LYONS v. DUGUSKI et al

Filing 21

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS of the Magistrate Judge that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's 1 Complaint without prejudice, DIRECT the Clerk to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in fo rma pauperis. The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. (Objections to R&R due by 10/11/2017). ORDER directing service of the REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge. Signed by Magistrate Judge R. Stan Baker on 9/27/2017. (ca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
STATESBORO DIVISION

JANEY M. LYONS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:17-cv-63

v.
COURTNEY DUGUSKI; SERCOYER REID
WILSON; and OFFICER BATTIE,
Defendants.

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s
Orders to furnish the Court with her consent to collection of fees from her prison trust fund
account. (Docs. 16, 18.) For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, (doc. 1), and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the
appropriate judgment of dismissal and CLOSE this case. I also RECOMMEND the Court
DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, currently housed at Pulaski State Prison in Hawkinsville, Georgia, brought this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contesting certain conditions of her confinement while
housed at Emanuel Women’s Facility in Swainsboro, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) On June 28, 2017, the
Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 16.) In that Order, the Court
instructed Plaintiff to furnish the Court with the statement of her prison trust fund account and
the consent to collection of fees from that account pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (Id. at
p. 3.) The Court explained that, if Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s Order by July 28,

2017, the Court would dismiss this case. (Id. at p. 4.) In response, Plaintiff submitted only her
Prison Trust Fund Account Statement. (Doc. 17.) The Court provided Plaintiff with another
opportunity submit her consent to collection of fees and warned her that failure to comply could
result in dismissal of this action. (Doc. 18.) However, Plaintiff once again only provided her
Prison Trust Fund Account Statement. (Doc. 19.)
DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this
Court’s directives. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS
Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
I.

Dismissal for Failure to Follow this Court’s Order
A district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte pursuant to either Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its
docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) 1; Coleman v. St. Lucie Cty. Jail, 433 F.
App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V
MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the
involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims,
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005
WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192
(11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of
record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,]

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In Wabash, the Court held that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without
affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. However, Plaintiff was forewarned on two
occasions that her failure to abide by this Court’s Order could result in the dismissal of her Complaint.
(Doc. 16, p. 4; Doc. 18, p. 2.)
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. . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)).
Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce
its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t,
205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458
(11th Cir. 1983)).
It is true that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be
utilized only in extreme situations” and requires that a court “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of
delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser
sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623,
625–26 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem.
Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x
616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without
prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are
afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619;
see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this
action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal
without prejudice for failure to prosecute Section 1983 complaint, where plaintiff did not
respond to court order to supply defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251
F. App’x at 620–21 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute, because
plaintiffs insisted on going forward with deficient amended complaint rather than complying, or
seeking an extension of time to comply, with court’s order to file second amended complaint);
Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute

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Section 1983 claims, where plaintiff failed to follow court order to file amended complaint and
court had informed plaintiff that noncompliance could lead to dismissal). With Plaintiff having
twice failed to provide the Court with her consent to collection of fees, the Court has no means to
collect the filing fees in this case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thus, Plaintiff has
demonstrated a clear record of disregard for this Court’s Orders, and a sanction other than
dismissal would not suffice to remedy her deficiencies.
Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice for
failure to follow this Court’s Orders.
II.

Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 2

Though

Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these
issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that
appeal is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is
not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this
context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691
(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous
claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or
argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal
theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is
frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or

2

A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.
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fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States,
Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to
raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY
Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s
Complaint without prejudice, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of
dismissal and CLOSE this case, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and
Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address
any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later
challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must
be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle
through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United
States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed
findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not
meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A
party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United

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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final
judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of
Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 27th day of September,
2017.

R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

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