
(Id. at 15.)
Connell into the
Meanwhile, Defendant
approached the Civic, in which Plaintiff had remained. (Id.)
Defendant identified himself to Plaintiff,
was there, and asked basic questions.
Plaintiff identified herself,
explained why he
(Id. at 15-16.)
After
Defendant recognized her name
and knew that she had been previously convicted of possession
1 Plaintiff testified that she had gone first into the
convenience store to use the restroom and then returned to the
passenger seat before Mr. Connell left the vehicle.
Dep. at 32-33.)
(Reddick
of cocaine.2
(Id. at 16,
63-64.)
!
According to Plaintiff, Defendant informed her that she
was going to jail for being a part of a drug sale.
Dep.
at 40.)
(Reddick
Plaintiff told the officers that she did not
know anything about drug activity. (Id. at 45.)
Nevertheless,
after Plaintiff was detained in a patrol car, a police canine
made a positive alert on the Honda Civic,
presence of drugs.
colleagues
then
(Lienhard Dep. ajt 16.)
began
searching
jthe
indicating the
Defendant and his
car.
(Id.)
While
i
searching, Defendant observed smalljpieces of a white, rocklike
substance
seated.
on
the
floorboard
(Id. at 17, 24 & Ex. 1.)
crack cocaine to Defendant. (Id.)
drug test on the substance.
where
Plaintiff
had
been
The substance looked like
Defendant performed a field
The field test involved opening
a vial containing certain chemicals, placing the substance in
the vial, and observing whether the substance changed color.
A
color
cocaine.
change
to blue
Defendant
indicated a positive
followed these'
result
for
steps and observed the
substance turn blue inside the vial.j (IcL at 25, 41, 50 ("The
j
best of my recollection was that the substance turned blue
i
inside the vial that was emersed (sic) in liquid.").)
2
Plaintiff had been arrested in 2008,
possession of cocaine.
(Reddick Dep. at 8-9.)
been involved in the investigation.
Dep. at 62-64.)
at age 17,
for
Defendant had
(Id. at 9-10; Lienhard
For her part, Plaintiff contends that the field drug test
was not positive.
She claims that she saw Defendant pick up
a substance from inside the car and place it in a field test
vial.
She claims the vial did not change color and that she
witnessed the officers
(Reddick Dep.
at
throw the jvial
46-48.)
The
officers
in nearby bushes.
then came
Plaintiff and asked her whose cocaine it was.
(Id.
over
to
at 47.)
Plaintiff was placed under arrest and transported to the
Bulloch County jail.
Plaintiff retrieved the vial from the
bushes after she bonded out of jail.!3
was
retained by her parents
attorney.4
(Id. at 49-50.)
and
(Id. at 49.)
then
turned over
The vial
to
her
Plaintiff contends that when the
vial was retrieved from the bushes, there was no blue coloring
in it.
(Id.
at 51.)
Plaintiff insists
that the substance
pulled from the car was actually biscuit crumbs.5
(Id. at
35.)
3
The elapsed time between arrest and retrieval of the
vial was about 36 hours.
4
(See Reddick Dep. at 53.)
The vial was produced by Plaintiff's attorney at her
deposition over two years later, at Which time it was examined
and photographed. (Reddick Dep. at 48-49 & Ex. 1.) Plaintiff
testified that when she retrieved the vial, it had more liquid
in it and did not contain any blue droplets or flakes.
(Id.
at 49.)
She testified that u [e] verything was still at the
bottom of the vial,"
(Id. at 50.)
Yet, an examination of the
vial at deposition revealed a few blue droplets or flakes.
(Idj
i
5 Plaintiff remembers that two days prior to her arrest,
she shared a biscuit with her dog in the car that she had just
cleaned and that the dog made a mess on the floorboard.
(Reddick Dep.
at 35.)
Defendant's report of investigation does not mention that
he conducted a field test of any substance.
39-40 & Ex.
that
he
cocaine.
1.)
However,
conducted
the
(Lienhard Dep. at
Defendant testified at deposition
test
(Id. at 27-28, 41.)
with the vial after the test.
and
that
it
was
positive
for
He could not recall what he did
(Id. at 45.)
Defendant further
testified that it is his agency's practice to "dispose of" the
field test vial, typically in a trash can.
In addition
to
the
field
test,
(Id. at 45-48.)
Defendant
collected a
sample of the white substance on the floor board as evidence.
