Patton v. Williams et al
Filing
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's 8 Amended Complaint without prejudice, CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to o bject to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered (Objections to R&R due by 8/22/2016). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 8/8/2016. (ca)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
JONATHAN L. PATTON,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-54
v.
WARDEN STANLEY WILLIAMS; MILTON
SMITH; V. JACKSON; ARLENE HUNT;
TERRY MOYE; ALEXIS WILLIAMS;
COUNSELOR GATES; TINA KELLY;
SHOLANDO ROBINSON; OFFICER
JOHNSON; C. WATKINS; JOHN DOE;
AMBER ROBINSON; OFFICER GIBBS,
Defendants.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Hays State Prison in Trion, Georgia, filed a
cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement.
(Doc. 1.) For the reasons that follow, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint, CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked by his cellmate after Defendants
refused to place him in protective segregation. (Doc. 1, p. 10.) Plaintiff contends that he
requested protective segregation after being labeled a snitch for filing a sexual harassment report
against Defendant Sholando Robinson. (Id. at p. 12.) However, Defendants refused to put
Plaintiff in protective custody and instead housed him with another inmate on disciplinary
segregation. (Id. at p. 10.) When Plaintiff told Defendant Hunt that he and his inmate “was [sic]
about to have a physical altercation and he was threaten to kill me[,]” Defendant Hunt allegedly
told Plaintiff, “I don’t care he need to beat you Patton because every day it’s something with you
[sic].” (Id. at pp. 10–11.) Subsequently, Plaintiff contends that his cellmate attacked him with a
“homemade weapon,” causing a bleeding head wound. (Id. at p. 11.) Plaintiff yelled for help
and asked to be put in protective segregation, but his request was denied. He received medical
treatment several hours later after a few more instances of kicking and slapping by Plaintiff’s
cellmate. (Id. at p. 12.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment
of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows
an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which
shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must
dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity.
Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is
frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . .
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set
of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without
arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard,
this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not only the
authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose
factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of
unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and,
therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350
F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse
mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We
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have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).
DISCUSSION
I.
Dismissal for Abuse of Judicial Process
The Complaint form directly asks Plaintiff whether he has “brought any lawsuits in
federal court” prior to his current filing. (Doc. 1, pp. 2 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff discloses
only one lawsuit, Patton v. Millines, No. 1:15-cv-3025 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2014). In the next
question asking whether “any suit [was] dismissed on the ground that it was frivolous, malicious,
or failed to state a claim,” Plaintiff lists a new, pending lawsuit, Patton v. Rowell, No. 5:15-cv-25
(January 27, 2016). (Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added).) An attachment entitled, “Previous Lawsuit
Attachment” only lists Patton v. Millines as a “previous lawsuit.” (Doc. 1, p. 15.) A search of
Plaintiff’s litigation history does reveal that Rowell is a pending case, but the Court’s case
management system also reveals that Plaintiff has in fact brought two other causes of action
while incarcerated:
•
Order, Patton v. Jackson, No. 1:11-cv-2604 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2011), ECF No. 25
(dismissal for failure to state a claim, failure to comply with court order, and failure to
prosecute); and
•
Order, Patton v. Bryson, No. 5:15-cv-99 (S.D. Ga. May 12, 2016), ECF No. 11
(voluntary dismissal).
As previously stated, Section 1915 requires a court to dismiss a prisoner’s action if, at
any time, the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks
relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Significantly, “[a] finding that the
plaintiff engaged in bad faith litigiousness or manipulative tactics warrants dismissal” under
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Section 1915. Redmon v. Lake Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 414 F. App’x 221, 225 (11th Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir. 1997)). In
addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) permits a court to impose sanctions, including
dismissal, for “knowingly fil[ing] a pleading that contains false contentions.” Id. at 225–26
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)). Again, although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, “a
plaintiff’s pro se status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules.” Id. at 226.
Relying on this authority, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has consistently
upheld the dismissal of cases where a pro se prisoner plaintiff has failed to disclose his previous
lawsuits as required on the face of the Section 1983 complaint form. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F.
App’x at 226 (pro se prisoner’s nondisclosure of prior litigation in Section 1983 complaint
amounted to abuse of judicial process resulting in sanction of dismissal); Shelton v. Rohrs, 406
F. App’x 340, 341 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Young v. Sec’y Fla. for Dep’t of Corr., 380 F. App’x
939, 941 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006)
(same). Even where the prisoner has later provided an explanation for his lack of candor, the
Court has generally rejected the proffered reason as unpersuasive. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F.
App’x at 226 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff’s
explanation for his failure to disclose the Colorado lawsuit—that he misunderstood the form—
did not excuse the misrepresentation and that dismissal was a proper sanction.”); Shelton, 406 F.
App’x at 341 (“Even if [the plaintiff] did not have access to his materials, he would have known
that he filed multiple previous lawsuits.”); Young, 380 F. App’x at 941 (finding that not having
documents concerning prior litigation and not being able to pay for copies of same did not
absolve prisoner plaintiff “of the requirement of disclosing, at a minimum, all of the information
that was known to him”); Hood, 197 F. App’x at 819 (“The objections were considered, but the
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district court was correct to conclude that to allow [the plaintiff] to then acknowledge what he
should have disclosed earlier would serve to overlook his abuse of the judicial process.”).
Another district court in this Circuit recently explained the importance of this information
as follows:
[t]he inquiry concerning a prisoner’s prior lawsuits is not a matter of idle
curiosity, nor is it an effort to raise meaningless obstacles to a prisoner’s access to
the courts. Rather, the existence of prior litigation initiated by a prisoner is
required in order for the Court to apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the “three strikes
rule” applicable to prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis). Additionally, it has
been the Court’s experience that a significant number of prisoner filings raise
claims or issues that have already been decided adversely to the prisoner in prior
litigation. . . . Identification of prior litigation frequently enables the Court to
dispose of successive cases without further expenditure of finite judicial
resources.
Brown v. Saintavil, No. 2:14-CV-599-FTM-29, 2014 WL 5780180, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5,
2014) (emphasis omitted).
Plaintiff misrepresented his litigation history in his Complaint. The plain language of the
complaint form is clear, and Plaintiff followed it—to a point. (Doc. 1, p. 2.) Plaintiff disclosed
one past lawsuit but failed to fully disclose the existence of his prior lawsuits, including one that
was dismissed for failure to state a claim. This Court will not tolerate such lack of candor and
consequently, the Court should DISMISS this action for Plaintiff’s failure to truthfully disclose
his litigation history as required.
II.
Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 1
Though
Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that
appeal is not take in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
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A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.
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An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Or, stated another way, an in forma pauperis action
is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or
fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY
Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the numerous reasons set forth above, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint without prejudice, CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be
served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED
to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 8th day of August,
2016.
R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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