DAKER v. BRYSON et al
ORDER denying 52 Motion for Recusal. Recusal by the assigned judges is not warranted. Signed by Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/12/2018. (jlh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MARTY ALLEN, et ai.,
Before the Court is Plaintiff's pro se Motion to Recuse.
Magistrate Judge R.
(Id. at 1.)
Plaintiff asserts that
discriminatorily as compared to other cases, and saying anything
^ Notably, Plaintiff has filed identical motions for recusal in two other
matters he has brought in this Court, namely: (i) Daker v. Allen, Case No.
6:17-cv-23 (S.D. Ga. filed Feb. 3, 2017) (the "Allen I Case"); and (ii) Daker
V. Dozier, et al., Case No. 6:17-cv-110 (S.D. Ga. dismissed Jan. 29, 2018)
(the "Dozier Case").
(See Allen I Case, Doc. 95; Dozier Case, Doc. 18.)
Short histories of the factual background and proceedings of the Allen I Case
and Dozier Case are available in the Orders entered in those respective
(See, e.g., Allen I Case, Docs. 10, 15, 52, 93, 94; Dozier Case,
Docs. 4, 14.)
to rubberstamp-dismiss any and every case he files.
(Id. at 4.)
A short history of this case's factual background
and proceedings is available in the Court's Order dated December
6, 2017 and prior Orders entered herein.
(See Doc. 42; see also
Docs. 17, 21, 22, 30.)
Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 F. App'x 808, 810 (11th
Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself when
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party."
recusal under § 144,
28 U.S.C. § 144.
the moving party must allege facts
would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists."
Christo V. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see
affidavit must show that the bias was personal, not judicial in
^ (See also Doc. 52, at 4 ("Magistrate Smith [sic] has displayed a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Story [sic] has ruled against [Plaintiff] on numerous issues and requests for
relief that, taken together, demonstrate a pattern of judicial conduct of
such pervasiveness that an outside observer could fairly question
Baker and Judge Hall do the opposite out of spite."); id. at 17
Hall's biased and prejudiced eyes. Plaintiff can do no right, and
will find a pretext to dismiss anyways."); id. at 22 ("Magistrate
Judge Hall have acted as a surrogate prosecutor." (internal
and citations omitted)).)
455(a) requires recusal
where ''an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed
of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524
must be resolved in favor
United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir.
Generally, judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis
for recusal or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving
party] establishes pervasive bias and prejudice."^
Jones, 459 F.
^ See also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) ("[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circiamstances evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required (as discussed below) when no
extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds
for appeal, not for recusal.
Second, opinions formed by the judge on the
basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or
They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives
from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high
degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. An
example of the latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement
that was alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921), a World War I espionage case against GermanAmerican defendants: 'One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be
prejudiced against the German Americans' because their 'hearts are reeking
Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that
are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been
confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.
A judge's ordinary efforts
citations and alterations omitted)).
''Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings
adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel
constitute pervasive bias."
Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents
of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations
conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements and
over-simplifications of the relevant cases' proceedings and the
importantly, however. Plaintiff's allegations stem solely from
his disagreements with the rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and
(See Doc. 52, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported
instances of alleged bias/prejudice, including disparate docket
These are reasons for appeal, not recusal.
See Liteky v. United
judges is not warranted.
Based on the foregoing and upon due consideration, IT IS
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia this
day of March,
f, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED JTATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTIJEi^J DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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