Daniels v. Upton et al

Filing 43

ORDER denying Draker's 41 Motion for Intervention. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 2/17/2017. (csr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

XAVIER DANIELS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-94

v.
MANAGER UPTON; WARDEN ROBERT
TOOLE; and WARDEN STANLEY
WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

ORDER
Presently before the Court is inmate and non-party Waseem Daker’s (“Daker”) Motion
for Intervention. (Doc. 41.) Plaintiff filed this in forma pauperis action on July 7, 2016,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) After the Court conducted the requisite frivolity review,
Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his due process claims for injunctive relief and nominal
damages. (Doc. 12.) On February 7, 2017, Daker filed his Motion for Intervention. (Doc. 41.)
For the reasons which follow, the Court DENIES Daker’s Motion.
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a non-party to intervene in an
ongoing action if certain conditions, laid out by the Rule, are met. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. Daker
seeking to intervene and become a party to this case is akin to multiple prisoner-plaintiffs
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the same cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has considered the issue of whether “the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
[“PLRA”] permits multi-plaintiff [IFP] civil actions.” Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1196
(11th Cir. 2001). In Hubbard, the Court of Appeals noted that “the intent of Congress in

promulgating the PLRA was to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions of
confinement litigation.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997)).
After interpreting the PLRA, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court’s dismissal of a
multiple-prisoner/plaintiff lawsuit wherein the plaintiffs sought to proceed in forma pauperis
together. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the PLRA clearly and unambiguously requires
that ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall be required to
pay the full amount of the filing fee.’” Id. at 1197 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Specifically,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the following procedure:
The district court never reached the merits of the case, but instead dismissed the
case, finding that each plaintiff had to file a separate complaint and pay a separate
filing fee. To facilitate its ruling, the district court indicated that it would open a
new suit with a separate number in each of the plaintiff's names and consider the
original complaint to be their complaints. The majority of the 18 plaintiffs had
already filed separate petitions to proceed IFP. The court directed each of the
remaining plaintiffs to file his own form complaint and petition to proceed IFP.
The court then dismissed the original multi-plaintiff complaint without prejudice.
Id. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit determined that “the plain language of the PLRA requires
that each prisoner proceeding IFP pay the full filing fee[.]” Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. Allowing Daker to intervene in
this action would circumvent the Congressional purpose in promulgating the PLRA. Id. at 1197–
98. That is, “[t]he modest monetary outlay will force prisoners to think twice about the case and
not just file reflexively.” Id. at 1198 (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (May 25, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Kyle)). Additionally, allowing Daker to intervene would directly contradict the Eleventh
Circuit’s conclusion that “the PLRA clearly and unambiguously requires that ‘if a prisoner
brings a civil action or files an appeal [IFP], the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee.’” Id. at 1197 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)); see also Bowens v. Turner
Guilford Knight Det., 510 F. App’x 863 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of complaint under
2

Hubbard, in which six inmates joined claims in a single suit); Garcia v. McNeil, No. 4:07CV474SPM/WCS, 2010 WL 4823370, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 4:07-CV-474-SPM WCS, 2010 WL 4818067 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2010) (“Hubbard
decided that since every prisoner must pay a full filing fee, and since other litigants who join
together in one complaint pay only one filing fee, prisoners cannot join under Rule 20. That
means that the prisoners here, who have a lawyer and who do not pursue frivolous claims, cannot
join under Rule 20 in light of Hubbard—even if each of them pays [the filing fee]. This court is
bound by Hubbard.”).
Eleventh Circuit law clearly prohibits multiple prisoner plaintiffs from proceeding in
forma pauperis in the same civil action. 1 Consequently, the Court DENIES Daker’s Motion for
Intervention.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of February, 2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

1

Even if such clear precedent did not exist, Daker would still be prohibited from proceeding. Daker
asserts that he has a “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings” because he is also
an inmate in the Georgia Department of Correction’s Tier II program. (Doc. 41, p. 3.) This broad,
conclusory assertion is insufficient to meet the requirements set out by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 24 for either intervention as a matter of right or permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) &
(b)(2).
3