Daker v. Allen
Filing
98
ORDER denying 95 Motion for Recusal. Recusal by the assigned judges is not warranted. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/12/2018. (jlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION
WASEEM DAKER,
Petitioner,
CV 617-023
V
WARDEN MARTY ALLEN,
Respondent.
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Motion to Recuse.
(Doc.
95.)
Therein,
undersigned and
recuse
Petitioner
United
themselves
States
"from
requests
Magistrate Judge
this
case
involving" Petitioner.^
recusal
the
and
(Id. at 1.)
Baker
is
required
pursuant
history
of
Magistrate
to
orders
Baker
of
28
U.S.C.
shows
of
a
that
455(a)
pattern
treating
any
Stan
further
the
Baker
cases
Petitioner asserts that
undersigned
§
R.
both
by
and
Magistrate
because
both
[Petitioner]
"this
Judge
Judge
Court's
Hall
and
disparately
and
discriminatorily as compared to other cases, and saying anything
^ Notably, Petitioner has filed identical motions for recusal in two other
matters he has brought in this Court, namely: (i) Daker v. Allen, et ai.,
Case No. 6:17-cv-79 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Dec. 6, 2017) (the "Allen II Case");
and (ii) Daker v. Dozier, et al., Case No. 6:17-cv-110 (S.D. Ga. dismissed
Jan. 29, 2018) (the "Dozier Case").
(See Allen II Case, Doc. 52; Dozier
Case, Doc. 18.)
Short histories of the factual background and proceedings
of the Allen II Case and Dozier Case are available in the Orders entered in
those respective matters.
(See, e.g., Allen II Case, Docs. 17, 21, 22, 30,
42; Dozier Case, Docs. 4, 14.)
it
can
to
rubberstamp-dismiss
(Id. at 4.)
any
and
every
case
he
files.
A short history of this case's factual background
and proceedings is available in the Court's Order dated March 5,
2018 and prior Orders entered herein.
(See Doc. 94; see also
Docs. 10, 15, 52, 93.)
Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.
Jones v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 F. App'x 808, 810 (11th
Cir. 2012).
Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself when
a
a
party
to
district
court
proceeding
"files
a
timely
and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party."
28 U.S.C. § 144.
recusal
party must allege facts
under
§
144,
the
moving
"To warrant
that
would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists."
Christo V. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see
also
Jones,
459
F.
App'x
at
811
("The
facts
alleged
in
the
affidavit must show that the bias was personal, not judicial in
nature."
(citing
United
States
v.
Archbold-Newball,
554
F.2d
^ (See also Doc. 95, at 4 ("Magistrate Smith [sic] has displayed a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Judge
Story [sic] has ruled against [Petitioner] on numerous issues and requests
for relief that, taken together, demonstrate a pattern of judicial conduct of
such pervasiveness that an outside observer could fairly question the
district
court's
impartiality."
(internal
quotations,
citations,
and
alterations omitted)); id. at 9 ("[W]hatever Plaintiff [sic] requests, then
Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall do the opposite out of spite."); id. at 17
("In Judge Hall's biased and prejudiced eyes. Plaintiff [sic] can do no
right, and Judge Hall will find a pretext to dismiss anyways."); id. at 22
("Magistrate Baker and Judge Hall have acted as a surrogate prosecutor."
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).)
665,
682
{5th
Cir.
1977))).
Section
455(a)
requires
recusal
where ''an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed
of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
would
entertain
impartiality."
(11th
Cir.
recusal.
1989).
a
significant
doubt
about
the
judge's
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524
1988).
Any
doubts
must
be
resolved
in
favor
of
United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir.
Generally, judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis
for recusal or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving
party] establishes pervasive bias and prejudice."^
App'x
at
811
(citing
Archbold-Newball,
554
Jones, 459 F.
F.2d
at
682).
^ See also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) ("[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.
In
and
of
themselves
(i.e.,
apart
from
surrounding
comments
or
accompanying
opinion),
they
cannot
possibly
show
reliance
upon
an
extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required (as discussed below) when no
extrajudicial source is involved.
for appeal, not for recusal.
Almost invariably, they are proper grounds
Second, opinions formed by the judge on the
basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
partiality challenge.
They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives
from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
An
example of the latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement
that was alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921), a World War I espionage case against GermanAmerican defendants: *One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be
prejudiced against the German Americans' because their 'hearts are reeking
with disloyalty.
'
Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that
are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been
confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.
A judge's ordinary efforts
at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge's
ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune." (internal
citations and alterations omitted)).
''Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings
adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel
constitute pervasive bias."
Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents
of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted).
Here,
Petitioner's Motion
to
Recuse is
rife
with
feeble
conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements and
over-simplifications of the relevant cases' proceedings and the
Court's
Orders
and
reasoning
in
relation
thereto.
More
importantly, however. Petitioner's allegations stem solely from
his disagreements with the rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and
myself
and
therefrom.
the
unsound
assumptions
Petitioner
has
drawn
(See Doc. 95, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported
instances of alleged bias/prejudice, including disparate docket
management,
incorrect
application
"flipflopping"
instructions,
and
various
(i.e.,
as
issues
acting
of
sua
a
sponte
"surrogate
These are reasons for appeal, not recusal.
States,
motion
510
fails
prejudice
540,
to:
against
unequivocal
(iii)
U.S.
(i)
raise
(1994).
establish
Petitioner;
antagonism
otherwise
555-56
an
objective
resolution
of
prosecutor")).)
Moreover,
Petitioner's
judicial
bias
or
deep-seated
or
judgment impossible;
or
demonstrate
fair
precedent,
See Liteky v. United
pervasive
(ii)
rendering
legal
doubt
about
the
assigned
judges'
impartiality.
Accordingly,
recusal
by
the
assigned
judges is not warranted.
Based on the foregoing and upon due consideration, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion
to Recuse (doc. 95) is
DENIED.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this
day of March,
2018.
J. RANDAL HALL,'^ CHIEF JUDGE
UHITm/STATES DISTRICT COURT
^southern district of GEORGIA
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