(Id. at 51-52 & Ex. 5.)
The Georgia Bureau of Investigation
i
ultimately determined, however, that the collected substance
was not a controlled substance.
II.
(Id.,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ex.
6.)
STANDARD
The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R.
i
Civ. P. 56(c).
outcome of
the
Facts are "material": if they could affect the
suit under
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
the governing substantive
Inc.,
477 U.S.
242,
248
law.
(1986).
The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp. , 475 U.S.
574,
587
(1986),
and must draw "all
justifiable inferences in [its] favor,"
United States v. Four
Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1J128, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)
(en banc)
(internal punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the
Court,
by reference to materials on file,
motion.
the basis for the
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323
(1986).
How to carry this burden depends on; who bears the burden of
proof at trial.
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,
1115 (11th Cir. 1993) .
at trial,
If the movant bears the burden of proof
that party "must show that,
elements of its case,
... no reasonable jury could find for
the non-moving party."
the other hand,
on all the essential
Four Parcels,
941 F.2d at 1438.
On
if the non-movant has the burden of proof at
trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two
ways--by negating an essential element of the non-movant's
case or by showing that there is no jevidence to prove a fact
necessary to the non-movant's case.
See Clark v. Coats &
Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991)
(explaining
Adickes v.
and Celotex
Corp. v.
S.H.
Kress & Co.,
Catrett,
398 U.S.
477 U.S. 317
144
(1986*)).
evaluate the non-movant's response
(1970)
Before the Court can
in opposition,
it must
first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden
of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Jones
v. City of Columbus, 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997)
curiam).
A mere
conclusory statement that the
cannot meet the burden at trial is
F.2d at
(per
non-movant
insufficient.
Clark,
929
608.
If--and only if--the movant carries its initial burden,
the
non-movant
may
avoid
summary
judgment
only
by
*demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact
that precludes summary judgment."
Id.
Again,
how to carry
this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial.
If the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant
may
avoid
summary
judgment
only
by
coming
forward
with
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
If the non-movant bears the burden
of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to
the method by which the movant carries its initial burden.
If
the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material
fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to
withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material
fact sought to be negated."
Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116.
If
the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact,
the
non-movant
must
evidence that was
either
show
that
the
record
contains
"overlooked or ignored" by the movant or
"come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand
a
directed
verdict
motion
at
trial
based
on
the
alleged
evidentiary deficiency."
Id.
at
1116-17.
The non-movant
cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by
repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint.
See Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, J1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981).
i
Rather,
the
non-movant
must
respond
by
affidavits
or
as
otherwise provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
The
Clerk
has
given
Plaintiff
notice
of
the
summary
i
judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right
to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of
the consequences of default.
(Doc.
12.)
Therefore,
the
notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822,
i
825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) , are satisfied.
The time for
filing materials in opposition has ejxpired, and the motion is
ripe for consideration.
III.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
i
The sole claim in Plaintiff's complaint is a claim for
violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable search and seizure, i.e., false arrest.6
Through
his motion for summary judgment, Defendant contends he is
6
Section
1983
creates
a
federal
remedy
for
the
deprivation of rights, privileges orI
immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the Unitejd States by a person or
persons acting under color of law.;
Wideman v. Shallowford
Community Hqsp.. Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987).
There is no dispute that Deputy Lienhard was acting under
color of state law.
entitled
to
therefore,
qualified
the
Court
immunity
on
Plaintiff's
should grant
claim,
summary judgment
and
in his
favor.
"Qualified
immunity
offers
complete
protection
for
government officials sued in their individual capacities if
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
j
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known."
Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala.,
618 F.3d 124 0,
1254 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800,
818
(1982)
and Vinyard v. Wilson,
311 F.3d 1340,
(alteration and internal
1346
(11th Cir.
2002))
quotation marks
omitted).
"Qualified immunity from suit is intended to allow
government officials to carry out their discretionary duties
without
the
litigation,
fear
of
protecting
personal
from
suit
liability
all
but
or
the
harassing
plainly
incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal
law."
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, " [o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in
gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines."
Robinson v. Payton. No. 14-1962, 2015 WL 3937653, at *3 (8th
Cir. June 29, 2015) (citing Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712
(8th Cir.
2004) ) .
To receive qualified immunity, the government official
must first prove that he was acting within his discretionary
authority.
2003)
Gonzalez v. Reno,
(citing Vinvard,
325 F.3d 1228,
311 F.3d at
1234
1346) .
(11th Cir.
Here,
Plaintiff
does not dispute that Defendant was acting within the scope of
his discretionary authority during the arrest.
The burden now
shifts to Plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.
1303
Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295,
(11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Lumley v. City of Dade City,
Fla. , 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir. I2003)).
Courts utilize a two-part frkmework to evaluate the
qualified immunity defense.
First,; as a threshold inquiry,
the Court addresses whether the plaintiff's allegations,
true, establish a constitutional violation.
533 U.S.
light
194,
most
201
(2001).
favorable
to
If the facts,
the
Saucier v. Katz,
construed in the
plaintiff,
constitutional right has been violated,
show
that
An
a
then the Court asks
whether the right violated was clearly established.7
A.
if
Id.
Constitutional Violation
arrest without probable cause
Amendment.
violates
E.g., Kinasland v. City! of Miami,
1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
the Fourth
382 F.3d 1220,
Even so, an officer can avail himself
of the qualified immunity doctrine if he had arguable probable
7 This Court has the flexibility to first consider whether a
right
was
clearly
established
constitutional right was violated.
before
determining
if
a
See Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
However, the facts of the present case
are best suited for the traditional Saucier analysis.
10
cause for the arrest.
1271,
1283 (11th Cir.
Ala. , 608
F.3d
724,
Id. (citing Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d
1999)); Brown v.
734
(11th
Cir.
City of Huntsville,
2010)
(for qualified
immunity to apply, a defendant "need not have actual probable
cause, but only 'arguable' probablejcause") .
"The standard for arguable probable cause is whether a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing
i
the
same
knowledge as the officer! in question could have
I
reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light
of well-established law."
1160 (11th Cir. 1994).
officers
to
make
Eubanks v.
F.3d 1157,
reasonable
mistakes
with
regard
to
the
without being held personally
Bradley v. Tucker, 2015 WL 64944, at *8 (S.D. Ga.
Jan. 5, 2015)
(11th Cir.
40
"This standard permits law enforcement
existence of probable cause
liable."
Gerwen,
(citing Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579
1990) ) .
In this case, Defendant arrested Plaintiff for possession
i
of cocaine.
Thus,
in order for probable cause to arguably
exist, Defendant must have reasonably believed that Plaintiff
possessed cocaine.
The undisputed facts show that Defendant
knew the following at the time of Plaintiff's arrest: (1) that
Plaintiff arrived at the store with a suspected drug dealer;
(2) that Plaintiff had been arrested previously for possession
of cocaine;
(3)
that
the police canine alerted to her car
11
indicating the presence of a controlled substance;
that there were small pieces of a white,
and
(4)
rock-like substance
on the floorboard where Plaintiff haci been seated.
Defendant
would add that he also field tested! the white substance and
determined
that
it
disputed because of
was
cocaine.
This
fact,
however,
is
Plaintiff's testimony that she did not
observe "the vial change colors."
(Reddick Dep. at 47.)
The
fact that she observed Defendant simply throw the vial in the
bushes,
which she later retrieved,
could also be evidence of
a negative test result in the minds of reasonable jurors.8
The question then is whether a reasonable officer in
Defendant's position at the time of arrest, knowing all of the
undisputed facts but also knowing that the field test was
negative for cocaine, had arguable Iprobable cause to arrest
Plaintiff.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
if
.conclusively positive, probable cause existed.
the
test
was
Also, without
any field test, an officer would have probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for possession of cocaine.' Yet, what of the officer
8
The fact that it is common practice to dispose of the
vials negates this inference.
So too does the presence of
blue droplets or flakes in the vial at deposition.
Nevertheless,
condition of
little can be conclusively learned from the
the vial upon retrieval 36 hours later and
certainly not two years later at deposition. Indeed, whether
or not the vial contained "blue" is immaterial to the present
inquiry as the Court must construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, which is that the vial was thrown
in the bushes and did not indicate a positive test result.
12
who
conducts
Here,
the
a
field test
Court
focuses
who
testified
Defendant,
that
yields
that
used
to
help
suspected narcotic
result?
the
use
of
a
field
test
(See Lienhard Dep.
at 9.)
build
is
(Id.) jWhile the field test can
probable
sent
to
cause,
the
ultimately,
crime
lab
for
every
testing
"regardless of whether it tests positive or negative."
at 10.)
is
the decision of whether to arrest is not
solely based on a field test.
be
negative
on the uncontravened testimony of
within the officer's discretion.
More importantly,
a
(Id.
Accordingly, even if the field test proved negative,
a reasonable officer could still arrest a suspect if he has
probable cause to do so in the absence of the field test.
That is, a negative result in a field test does not negate the
other elements of an officer's probable cause to arrest.9
j
Upon these facts, even assuming that Defendant's field
test yielded a negative result for cocaine,
a reasonable
officer in his position at the time of arrest still could have
believed
that
Plaintiff
presence
at a drug
possessed
transaction,
cocaine
based upon her
her prior history with
cocaine, the canine alert, and the presence of what appeared
to be crack cocaine on the floorboard.
9
Thus,
Defendant had
The Court notes that there was absolutely no evidence
that Defendant acted with any maljice or bad faith toward
Plaintiff.
j
13
arguable probable cause for the arrest, and the arrest did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
B.
Clearly Established Law
If no constitutional right wasjviolated, the Court need
not address whether the defendant violated clearly established
law.
do
Saucier,
533 U.S. at 201.
Nevertheless,
the Court will
so.
There are three ways in which a plaintiff can show that
a
right
is
clearly
indistinguishable
constitutional
established:
facts
right;
(2)
within the Constitution,
establishes
a
"(1)
clearly
a broad
statute,
constitutional
case
law
with
establishing
statement
the
of principle
or case law that clearly
right;
or
(3)
conduct
so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated,
even in the total absence of case law."
Palm Beach,
Fla. , 561
F.3d 1288,
Lewis v. Citv of W.
1291-92
(11th Cir.
2009)
(citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff does hot cite any case law in
which an officer was found to have made a false arrest under
materially similar circumstances.10 j Terrell v. Smith, 668
See
F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) ("[P]laintiffs may establish
10
officer
Plaintiff would need to present case law in which an
was
found
to
have
violated
the
Fourth
Amendment
despite the fact that he had probable cause to arrest but for
a negative field test.
14
that
the
right
was
clearly
established
by
pointing
to
a
'materially similar case' decided by the Supreme Court, this
Court,
or the
[State]
Supreme Court.").
In fact,
Plaintiff
does not address the "clearly established" prong of qualified
immunity in brief even though the burden rests with her to
show the defense is inappropriate.
The Court then assumes that Plaintiff is relying upon the
general proposition that an arrest without probable cause is
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Couijt, however, has recently
reiterated
longstanding
"the
established law'
principle
should not be defined
generality.'" White v. Paulv,
552 (2017).
1341,
1015
1350
'clearly
'at a high level of
U.S.
, 137 S. Ct. 548,
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that
"obvious clarity" cases are rare.
999,
that
(11th Cir.
n.18
2011);
(11th
Cir.
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d
Rodriguez v.
2002)
("We
Farrell,
very
280
F.3d
occasionally
encounter the exceptional case in which a defendant officer's
acts
are
so
egregious
that
preexisting,
fact-specific
precedent was not necessary to give clear warning to every
reasonable . . . officer that what the defendant officer was
doing must be 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.").
The critical inquiry for this Court is whether
the law provided this Defendant
"fair warning"
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
15
See
that his
Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S.
730,
739
(2002),
cited in,
e.g.,
McClish v.
Nugent,
483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007)!; Coffin v. Brandau, 642
F.3d at 1013-14
(stating that the touchstone of the clearly
established inquiry is whether the unlawfulness of the conduct
would be apparent to a reasonable officer) .
Court
determines
that
it
is
not
In this case, the
obviously
clear
that
a
negative field test for the presence of cocaine will negate
the other elements of a probable cause determination for a
drug possession arrest to the point that the arrest violates
the Fourth Amendment.
That is,
Plaintiff has not shown that
her arrest went well beyond anything that a reasonable officer
would have considered reasonable under the circumstances.
!
i
IV.
Upon
the
judgment (doc.
foregoing,
10)
CONCLUSION
Defendant's
is GRANTED.
motion
Accordingly,
for
summary
the Clerk is
directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant,
TERMINATE
any remaining motions and deadlines; and CLOSE this case.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this { I day of June,
2017.
J.^RAltBAL HAL]/ CHIEF JUDGE
UNITE© STATES DISTRICT COURT
DUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
16
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